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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I consider the account of religious non-realism in the work of Don 
Cupitt and in other prominent writers belonging to the 'Sea of Faith' network. I 
argue that the appropriate context of the non-realists vmderstanding of religious 
belief is provided by philosophical pragmatism as this is presented in the work of 
John Dewey and Richard Rorty. This context outlines important aspects of the 'Sea 
of Faith' religious non-realists' self-understanding; and provides them with an 
argumentative resource which they can employ against alternative critical-realist 
approaches to religious belief I show that John Dewey's understanding of religious 
faith coheres with many of the ideas expressed by religious non-realists and that 
Rorty's pragmatism provides religious non-realism with a contemporary 
philosophical articulation of its theology. In order to defend this assertion I argue 
that Rorty's pragmatism does not necessarily lead to radical subjectivism nor to a 
dangerous political ideology as some interpreters have suggested. Further, I argue 
that his ideas are open to theological appropriation and that his rejection of religious 
belief is tempered by a tolerance toward those who still find a use for it. Rorty, I 
claim, has such a use. He employs the term 'God' as a backdrop against which he 
can present his own account of a pragmatic culture. I show that his work contains 
positive references to the influence that religious belief has had on the development 
of such a culture and argue that this pragmatic culture fits well with a non-realist 
understanding of religious belief 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject matter of this thesis deals with an approach to religious belief that has 
met with a good deal of opposition, hostility and ridicule.' Nevertheless, John Hick 
claims that the concerns which separate religious realists like himself from religious 
non-realists like Don Cupitt highlight "the most fundamental of all issues in the 
philosophy of religion today. The first three chapters of this thesis will consider 
the ways in which the non-realist side of this debate, associated with the work of 
Cupitt and other writers belonging to the 'Sea of Faith' network, has expressed itself 
The remaining chapters wi l l argue that an appropriate context for understanding the 
non-realist account of religious belief is provided by philosophical pragmatism. I 
shall defend this link between religious non-realism and pragmatism by highlighting 
in chapter five the religious ideas of John Dewey and the parallels between these 
ideas and those of the religious non-realists. I shall then defend this association of 
ideas further by arguing in chapters six and seven respectively that Richard Rorty's 
contemporary philosophical pragmatism does not necessarily lead to radical 
subjectivism nor to a dangerous political ideology as some interpreters have 
suggested. I shall further argue, in chapter eight, that his rejection of religious belief 
is not absolute. He has a use for religious belief and employs the term 'God' as 
backdrop against which he can present his own accoimt of pragmatic culture. His 
tolerance of private religious belief and the positive picture he sometimes presents 
of the religious influence on the development of a pragmatic culture, makes it 
possible to argue that Rorty allows to such a culture a non-realist understanding of 
religious belief In chapter nine I conclude by suggesting that a theological 
appropriation of Rorty's work is possible and that the consequences of such an 
' Witness the contentious nature of the debate around the publication of Anthony Freeman's God In 
Us and his consequent dismissal from the teaching post that he had held in the Church of England. A 
good summary of this debate is found in Mtist a Priest Believe a transcript of a BBC Heart of the 
Matter" programme transmitted on 19th September 1993. 
2 John Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-realism: Defining the Issue' in Joseph Runzo (ed) Is God 
Reed? (London: Macmillan, 1993) p. 3. 
appropriation by 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists would help to develop aspects 
of their own self-understanding as well as providing them with an argumentative 
resource which they can employ against alternative critical-realist approaches to 
religious belief 
The phrase 'Sea of Faith' is taken from Matthew Arnold's poem Dover Beach, in 
which he compares the ebbing tide with the slow withdraw of a religious faith 
centred upon a benevolent, purposefiil creator. Without God, the poem concludes, 
the world, lacks peace, love, joy and purpose on its own account. But for the 
religious non-realist, this is not a cause of melancholic despair but an opportunity to 
see religion in a new light, as a way by which humans create the values that Arnold 
saw as going out with the tide. The main catalyst of the religious non-realism in 
Britain has been the work of Don Cupitt and its popularisation through the media of 
newsprint, radio and television. In particular his eight part television series the 'Sea 
of Faith', has led to the formation of the 'Sea of Faith Network'.^ This network is an 
inter-denominational group of clergy and laity, which also includes hiraianists and 
members of faith traditions other than Christianity. Together they share a common 
desire to 'explore and promote religious faith as a human creation'. 
The network is constituted by a diverse group of individuals. Its members 
express a variety of opinions about religious belief Therefore, in chapter one, I 
shall discuss the work of some of the prominent writers in the network in order to 
narrow down the type of religious mentality that I take as being representative of the 
network's theological stance. Like Ludwig Feuerbach in the nineteenth century, they 
argue that the doctrines of religious belief, when understood in a literal or realist 
sense, can only be taken as a self-projection of human desires and ideals from which 
the community of believers are then ultimately alienated.'* Unlike Feuerbach 
however, they do not believe that the rejection of a literal or realist understanding of 
3 
David Boulton, A Reasonable Faith: Introducing the Sea of Faith Network (Loughborough Sea of 
Faith Network, 1996). v s" 
4 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, (1841), (E.T. George EUot, New York: Harper and 
Row, 1957), pp. 12-14. 
God necessarily undermines religious belief They accept Feuerbach's analysis that 
"there can be no more in God than is supplied by religion," but would disagree when 
Feuerbach adds that "religion gives up its existence when it gives up the nature of 
God. "5 For the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists, (henceforth referred to simply as 
religious non-realists), we can continue to be religious and continue to employ a 
vocabulary about God even though God is recognised as a human creation. This is 
because religious truth, for the non-realist, pertains less to the status of that to which 
a word in a vocabulary refers and more to the status of the vocabulary itself, in terms 
of how it enables us to cope with the world in which we live. While Van A. Harvey 
argues that a concenfration upon Feuerbach's later work would reveal a greater 
emphasis on religious belief as an affirmation of life and its contingencies and a 
desire for happiness in the face of nature's necessities rather than an emphasis upon 
the projection of our alienated essence,^  I shall not, in this thesis, be concerned with 
Feuerbach's work. The reason for this is that while his theology is the precursor of 
many of the ideas of religious non-realism, the tenor of his thought is ultimately 
hostile to religious be l ie f As Harvey notes, ultimately Feuerbach's is an atheistic 
critique of religion which wavers "between the view that religion is the wish to be 
free from the necessities of nature and the view that religion is the attempt of 
primitive peoples to control nature for the sake of happiness."^ The first view 
suggests that religion derives from an innate human capacity to project out our 
alienated essence. The second view suggests "that religion is a product of ignorance 
and that people who have science have no need of r e l i g ion .Un l ike Feuerbach, 
religious non-realists argue that religious belief is a desirable human creation that 
^ ibid., pp. 15 and 17 respectively. 
^ Van A Harvey', "Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx' in Ninian Smart, et al (ed.) Nineteenth Century 
Religious Thought in the West, Vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 291-328. 
^ Nevertheless, Harvey allows that privately Feuerbach "possessed a deep religious sensibility" ibid., p. 
320. which is evidenced by a quotation taken from one of Feuerbach's letters that would be applauded 
by religious non-realists. Feuerbach notes: 
There is only one true reasonable religion. It is the joy of life, the delight, which will not 
permit itself to be interrupted, in whatever is positive in life. 
Ludwig Feuerbach quoted by Harvey ibid., p. 320. 
8 ibid. p. 321. 
9 ibid., p. 321. 
we should continue to explore and promote. While they understand God as a human 
creation they also regard spiritual and religious ideals as supreme human values 
which it would be de-humanising to abandon and which ought still to be promoted 
within accepted styles of Christian worship. However, this does not necessarily 
distinguish them from the main body of liberal theological thinking that has 
developed in the twentieth century. In an attempt to make this distinction, the 'Sea 
of Faith's' own document. Notes For Newcomers, contrasts non-realism with what it 
terms the semi-realism of liberalism. It notes that non-realism denies the 
meaningfulness of asserting a belief in a transcendent divine being. The Notes For 
Newcomers continues: 
This [non-realism] contrasts with semi-realism as understood in liberal 
theology where God may not be personal but is nonetheless an existing 
transcendent reality in which one may trust. 
Religious non-realists separate themselves from liberal theology by giving up any 
residual belief in the independent reality of God. This begins to help to define 'non-
realism' but it is not a completely adequate definition. 
According to Hick, it is unlikely that there are any "pan-realists who believe in 
the reality of fairies and snarks as well as of tables and elecfrons; and likewise few i f 
any omni-non-realists, denying the objective reality of a material world and of other 
people as well as of gravity and God."'^ Realism and non-realism are not 'across the 
board' responses to all the objects which we could conceivably refer to. For 
example. Hick notes that certain religious realists like Richard Swinburne "are 
inclined to be realist in relation to at least some universal and to logical truths, while 
others (such as myself, [Hick] for example) are inclined to be non-realist at this 
point."i2 It is quite possible. Hick argues, to be realist about some objects of referral 
and non-realist about others. As he notes. Bishop Berkeley "was an idealist in 
'° Sea of Faith, 'Notes for Newcomers', quoted by Stephen Mitchell, 'Creating an Identity' in David 
Hart (ed.), Sea of Faith Network: 5 Years of Making Waves (Loughborough: Sea of Faith Network, 
1994), p. 13. 
'^John Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-Realism' op. cit., p. 4. 
'2 ibid., p. 4. 
relation to the physical world and a realist in relation to God"^^ and we could add 
that Feuerbach was a realist in relation to the physical world and an 'idealist' in 
relation to God. Indeed, despite the valuable insights Feuerbach makes about the 
himian creation of religious belief, he can be regarded as a religious realist in the 
sense that he claimed to have identified the "correct translation of the Christian 
religion ... into plain speech." "God," he asserts, "is the manifested inward nature, 
the expressed self of a man." Or again, he notes,"... what by an earlier religion was 
regarded as objective, is now recognised as subjective ... . " i ^ Here the truth of 
religion, for Feuerbach, as Karl Barth notes, is an "anthropological realism."'^ 
Feuerbach's religious non-realism can be porfrayed as a positivism about the human 
which is, according to Barth, "in its way as indemonsfrable as revelation itself... ."'^ 
Further to Hick's account of this distinction within realism, the American 
pragmatist Richard Rorty suggests that since the nineteenth century realism has been 
conceived in two distinct ways. On the one hand there are the positivists like 
Bertrand Russell who offer an empirical account of realism and who insist that 
reality is boimd in time and space with truth being the correspondence of our 
language and concepts to this reality. On the other hand there are the Platonists, the 
franscendental philosophers who insist "that some normative sentences about 
rationality and goodness correspond to something real, but invisible to natural 
science." '^' For positivists, talk of reality refers to the immanent material world. 
The Platonists, however, would wish to qualify what is meant by such talk to 
include principles and ideas beyond time and space which are inaccessible to sense 
experience. 
13 ibid., p. 4. 
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit., pp. xxxiii, 12-13 and 13. 
15 Karl Barth, 'An Introductory Essay* [E.T. James Luther Adams 1957.] in Ludwig Feuerbach, The 
Essence of Christianity, op. cit., p. xxiv. Reproduced from 'Die Theologie und die Kirch' Vol. 2. 
1928. pp. 212-239. Equally, Jack Verheyden argues that for Feuerbach, "the predicates of God are 
not only ideals but receive ontological actuality in the unfolding course of the human race". 
Verheyden, 'Ludwig Feuerbach's Philosophy of God' in Runzo Is God Real? op. cit. p. 36. 
1^  Barth, 'An Introductory Essay' op. cit., p. xxviii. 
Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. xv. 
For many realists, God is to be excluded from what counts as real. The 
existence or non-existence of God, they claim, makes no difference to the empirical 
world and so the question of God's reality is meaningless. The religious impulse is 
accounted for by reducing its myths and language to more empirically acceptable 
realities so, for example, "the meaning of a religious assertion is given by its use in 
expressing the asserter's intention to follow a specified policy of behaviour."The 
'religious' realist wi l l reply to the atheistic realist that the existence of God does 
make a difference to the empirical world. Indeed, without the existence of God, the 
world would be unintelligible. As Hans Kting notes: 
God is the most real reality, active in all reality: everywhere and at all 
times providing the world and men with a final point of reference, a unity, 
value and meaning. 
Thus the dispute between realists and non-realists may, as often as not, be a dispute 
between these different types of realism. 
While Hick is correct to note that the contemporary debate between religious 
realists and non-realists is not conducted on anti-religious grounds,^ ^ questions about 
which objects of discourse we should be realist about and which we should not 
introduces issues with which realists are fimdamentally concerned but which non-
realists wil l wish to drop altogether. Thus, contra Hick, an omni-non-realist position 
is possible, I wall suggest, i f we follow Richard Rorty and attempt to move beyond 
positivism and Platonism by dropping the fimdamental concerns that both share; 
concerns that include the accuracy and correspondence of linguistic representations 
of the world (or of God) to the supposedly foimdational reality that give such 
linguistic terms their meaning and reference.^! 
R.B. Braithwaite, 'An Empiricist's view of the Nature of Religious Belief in Basil Mitchell (ed.), 
The Philosophy of Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 80. 
19 Hans Kiing, On Being A Christian (E.T. by E. Quinn, Glasgow: Fount, 1978), p. 295. 
'^ ^ Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-Realism", op. cit. p. 8. 
21 Richard Rorty, "Beyond Realism and Anti-ReaUsm' in Ludwig Nagl and Richard Heinrich (ed.) Wo 
steht die Analytische Philosophieheute?, Weiner Reihe: Themen Der Philosophie, R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, Munich, 1986. pp. 103-115. 
In a book on the realist/nbn-realist debate. Is God Real?, Joseph Runzo defines 
religious realism. He writes that for realists "religious discourse is meaningful i f it 
involves ontological reference to an external, self-subsistent God. "22 According to 
this view religious non-realism becomes the simple negation of the affirmation of 
the reality of God. As Runzo notes: 
... realists hold that there exists a transcendent divine reality, independent 
at least in part of human thought, action or attitude. Religious non-
realists deny this.^^ 
Yet, he recognises that total independence would cut the realist o f f from the world, 
or from God, altogether. In order to avoid such a counter-intuitive suggestion the 
philosopher Mark Sacks, leaning heavily upon the ideas to be encountered in this 
thesis through the work of Richard Rorty, offers in his book The World We Found, a 
distinction between ontological dependence/independence and causal 
dependence/independence.2'* Items in the world wil l have a causal relation to our 
experience of them, and in this sense there wil l always be a relation of dependence 
between us and the world. The realist. Sacks notes, also apparently needs these 
items to be ontologically independent of experience as a necessary condition for 
asserting their reality.^^ Unfortunately it is not at all clear that asserting ontological 
independence has any practical value in determining the status of what is and what 
is not real. Sacks writes: 
We simply carmot conduct an enquiry in the absence of object-directed 
experience; and yet ... [realists] ... want to establish what is the case 
independent of it. 26 
The realist's own criteria of ontological independence. Sacks argues, is itself that 
which makes realism problematic.^? Causal dependency is all we need when it 
22 Runzo (ed.)/5 God Real?, op. cit., p. 164. 
23 ibid., p. 1. 
24 Mark Sacks, The World We Found: The Limits of Ontological Talk, (La SaUe, Illinois: Open Court 
1989), pp. 7-11. 
25 ibid., p. 21. 
26 ibid., p. 23. 
27 ibid., pp. 23-24. 
comes to talking about the various items we encounter in the world. The lack of 
determinacy that the realist's criteria exhibits is confirmed by Runzo's use of the 
ambiguous phrase, 'at least in part', when he talks of God's independent reality. 
Such a phrase immediately raises a question that has little or no agreed answer, 
namely; 'Which 'parts' of hmnan experience are to be included and which excluded, 
when it comes to determining the independence of divine reality?' This question 
arises when we consider William Alston's accoimt of religious non-realism. For 
Alston, Paul Tillich and John Hick (and by extension Runzo) are to be understood as 
offering versions of religious non-realism because they do not affirm a large enough 
'part' of divine revelation as independent 'of human thought, action and attitude'.^s 
With such disagreement among religious realists we might conclude, as Sacks does, 
that: 
[the] distinction between real objects and those which are not real would 
seem to be sharply dissipated once we realise that there are no satisfactory 
guidelines for its application. 25 
The notion of causal dependence will be developed later in the thesis in relation to 
Rorty's account of the work of Donald Davidson in order to outline an appropriate 
definition of non-realism. 
To anticipate this, and in order to clarify the meaning of the term 'non-realism' 
from the begirming, it wi l l be useful to draw a distinction between non-realism and 
anti-realism. These terms tend to be employed synonymously by religious non-
realists.3° Recently, however Cupitt has attempted to distinguish them. Anti-
realism, Cupitt suggests is a paradoxical position, the "contradictory of realism, its 
straight antithesis. "3' Non-realism, on the other hand, is not concerned with 
28 William P. Alston, 'Realism and the Christian Faith', in International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, Vol. 38. 1995. pp. 37-60. 
29 Sacks, The World We Found, op. cit., p. 22. 
30 Don Cupitt does make at least two attempts to distinguish anti-realism from non-realism in 
Creation out of Nothing, (London: SCM Press, 1990) pp. 92-105 and The Last Philosophy, (London: 
SCM Press, 1995), pp. 148-149, Although the latter attempt is more successful than the former, it is 
not followed through or developed systematically. 
3 ' Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 148. 
10 
"disconcerting paradoxes," but is still defined by him as "the contrary of realism. "32 
This thesis accepts the definition which Cupitt offers of anti-realism and wil l follow 
Rorty in seeing it as implicitly sharing the same foundational concerns of realism. 33 
However, non-realism is defined more positively not by opposing it to realist 
concerns but by abandoning these concerns altogether. It will align itself with 
pragmatism in regarding our common sense intuitions about the external world as 
satisfied by a relation of causal dependency without the ontological independence 
over which realists dispute with each other and with anti-realists and over which 
theists often dispute with atheists. A pragmatic religious non-realism wil l want to 
clear away such disputes as unhelpfiil to the practices that constitute our religious 
activity. Such activity wil l be experienced in terms of its practical effects and its 
success wil l be judged on the extent to which it enables us to cope with the world in 
which we live. Religious non-realism will not posit the existence of God 
independent of, or antecedent to, the humanly created vocabularies of religious faith 
and so wil l regard both the affirmation and the negation of such an entity as a non-
issue. 
32 ibid., p. 149. 
33 Richard Rorty, Objectivity.Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1 -17. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RELIGIOUS NON-REALISM OF THE 'SEA 
OF FAITH' THEOLOGIANS 
1 1.Introduction: 
My aim in this first chapter wil l be to outline the particular affirmation of religious 
belief and practice foimd in the writings of Christian non-realists belonging to the 
'Sea of Faith network'. I shall highlight their claim that religion should now be 
explored and promoted as a human creation and their rejection of atheism. I shall 
emphasise their recognition of the usefulness of religious belief and practice and the 
sense of liberation that they feel at having adopted a non-realist account of religious 
belief 
1.2. Religion As a Human Creation: 
Religious non-realists, such as Anthony Freeman, David Hart, Hugh Dawes, Graham 
Shaw, Stephen Mitchell and Don Cupitt, share with religious critical realists the 
idea that religious belief is, and always has been, a human creation. For the 
religious critical realist, religious beliefs "are the human creations of those who 
somehow have opened themselves to the ever-calling, ever-real realm of the spirit, 
to that God-presence that lives at the heart of the universe..."' Religious critical 
realists like Bishop Jack Spong, who addressed the eighth 'Sea of Faith' annual 
conference in 1995 with these words, believe that there is a real God beyond all oiu-
human constructions of the divine, a God of surprise that breaks open all our human 
symbols for God.^ For the non-realist however, this is just one more human sfrategy 
by which we continue to avoid the demand to take full responsibility for our 
religious creativity. For these non-realists there is something of a practical 
imperative about this demand; the credibility of religion, and its future affectivity. 
' Jack Spong, 'Religion as a Human Creation?' in Sea of Faith Magazine Vol. 23. 1995.p. 12. 
2 It should be noted that there is a constituency within the 'Sea of Faith' that finds such a critical realist 
account of the human creation of religious belief appealing. 
12 
requires that we consciously assert our own responsibility for our own religious 
creativity. As Graham Shaw notes in his book God In Our Hands: 
the human origins of religious belief and the continuing human creativity 
in their development ... [has] ... to be honestly acknowledged, and 
indeed the fiiture of religion depends upon this being done.3 
For religious non-realists, to take fixll responsibility for our religious creativity, 
rather than relying on notions such as "the wordless wonder of that [divine] reality,'"* 
is to presage a radical alternative to both conservative and liberal theology. This 
radical alternative is humble enough not to claim any final, foundational or absolute 
truth even for some mysterious reality beyond words. It sees religious belief as 
always in transition and constituted by the historical contingencies that constitute 
human life. To suggest that religious doctrine, formulated in this context, can act as 
a criteria for judging genuine religious, or indeed Christian, affiliation because they 
somehow represent truths built up within a religious tradition through encounter 
with, rational reflection about and prayerful devotion towards some ineffable source 
which these encounters, reflections and prayers make known is, according to non-
realists, to place temporary historical, cultural and personal road-blocks upon human 
spiritual development and hinder those genuine human encoimters, reflections and 
prayers to which realists refer and which constitute the religious dimension of 
experience. Thus in his book, God In Us, Anthony Freeman argues that religious 
belief requires a shift of emphasis "from heaven to earth, from the next worid to this 
one, and from dogma to spirituality and ethics. This means, for example, that 
belief in eternal life as something lived in a heavenly realm, needs to be re-defined 
in terms of the quality, meaning and purpose of life here and now.^ The use of 
religious language about God becomes a means by which we point to, and further, 
our most significant human values. For Christian non-realists, religious people 
3 Graham Shaw, God in Our Hands, (London: SCM Press, 1987), p. jdv. 
Spong, op cit., p. 12. 
5 Anthony Freeman, God in Us, (London, SCM Press, 1993), p. 29 
6 ibid., p. 69. 
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should no longer feel the need to claim that God is independent of human 
creativity^ Freeman argues that faithfulness to the "Declaration of Assent' means 
expressing his Christian belief in non-realist terms, for only in this way may the 
gospel be proclaimed afresh to our generation.^  Both religious conservatives and 
theological liberals, according to Freeman fail to take up the challenge of modernity. 
Conservatives build an artificial fantasy world cut off from everyday life. They 
require the acceptance of beliefs about God's reality, life after death, and miracles 
which, while once impressive human creations, have now become outwom. 
Freeman likens religious conservatives to people who are able to tell the time not 
because they have a watch but because someone once wrote it down for them.^  Our 
understanding of the world changes and so must our understanding of religious 
belief Science, philosophy and sociology, according to Freeman, no longer take 
account of a realist God in their methodology and nor do the majority of people in 
their everyday lives. A God who intervenes, a God who is an independent super 
person who can produce effects in this world, is no longer an option for a living 
religious faith. According to Freeman, not only is a realist conception of God 
incredible and thus unlikely to convince people today, it is also religiously 
unattractive. It projects a picture of God with little relevance to today's world and 
then proceeds to present this picture as if it were always independent of human 
projections. Then, in order to protect this supposed independence, the conservative 
requires us to divorce the reality of God from how we understand that reality's 
relation to the world. Bishop Richard Harries, for example, wishes to make this 
distinction. In his response to Freeman's book. Harries asserts both God's reality and 
God's relationality with the world in such a way as to suggest their independence 
7 ibid., p. 25. 
^ ibid., pp. 73, 83. The 'declaration of assent' being a statement of loyalty to the tradition of the 
church and its promotion in a contemporary context. It is affirmed by clergy of the Church of England 
at their ordination. 
9 For Freeman, "To believe in a supernatural all-powerful interventionist God when the rest of the 
world has abandoned that belief is not the same thing as having believed in such a God when it was 
the generally accepted world view." ibid., p. 8. 
14 
from each other."We have to distinguish," writes Harries, "questions about God 
from questions about how God relates to the world." He continues: 
God could still be very much there, holding all things in existence, 
enfolding all things with his love and filling all things with his spirit but 
may nevertheless deliberately not intervene,... .' ^  
The non-realist would reply that such a distinction makes no sense: God's reality is 
only known in its relation to us and this relation for the non-realist, is always 
something we construct. "Holding", 'enfolding", "loving", "filling" and "deliberating" all 
seem very much like terms of relational involvement, if not miraculous intervention. 
Freeman agrees with Harries that "religious faith is natural to us as human 
beings. "'2 But while Harries opens the door to scepticism by asserting the 
independence of God's reality from God's relation to us,'^  Freeman is able to assert a 
new religious certainty. He writes, "Only when I had accepted that 'I do not believe 
in God' (my old [realist] God) was I free to discover how with integrity 1 could still 
say 'I believe in God' (understood in a new way)."i'* For the Christian non-realist the 
religious impulse does not require proof of its validity. For them, we might say, if 
we choose to interpret events in our lives in terms of a humanly created 'religious' 
vocabulary we can assert that God is constantly guiding the world and enfolding us 
in divine love with a certainty that no realist dualism can supply. The reality of God, 
God's relation to the world and the human religious imagination cannot be separated 
in the way the conservatives require in order to guarantee God's independence of 
human construction. A similar point is well summarised by Shaw. He writes: 
At the heart of a responsible religion is the recognition that my portrayal 
of God represents choices that I have made There is no compelling 
God who exists to impose such choices upon us. If I am religious it is 
because I want to be. It is a way of life and an attitude to life which 
attracts and fascinates me. I sense within it unique opportimities. 
10 Richard Harries, The Real God (London: Mowbray, 1994), pp. 9-12. 
1' ibid., p. 9.(Both quotes) 
12 ibid., p. 20. 
13 ibid., pp. 18-19. 
1'' Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 11. 
15 Shaw, God in Our Hands, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 
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For Shaw, as for other religious non-realists, "it is possible for the religious person 
to recognise his responsibility for his God and yet to continue to believe in God... "'^  
A non-realist understanding of God appears more religiously attractive than the God 
of the conservative religious realist because it is seen to be more effective in 
providing for the needs of a responsible, autonomously chosen faith. 
According to Freeman, liberal theology fares no better than conservative 
theology. Liberal theology, he suggests lives a schizophrenic existence because it 
allows that religion is a human product and accepts a naturalistic account of life, yet 
it still wishes to see a real God working in, and through, these human products and 
natural processes. Thus in this liberal mode, writes Freeman: 
... official church reports spend many pages loyally examining the 
biblical evidence and then effectively ignoring it when it comes to making 
recommendations. It seems impossible for liberal theology to avoid 
looking wishy-washy and defensive. 
While religious non-realists owe much to liberal theology,'^  they deny the possibility 
of accommodating a realist God to modem knowledge. For example, while David 
Hart accepts both that religious belief must not be "totally at variance with the 
general scientific and empirical conditions of late twentieth century Western 
humankind,""^ and also that each generation discovers Christ from within "the 
crucible of their own experience, "2° both defining characteristics of liberal 
theology,2i he does not wish to see theological liberalism reinstated. He refers to the 
failure of liberalism by quoting favourably from Thomas Mann's novel Doctor 
16 ibid., p. 145. 
'"^  Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 9. 
For example Hugh Dawes describes his book as a liberal essay. Hugh Dawes, Freeing the Faith, 
(London: SPCK, 1992), p. 2. 
5^ David Hart, Faith in Doubt, (London: Mowbrays, 1993) ,p. 18. 
20 ibid., p. 15. 
21 Along with accommodation "to modem experience, world views and criteria," David Ford indicates 
that liberal theology stresses "religious experience, historical consciousness, and the need for freedom 
from traditional dogma..." David Ford, (ed) The Modem Theologians Volume II (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), p. 309. In these terms 'Sea of Faith' non-reahsm does continue many themes from liberal 
theology though it abandons the type of accommodationism that leads to the theological schizophrenia 
which Freeman identifies. 
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Faustus. Here liberal theology is regarded as a contradiction in terms. Quoting 
Mann, Hart writes that liberal theology posits: 
A proponent of culture, ready to adapt itself to the ideals of bourgeois 
society, as it is, it degrades the religious to a fimction of the human; the 
ecstatic and paradoxical elements of the religious genius it waters down 
to an ethical progressiveness. ... [L]iberal theology ... is weak, for its 
moralism and humanism lack insight into the demonic character of 
human existence, cultured indeed it is, but shallow; of the true 
imderstanding of human nature and the tragic nature of life the 
conservative tradition has at bottom preserved far more; for that very 
reason it has a profounder, more significant relation to culture... P-
Unlike liberal theology, non-realism does not aim to acconraiodate the divine to the 
human. Rather, the modernising and experiential nature of 'Sea of Faith' religiosity 
and its desire to be free of traditional dogmas, aims at the creation of a radical 
theological perspective on the world which requires us to take fiill responsibility for 
our religious creativity. For non-realists, religion is 'a fimction of the human' rather 
than an accommodation of something extra-human to the human. In the light of 
theological changes over the last few hundred years. Freeman writes: 
Liberals, while happy to learn more of our religious origins and 
development, have still held that behind the human activity lies the 
guiding hand of a supernatural God. ... Radicals say that we do not need 
to bring in the supernatural at all. ... To invoke the supernatural is 
unnecessary, because we can explain all aspects of our life without it. It 
is also dangerous, because it leads to our claiming supernatural and 
indeed divine authority for things which are in truth only human. 
For non-realists, accepting religious belief as a human creation requires us to 
cease to expect religious truths to be anything other than human and conventional. 
They would have us abandon any idea that religious belief conveys some extra-
human absolute or final truth. Indeed, Graham Shaw argues that any such absolute 
truth is inimical to religion and a perversion of the gospel of Jesus Christ. This 
gospel is not a matter of submission to a pre-ordained authority but rather points to 
22 Thomas Mann, 'Doctor Faustu^ quoted in Hart, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
23 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 10. 
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possibilities that are up to us to realise.^ * "The only privilege it bestows," writes 
Shaw, "is the opportunity to exercise our freedom and to achieve our peace. "25 This 
opportunity is lost if we see the gospel as providing absolute guiding truths, for then 
we cease to take fiill responsibility for our religious convictions. 26 
Shaw recognises that there is a danger that this approach is prone to the charge 
of subjectivism, but he argues that such subjectivism is often required in order to 
break free from a Christian community beguiled by claims about ultimate truth, 
claims which are often defended merely by appeal to paradox, mystery or 
providence; such cloaks of religious authority stifle genuine religious freedom. For 
Shaw, understanding religion as a human creation means that we are less able to 
manipulate other people through the use of such cloaks.27 "Accountability to 
others," writes Shaw, "is much more difficult to manipulate than accountability to 
the unseen God."28 It is an effective block to rampant subjectivism.29 
According to Hugh Dawes, in his book Freeing the Faith, the claim to be in 
possession of religious absolutes restricts Christian renewal by making full church 
membership appear possible only if a certain collection of dogmas and practices are 
2'* For Shaw "holiness is not a matter of submission to authority, but of exercising freedom. The 
authoritarian note in scripture, which cannot be ignored, is only a foil to the invitation to freedom." 
Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority (London: SCM. Press, 1983) p. 274. 
25 ibid., p. 275. 
26 Shaw writes: 
So long as the reader [of scripture] is expected to arrive at some prejudged conclusion, he 
will stand in awe of his guide. ... The benefit of reading scripture does not he in arriving 
at a particular set of conclusions, but in the nature of the exercise. It is the stimulus to 
use our minds, to trust our judgment, to respond with our emotions and moral vision. In 
that exercise and in no other way scripture conveys its benefits to the reader. ... [Ijt's 
value lies not in possessing one privileged meaning, but in wrestling with its perplexities. 
The disciple has no other reward apart from the struggle, 
ibid., p. 276. 
27 ibid., pp. 277-279. 
28 Shaw, God in Our Hands, op. cit., p. 178. 
29 Such accountabiUty, Hart argues, requires a recognition of religious pluralism without imposing on 
diflferent religious faiths some universal or absolute category which they must all share.Hart notes: 
We do not have to discover a set of common characteristics between a collection of 
paintings to appreciate their indi\adual and collective contribution to our human vision of 
the worid. By walking around the gallery and appreciating them each and all, we enlarge 
our total vision, but we do not need to convince ourselves or anyone else that there is 
only one Reality the individual artists are attempting to portray on their canvases. 
David A. Hart, One Faith?, (London: Mowbrays, 1995) p. 146. 
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wholeheartedly accepted.^ " When the church fails to see the human handiwork 
behind its beliefs and practices at least three disastrous consequences arise.^ i pirst^  
the absolutisation of certain values may lead to the absolutisation of specific social 
and economic conditions associated with a particular period of history. Second, a 
deontological legalism may follow as past answers to ethical issues get misapplied 
to contemporary moral dilemmas.32 Third, the church itself may increasingly come 
to look, from the outside, like an esoteric club with outdated rituals and beliefs 
which are only meaningful to a dwindling minority. Like Miss Havisham in Great 
Expectations, the Church, with its traditional dogmas and practices, is seen from 
outside as inhabiting a decaying, cobweb covered and moth-eaten environment 
where time has stood still.^ '* If the church were to recognise religion as a human 
creation designed by us to meet our needs, it would find it easier to share in those 
important events which surround the lives of ordinary people today. By abandoning 
ritual purity or doctrinal correctoess the church may discover its best means of 
renewal.35 
Dawes notes that like non-realists, liberals concerned about the future of the 
Church and Christian belief also view the adherence to absolutes with a degree of 
suspicion. For example he quotes Maurice Wiles" Faith and the Mystery of God as 
follows: 
The position in which we find ourselves is one which seems to call at the 
same time for an absoluteness of commitment and a recognition of the 
limitations of our own perspective, both as individuals and as the 
Christian Community. Do without the first and there is a crippling loss of 
religious vitality; do without the second and there is a danger not merely 
of absolutizing our own perspective but of religious fanaticism as well.^ ^ 
30 Dawes, Freeing the Faith, op. cit., pp. 10-20, 33. 
31 ibid., pp. 72.flF. 
32 ibid., pp. 72-74. 
33 ibid., pp. 13-15. 
34 ibid- p. 10. 
35 ibid., p. 14. 
36 Maurice Wiles, Faith and the Mystery of God, (London: SCM Press, 1982), p. 4 quoted in Dawes, 
op. cit., p. 118 (Dawes' italics). 
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For Dawes, absoluteness of commitment can be affirmed if it means a commitment 
to a radical, open and non-realist Christianity which sees doubt and questions as an 
asset rather than as a drawback. Such an open Christianity will find guidance from 
its tradition while admitting that its past is past; it will recognise the importance of 
the present moment and use its past in new and creative ways.^ '^  The difference 
between liberals like Wiles and non-realists like Dawes or Hart is that whereas for 
Wiles religious belief is "perspectival, parabolic and provisional"^^ because there is 
"that which cannot be directly spoken;"^ ^ non-realists believe that there is no "non-
perspectival or absolute religious position'"**^  because all such positions are our own 
human creations. Whereas the liberal still claims some access, however indirect, to 
an ultimate, final and absolute truth,'* • the non-realist will make no such claim. For 
Freeman, there is neither an absolute entity like God out there independent of our 
religious creativity, nor "absolute existing-out-there values such as peace, joy, 
goodness, beauty, love etc.'"'2 Such values, which are highlighted within the 
Christian tradition are our own creations and our religious vocabularies are not so 
much exhibiting a necessary "degree of indirectness""^ but are expressing our 
commitment to those ideal values at the same time as they produce our picture of 
God.'*'* A notion such as 'indirectness' is again seen by non-realists as representing a 
human strategy designed to enable us to escape admitting responsibility for our own 
religious creativity. 
One problem for this non-realist approach might be that it risks encouraging 
moral relativism, but Freeman denies the relevance of this charge. He writes: 
Dawes, Freeing the Faith, ibid., p. 119. 
38 Maurice Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue, (London: SCM Press, 1992) p. 
64. 
39 Wiles, Faith and the Mystery of God, op. cit., p 18. 
"0 Hart, Faith in Doubt, op cit., p. 6. 
"1 Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
"2 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 70. 
'*3 Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue, op. cit., p. 65. 
"" Anthony Freeman, 'Theology and the Church inModem Believing, Vol. 35. 1994. p. 39. 
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[Our] values were human even when they were believed to be etemal 
truths. It is himian beings making human judgments who have given 
Hitler the thumbs down and Mother Teresa the thumbs up.''^  
Such judgements are liable to change, but as Freeman puts it, ""If we know that all 
otu: values are human, it ought to make us a little more modest in our insistence on 
them."""'' Viewing religion as a human creation means living with and valuing 
change in matters of religious belief As Shaw puts it, '"Religion does not represent 
a continent awaiting discovery, it is rather an opportunity to be realized, and which 
like human art lives by being realized ever anew."'"'' For non-realists, the pictures 
we create of God are fallible because they are historically contingent, dependent 
upon the demands and requirements of different human attitudes and practices as 
these arise and decline over time in relation to our ever changing himian 
circumstances and purposes. For Freeman, accepting historicism means that each 
reinterpretation of Christian faith is "[n]ot just a different interpretation of the same 
essential core, but a different faith.""** There are no timeless truths about God."' He 
writes: 
For me, this eternally true thing called 'the faith' is an illusion, a usefiil 
fiction to affirm our desire to stand in line with the great Christian heroes 
of the past. ... Every generation creates its own faith ... The faith of each 
century is different. Pretending that they are the same only gives 
ammimition to those forces within and outside the church which oppose 
change and iimovation.50 
Non-realists, then, value change and see it as part of the process by which 
Christianity is able to renew itself in each generation. 5i By valuing and promoting 
such change they hope to ensure that religion remains a relevant feature of people's 
lives.52 Only a radical, non-realist accoimt of Christian belief which accepts God as 
"5 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 70. 
"6 ibid., p. 71. 
""^  Shaw,. God in Our Hands, op. cit., p. 179. 
"^  Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 75. 
"9 ibid., pp. 8, 28, 80. 
50 ibid., p. 77. By denying that Christian faith has an essential core, Freeman again displays the radical 
rather than the liberal orientation of'Sea of Faith non-realism. 
51 Hart, for example, believes that a non-realist mentality is well suited to come to terms with the 
theological changes that are suggested by Feminist theology. See Hart, Faith in Doubt, op cit., p. 6. 
52 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 81. 
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a human creation is religiously attractive in today's world. By accepting a non-
realist understanding of God, Freeman believes, "the church will be able to take up 
its rightful place in the creative area of life. "53 
Spiritual liberation is often seen by the proponents of religious non-realism to 
be a fruit of accepting this account of religious belief For example. Hart describes 
his realisation of a non-realist understanding of religious belief as "a moment of 
pure joy"5'» and Freeman finds the innovation toward non-realism to be a liberation 
from what he sees as both the oppressive demands of traditional realist belief, and 
from the repression of human creativity and individuality which that belief often 
engendered in its followers. 55 This sense of liberation is keenly expressed in 
Freeman's description of his acceptance of Christian non-realism as a 'conversion 
experience'. He writes: 
... it was not a conversion from imbelief to faith, but from a Christianity 
which had become oppressive to one which brought a glorious sense of 
freedom and joy. This freedom came when I accepted that I did not 
believe in God as a traditionally understood. That was a kind of trigger 
which released me to find a new meaning in the word God. 56 
For Freeman, part of the liberating experience of accepting a non-realist account of 
God, is the healthy disrespect that it encourages toward hierarchical conceptions of 
authority. It enables him to offer new interpretations of Christian faith without 
making Christianity have to conform to either credal of scriptural authority. 5' Such 
authorities should be regarded as replaceable hiunan rules and guidelines. To claim 
divine authority for them leads to abuse of power and an unhelpful conservatism. 58 
53 ibid., p. 83. 
5'* Hart, Faith in Doubt, ibid., p. 7. 
55 This sense of liberation is largely a personal matter which may be effected by anxiety about the loss 
of one's livelihood in the context of a Church willing to dismiss those who hold to a non-realist 
Christian faith. However, the sense of liberation mvolved here is more than a sense of being able to 
follow one's conscience against the dictates of authority, it is fijndamentally a sense of liberation from 
the encrustation of dogma that has hampered the ongoing human spiritual pUgrimage. 
56 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 11. 
57 ibid., p. 75. 
58 ibid., p. 82. 
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Thus for Freeman, "Taking the non-existence of a supernatural God as our working 
hypothesis will lead to a more open and democratic form of church life."59 
This sense of liberation also featiires strongly in the work of Graham Shaw. He 
builds up a picture of the oppressive realist God that emerges from within the 
practices and fraditions of biblical religion. For him, to be liberated from the 
oppressive consequences of belief in the biblical God requires us to recognise the 
human responsibility for this, or any, God. By attributing qualities of omniscience 
and providence to God, and understanding God through the metaphors of'judge' and 
'king". Lord of history" and "creator of the universe', religious leaders who evoke such 
a God end up by taking for themselves the power invested in that God and claim to 
speak in that God's name, while declining responsibility for the consequences that 
follow from the actions carried out in the name of that God.^ With such a picture, 
God's all-seeing eye is usually enough to keep most believers in line with the rules 
imposed by the religious elite. It insures the realist's system of religious control and 
confirms that within such a system "the only human initiative and responsibility 
which are allowed are sin and guilt."'^ i A non-realist conception of God, however, 
requires us to take and acknowledge fiill responsibility for every aspect of our faith 
including the God we create. 
According to Shaw, Jesus offers a way of liberation from the God of power 
because he accepted fiill responsibility for the God of peace which he evoked in his 
life and death.^ 2 j o follow Jesus, to take fiill responsibility for our religious faith, is 
59 ibid., pp. 82-83. 
60 Shaw writes: 
The religious leader declines any responsibility and attributes all to God. In reality he 
contributes far more than he reahzes or acknowledges to that God. His assent, his 
interpretation of the religious tradition, is what gives that God vitality. He tells himself of 
course that he believes and behaves as he does because God exists. It is the existence of 
God, which absolves him of responsibility. If such a God does not exist, then rt is the 
religious leaders who have to accept fiill responsibihty for the conflicts they create in his 
name. 
Shaw, God in Our Hands, op. cit., p. 51. According to Shaw, such conflicts are the resuh of 
unbalanced social relations that arise from the religious fantasies of power and control which Shaw 
associates with the God of realism and which he believes the gospel message of freedom and peace has 
brought into question. 
61 ibid., pp. 50-51. 
62 ibid., pp. 133-136. 
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to be in a position where we no longer manipulate and control others by appealling 
to the God we evoke. It is to be liberated from the religious fantasies of power 
dreamt of by the religious elite.. The goodness of the God Jesus evoked is as 
transcendent as the cross was to those who stood at its foot, but this is a 
transcendence that describes the moral difference between the realist God of power 
and the non-realist God of peace.63 The God of peace and grace, who displays his 
weakness on the cross points us, Shaw argues, to a more responsible and less 
repressive faith. Despite the attempt of the Gospel writers and St. Paul to 
rehabilitate the realist God through evasive fantasies of power expressed in terms of 
providence and resurrection, "our task as Christians today," writes Shaw, " is to 
learn to affirm the crucified Christ without resort to those evasions of his story"6" 
To own responsibility for our God is to liberate ourselves from the oppressive 
consequences which Shaw believes to be inextricably linked with belief in a realist 
God. Shaw concludes: 
I ... fiilly recognize my responsibility for my God and yet believe that 
only in the use of such language, in which I address God and discover 
myself in speaking to him, can I approach a self-knowledge which is both 
honest and sustainable.65 
1.3. The Rejection of Atheism: 
The fact that Freeman and Shaw still affirm and value belief in God, understood in 
non-realist terms, indicates an important concern of religious non-realism 
Alongside its commitment to the view that religion is a himian creation it asserts 
with equal candour its opposition to atheism. According to Freeman it is 'unfair" to 
represent the Christian non-realist self understanding as atheistic.66 'Sea of Faith' 
non-realists may appear to share a common agenda with atheists when they assert 
that: 
63 ibid., chap. 1 and 4. 
64 ibid., p. 20. 
65 ibid., p. 145. 
66 ibid., p 25. 
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... there is nothing beyond or outside human beings, neither 'God' nor 
some notion like Ultimate Reality' that gives life meaning and purpose. 6" 
But in fact, they argue, that it is precisely because humans have always given life 
meaning and purpose through the use of religious ideas, by employing a religious 
vocabulary and by engaging in religious practices that we should not succumb to an 
atheistic construction of reality. As Freeman writes: 
We [non-realists] still find value in the Christian vocabulary, including 
the word God, and in the Christian stories, especially those of Jesus. A 
secular humanist, an atheist, has no place for such things.68 
Thus, unlike some contributors to the 'death of God" movement who wanted to keep 
Christianity in terms of the example and teaching of Christ but not its metaphysics,69 
non-realists wish to maintain belief in a God who acts in and through human 
creativity. In religion, they argue, himian beings affirm life's meaning and value by 
employing a language about God. While, according to Shaw, belief in an all 
powerful realist God "is at best mistaken and at worst deceit,"''o he notes that: 
Once we have recognised that all religion is man-made, instead of 
repudiating it with a misplaced sense of disappointment, we might still 
choose to affirm religious activity as something which enriches our lives 
and which like other forms of art is inextricably intertwined with human 
creativity and freedom. ... [TJt must be something of an embarrassment to 
all but the most complacent atheist that so much of man's social 
organisation and artistic achievement has been associated with religion.^ i 
According to Shaw what non-realists learn from atheists, like Bertrand Russell and 
J.L. Mackie, is that the ruse of an objective God, whose reality we imconsciously 
project in order to receive in return a forcefiil controlling power over us, has now 
come to an end. What the atheist tells us is that we can do away with the realist God 
of power. But, for Shaw, this termination of the God of power was anticipated in 
the life and death of Jesus. Shaw writes: 
67 Sea of Faith, "Notes for Newcomers' quote by Stephen Mitchell, 'Creating an Identity* in David Hart 
(ed.) Sea of Faith Network: 5 Years of Making Waves, (Loughborough: Sea of Faith Network, 1994), 
p. 13. 
68 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 28. 
69 AlistairKee, The Way of Transcendence, (London: SCM Press, 1971), pp. 69-70. 
"70 Shaw, God in Our Hands, op. cit., p. 153. 
'1 ibid., pp. xiv-xv. 
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He [Jesvis] made his challenge not as an atheist, but in the name of his 
God. The response he encountered rules out the notion that it was 
therefore less radical than that of the modem atheist. Indeed despite its 
negative critique of metaphysical theology, modem atheism remains 
trapped in the categories of the religions of power which it purports to 
attack. ... Its preoccupation with the existence and objectivity of God is a 
perverse acknowledgement of the religious tradition it wishes to 
overthrow. 72 
Thus for the non-realist, Shaw continues: 
Accepting much of the atheists' argument does not threaten the heart of 
Christianity, rather it impels religious people to rediscover itP 
The heart of Christianity, according to Shaw, is prayer and practice which takes its 
inspiration from the God of peace and grace for whom Jesus took full 
responsibility. 74 The, atheist's critique should be neither ignored nor regretted since 
it "returns Christians to the foot of the cross"75 However, taking responsibility for 
the God we evoke, does not mean submitting to atheism. Shaw writes: 
The atheist assumes that in once revealing our creativity in our religion, 
he has destroyed it; but the Christian has no reason to be surprised or 
abashed that he is responsible for his God. Instead he has only to learn to 
say with confidence and humility, 'My Father and I are one' (John 
10.30).76 
Most Christian non-realists, therefore, are not claiming to offer religion without God 
They recognise that in taking responsibility for our God we are able, in Freeman's 
words, to "benefit from using God religiously, without believing in him as an 
objective and active supernatural person."'^  
72 ibid., pp. 169-170. 
73 ibid., p. 170, 
74 ibid., pp. 172-176. 
75 ibid., p. 170. 
76 ibid., p. 177. 
77 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 24. The paucity of rigorous argument in Freeman's book should 
not blind us to the main points that he and other Christian non-reaUsts are making , namely, that 
language about God has a place and a central one at that within non-realist theology and that such 
theology oflfers the best hope for religious renewal in a secular culture. It oflFers for Freeman, "the 
most authentic form of Christianity which can be held today." ibid., p7. 
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1.4. A Practical Orientation: 
This last point adimibrates a fiirther significant aspect that emerges when the 'Sea of 
Faith' non-realists present their imderstanding of religious belief, namely, orientation 
aroimd practice. They suggest that a religious vocabulary will need nothing more to 
sustain it than those practices in which it is found to be useful and that discussion 
about God, and worship to God will remain central aspects of this vocabulary. As 
Shaw writes: 
... the only reality of God lies in the use of that word by human beings. It 
does not refer to some supernatural or mysterious or special being; it is 
instead a word of the creative imagination by which we construct first in 
imagination and ultimately in reality a new and different world.'^  
Religious beliefs have real effect in the practical world of everyday life. In this 
pragmatic context, religious experiences are seen by non-realists as experiences we 
himians have in relation to the God we create and then recreate in the light of these 
experiences so that, according to Freeman we are "using God pragmatically ... 
[rather] ... than thinking about him theoretically.""'^ ^ Equally, the arguments for the 
existence of God are seen by non-realists as attempts by a previous generation of 
Christians to create a language about God in terms which were usefiil to human 
purposes that these arguments now fail to fiilfil. We can now construct our God in 
terms useful to our current purposes and in ways which are no longer dictated by the 
methodological procedures of the traditional proofs.^ o This is not because the 
proofs can be shown to be false but because they are no longer religiously usefiil. 
Religion should not now be concerned with dubious questions of proof but rather 
should be concerned, in Freeman"s words, with the "'human attempt to make sense of 
the human predicament, " ^ i For Christian non-realists the pragmatic value of having 
a vocabulary about God rests in what it enables us to do. For them, such a 
vocabulary enables us to cope with the world we live in by encouraging us to choose 
Shaw, The Cost of Authority op. cit., p. 282. (My italics). 
79 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 23. 
80 ibid., pp. 16-18. 
81 ibid., p. 81. 
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to see our lives in terms of meaning and purpose despite what evidence there may be 
to the contrary As Hart puts it, religious stories help to "illuminate our situation. "82 
They also help to transform it. As Shaw notes, the significance of a vocabulary 
about God "is uniquely precious." He adds: 
... it is an integral part of human freedom, a means by which we 
transcend the given and transform ourselves and the world. 83 
According to Shaw, this transformative function enables us to transcend the given 
by means of imaginative detachment. This allows us to challenge and subvert 
existing structures of human power and authority. It calls us to action and 
"facilitates the creative redescription of reality. "8-* 
In Faith In Doubt, Hart argues that the realist conception of God is of no further 
religious use to us. 85 Nevertheless, we can still utilise a traditional religious 
vocabulary. The usefulness of a vocabulary about God is sustained by the practices 
of prayer and worship. He writes: 
religious non-realists believe that the tiraditional language of God is the 
most helpful matrix for human beings to relate and connect with the 
deepest parts of themselves, and that this language if often useful in 
discovering the workings of the parts of ourselves that seem outside the 
scope of our rational control.86 
Affirming Christian belief and practice as a means of "speaking about ourselves, and 
discovering the roots of our personality and interpersonal conMnunication,"87 Hart 
offers a non-realist accoimt of Christian worship. He writes: 
... liturgies can give us a right sense of ourselves in our human context, 
and loving perceptions of the others with whom we are inextricably 
bound through our families and our society .... [0]ur worship prepares us 
for lives of worthiness; liturgy is the text for full commitment to the 
panoply of human values, and gathering together in prayer is a way of 
82 Hart, Faith in Doubt, op cit., p. 138. 
83 Shaw, The Cost of Authority, op. cit., p. 282. 
84 ibid., p. 283. Divorced from action, Shaw asserts, imaginative constnictions can only lead to 
reU^ous fantasy. 
85 Hart, Faith in Doubt, op. cit., p. 1 
86 ibid., p. 20. 
87 ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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saying with others: ... 'let us give each other the chance not to exploit and 
injure but to work with and build up'. 88 
The many different styles of praise and forms of worship mean that unlike doctrine, 
liturgy is dynamic, ever changing and undogmatic, permitting '"spontaneity and free 
expression"".89 There is, for Hart, no question of the existence of God "out there" to 
whom our worship is directed. For according to Hart, God is "'nothing more or less 
than the human creation and articulation of the area of our deepest concern. "90 With 
this view of God, our religious worship constitutes the activity of a community of 
'soul-friends' who "give expression together in symbolic form to our deepest spiritual 
yearnings and our human longing for some understanding of the ... [imiverse]."9i 
Both Freeman and Dawes express similar points about worship.92 For Freeman, 
Christian worship is an extremely usefiil human activity which provides discipline 
and stability in life and a sense of belonging and fellowship, not only with one's 
contemporaries, but also with past generations of Christians.93 For him, while 
prayer and worship "is not about talking to an invisible supernatural being...[but] 
about stillness and recollection and aligning one's will and one's actions with one's 
highest values, "9" he believes that we can still utilise reference to 'God' by 
understanding prayer and worship "as a process of bringing to bear on our world and 
our life those values which we call God. "95 Like Hart and Dawes, he acknowledges 
that the closure of belief in the traditional realist conception of God makes little 
difference to the non-realist's approach to worship and prayer. As Hart put it: 
Just as we do not need to live and dress in Elizabethan costume to attend 
and learn from a Shakespearean play, so it is not necessary to have a 
realist mentality or to believe in a Father-God "out there" to benefit from 
participation in sacramental liturgy.96 
88 ibid., pp. 92-93. 
89 ibid., p. 91. 
90 ibid., p. 69. 
91 ibid., pp. 69-70. 
92 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 52 snd Dawes Freeing the Faith, op. cit., pp. 106-108. 
93 Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
9" ibid., p. 57. 
95 ibid., p. 57. 
96 Hart, Faith in Doubt, op. cit., p. 87. 
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To show how this can be the case. Hart offers a non-reahst interpretation of the 
order of Holy Communion in the Church of England. He begins by quoting a non-
realist preface to the service written by Ronald Pearse which highlights the high 
regard non-realists have for Christian practice. It reads: 
A responsible spirituality is important for our health and for the well-
being of the world. It can be supported by following a way of life within 
a fellowship. The Christian Church is a fellowship which maintains and 
renews itself in the Eucharist, for which we have assembled. In this, we 
honour our historic myths and practice, discerning and using v^ dth 
integrity the content of our tradition and the opportunity of new insights, 
orienting ourselves anew in honesty, love and creativity. 
Next Hart proceeds to give a non-realist account of various stages in the service. 
The prayer of confession recognises the Tact of brokenness' in our relationship with 
ourselves, other people and the world, helping to free us from our past failings and 
to being again renewed. With the pronoimcement of absolution one can feel at 
peace again with oneself and a stronger sense of solidarity with one's worshipping 
conMnunity. The readings of sacred stories and the sermon show that there is no 
grand biblical view to be offered, only a collection of fragmentary stories that make 
up a continually growing mosaic upon which the congregation may wish to reflect 
or even to add further pieces.^ ^ The creed is another focus for conunimal solidarity 
in which the precise content of the words is less significant than the communal 
affirmation of f a i t h . i n the prayers of intercession the congregation share the 
concerns of the wider and local community, remind themselves of their common 
mortality and become aware of where practical action might be appropriate."^ The 
peace is symbolic exchange of fellowship and the offering of bread, wine and a 
financial collection signify the self-giving of the members of the community in the 
service of others and allows each member to see themselves as both giver and 
97 ibid., p. 80. 
98 ibid., pp. 80-81. 
99 ibid., p. 81, For Freeman the creed can be equated with a rugby player's song in terms of its use in 
creating communal solidarity. Freeman, God in Us, op. cit., p. 84. 
' 0 ° Hart, Faith in Doubt, op. cit., p. 82. 
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receiver. I'^i The breaking of bread points to the fragmentation found in the Uves of 
individuals and communities and a willing acceptance of the human condition. The 
commimion is taken passively but each communicant receives the bread and wine 
by their own choice, thereby preserving their own creativity in faith.'02 Finally, the 
dismissal suggests, in the words of Stephen Mitchell, quoted by Hart, that "faith is 
not a matter of truth, more of bearing fruit. "'03 He thus concludes: 
The language of liturgy ... can offer us a collection of interpretative tools 
which ... can connect us with our deeper selves and with one another in a 
manner that frees rather than truncates our spiritual development.'O'* 
According to Shaw, i f we do still wish to talk about the truth of Christianity then 
this is to be found not in believing its doctrines "but by trying to practise it"'^^ 
1.5. Conclusion: 
In this first chapter I have considered some of the religious ideas foimd in the 
published works of various prominent members of the 'Sea of Faith' network. I have 
svmimarised their concern to establish, as a matter of religious imperative, a non-
realist understanding of religious belief 
For the sake an appropriate and credible religion for today, religious non-
realists in the 'Sea of Faith network believe that Christians now need to accept that 
religion is a human creation for which we should take ful l responsibility. A non-
realist religious faith will radicalise liberal theology by denying the religious 
usefulness of asserting the existence of God independent of, and antecedent to, our 
human creativity and thus also any absolute, final or ultimate religious vocabulary. 
It wil l accept change and contingency and a need for a greater humility about one's 
own religious assertions. Further, it affirms an antipathy toward atheism and a deep 
awareness of the human need for, and the usefulness of, religious belief and 
practice. Religious non-realists believe that this wil l lead to a spiritual liberation in 
101 ibid., p. 83. 
102 ibid., p. 84. 
103 ibid., p. 85. 
ibid., p. 93. 
Shaw The Cost of Authority, op. cit., p. 279. 
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which Christianity is promoted in ways that are less oppressive than is suggested by 
a realist conception of God. 
I have discussed the work of these 'Sea of Faith' writers without referring to the 
work of Don Cupitt in order to emphasise that 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realism is 
not limited to the ideas of one individual. Nevertheless, Cupitt's work is strongly 
influential. A l l aspects of the discussion so far can be attributed to ideas in Cupitt's 
work. In Taking Leave of God, Cupitt outlined the view that religion is most 
appropriately understood as a human creation. It is an extremely useful human 
enterprise which we need to continue to promote. For Cupitt, "God is a myth we 
have to have."'o^ "Religious language" he adds "is not in the business of describing 
really-existing super-sensible objects and their activities. ... [RJeligious language is 
not descriptive or metaphysical but intensely practical. "107 Cupitt views religion as 
a pathway for practical living, rather than as a set of doctrines to which assent must 
be given. Religion is "a continuous flowing creative process, a little like art; 
humanly constructed and constructing, of course, yet retaining its own special place 
and authority in our lives."i08 Since "everything now is a product of time and 
chance," 109 it is not surprising i f we change our religious ideas. We can now watch 
God evolve as we take responsibility for our religious activity, no It is this, Cupitt 
believes, which makes life a spiritual joumey.in Indeed, part of what it takes to 
make Christianity credible today involves embracing transience and change so that 
"the daily practice of religion becomes itself the only goal of religion."ii2 Such a 
religion wil l be: 
106 Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 166. 
107 ibid., p. 164. 
108 Don Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, (London: SCM Press, 1990), p. x. 
109 Don Cupitt, The Time Being, (London: SCM Press, 1992), p. 116. 
110 Don Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, (London: SCM Press, 1989), p. 65. 
111 ibid., p. 69. 
112 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 126. 
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... a religion without absolutes, v^thout perfection, without closure, 
vkithout eternity. A religion ... that says yes to time, contingency, open-
endedness, transience, 
Cupitt is confident that we "can easily go on being religious and creating religion in 
the ful l awareness that religion is only human"' without seeing this as atheism. 
For Cupitt, "religious faith matters a lot""^ and "what God is, is given by the part 
God plays in the religious l i f e . " " ' Non-realism is not simply "being modem' for it 
own sake but is primarily a source of Christian renewal."" Cupitt thus sees a 
pragmatic demand placed upon Christians to ensure that a religious vocabulary and 
religious practice continue for their own sake. A realist interpretation of that 
vocabulary, however, is now not the best way to achieve this. " 9 
In the next two chapters I shall turn to a more detailed exposition of Cupitf s 
work. I shall do this for two reasons. First, in order to outline various intellectual, 
religious and ethical explanations for the growth of 'Sea of Faith' religious non-
realism, and second, to establish the significant role played by philosophical 
pragmatism in these explanations. This vnll be important for the second half of the 
thesis which wil l attempt to show first, that many of the ideas of 'Sea of Faith' 
religious non-realism are anticipated in the religious thought of the American 
pragmatist John Dewey and second, that a philosophical articulation of religioxis 
non-realism might now be sought in the work of the contemporary American 
pragmatist Richard Rorty. 
"3 ibid., pp. 81-82. 
' Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 26. 
Cupitt notes that this is not atheism because someone like a religious non-realist "cannot describe 
the basis of her own existence except in religious language." Life Lines, (London: SCM Press, 1986) 
p. 138. 
" 6 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 36. 
1 Cupitt, The World to Come, op. cit., p. 63. 
" 8 Cupitt outlines the form of renewal he has in mind. First, the Church must be this worldly, it 
should look sideways to solve its problems and recreate itself^  not upwards toward some external holy 
realm. Second, the Church will need to see its beliefs in terms of moral rather than intellectual 
allegiance. Third, it must be open and willing to accept change. Forth, it will need to be creatively 
engaged in the never ending, never completed, struggle for the production of meaning and value and 
fifth it will say yes to contingency. Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 59-61. 
' 19 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, (London: SCM Press, 1988), p. 36. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS NON-REALISM 
2.1. Introduction: 
In the last chapter I discussed the religious thought of the non-realist 'Sea of Faith 
Network'. They claim that an effective religious faith of the future will have to be 
non-realist. However, they do not consider in any detail why this claim has the force 
that they assume it to have. My first aim in this chapter wil l be to consider the 
intellectual explanation for the phenomena of religious non-realism. I shall do so by 
examining the work of Don Cupitt, for it is chiefly upon his account of the cogency 
of these explanations that the other Sea of Faith writers tend to rely.i My second 
aim wil l be to emphasise the pragmatic strand in his work. This strand, I wil l 
suggest, can be understood as providing these explanations with a semantic space 
which is not already filled by realist presuppositions. 
Although Cupitt's explanations of the attractiveness of religious non-realism 
overlap and draw upon each other, it wi l l be useful to attend to them under three 
separate headings. First, there is his interpretation of the intellectual heritage upon 
which he draws; second, there is his account of more recent developments in this 
intellectual heritage associated with the linguistic turn in philosophy and third, there 
is his consideration of pressures internal to religion and ethics which make a non-
realist rather than a realist religious faith a genuine inheritor of the Christian 
tradition. In this chapter I shall attend to the first two; in the next chapter I shall 
attend to the third. In so doing I wi l l not be primarily concerned to offer a detailed 
developmental accoxmt of Cupitt's work. Such accounts are readily available 
elsewhere.2 I wi l l , however, refer to Stephen Ross White's classification of the 
1 David A. Hart, One Faith?, (London: Mowbrays, 1995), p.6. 
2 Scott Cowdell, Atheist Priest? Don Cupitt and Christianity (London: SCM Press, 1988). Stephen 
Ross White, Don Cupitt and the Future of Christian Doctrine (London: SCM Press, 1994). 
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stages of Cupitt's theological pilgrimage in order to provide the context against 
which to set my discussion. 
According to White, intellectual integrity has driven Cupitt from the critical 
realism of his early theological vmtings into the non-realist stage of his thought 
marked by the publication in 1980 of Taking Leave of God, and then beyond into a 
third stage; a radically linguistic, anti-foundational account of non-realism itself ^ In 
the first stage of Cupitt's theological pilgrimage outlined by White, Cupitt 
juxtaposes a critical realism concerning divine transcendence based on the via 
negativa v^th a concern for the imagery and practice of religious belief The images 
we have of God are always our ovra creations, yet we have no reason to deny the 
possibility of a real God beyond these human images. A God who is ineffable and 
transcendent bursts open all our images and thus confirms their inadequacy. Our 
images of God undermine themselves by pointing to the divine presence hidden 
beyond all such imagery. God, Cupitt writes, "is his hiddenness.""* Cupitt's early 
work attempts to weld together the nearness of the God of human imagery and 
practice with the transcendent otherness of God suggested by the via negativa.^ At 
this stage Cupitt comments: 
... what God is is not so much expressed in our success in speaking about 
him as rather indirectly suggested by our failure.^ 
Here, Cupitt accepts much of the modem critique of religion suggested by 
Feuerbach, Freud and others. These thinkers are not to be viewed as supporting a 
non-realist understanding of religious belief but as extenting the via negativa's 
denial of affirmative pictures of God.'' We must think of God in human imagery but 
3 White, ibid., p. 97. 
Don Cupitt, Christ and the Hiddenness o/Gorf (London: SCM Press, 1971), p. 206. 
5 ibid., pp. 198-213. 
6 ibid., p. 203. 
7 Cupitt held this position up until 1980 and it is perhaps best expressed in The L^ap of Reason 
(London: SCM Press, 1976). Also see Don Cupitt, Explorations in Theology 6 (London: SCM Press, 
1979), pp 56-57. 
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we must also deny the adequacy of this imagery. ^  Only in this way can God be 
understood in his hiddeimess. 
However, the denial of the adequacy of this imagery, when pushed to its limits, 
leads Cupitt into the non-realist stage of his theological pilgrimage. In this stage, 
rather than indicating the transcendent mystery of God, the via negativa is 
transformed into a critique of the usefulness of any belief about the reality God. 
This shift in Cupitt's position can be seen as the result of his attempt to answer with 
integrity a question he asked himself in Christ and the Hiddenness of God. He 
asked: 
How can religion both be sure about God and yet be sure of the 
inadequacy of all the representations of God with which it operates?^ 
The answer he gave in that book, which saw the hiddenness of God revealed as 
hidden in our various inadequate attempts to imaginatively speak of God, proved 
unsatisfactory. Now God becomes understood by Cupitt as a regulative ideal: the 
sum of our goals and values projected in the imagery, and lived out in the practice, 
of religion. I intend in what follows, to consider some of the reasons Cupitt gives to 
explain why his theological pilgrimage has led him from his earlier critical realist 
understanding, to a non-realist understanding of religious belief 
2.2. The Intellectual Heritage of Cupitt's Religious Non-Realism: 
Cupitt suggests that in the contemporary socio-historical context, religious realism is 
becoming problematic as an intellectually viable option for religious believers to 
hold. Historical developments in om^ understanding of ourselves and our world over 
the last four hundred years have put belief in a real God under a good deal of strain. 
Cupitt cites the change in the seat of intellectual authority as a chief cause of this 
strain. 10 In The Sea of Faith and Only Human Cupitt enlists the support of various 
^ Cupitt, CAra/awrffAe///iii?/7nes5o/Gorf (Second Edition. London: SCM Press 1985) p 7 
9 ibid., p. 56. ' • 
10 For Cupitt, this inteUectual revolution can be clearly shown to have taken place when we compare 
the picture of the world presented in modem science with the picture of the world that we can gain by 
reading the Book of Common Prayer (1662), or even the Alternative Service Book (1980) where a 
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influential movements and individual thinkers to catalogue this change. It is a 
change away from religious dogmatism toward what Cupitt terms 'critical 
thinking'." Critical thinking is marked by the acceptance that all knowledge is 
human and that all human knowledge is natural, historical and instrumental. 
Whereas pre-critical thought orientated itself around an antecedently existing reality 
out-there, critical thinking "begins with our cognitive powers."'^ In critical thinking, 
religion can no longer act as a buttress for a set of treasured social dogmas 
supposedly revealed from some authoritative source outside of the human realm. 
Rather, religious goals are internal to spirituality, "a function of human 
religiousness,"''' but nonetheless transcendent and authoritative as freely chosen and 
action-inspiring ideals. Cupitt %vrites: 
Religion is an activity: it postulates a goal and seeks to attain it. Realist 
theologies claim that the religious ideal is already actual, being fully 
attained in the metaphysical realm quite independent of any effort by us 
... they [thus] cut the nerve of religious striving. 
For critical spirituality on the other hand, 
[T]o speak of God is to speak about the moral and spiritual goals we 
ought to be aiming at, and about what we ought to become . . . . The true 
God is not God as picturesque supernatural fact, but God as our religious 
ideal. 16 
In this form, religion can survive in a culture that has become fully humanised, 
naturalistic, historicised and instrumental. 
In The Sea of Faith Cupitt offers an account of what he takes to be the historical 
development of Western culture in this direction and thus an explanation of why a 
pre-scientific picture of the world is still maintained. Don Cupitt, The World To Come (London: SCM 
Press, 1982) pp. 53-59. 
" Don Cupitt, The Sea of Faith: Christianity in Change (London: BBC, 1984), pp. 249 ff. and 257. 
'2 ibid., p. 252. 
'3 ibid., p. 250. 
14 ibid., p. 265. 
15 ibid., p. 265. 
16 ibid., p. 270. 
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realist conception of religious belief seems to him intellectually unsatisfying. Here I 
shall mention four pairs of thinkers who have had an important impact on Cupitt's 
thought: these are Descartes and Kant, Galileo and Darwin, Hegel and Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. A l l of these figures are considered here only in terms 
of their significance to Cupitt. I do not intend to offer a comprehensive account of 
their work. 
From Descartes' method of radical doubt and from Kant's transcendental 
philosophy we learn, according to Cupitt, that all knowledge is human knowledge, i ^ 
From Descartes we learn that certain knowledge is obtainable only through rational 
human thinking, i ^ We can doubt everything except that it is we who doubt. 
Descartes' method creates a conception of the self that is, according to Cupitt, 
"autonomous and self-defining." Descartes' subject, Cupitt continues, "finds his 
criterion of truth within himself and ... generates his own knowledge for himself out 
of his own resources, " i ^ The human knower thus rivals God as the source of certain 
knowledge.2o However, Descartes required God's existence in order to guarantee the 
successiveness of our clear and distinct ideas. We need a notion of God to unify 
our self-understanding created by the method of doubt^i This need itself represents 
a crucial reversal in the fraditional understanding of the divine-human relationship. 
Now, instead of humans being created to fu l f i l the divine purpose, God is being used 
by us to fu l f i l the requirements of the rational human mind. The history of 
secularised thinking then becomes a series of stage posts in which human beings are 
increasingly able to find ways of fulfilling these requirements for themselves. God 
thus increasingly becomes an imnecessary hypothesis. 22 Perhaps the most important 
17 ibid., pp. 131-133, 136-139. 
18 Don Cupitt, Radicals And the Future of the Church (London: SCM Press, 1989). pp. 134-135. 
19 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 133. Later Cupitt finds reason to repudiate Descartes' 
foundation of selfhood: see Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp 167-169. 
20 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 198-199. 
2lRene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (1637 and 1641) (E.T. F.E SutclifiFe, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. ), pp. 132-133 and 54-60. 
22 But as Eberhard Jungel, God As the Mystery of the World (1911) (E.T. Darrell L . Guder, 
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1983,) Ch. 3, points out, while this may lead us to question our reUance 
upon metaphysical theology it does not necessarily imply the inevitability of a non-realist 
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of such stage posts is found in Kant's transcendental idealism which attempted to 
answer the sceptical consequences that follow from Descartes' intemalisation of 
indubitable knowledge. 
Without the role played by God in Descartes' system it would be difficult to 
know for certain that our humanly generated knowledge of the world is in fact in 
touch with the contours of our actual environment. Thus, John Locke argued that 
our humanly generated knowledge of the world is not based on rational innate 
principles but on sensations; that is, empirical perception and our reflection on these 
perceptions. Sensations produce simple ideas of the external world in our mind and 
reflection produces complex ideas.^ ^ Together they give us our knowledge of the 
physical and moral wor ld .Howeve r , in the work of Bishop Berkeley, Locke's 
empiricism becomes transformed into absolute idealism and God again becomes the 
basis for asserting indubitable knowledge. Berkeley points out that the idea of 
substance, in the view of Locke, was a 'complex' idea requiring both sensation and 
reflection and is therefore to some extent mind-dependent. This impression is 
further enhanced by Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
The primary qualities are those intrinsic to the idea of an object that sensation 
produces in us. As intrinsic, they remain the same under different conditions and 
include things like the solidity, extension and mobility of an object and its number. 
The secondary qualities include the object's colour, smell, taste etc.. These are 
relative to the conditions of observation; imposed by the mind rather than being 
intrinsic to the object. Nevertheless, since these relative secondary qualities are 
crucial in both defining the object and in differentiating it from other objects, and 
since 'substance' is itself a mind-dependent 'complex idea', Berkeley is led to suggest 
understanding of God. The reality of God could be revealed rather than a matter of metaphysical 
construction. 
23 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Hunum Understanding (1690). (Glasgow: Fount, 1964 ed.), pp. 
83-98. 
24 Ethics here becomes a matter of utilitarian reflection on experiences of pain and pli easure. 
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that our experience of objects as a whole must be of mental "rather than material 
phenomena.25 For Berkeley objectivity has nothing to do with materiality. "... 
[W]hen I shut my eyes," writes Berkeley, "the things I saw may still exist but it must 
be in another mind. "26 This 'other mind' is the absolute mind of God. Thus, as 
Descartes, Berkeley sees God as the final fallback for an imderstanding of human 
knowledge. It is this reliance upon God to which David Hume objected. For Hume, 
the idea of God like other abstract ideas, "arises from reflecting on the operations of 
our own mind."27 Without either the God of Descartes or the God of Berkeley, 
neither rationalism nor empiricism seemed able to provide an adequate foundation 
for human scientific knowledge. 28 
It was this scientific and theological problem that Kant attempted to address. In 
doing so Kant replaced the God of Descartes and Berkeley with a human-centred 
franscendental ideahsm. For Kant, objective knowledge results from the application 
of transcendental, a priori human concepts—our intuition of space and time and our 
categories of understanding—^to experience. In this way objective knowledge is 
constituted by our concepts rather than simply discovered. As Cupitt puts it, "the 
world mirrors the mind, and not the other way round. "29 Accordingly Cupitt learns 
from Kant that: 
The creative work of turning chaos into cosmos, ascribed in the past to 
God, is now seen as something that is necessarily done by human 
activity. 50 
25 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues Between 
Hylas andPhilonous (1713). (Glasgow: Fount, 1962 ed.), pp. 68-70, 88. 
26 ibid., p. 110. Also pp. 108-111, 140-146, 200-201, 225. 
2'^  David Hume, Enquiries (1777) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 19. 
28 For example, Hume was troubled by the question of how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and 
effect and was forced to conclude on empirical grounds that the law was established merely by 
convention and thus not a strictly scientific law at all. ibid., pp. 27-39. Hume saw his task as bringing 
to public attention the sceptical consequences that flow fi-om empiricism. This is not a situation that 
Hume was entirely comfortable with since, as Antony Flew points out, if cause and effect were a 
matter of convention, miracles would seem to be conceivable and this for Hume would be catastrophic 
for science. David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 82 ff; 
29 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 138. 
50 ibid., p. 138. 
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For Kant, our concepts are synthetic a priori judgements; knowable only as the 
conditions necessary for any knowledge at all. This means that beyond them and the 
phenomenal knowledge they make possible, there is no other knowledge to be had. 
Any notion we have that claims to take us beyond space and time—any notion of an 
eternal supernatural God, for example, wi l l need to be understood as an ideal of 
reason and, i f useful, a guiding principle for action. What God carmot be is an 
object of possible experience.^i For Cupitt, Kant informs us that "God should ... be 
interpreted as a guiding ideal... ."^2 However, Cupitt also displays some 
ambivalence toward Kant. Kant, for Cupitt, is a 'semi-realist'^ ^ who still insists upon 
the objective necessity of his a priori concepts and the raw data, or noumena, they 
allow us to interpret.^'* Equally, like Descartes, Kant also conceived God as being 
logically necessary. God, for Kant, is a necessary postulate of practical rather than 
theoretical knowledge. Kant suggests that the unconditional moral law within us by 
which we choose to do right or wrong requires us to postulate (i) our own freedom 
so that we may freely choose right from wrong, (ii) our immortality so that virtue 
can be rewarded with happiness in another life i f not in this life, and (iii) God, as 
that in whom the unity of virtue and happiness is guaranteed. 
However, Kant's attempt to redefine the reality of God as a postulate of moral 
knowledge is not without its difficulties. On one count, the postulate of God seems 
to perform a similar function to the postulate of immortality, thus questioning our 
need to postulate both. On another count, both of these postulates put into question 
the autonomous imconditional nature of virtue specified in the first postulate. Thus, 
for example, T.M. Greene writes in his infroduction to Kant's Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone: 
1^ Immanuel BCant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781) ( E .T. Norman Kemp Smith London: MacMillan 
edition 1929), pp. 525-531 (A 631-642, B 659-670.) See Don Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 
124-125. 
32 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 230. 
33 C f Cupitt, Radicals And the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 167 with p. 124. 
34 ibid., p. 85, and Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 57-59. 
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I f on Kant's own principles, it is wrong to use men merely as means to our 
own ends we are not entitled to bring God into our scheme of things 
primarily as a means to our ultimate happiness. 35 
Rather, the virtuous act should be seen as its own reward. There is apparently, 
therefore, no need to postulate either God or immortality as necessary conditions of 
morality. Equally significant, Greene notes, is that Kant's conception of the 
happiness that is virtue's reward, is imderstood by Kant as "sentient in character ... 
[and yet] he [Kant] has previously shown that man's sentient nature is phenomenal, 
that is, temporal and not eternal."3^ To suggest therefore that God guarantees the 
unity of virtue and happiness is to bring God into the phenomenal realm of 
experience, precisely where Kant has argued God cannot be. Thus i f the notion of 
God works as a moral ideal at all, it must do so according to Cupitt "as the symbolic 
personification of ... guiding principles and ideal goals"3'' and not as a necessary 
postulate of moral knowledge. 
The value of Kant's accoimt of theoretical and practical knowledge for Cupitt is 
that it shows how "we autonomously impose rules on our own action in order to 
bring into being the world that our reason tells us ought to be. "38 Cupitt then takes 
Kant's account of ethical autonomy and applies it to religion. It is we vdio freely 
choose to be religious for religion's own sake. 39 Accordingly, i f religious belief is to 
be freely chosen and not based on some illusionary heteronomous supernatural 
guarantor for its validity, we must drop the idea of God as an objective being with 
existence independent of us. Religion must be disinterested in the sense that it 
"cannot depend upon any external facts such as an objective God or a life after 
death.'"'o Instead, God is to be fully humanised: a symbolic personification of our 
35 T.M. Greene, 'The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion', Introduction in 
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793) (E.T. T.M. Greene and Hoyt H. 
Hudson New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. bdv. 
3^ ibid., p. Ixiv. 
3 ' Don Cupitt, The World To Come (London: SCM Press, 1982), p. 150. 
38 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 138. 
39 Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 95. "The religious requirement," 
Cupitt notes, operates "like a Kantian categorical imperative." 
"0 ibid., p. 10. 
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religious ideal.^i To be faithful to itself, religion cannot have any objective 
cognitive content because " i f God were to become in any way determinate," writes 
Cupitt, "he would restrict the freedom which is the essence of spirituality. "42 Like 
Kant's moral wi l l , religious faith can only be binding upon us i f we freely choose it 
ourselves. Its tmth must become subjective i f it is to transform us spiritually.^^ 
Given Kant's account of human knowledge, religion must become non-realist i f it is 
to work at all. However, Cupitt notes: 
I continue to speak of God and to pray to God. God is the mythical 
embodiment of all that one is concerned with in the spiritual life. He is 
the religious demand and ideal ... and the enshriner of values. He is 
needed—but as a myth. 44 
Despite the epistemological shift of emphasis from the known to the knower, the 
idea of God still has an important religious function in Cupitt's religious non-
realism. 
With the second pair of thinkers, Galileo and Darwin, the natural worid, the 
processes that govern it and the development of life within it, become understood 
from the perspective of what is humanly knowable through observation and 
experimentation rather than through divine revelation. The religious account of the 
universe, as understood from the biblical witness, is replaced by a very different 
human account of nature; an account which takes its point of origin from the 
physical world rather than from the workings of some supernatural metaphysical 
force.45 
41 Cupitt writes: "We use the word 'God' as a comprehensive symbol that incorporates the way the 
religious demand presents itself to us (God's will), its ideal fiilfilment by us (God's essence), and the 
mythic psychodrama that envelops us on the way (God's action)." ibid., p. 96. 
42 ibid., p. 107. 
45 ibid., p. 166. Note, however, that Cupitt later repudiates his quest for the essence of religion within 
the internalised autonomous religious consciousness. See Cupitt, Radicals And the Future of the 
Church, op. cit., p. 52. 
44 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 166. 
45 Galileo, and to a greater extent Darwin, are evoked in Cupitts' texts to symbolise a naturalistic and a 
secular view of ourselves and our world. This secular, naturalistic, view is one in which our 
knowledge of the world is now provisional and shifting; one in which knowledge is produced by us 
rather than revealed to us. This view is one in which we look to meteorology rather than prayer when 
we need rain; to the physicist, chemist, or biologist rather than to the interpreter of Genesis, when we 
43 
From Galileo, according to Cupitt, we learn that what was once preached as an 
eternal truth about the way God had created the world was in fact nothing more than 
an understandable but misguided human picture of the world based upon limited and 
inaccurate observations. However, not only did the religious understanding of the 
universe have to coimtenance the idea that it had been in error: that a supposedly 
immutable doctrine about God's creation of the earth at the centre of the universe 
was in fact going to have to change; but also that the mechanical view that replaced 
it seemed to leave little room for divine intervention. With Galileo, God begins to 
be squeezed out of the universe.i^ 
Although Galileo still found a place for God, he had displaced the earth from 
the cenfre of divine creation and made God appear more distant, less likely to act 
against his own mechanical laws. This Deistic image of God gained some 
popularity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but was deah a severe blow 
by Darwin's theory of evolution. "After Darwin," writes Cupitt, "religion must 
reconcile itself to this earth.'"^ '^  I f Galileo suggested a radical franscendence of God, 
Darwin suggested God's radical immanence. Aubrey Moore conceded in the 
nineteenth century that now God must be considered as everywhere present in the 
universe or nowhere.'** 
need to know about the creation of life and the origin of the universe. One in which we look to 
medicine rather than divine intervention for the cause and cure of himian illness. We now see that our 
previous world-views were all man-made and, Cupitt notes, that the modem scientific picture of the 
world makes "obsolete all previous world-views" (Cupitt, The World To Come op. cit., p. 54). It is 
one in which, according to Cupitt, a realist conception of religious belief does not fit in. It no longer 
has a usefiil role to perform. Don Cupitt 'A Tale of Two Cities: The World to Come' a dialogue with 
J.A.T. Robinson in J. A T. Robinson, Where Three Ways Meet (London: SCM Press, 1987 p.31.). 
Cupitt writes: 
As the course of this world became gradually more completely explicable in purely natural 
terms there was less and less need to appeal to supernatural agency. One can describe 
how and why other people in the past believed in supernatural causes and effects, but it 
has become increasingly diflBcult to think in such ways oneself, today. 
Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. 60. 
16 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., pp. 42-48. 
'1'^  Don Cupitt, Only Human (London: SCM Press, 1985), p. 56. 
Aubrey Moore, 'The Christian Doctrine of God' in Charles Gore (ed.) LuxMundi (London: John 
Murray, 1891 edition), pp. 73-74. 
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For Cupitt, from Darwin we leam that creation is not cosmos but chaos. The 
random mutation of species and a fit envirormient for survival is responsible for 
human existence and not the direct act of divine fiat. While for Galileo, God wrote 
the book of nature and the books of scripture, in Darwin's biological accoimt of 
human life the book of scripture is shelved. Many Christian beliefs about scriptural 
authority, creation, sin, atonement and himian nature had to be re-thought. 49 The 
result, for Darwin, was a loss of faith in a benevolent creator in favour of an 
enforced contentment with agnosticism. 50 For Cupitt however, the fact that faith 
had to be re-thought after Darwin lends support to the idea that religious belief is, 
and always was, a human creation designed by us to f i i l f i l natural human purposes, ^ i 
In naturalising our knowledge of the world both Galileo and Darwin caused a 
necessary re-evaluation of otir religious understanding of ourselves and our world. 
For Cupitt: 
Darwinism compelled people to see that the thinking subject is not a 
metaphysical entity somehow occupying a privileged position outside 
nature, but is itself merely a product of nature and immersed in nature, so 
that all human thinking is in the end practical;... 52 
The human species is no more privileged than any other and we have no more right 
to think we survive death than any other living creature. According to Cupitt the 
liberal theology that has attempted to incorporate Darwin's insights still has not 
come to terms with the naturalistic and non-purposive consequences of Darwinism; 
only a radical non-realist theology can do this. 55 
From the naturalistic perspective on human knowledge, which Galileo and 
Danvin helped to create, a different conception of religion begins to emerge; one 
49 Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., pp. 41-47. 
50 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 66. 
51 ibid., p. 245. In Cupitt's later work the purpose of religion is to sustain the moral imperative to 
value life in all its contingency and transience and to employ creative uses of language in order to re-
value whatever has been undervalued. See Don Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., and The New 
Christian Ethics {London: SCM Press, 1988). 
52 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 187. 
55 Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 47.; The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 49, 55.; Creation Out 
of Nothing, op. cit., p. 34.; The Last Philosophy, (London: SCM Press, 1995), pp. 20, 37-38. 
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that makes i t "possible to see morality and religion as made for man, rather than the 
other way roimd."^'' From this perspective, the philosophy of religion found in 
Feuerbach, Freud, Marx, Durkheim and others accounts for religion by viewing it as 
a human creation: a projection of our alienated essence, a neurosis, a consolation 
from political oppression or a code of social norms. In each case religion is viewed 
as emerging from within the natural conditions of human existence. However, this 
is not necessarily a negative development unless it is assumed that a naturalistic 
account of religious belief can successfully dismiss our need for religion. The 
problem with such assumptions is that they tend to be reductive and positivistic. 
They rest upon some account of an uninterpreted given that is found in the 
conditions that are thought to underlie authentic human existence: some pure 
unalienated fixed human essence or some extra-cultural account of the scientific 
world. But Cupitt is as opposed to naturalistic realism as he is to religious realism" 
and he finds resources for this opposition in the next two pairs of thinkers. With the 
first pair, Hegel and Kierkegaard, natural human knowledge itself becomes 
historicised, and with the second pair, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, any supposedly 
fixed points of reference for knowledge in the human or in nature are shown to be 
historically contingent and without foundation in anything other than our current 
instrumental and cultural practices. 
According to Cupitt, Hegel's philosophy teaches us that all natural human 
knowledge is historical and changing while from Kierkegaard we leam how to deal 
religiously with this new naturalised and historicised account of human 
knowledge.56 Cupitt writes: 
Hegel shows a realist idea of God becoming so fiizzy, metaphorical and 
indefinite that it eventually dissolves away altogether. Kierkegaard shows 
that the way to restore religious seriousness and depth to life is to give up 
^ Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 67. 
Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 64-66. 
56 ibid. pp. 162-163. 
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the cosmic and metaphysical side of theistic behef, and to make faith in 
God subjective and existential. 
With Hegel, Cupitt suggests, we learn that the doctrines of Christianity become 
imaginative apprehensions of the relentless progress of 'spirit'. For Hegel, Cupitt 
notes, the incarnation represents "the ... identity of the human spirit with Spirit 
itself; [while Christ's death and resurrection] symbolised the principle of ... 
contradiction and reconciliation that permeated all Hegel's logic.'"'^ Any conception 
of transcendence that we have wi l l never be ahistorical. After Hegel, Cupitt notes: 
Religious ideas could be seen as projections of the human imagination ... 
something which for the moment might seem to stand over against man 
but which in time was necessarily destined to be reabsorbed into man as 
his consciousness advanced another stage. '^ 
There remains in Hegel the teleological realisation of absolute spirit within the 
historical process, but Cupitt reads Hegel after Darwin for whom the processes of 
life and history have no absolute end. The inmianent historical process is not 
moving toward some ultimate fiilfilment and is itself purely the result of random 
chaotic events.60 From Hegel, Cupitt argues, we learn that "all frameworks, worid 
views, science, moralities and the like are internal to ... our historicality,"^! we 
become aware of the hermeneutical complexity involved in understanding the past 
and fiirther, aware of the contribution we make in creating religious belief We 
learn, notes Cupitt, "that religion is human, historical and cultural all the way 
through. "^2 Our current theologies are relativised to our own historical context. 
We recognise, in short, that our "[b]eliefs are datable human products."^ But 
historicity need not be conceived negatively as decay or as a move away fi-om an 
original perfection.65 Cupitt maintains a positive evaluation of time without the 
57 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 249. 
58 ibid., p. 140. 
59ibid. ,p. 141. 
60 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 40-41 and 4/i'er/I//(London. SCM Press, 1994), pp. 89-90. 
6^ Don Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 98. 
62 Don Cupitt, 'Anti-realist Faith' in Joseph Runzo (ed.) Is God Real? (London: Madvfillan, 1993), p. 54. 
63 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 36. 
64 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 252. 
65 Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 5. 
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fiirther Hegelian belief that the historical process is teleologically directed by the 
systematical movement of Spirit. Such a general notion tends to downplay the role 
of the individual's free choice as the significant feature of historical change and 
development. Thus, at this point, Cupitt turns away from Hegel to Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard, Cupitt notes: 
... [goes] beneath realist ideas of God to the primal meaning of God as my 
God, my life-aim, my spiritual task and goal; and 'my God' is not a 
metaphysical being but the expression of my spiritual commitment to my 
life-aim.66 
Faced with Hegel's all-encompassing system Kierkegaard turned inward to a 
religious and existential seriousness which replaced the general movement of the 
historical dialectic with individual historical human choices before God.^ ^ 
According to Cupitt, Kierkegaard believed that "the various worlds men may 
construct and inhabit are products of their own inner lives"^^ and not the products of 
spirit's self-expression. He thus reviled any attempt to refer to the objectivity of God 
on the basis of a system such as that of Hegel. Kierkegaard's insistence upon God's 
transcendence, according to Cupitt, was aimed less at restoring the traditional realist 
picture of God and more at underiining the internal and spiritual decision of faith 
which had to be made by a free act of wil l , that is, a will not dependent upon 
something like Hegel's metaphysics or Christendom's reduction of God to an ascent-
demanding object in a creed.^' Thus, for Cupitt, we leam from Kierkegaard that: 
The problems of religion must not be solved abstractly in thought but 
concretely in human existence. Theology must be translated into 
spirituality. Hence the attack on metaphysics and objectivity, and in the 
long run the development of a non-realist interpretation of religious 
belief^ 
^ Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 249. 
6^ ibid., pp. 151-152. He thus resembles Pascal who "facing up to the eternal silence of the infinite 
spaces, was forced back upon Christ, the human reahn and the heart." Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 
47. 
68 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 155. 
69 ibid., pp. 150, 154. 
70 ibid., p. 230. 
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After knowledge has been humanised, naturalised and historicised, faith 
remains possible as an iimer demand "to become a fiilly individuated spiritual 
subject."" '^ However, Kierkegaard does not go far enough for Cupitt. Cupitt notes: 
Kierkegaard maintained the traditional western Christian religious 
psychology unaltered, for he lived before the age of Darwin, Nietzsche 
and Freud. Today we have to pass through the fire of their criticism, and 
that wil l require us to go a long, long way beyond Kierkegaard's 
position. 72 
This brings us to the fourth pair of thinkers that Cupitt believes have helped to 
shift the intellectual seat of authority away from a realist and towards a non-realist 
conception of religious belief, namely, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. From 
Nietzsche, Cupitt learns that: 
A l l our knowledge is practical and perspectival, evolved in the service of 
group life. There are no facts, only interpretations, and no truths, only 
useful fictions. 73 
For Nietzsche, when knowledge is fully human, natural and historical it must also be 
understood as perspectival; offering no fixed truths or agreed notion of reality. 
Rationality thus becomes a set of superficial, but useful, human interpretations. 
According to Cupitt, the aim of The Joyful Wisdom and Zarathustra is to aimounce 
to the world the effect of the death of God and to call for an affirmation of a playful 
ironic celebration of life's transience and contingency. When knowledge becomes 
perspectival, understood as a collection of competing fictions, critical thinking itself 
becomes just another manifestation of the 'will to power' and the desire for truth is 
forced to recognise its own perspectival status. Cupitt notes: 
... the will to truth, ... when pressed to its furthest limit, comes at last to 
the ironical conclusion that there is no absolute truth, and is forced to pass 
over into the superman's joyful wisdom of 'goodwill towards 
appearance'.74 
71 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. 61. 
72 ibid., p. 61. 
73 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 202. 
7'* ibid., p. 206. 
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The platonic distinction of appearance and reality collapses leaving claims that 
attempt to account for reality, religious or otherwise, as examples of the all too 
human wi l l to power. 
However, Cupitt disagrees with Nietzsche about the implications that 
perspectivism has for religious belief "^ 5 Whereas Nietzsche believes that 
Christianity cannot survive the end of foundationalism and the collapse of reality 
into appearances, Cupitt believes that it can. Christianity, he argues, is "well able to 
ingest even its own death. "^6 Whereas, for Nietzsche, the crisis of realism leads to 
complete nihilism in which only the 'Superman' creates his own world ex nihilo, 
Cupitt believes that this crisis is a "religious necessity ... [a] ... stepping-stone to 
something new and constructive.""^ The end of a realist understanding of religious 
faith does not lead us into atheism or agnosticism, but rather draws us closer to a 
religious affirmation of life in all its transience and contingency.^* Whereas 
Nietzsche saw in religion an oppressive morality designed to encourage a slavish 
mentality of the herd and a set of beliefs and laws designed to fend off our fear of 
life's contingency, Cupitt sees in religion the human effort to put value and meaning 
into the world devoid of any value and meaning on its own account. For Cupitt, the 
truly religious person is someone who finds in religion the strength to make meaning 
in the void. He writes: 
Traditionally realistic religion fimctioned to make people weak, but there 
is the alternative of a non-realistic kind of religion that functions to make 
people strong. 79 
This ability to make meaning through religion is infused with irony. Meaning is 
always of our own making and so is religion. Religion is a human creation that 
helps us live in the void. For Nietzsche, the strong have no resources other than 
75 ibid., pp. 209-210. 
76 Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 203. 
77 ibid., p. 111. 
78 Don Cupitt, What is a Story? (LowAon: SCM Press, 1991), pp. 153-154, and The Time Being, op. 
cit., Ch. 7. 
79 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 69. 
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their own strength by which they create meaning. For Cupitt, it is religion that 
provides us with common resources for re-creating our world. "Through religion," 
writes Cupitt, "it is we who must make life make sense."^ o 
Despite this level of disagreement, Cupitt is still much indebted to Nietzsche. 
According to White, this debt is threefold: the criticism of Christianity's slavish 
mentality, the proclamation of the end of realism, and the affirmation of life within 
the void. 81 None of these, however, should be taken as a denial of the possibility of 
a religious commitment. For example, Albert Schweitzer's idea of 'reverence for 
life', as a guiding principle of valuation, can be seen as a moral re-creation of 
Nietzsche's will-to-power as the 'will-to-live' transformed by the religious impulse 
into the 'will-to-love'. 82 Because of the harsh and violent nature of the universe, 
such 'Reverence for life', wil l always be "an unavailing ethical struggle"83 and thus 
reminiscent of both Kant's attempt to unify virtue and happiness and, Jesus' 
proclamation of the imminent Kingdom. 84 Schweitzer's attempt to bring the 
kingdom of God on earth through his missionary and medical activity is, according 
to Cupitt, "an obligatory impossibility"85 which points to the moral worth of the 
Christian story. This is a story, Cupitt notes, that tells us to: 
Give up ... illusory mystical yearnings, accept the human condition, love 
your neighbour, pour your own life out into the common life of all 
humanity. In a word, give up God and be content with Christ. 86 
This message, however, is too blunt to be accepted. We therefore need stories about 
God and God's kingdom in order to help us to give up belief in God; that is, the God 
of realism. 87 
80 ibid., p. 69. Also see, Cupitt, The World To Come op. cit., pp. 129-130 
81 White, Don Cupitt and the Future of Christian Doctrine, op. cit., p. 44. 
82 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., pp. 106-109. 
83 ibid., p. 232. 
84 ibid., p. 232. 
85 ibid., p. 232, 
86 Cupitt, What is a Story? op. cit., p. 133. 
87 ibid., pp. 134-154. 
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After Nietzsche, according to Cupitt, theological thinking about God becomes 
paradoxical and ambiguous. Like all knowledge, it is not only seen as human, 
natural and historical; it is also instrumental and pragmatic. What becomes 
important is the use people make of religious language; how it functions in what 
they aim to achieve, rather than questions about the reality that lies behind such 
j jgg 88 
For Cupitt, this instrumental, or pragmatic, element of modem religious 
believing in which the "concern for meaning entirely replaces the traditional 
concerns for objective existence and knowledge of what exists,"*^ is embodied in the 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Cupitt writes: 
From the new non-realist viewpoint a person believes in God i f the idea of 
God does some real work and plays a constitutive part in his thinking and 
in shaping his way of life; for as Wittgenstein says, a word that does no 
real work is like an idle cog in a machine.^o 
In his early work, the Tractatus, Wittgenstein limited the meaningful use of 
language to the way words picture things leaving other uses of language in a 
paradoxical state of trying to express ineffable mysteries. In his later work, 
however, particularly in his Investigations, he argued that language is not 
meaningful simply because it might picture things but because in doing so it exists 
within a context of practices that provided the mles governing the meaningful use of 
words in that context. The meaning of a sentence in one context of practices may 
differ from the meaning of that sentence given in a context of practices that 
engender a different set of mles for language use, even though the same words are 
used in both cases. Thus, as far as religious language is concemed, Schweitzer's 
religious 'obligatory impossibility' becomes, in the early Wittgenstein, 'inexpressibly 
wonderful' and in the later Wittgenstein 'inexpressible wondef is seen as the 
88 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 232. 
89 ibid., p. 241. 
90 ibid., p. 245. 
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practical form that religious language takes, ^ i Cupitt believes that we learn from 
Wittgenstein that: 
... the more we become conscious of the merely-human character of 
religious language, the more clearly we see that all religious 'knowledge' 
is—and has to be—simply practical.52 
Cupitt adds: 
Philosophy, in his [Wittgenstein's] view, is a sustained attempt to cure 
ourselves of transcendent illusions and persuade us to be content with 
what is—and what is, is language and the human realm, and nothing 
else.93 
For Cupitt, just as Wittgenstein draws attention to our use of language in everyday 
life, in order to cure us of certain philosophical illusions, so genuine religious belief, 
by turning us toward this world, cures us of certain theological illusions about the 
reality of God.^ ^ por Cupitt, Wittgenstein's outlook was naturalistic, voluntaristic 
and human, making Wittgenstein, according to Cupitt, "a non-realist about religion 
... [and] ... everything else."95 when knowledge becomes understood as human, 
natural, historical and instrumental it also becomes understood pragmatically. Our 
knowledge and our theories, Cupitt writes, "can be described as 'true' only in the 
sense that, and for so long as,... they work usefully."''6 
So far in this section I have sketched very briefly Cupitt's account of four pairs 
of thinkers. In Cupitt's view, the work of these thinkers helps explain why non-
realism in religion has become not only possible but requisite. Each of these 
thinkers have contributed to a shift in the intellectual seat of authority. I f religious 
belief is to remain intellectually credible it must, Cupitt believes, now adopt for 
itself a non-realist self-understanding. Such an understanding of religion would 
91 ibid., p. 243. 
92 ibid., p. 221. 
93 ibid., p. 222. 
94 Don Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 1-3. 
95 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 222. 
96 ibid., p. 188. 
53 
"teach us to accept and make the most of our new sense of ourselves and our place 
in nature. "97 
While I have limited myself to a discussion of eight thinkers upon whom Cupitt 
relies in order to explain the intellectual heritage of non-realism, I cannot emphasise 
too much that I have been considering Cupitt's own interpretation of their work. 
Other interpretations of the significance of these thinkers, interpretations that make 
religious belief more amenable to religious realism, are equally possible and 
defensible. Therefore, reference to these thinkers should not be taken as offering 
conclusive proof that the intellectual endeavour is moving inexorably in the 
direction of religious non-realism. However, reference to them does help explain 
why Cupitt, and others like him, think that non-realism in matters of religious belief 
is something which we now ought to try to explore and promote. 
Alongside his intellectual account of the decline of religious realism, Cupitt 
also believes that there are a number of social changes which have also contributed 
to the shift in intellectual authority that has seen this decline. Two examples noted 
by Cupitt are the movement toward democracy and the effects of industrialisation. 
In the case of the former, Cupitt suggests, the notion of political authority underwent 
a profound social change after Galileo's discoveries. It became more difficult to 
claim for it "the sort of cosmic backing that [it] had always had in previous 
societies." As a result, Cupitt continues, authority becomes understood as originating 
from below, "from within the human community rather than from a higher world 
above. "98 The steady movement toward democracy is seen by Cupitt as a 
manifestation of a tacit acceptance of religious non-realism. Authority for 
government comes not from a divine source independent of us, but from rationally 
conceived constitutions, collective human decision-making and community 
97 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. 62. 
98 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 46. 
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participation. As the notion of a free citizen within a democratic society emerges, 
the notion of religious authority is weakened.99 Cupitt writes: 
The work of politics was no longer merely to enforce obedience to sacred 
authority, but to establish consent and public debate.'oo 
While Cupitt admits that enlightened citizenship and democratic government are not 
entirely fauhless, noting that democratic government is itself "maintained by a 
mixture of force and mystification,"'oi he is nonetheless correct to point out that 
now the human rather than the divine authorisation of political and social control is 
almost universally recognised. This recognition has seen the withdrawal of religious 
belief from the social space it once occupied and this has detrimental consequences 
for its realist self-understanding. 
Another cause of this withdrawal, Cupitt suggests, is industrialisation. 
According to Cupitt, the industrial revolution brought home to a vast number of 
people the intellectual shift that had taken place in western Europe. In the new 
industrial towns the old religious certainties were replaced by the harsh reality of 
industrial progress and the stmggle for economic power. According to Cupitt, the 
church neglected or disclaimed these industrial areas and many of the leaders of the 
new working classes abandoned religion and took up politics.'02 Meanwhile the 
successes of the industrial revolution meant that human progress was measured in 
terms of the great feats of human engineering, invention and discovery. Human 
ingenuity and progress became the measure of all things especially when it 
successfully turned to the melioration of harsh working and living conditions 
suffered by the industrial poor.'03 Human betterment is now seen less as a matter of 
supernatural intervention and more as a matter of the instrumental realisation of 
desired ends through human ingenuity and creativity. The sense of well-being and 
99 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 74. 
'00 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 134. 
101 CupiVL, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 179. 
Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 26. 
103 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 189-190. 
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desire for progress it engendered, Cupitt maintains, continues now in late capitalist 
society but it is lived vicariously through mass production, the media and our 
participation in the commercial marketplace. 104 "What religion used to call faith," 
Cupitt notes, "is now re-christened consumer confidence. "105 The social space 
available for religious belief and practice thus appears to recede even further. Even 
the invention of the motor car and the camera can be shown to have eroded and 
supplanted the social space once occupied by religious practice and belief 106 
Again, however, we must take care not to assume that these social factors 
justify a non-realist account of religious belief They do however help explain why 
some theologians are now finding non-realism appealing. For these theologians the 
human, natural, historical and instrumental understanding of knowledge that has 
developed in the last 400 years, and the various changes in our social lives over that 
period, make religious non-realism an attractive position to hold. Convinced by a 
picture which sees life as all there is, these theologians believe that we need the 
resources religion provides in order to help us make our lives meaningful. 107 
Religion both inspires creativity and calls us to work toward the realisation of the 
104 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 77-80. 
105 ibid., p. 78. 
106 In relation to the motor car, for example, D.Z. Phillips shows how its use eroded the ritual of the 
funeral procession. More people have cars, roads widen, traffic increases, processions move faster, 
other drivers no longer slow down. "Slowly but surely," writes Phillips, "factors which &st seemed to 
have little to do with religion eroded a religious response." D.Z. Phillips, Belief, Change and Forms of 
Life (London: MacMillan, 1986), p. 90. 
In relation to the camera Cupitt alludes to Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida (E.T. Richard Howard, 
London: Fontana edition 1984). For Barthes, the photograph fills the ritual space in society that deals 
with the dead; a space vacated by religion, (ibid., p. 92.). But in the photograph even the dead 
become ephemeral. The photo, which replaced ritual and story—important aids to memory—itself 
erodes, so that "by making the (mortal) photograph into the general and somehow natural witness of 
'what has been,' modem society has renounced the monument." (ibid., p. 93.). This itself becomes a 
further erosion of religion's social space. Cupitt writes: 
These many images of vanished instants fail to cohere, do not add up to anything 
substantial ... We have been and we are no more than long chains of fleeting events that 
cannot be disentangled from the universal flux of becoming ... 
Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., pp. 192-193. We see, Cupitt notes, "that without the activity of the myth-
maker, reality, ... the world and our life is no more than a stream of vague and fleeting events that 
pass away from moment to moment." (ibid., p. 192.). Hence, there is a need for religion, if not realist 
then non-realist religion. 
107 "Religion," vmtes Cupitt, "is our way of making sense of a life that otherwise would make no 
sense at all." Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 191. 
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values it enables us to imagine. This wi l l be religion purged of its realist beliefs. It 
wil l , Cupitt notes—perhaps over-dogmatically and paradoxically, be religion 
"undertaken just for its own sake, as an autonomous and practical response to the 
coolly-perceived tmth of the human condition. "los As an autonomous intemalised 
ideal, to act religiously will be to act both freely while avoiding egoism and to act 
disinterestedly without the thought of some great heavenly reward. i09 "This," Cupitt 
notes, "is tme religion: all else is superstition."no Purged of its realist beliefs 
religion can begin to countenance the human, natural, historical and instrumental 
interpretation of its own claims and concems. Such an interpretation will be 
pragmatic in at least three respects. 
Firstly, as an autonomous intemalised principle guiding action, "God is the 
work 'God' does in framing and facilitating the act of faith."iii As such, the 
religious demand which 'God' mythically personifies'i^ remains for the non-realist 
both authoritative and t r anscenden t .A God who exists in an objective sense 
would be religiously inappropriate because, Cupitt notes: 
The authority of the religious requirement has to be autonomous and 
intrinsic in order that it may be fully internalized, imposed by us freely 
upon ourselves and made our own.ii'* 
In this way God can be understood as working in us an iimer transformation without 
jeopardising our spiritual freedom. Cupitt writes: 
... when I bind the religious requirement unconditionally upon myself it 
so affects me that I quite properly and meaningfully describe it as waiting, 
as searching me out, as judging and condemning me, as restoring me, 
freeing me and as filling me with divine spirit, 
108 ibid., p. 202. 
109 ibid., p. 190. 
n o ibid., p. 202. 
111 Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 138. 
112 Cupitt, TakingLeave of God, op. cit., p. 113. 
11^ Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 136. 
11'* Cupitt, TakingLeave of God, op. cit., p. 96. 
115 ibid., p. 93. 
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For Cupitt, a meaningful God is an affective God, "only as I take religious realities 
to heart and make them wholly my own," he writes, "do I discover what religious 
tmth is."ii6 This tmth is my spiritual liberation. 
Secondly, this religious tmth is not only pragmatic in the sense of being known 
in its practical effect on the believer; it is also pragmatic as praxis. Religious tmth 
is not primarily a matter of intellectual assent: it has to be done; practised in 
concrete situations of l i fe . i i7 As Cupitt notes, "... the meaning of the word 'God' 
shows itself in the practice of religion."''8 And elsewhere, Cupitt adds: 
Religion is practical, and the function of religious doctrines is to show us 
in condensed and symbolic form what this practical reality of religion is, 
and to guide us along its path. The concrete lived reality of the religious 
life comes first, and the doctrine is simply a mythical representation of it, 
119 
Thirdly, religious belief is pragmatic in the sense that it enables us to cope with 
the world in which we live. It provides tools and resources that help us to live the 
spiritual life. 120 It enables us to make meaning out of our lives and to create values 
to live by. 
These pragmatic strands in Cupitt's thought survive the eclipse of his first 
attempt to present an account of non-realist religious belief in terms of the 
autonomous intemalised religious consciousness, by his later, linguistic account of 
non-realist religious belief But just as they are sometimes submerged xmder Cupitt's 
occasional dogmatic and realist account of the autonomous intemalised religious 
consciousness, so in the latter account they tend to be submerged under Cupitt's 
occasional dogmatic and post-modernist account of language. Nevertheless, these 
pragmatic strands are significant features of Cupitt's understanding of religious non-
realism and provides Cupitt with an altemative to the positivistic critique of 
116 ibid., p. 92. 
117 ibid., pp. 126, 130. 
^ ibid., p. 57. 
119 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. 38. 
120 Cupitt, 'A Tale of Two Cities' op. cit., pp. 23, 25. 
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religious realism. In the positivist's view,i2i science provides us with objective 
knowledge which is incompatible with the beliefs of traditional Christianity. In the 
pragmatist's view, science has no epistemologically privileged status. As Cupitt 
notes, when pragmatism prevails, science, religion, morality, and art will be judged 
by the "contribution [they] make to human well-being," 122 and not by whether they 
accurately represent some aspect of the world. On this view, Cupitt adds: 
... science is one useful himian language-game and religion is another, but 
both are human constructions... 123 
When writing these words, Cupitt was not prepared to adjudicate between the 
positivist's and the pragmatist's view of science. "Either way", he notes "religion 
loses its old realist sort of truth..." 124 Now, however, without losing his trust in the 
value of science, 125 Cupitt has increasingly taken his place with the pragmatists 
rather than the positivists and this inclination is affirmed in Cupitt's assimilation of 
the linguistic turn in philosophy. This turn itself provides a further set of reasons 
that explain why Cupitt and other religious believers now find a non-realist 
approach to religious belief attractive. It is this set of reasons that I shall now 
consider. 
2.3. The Recent Philosophy of Language and Cupitt's Religious Non-realism: 
The philosophy of language provides Cupitt, and other 'Sea of Faith' writers, 126 with 
perhaps the strongest set of reasons that explain the attraction to a non-realist 
understanding of religious belief Religious belief requires a language in order for it 
to have any meaning and language is humanly created. However, Cupitt's 
appropriation of ideas from the philosophy of language is complex and is never 
systematised. He draws on the work of at least three philosophers who have rather 
121 Such a view is exemplified by Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian, (London: Unwin, 
1957). 
122 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. x. 
123 ibid., p. xi. 
124 ibid., p. X. 
125 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p.9. 
126 See for example David Hart, Faith in Doubt, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
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different emphases and presuppositions. These are: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jacques 
Derrida and, more recently but less overtly, Donald Davidson. In this section I shall 
briefly summarise Cupitt's understanding of these philosophers. In doing so I shall 
not consider the background from which these philosophers draw their accoimts of 
language, nor shall I consider whether Cupitt's interpretation of their work is the 
most apposite. My aim is merely to show the effect that these philosophers have 
had on Cupitt's work and the motivations they engender in this context for 
developing a non-realist account of religious belief 
Since the mid-1980's Cupitt has been convinced by what is perhaps the central 
argument of each of these philosophers, namely that our understanding of tmth and 
meaning, and thus also our understanding of reality and objectivity, is always 
conveyed in and created by a human use of language.'27 However, this is not a 
conclusion that Cupitt was quick to accept. In the pre - non-realist stage of his 
theological pilgrimage, Cupitt was reluctant to embrace the Wittgensteinian 
understanding of religious belief associated with D.Z. Phillips.'28 This reluctance is 
perhaps reflected in the distant style in which, in Taking Leave of God, Cupitt comes 
to adopt what he calls Phillips' 'expressivist' account of religious belief'29 It is not 
until The World To Come, where Cupitt describes this 'expressivist' account of 
religious belief as a welcome "theological pragmatism", that he wholeheartedly 
embraces the idea that language constmcts reality, i-^ o He notes that in The World to 
Come, he first began to reflect on the type of Franco-American philosophy recently 
outlined by the American pragmatist Richard Rorty.'-^' Thus from an early stage. 
127 Don Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, (London: SCM Press, 1987), pp. 18-21. 
128 Cupitt, The Leap of Reason, op. cit., p. 41.; Explorations in Theology, op. cit., pp. 24-26. 
129 Cupitt, TakingLeave of God, op. cit., pp. 56-58. Phillips has always tended to use the term 
'expression' when considering the nature of religious language but has never wanted to be understood 
as a non-realist. This is to some extent due to his association of non-realist with the views expressed 
by Richard Braithwaite in his 'An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Rehgious Belief in B. Mitchell 
(ed.). The Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). See D.Z. Phillips, 
Religion Without Explanation, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), pp. 139-150 and 'On Really Believing' in 
Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion, (London: MacMillan, 1993), pp. 33-55. 
130 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., pp. 160-162. Also see pp. 12-13, 130-131. 
13' Don Cupitt, 'A Reply to Rowan Williams' mModem Theology, Vol.. 1, 1984, p. 26. 
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Cupitt's tmderstanding of the constructive nature of language has been entwined 
with, and informed by, philosophical pragmatism. 
This is also evidenced in Cupitt's account of Wittgenstein for whom, Cupitt 
comments, "words and sentences are not invisible essences laid up in a Platonic 
heaven, but are given by the part they play in social life".i32 In this view, the 
meaning a use of language has will always be a public matter and will depend upon 
the human practices that provide its public context. Talk of God will be meaningfiil 
within the context of our religious practices so that Cupitt can affirm that he can 
only understand 'God' in religious terms as "the part God plays in the religious life 
...".133 In this sense, language determines the religious reality. Religious realism 
must therefore be understood as a doctrine internal to a human use of language. For 
Cupitt, the value of Wittgenstein's account of language is the attention it gives to the 
use of language within our everyday practices, thereby drawing us away from, and 
curing us of, the tendency to posit meanings outside of human life and practice and 
human uses of language. i34 Cupitt never moves far from this Wittgensteinian view 
of language, 135 but in Only Human and onward, until The Time Being, Wittgenstein's 
notion that language provides the limits of our worldi36 comes to be expressed by 
Cupitt in terms of the slogan associated with Derrida's deconstructive account of 
language:"// n'y a hen hors du texte."i37 Claiming Derrida as his inspiration, Cupitt 
tells us: 
132 Cupitt, The World To Come, op. cit., p. 54. 
133 ibid., p. 63. In this Wittgensteinian view, Cupitt writes: "Language does not gain its meaning by 
referring and copying m that way. Instead, language has to be seen as embedded in and interwoven 
with human practices." The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 220. 
134 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 1-3. 
135 See for example Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 86.; What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 
139-140.; After All, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
136 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (1922) (E.T. D.F. Pears and B.F. 
McGuinness, London: Routledge, 1961), Iffl 5.621, 5.63, 5.62; Cupitt, The world To Come, op. cit., p. 
131. 
137 'There is nothing outside of the text'. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, (1967) (E.T. G.C. 
Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 163. For an interpretation of Derrida's 
work that is more amenable to realism see Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism? 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).; Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).; Graham Word, Barth, Derrida And the Language of Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Outside life there is not even nothing. Stop thinking in such ways, cure 
yourself of trying to talk nonsense! Understand that language is all, and 
forget about trying to step outside, for there is no such step that could 
conceivably be taken. 
I f the second stage of Cupitt's theological pilgrimage, as classified by White, is 
marked by a retreat inward to an internal space still occupied by the divine in the 
form of the autonomously chosen religious consciousness, then in the third stage this 
retreat is cut o f f Religion now becomes a matter of public convention. Social 
change, rather than personal autonomy, becomes seen by Cupitt as the site of 
religious freedom and moral re-evaluation. When all knowledge is seen as 
human, natural, historical and instrumental and when this knowledge is shown to be 
meaningful only inside a use of language, then we see that there can be no outside: 
no transcendence of the public human realm; no outside to history or culture; no 
outside to language. Cupitt writes: 
[Ijdeas about transcendence are in themselves ... just "immanent; 
supernatural beliefs ... natural phenomena; mystical experiences of 
stepping right out of time ... have a natural history in time. 
Religious non-realism is a form of radical immanentism,''*^ and radical linguistic 
outsidelessness is increasingly called upon by Cupitt to explain why we should now 
Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. xi. See also p. xii. 
Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 80-82. 
I'^ O Although an outside may be imaginatively conceived inside language. Cupitt, What Is a Story?, 
op. cit., pp. 82, 102. 
1'" Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 87 (Cupitt's own marks of omission and italics); also 
p. 120. Comparing Wittgenstein and Derrida on this notion of outsidelessness, Cupitt writes: 
Wittgensteinian might make the point by saying that for us the worid is within language 
and not vice versa, Derrida, while saying essentially the same thing, speaks not of 
language but of texts and writing ... for however far we go in chasing after some extra-
textual reality which can fiinction as an objective criterion for checking the text, we will 
still be operating within the realm of text. Our relation to whatever we describe as 'reality* 
will still be subject to the textual logic which governs all thought. We never grasp 
objective 'natural presence' in a clear-cut, univocal way, for the very act of grasping is 
itself language-shaped. Whatever we do, we are always within the logic of text, which is 
secondary, differential and foil of systematic ambiguities. 
Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 193. 
1'*^  For Cupitt religion is learning to live with radical immanence. Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. 
cit., p. 149. He writes elsewhere: 
The Flux is outsideless. There is only all this, and there's nothing wrong with all this. The 
work of religion ought to be, not to take us out of it, but simply to reconcile us to it. 
Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 17. 
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be religions non-realists.''*^ According to Cupitt, after Derrida, words cannot be 
understand as transcendental signifiers. Rather, they are immanently inscribed signs 
that receive their meaning from other such signs in an imending relational chain of 
'differance'.''*'* A l l meaning must be understood as differential and humanly 
produced rather than referential and extra-human. "A dictionary," writes Cupitt, 
"shows meaning to be relational and differential... not from sign directly on to [the] 
thing signified, but sideways from sign to sign."''*^ Thus, in an important sense, 
Cupitt argues, language produces reality. "Your vocabulary," Cupitt writes, "shapes 
your world. "'"^ ^ Religion, ethics, art, and science, as well as notions of self and 
world are all constituted by the language in which they are conducted.''*'^  When 
meaning is understood as its current usage within language, talk of an objective, 
reahst, supernatural, extra-human God beyond language is finally silenced, i'*^ To 
find out all there is to find out about God we need not go beyond human life and 
human language. "Like us," Cupitt notes, "God is made only of words."''*^ On 
Derrida's account of language Cupitt argues: 
... everything is constituted within the foimdationless, unanchored, 
evolving cultural-linguistic whole of which we are all part and to which 
we all contribute. 
Because language is always shifting and never fixed there can be no self-present 
meaning. A l l language in this sense is like writing. It has to be interpreted and re-
interpreted. Even speech, which appears to be grounded in the meaning intended 
For the visionary nature of Cupitt's understanding of outsidelessness see Cupitt, Creation Out of 
Nothing, op. cit., pp. 87-89. 
''^ 'Differcmce' indicating a combination of deferral to other signs and its difference from them. 
Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 21. Religion, Cupitt notes, must be seen as "a thesaurus 
of meaning." Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 205. 
''•^  Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. ix. 
ibid., p. ix. Cupitt recognises that Nietzsche, Lacan, Lyotard and Baudrillard are also significant 
figures in the general development of the view of language which Derrida outlines, ibid., p. 12. 
''^ ^ ibid., p. 70. Also Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 12, 18. 
'''^  Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. x. 
150 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 42. 
'51 ibid., p. 12. 
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by the speaker, must presuppose the differential chain of meaning and will thus 
always be open to ambiguity and the slippage of self-presence.'52 
The third, more subtle, influence on Cupitfs understanding of language is 
Donald Davidson. Like Derrida, Davidson argues that there is no site for questions 
of meaning, truth and reality outside of, or beyond, a use of language. Samuel C. 
Wheeler I I I writes: 
For Davidson,... [t]here is no 'presence' behind language, but rather, what 
is behind language is inseparable from further language.'53 
However, Davidson's accont of language is more amenable to the pragmatism and 
the linguistic and biological naturalism, that Cupitt wants to develop in theology, 
than is the deconstructive post-modernist account associated with Derrida. Indeed, 
Cupitt states that, at least since 1994, he is "wanting to read Davidson on language, 
rather than Derrida."'54 Cupitt's attempt to bring together biological and linguistic 
naturalism to produce a non-realist religious and metaphysical story that is not 
untruthful'55 may now no longer be facilitated by a deconstructive account of 
language. Since After All, Cupitt has followed the advice he gave in Life Lines to 
recognise the value of post-modernism and then "make haste to move on."'56 
now suggests that we require "a post-postmodernist attempt at reconstruction. " '5 ' 
The difference between Davidson and Derrida is that whereas Derrida is concerned 
to see in the differential play of language an unspecifiable 'other' of language which 
supposedly prevents language itself from becoming the source of self-present 
meaning, '58 Davidson is concerned with the assumptions that are required by our 
'52 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 112.; Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 141, 
'53 Samuel C. Wheeler m , 'Indeterminacy of French Interpretation: Derrida and Davidson' in Ernest 
LePore(ed.), Truth and Interpretation, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 489. 
'5'* Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 134. Cupitt adds that in seeing words as tools for doing 
certain jobs the pragmatic tradition in philosophy resembles Wittgensteinian thought, ibid., p. 147. 
'55 Cupitt, 4^cry4//, op. cit., p. 39.; What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 81-82. I shall discuss this in a little 
more detail in chapter 5. 
'56 Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 127. 
'57 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 7. 
158 See Derrida's dialogue with Richard Kearney in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary 
Continental Thinkers, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 123-124. 
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ubiquitous interpretative activity. These assumptions give us our world more or less 
as we perceive it to be. Thus, on the presupposition of a Davidsonian account of 
language Cupitt is able to affirm a position between constructivism and naive 
realism, in which "we together constitute a common life-world."i^° Our language 
and our world are inextricably interwoven. The objective world returns as a 
humanly angled construction on the outer face of language, i^ i Explicating this point 
Cupitt writes: 
The only world we have, the only world we know anything about, and the 
only world we have the slightest reason to believe in, is the world of us 
talking animals, the world as it relates to, and is going to be seen by, 
beings with our needs, our purposes, our feeling and our language, i^^ 
Davidson thus provides Cupitt with an account of language situated in life and an 
account of human life that is situated in language. The meaning of life and the 
meaning of language are bound up with each other, there is no antecedently existing 
entity outside of language and life that further establishes their meaning or reality. 
A l l three philosophers have played a significant role in undermining Cupitt's 
confidence in realism. But, from The Time Being onwards, he tends to use 
deconstruction piecemeal in order to illustrate a point against realism, rather than 
wholesale as in Creation Out of Nothing. Equally, Davidson's account of language, 
which now dominates Cupitt's theology, was only mentioned in passing in Creation 
Out of Nothing}^ Meanwhile, Cupitt's understanding of Wittgenstein's account of 
language as establishing meaning internal to our practices, is affirmed throughout 
159 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 50. 
160 ibid., p. 16. 
161 ibid., p. 58. For Davidson, language gives us our world. But Cupitt, while under the influence of 
deconstruction, sometimes suggests that the world drops out of the picture altogether. See Creation 
Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 195. [It must be noted, however, that such a disenchanted view of the 
world may not represent Derrida's own account of deconstruction. See Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, 
Realism and Postmodernism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 255-262.] Under 
the influence of Davidson, however, Cupitt argues that our common world is constructed by people 
who share a common language and that therefore "[ejverything is what it seems to be ... " Cupitt, 
After All, o^. da.., p. 47. 
162 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 101. 
163 Cupitt, 777^  Time Being, op. cit., pp. 106-107. 
•6^ Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 206. n.l7. 
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Cupitt's works since Taking Leave of God. Taken together, all three provide Cupitt 
with a pragmatic accoimt of language'^5 that fiimishes him with a set of reasons that 
help explain why a non-realist approach to religious belief now seems appealing. 
Perhaps the most important of these reasons is the question that this account of 
language raises against the correspondence theory of knowledge upon which, Cupitt 
believes, many versions of religious realism, especially Platonic versions, rely.'^^ 
Such versions of realism, Cupitt notes, suppose "that the great words of philosophy, 
religion, ethics and so forth, must stand for unchanging and invisible essences, like 
the Platonic ideas."'^ "^  But Cupitt's account of language undermines this in at least 
three ways.'^ s Firstly, it denies the realist any fixed starting point from which it 
might be possible to hook words onto things. What might appear to be a linguistic 
necessity is, Cupitt argues, just a piece of convention which is always liable to 
undergo change. There are no fixed points of reference around which it might be 
possible to build a stable theory of correspondence. I f there is no non-conventional 
reason why the word 'table' should refer to the piece of fiimiture that I am currently 
resting on, then there is also no reason why the word 'God' should be understood as 
referring to anything other than the conventional set of meanings associated with the 
term. The realist might respond by arguing that in some cases conventional 
meanings might, by fortune, stumble across a natural hook-up between word and 
thing. Secondly, though, Cupitt points out that we hardly have sufficient reason to 
know when such a fortunate connection has been made. To recognise that a 
connection has been made presupposes that we aheady know in advance what the 
fortunate set of words would look like before coming to use them. As Cupitt notes, 
the realist would need to "employ some medium other than language in order to 
define the [language-to-reality relation and that] medium ... will have to be able to 
'65 Cupitt sees Wittgenstein as "a sort of pragmatist." ((Only Human, op. cit., p. 203.), and despite its 
drawbacks, he still conceives the differential deconstructive understanding of language as defining 
meaning in terms of use (Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 83). 
'66 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., Ch. 2 and pp. 99-100. 
'6'7 Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith' in Runzo (ed.), Is God Real?, op. cit., p. 46. 
168 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
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compass both ends of [that relation]."i69 We have no such medium. We caimot 
know the world in any way other than by our current linguistic conventions. These 
conventions cannot be compared with a view of the world that is outside them. 
Cupitt writes: 
... we are so completely immersed in life-and-language that we cannot in 
fact spell out any other way that things might have been for us. I 'o 
Thus, Cupitt notes, our only possible source of true knowledge "is internal to our 
discursive practices, and external copying-truth is plainly mythical."i^i As Davidson 
argues, when it comes to the question of truth, "[tjhere is no reason to look for a 
prior, or independent, account of some referential relation. "1^ 2 The only connection 
we need to make for truth to be philosophically significant "is the connection with 
the users of language."i^ ^ Thirdly, Cupitt notes, the realist must assume that 
somewhere there is something, albeit as yet extremely amorphous, that really is how 
things are. Unfortunately, for such a notion to be meaningfully articulated it has to 
submit itself to the iterability of language. "The consequence is," Cupitt writes, 
"reality never gets fully closed or fixed but goes on being contested endlessly, "i'^'' 
'How things really are' remains amorphous and unspecifiable. 
Thus, a correspondence theory of knowledge is incoherent because, as Cupitt 
notes: 
... nobody can take up a fully-independent standpoint and vocabulary for 
seeing and defining the way the two orders [word and object] nestle 
together. What is it that fits snugly up against what, and where? 1^ 5 
169 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 38. 
1^° Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 138. Elsewhere Cupitt notes that conventionality "has the 
effect of destroying the old metaphysical foundations of knowledge" {The New Christian Ethics, op. 
cit., p. 118.). 
I ' l Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 39. 
i'^ 2 Donald Davidson, 'The Structure and Content of Truth", in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, 
1990, p. 300. 
"3 ibid., p. 300. 
1''* Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 60. 
1^ 5 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 84. 
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It is also a cause of scepticism because, as Davidson points out, correspondence 
theories not only leave us uninformed about the nature of the transcendent entities to 
which our words are si^jposed to correspond, but also "such theories deny that what 
is true is conceptually coimected in any way to what we believe."i'6 n jg ridiculous, 
Cupitt argues, to doubt that our beliefs about the manifest world, which language 
produces and presents to us, are out of touch with the world. We cannot possibly 
imagine how else the world might be.i'^ '^  As Davidson notes in the conclusion to his 
article "Empirical Content', the connection between our beliefs and our world does 
not involve positing "sense data, uninterpreted givens or unwritable sentences."!''^  
Rather, it involves an act of interpretation in which the assumption of a shared 
linguistic world enables us to allow to a speaker that for the most part his beliefs are 
true beliefs. Davidson writes: 
... the causal relation between our beliefs and speech and the world also 
supply the interpretation of our language and of our beliefs. i'^ 9 
In a passage clearly influenced by his understanding of Davidson, Cupitt writes: 
We are biological organisms, and for all intents and purposes our life-
world is the world, and that's it. ... [T]he world is all ours, our home, ful l 
stop. There are no ... mysteries,... This world, our life-world, is our only 
and final home: it has no further world beyond it. It is the world of our 
own shared feeling, our sympathy: of course it has no Beyond. 1^ ° 
I f the correspondence model of knowledge is discredited so also, according to 
Cupitt, is foundationalism and the dualist metaphysics i t creates. Both, Cupitt 
believes, are central elements of a realist account of religious belief.i^i 
Foundationalism usually conceives God or some self-evident proposition as 
blocking regressive questioning about the basis up<Hi which our knowledge can lay 
claim to truth. A central core truth is envisaged against which various forms of 
176 Davidson, 'The Structure and Content of Truth', op. cit., p. 299. 
1'^ '^  Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 37. 
I'^ s Davidson, "Empirical Content", in E . LePore (ed.). Truth ami Interpretation, op, cit., p. 332. 
179 ibid., p. 332. 
180 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
181 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 102. 
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knowledge can be judged But Cupitt points out that our understanding of language 
would suggest that such foundational notions are redundant. In a comment 
primarily about foimdations in morality, Cupitt writes: 
... linguistic meanings ... simply cannot be held immobile in the way that 
foundationalism demands. So we must give up foundationalism and 
instead see ... religion as being an evolving language and a continuing 
conversation. It does not need and it cannot have either certain and 
inmiovable foundations, or invisible and extra-historical rails to direct it 
aright.'82 
I f meaning is internal to a use of language there can be no non-linguistic, no non-
relational account of foundations. Cupitt comments, "[tjhere is no longer anything 
out there for faith to correspond to, ... the only test of faith now is the way it works 
out in life. "'83 Like any human ideology, foundationalism is "carried in human 
practices and human language. "'84 Language, Cupitt notes, "doesn't have or need a 
Beyond. ... [because it] already presupposes and produces a world all by itself "'85 
To explicate this Davidsonian point, Cupitt compares realists to over-zealous onion 
peelers. Continually peeling in search of the core they "miss the point that 
objectivity is given with the whole onion."'86 As Cupitt notes elsewhere: 
... after the turn to language, we see that the world of everyday life 
conjxired up by our language is the only worid there can be for us. '8" 
It is now a matter of common sense that our knowledge of the world, our rehgion 
and anything else, is produced in language and since language is only human so too 
is our world and our religion. '88 
Another implication of this account of language, for Cupitt, is the demise of the 
notion of absolute truth. While some versions of religious realism may claim not to 
'82 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 142-143. 
'83 Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 202. 
184 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
185 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 121. 
186 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 19. 
187 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 6. 
18* Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 70. "Language," Cupitt notes, "has made God." ibid., 
p. 70. 
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rely upon a correspondence theory, they nevertheless claim to be adumbrating a 
theology that, i f recognised as true, should be seen as representing a divine figure 
that must be asserted as true for all time. However, three points make it clear that 
there is no possibility of rejuvenating a notion of truth that would support realist 
claims about God. First, i f something is claimed to be true it is not, Cupitt suggests, 
because we can make a strong thesis out of 'truth', but because such claims fit with 
our current linguistically established human consensual activity. i89 Second, such 
truths are "socially-produced, historically-developed, plural and changing. " ' 9 ° As 
local and humanly created, they remain contingent, ambiguous and incomplete. 
They can therefore offer no support to realist faith. Notions like 'God', 'absolute 
truth', and 'moral order* are rhetorical uses of human language designed to produce a 
particular way of living by manipulating words into coherent stories. Thus, Cupitt 
writes: 
When I say that Christianity is true I mean that this particular system of 
signs and house of meaning is trustworthy and reliable as a ... vocabulary 
in which I can frame my own religious life. ... We do not need more than 
that...'91 
Third, it is only within story that human talk of truth makes sense. It is only within 
the context of a specific creative use of language that 'God', or indeed a 'philosophy 
of language' itself, can have meaning. '^2 In story we can conjure up an outside. 
'^9 Cupitt, After AU, op. dt , p. 41 
190 f 
Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 45. Such truths are small't' rather than capital'T' 
truths: ibid., p. 45. They are personal and regional: ibid., p. 85. See also Radicals arut the Future of 
the Church, op. cit., pp. 12-13 .; The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 47, 110, 116, 137. 
'91 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 55. Elsewhere, Cupitt writes: 
It is only because there is no truth, and instead merdy a plurality of truths, that we have 
been able to rehabilitate the spiritual Hfe, as being a pilgrimage through a long series of 
truths. Furthermore, this pilgrimage has no great destination and is never complete,... 
Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p.214. 
'92 This is a story in which 'God' reveals himself in language and henceforth, Cupitt notes, las: 
.. to abandon his absoluteness and selfsameness and suffer dispersal into the endlessness 
of interpretation. ... [L]ike any other speaker of a human tongue he must become in the 
end nothing but the many different things that others make of him. 
Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 143. 
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imagine the transcendent, and dream up visions of eternity, but such "stories of 
escape are still stories, " i 93 
For Cupitt, the ubiquity of language means that we are always within the stories 
we tell of our life and our world. These stories, include the stories we tell in, and 
about religion, and about langu^e itself. They provide all the objectivit>' we need 
and a cogent explanation for the intellectual attractiveness of religious non-realism. 
Cupitt notes: 
Objectivity is given in and with language; it is not, as realists suppose, 
something external to language around which language wraps itself 194 
Nevertheless it is still an open question whether we choose a realist or a non-realist 
story of religion. A choice between them, Cupitt suggests, will be made on 
pragmatic grounds, in terms considered to be most helpful to human living and most 
credible to the human intellect. 195 
2.4. Is Cupitt's Accoimt of the Intellectual Heritage of Religious Non-realism 
Religiouslv Satisfying?: 
Cupitt's critics do not accept his account of the intellectual heritage that I have been 
considering in this chapter. Brian Hebblethwaite, for example, argues that Cupitt's 
account of our intellectual heritage is selective and shaped by his "prior commitment 
to an anti-metaphysical ... pragmatic understanding of religious faith . . ." i96 
According to Hebblethwaite, the thinkers that for Cupitt constitute this heritage are 
either profoundly mistaken about their understanding of religious belief or are read 
so selectively by Cupitt that the service they actually do in rooting out false pictures 
of realist religious belief is turned into a criticism of all forms of religious 
realism. 197 Hebblethwaite accuses Cupitt o f accepting unquestioningly the atheistic 
metaphysics of secular thought and of ignoring alternative theological positions 
193 Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 134; also pp. 29-30. 
194 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 19. 
195 Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 9. What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 79. 
196 Brian Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism, (Cambridge-
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p 52 
197 ibid., Ch. 2. 
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which continue the task of interpreting modem thought in terms of theistic belief 198 
Above all, he accuses Cupitt of an unquestioning acceptance of Kantian subjectivity 
and Nietzschean constructivism. i99 
However, Hebblethwaite's account of Cupitt can be challenged. Firstly, we 
have seen that Cupitt does not accept Nietzsche's philosophy unquestioningly and 
his later account of religious non-realism demurs from his earlier attempt to ground 
religious belief in a Kantian style ethical subjectivity. Secondly, Hebblethwaite's 
own attempt to defend a realist account of truth, which amounts to a defence of the 
views of Michael Devitt against the combined wisdom of Donald Davidson, Hilary 
Putnam and Michael Dummett, is itself a selective account of the recent philosophy 
of science and leads in any case only to a materialistic and deterministic naturalism 
which Hebblethwaite argues does not fit with the human experience of life. For 
Hebblethwaite, only i f our natural material world is created by a loving God can we 
make sense of our experience.200 Thirdly, therefore, despite his own criticism of the 
type of philosophy of religion that builds a picture of God's reality from the prior 
assumption of that reality,20i Hebblethwaite finds himself relying upon a prior 
theistic interpretation of human experience. His rationalisation of the world in 
terms of theism, his interpretation of human self-transcendence and his account o f 
revelation all presuppose, rather than argue, a theistic ground to experience. 
Hebblethwaite's understanding of the intellectual heritage, we might say, is shaped 
by his prior commitment to a metaphysically orientated theistic understanding of 
religious faith.202 
While Cupitt would claim that nothing hangs upon a privileged reading of the 
intellectual herit^e connecting it v^th something like 'the truth of the matter'. 
198 ibid., Ch. 4. 
199 ibid., Ch. 5, esp. pp. 79-80. 
200 ibid., Ch. 7. 
201 ibid., pp. 142-143. 
202 June O'Connor points out that these prior assumptions on both sides mean that the arguments of 
one 'cut little ice' with the arguments of the other. June O'Connor, 'It's Time to Talk About Trust', in 
Joseph Runzo (ed ). Is God Real? op. cit., pp 177-178. 
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Hebblethwaite regards this as a necessary pre-requisite against which any religiously 
satisfying interpretation of the intellectual heritage, and that heritage itself, must be 
judged. For Cupitt, it is enough that this heritage provides abundant resources for 
the reconstruction and renewal of religious belief Whereas Cupitt sees the truth of 
this heritage as opening "some pathways of intellectual, moral and religious 
renewal,"203 Hebblethwaite sees its truth primarily in, and as much as it gives 
expression to, an antecedently existing divine reality. For Cupitt, the fact that 
alternative interpretations of this heritage exist suggests that 'the truth of the matter' 
is ambiguous and plural and not something determined by 'ultimate' or divine reality. 
The question between religious realism and religious non-realism in this context can 
thus be seen as a pragmatic question: 'does realism or non-realism for religious 
believers, offer the more satisfying accoimt of the intellectual heritage?' I f we 
express the issue in this way Hebblethwaite is certain that what he terms Cupitt's 
subjectivist, anti-metaphysical, expressivist, pragmatism is intellectually, religiously 
and morally inadequate to genuine religious sensibilities. 204 These sensibilities 
require that life has ultimate meaning and fulfilment. Only the existence of a real 
God along the lines revealed within the Christian tradition and scripture205 can 
guarantee the salvation and eternal life that make life meaningfiil.206 Hebblethwaite 
is astonished that anyone could find liberating the pale shadow of Christianity that is 
'Sea of Faith' religious naturalism.207 Such a view rips the heart out of religion and 
is tantamount to atheism.208 i t is a form of religious belief which simply does not fit 
traditional Christian belief. Hebblethwaite indicates that the type of Buddhism 
which Cupitt admires for its beliefless disinterested spirituality of the void, is 
203 Don Cupitt, 'Responses', in David L. Edwards, Tradition and Truth, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1989), p. 286. r i r- ^  
204 Brian Hebblethwaite, 'A Critique of Don Cupitt's Christian Buddhism, m Runzo (ed.), Is Uoa 
Real?, op. cit., pp. 135-148. 
205 Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 
206 ibid., p. 142. 
207 ibid., p. 145. 
208 ibid., p. 152. 
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inadequate as a religion let alone to a religion of salvation.209 Non-realism 
impoverishes religion and could never sustain a church.210 Religious non-realism is 
morally inadequate, because by allowing that humans create their own values, the 
moral realm becomes arbitrary, historically contingent and relativistic. The only 
consequence will be nihilism. Hebblethwaite also notes that by reducing the human 
to the natural alone, religious non-realists make it impossible for us to have any 
understanding of that self-transcendence which is so important in exciting religious 
sensibilities toward an experience of the eternal and spiritual realm beyond the 
physical, material world.211 Religious non-realism is intellectually incoherent 
because it fails to see that it cannot help relying upon a foimdational metaphysics of 
some kind. As an example, Hebblethwaite mentions Cupitt's notion of Iife-energy2i2 
which seeks symbolic representation in art, science, religion or other areas of human 
endeavour.213 
However, what these points fail to recognise is that Cupitt is writing for those 
for whom religious realism has ceased to be a live option. As Rowan Williams 
argues, Cupitt is not offering a religious hypothesis but a different religious 
vision.214 What Cupitt wants is a reconstruction of religious belief which remains 
inside existing religious institutions. In the next chapter, I will show why Cupitt 
disagrees with Hebblethwaite and instead believes that non-realism is more 
conducive to religious renewal and more satisfying to religious sensibilities than is 
religious realism. 
209 ibid., pp. 117-119. For a more sympathetic account of Cupitt's similarities and differences with 
Buddhism see Gregory Spearritt, 'Don Cupitt: Christian Buddhist?', in Religious Studies, Vol. 31, 
1995, pp. 359-373. 
210 Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth, op. cit., pp. 139-153. 
211 ibid., pp. 128-129. 
212 Hd5blethwaite, 'A Critique of Don Cupitt's Christian Buddhism', op. cit., p. 141. 
213 Cupitt consistently notes the heuristic nature of this term and reiterates that he has no desire to 
reinstate foundationalism by employing it. Don Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 222. This view is 
confirmed by Mason Olds, who points out that Cupitt follows something like Spinoza's 'conatus^ or life 
impulse in his ethics rather than Plato's dualism. However, as Olds notes, Cupitt's preference is 
pragmatically orientated rather than metaphysically grounded. Mason Olds, 'Don Cupitt's Ethics", m 
Religious Humanism, Vol. 28, 1994, p. 85, n lO, relating to pp. 76-77. 
21'' Rowan Williams, 'Religious Realism: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt' in Modem 
Theology, Vol. 1, 1984, pp. 16, 18-19,22. 
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2.5. Conclusion: 
My aim in this chapter has been to consider the intellectual heritage upon which 
Cupitt draws in order to explain why he and the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realist's 
believe that religious non-realism is now an atttactive option for religious people to 
adopt. The cumulative effect of significant ideas in the history of western thought, 
Cupitt believes, has shown our knowledge, including our religious knowledge, to be 
human, natural, historical and instrumental Alongside other historical changes this 
shift in the intellectual climate has withered the social space available for realist 
religious belief. Religion now becomes understood as a human use of language and 
a set of human practices in which we engage for purposes that assist our living in 
the world. Talk of God now acts as a unifying symbol o f religious life. I f we are 
religious today, Cupitt believes, it is not because we are committed to putative 
supernatural truths but because it is pragmatically helpful in various ways for us to 
be religious. By offering an alternative immanent accoimt of fraditional realist 
belief, the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy provides the western philosophical 
fradition with a further impetus toward the development of religious non-reahsm. 
This linguistic turn pulsates with pragmatic resonance. In that Cupitt's view of 
language remains understood as human, natural, historical arid instrumental this 
pragmatic resonance wi l l dominate his account of religious non-realism. Equally, 
there are pressures internal to religious and ethical belief which, according to Cupitt, 
make a non-realist religious faith, rather than a realist religious faith, the religious 
inheritor of the Christian tradition. It is this claim that I shall discuss in the next 
chapter. Then, in chapter four I wi l l consider some criticisms of Cupitt's position 
and introduce the pragmatic context in which the religious non-realist might 
understand the explanatory role of both the intellectual heritage, discussed in this 
chapter, and the pressures internal to religious and ethical belief^ to be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL APPEAL OF RELIGIOUS NON-
REALISM 
3.1. Introduction: 
The shift in the intellectual seat of authority alluded to by Cupitt helps to explain 
part of the appeal of religious non-realism. However, Cupitt is keen to emphasise 
that the religious non-realist does not aim to "resolve the idea of God into non-
religious terms."' Religious belief, Cupitt argues, provides ample opportunity for 
the development of a non-realist theology. Indeed, he argues that it is for the sake of 
religion and its future that we now need to be non-realist. As White points out, 
Cupitt "attacks realism because he values religion. "2 Alongside various intellectual 
pressures, the renewal of religious belief itself constitutes a major motivation behind 
the development and appeal of religious non-realism. In this chapter, therefore, I 
shall be primarily concerned with those pressures internal to religious belief and 
ethical practice which Cupitt believes allows for a non-realist reconstruction and 
renewal of religious belief Then, in the next chapter, I shall infroduce the 
pragmatic context in which we might best understand the explanatory role of both 
the intellectual heritage which Cupitt sees as leading to the development of religious 
non-realism, considered in the last chapter, and the pressures internal to religious 
belief and ethical practice, which I shall considering in this chapter. 
As we have seen, with the publication of The Long Legged Fly (1987), a 
significant shift of emphasis occurs in Cupitt's work. According to White's 
classification, this shift marks the transition from the second to the third stage of 
Cupitt's theological pilgrimage. In the second stage, from Taking Leave of God 
' Don Cupitt, Only Human, (London: SCM Press, 1985), p. 136. 
2 Stephen Ross White, Don Cupitt and the Future of Christian Doctrine. (London: SCM Press, 
1994), p. 118. also p. 76. Or, as Joseph Runzo puts it, for Cupitt "theological realism can literally 
inhibit or even distort the life of faith." Joseph Runzo (ed). Is God Real?, (London: MacNCHan, 
1993), p. 161.; Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, (London: SCM Press, 1980), pp. 2, 154. 
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(1980) up until Life Lines (1986), Cupitt's opposition to religious realism is 
motivated by what he takes to be its contradiction of genuine religious belief, 
practice and affection generated by the autonomous internalised religious 
consciousness. After Life Lines and from The Long legged Fly onwards, the 
autonomous internalised religious consciousness no longer acts as a religious a 
priori defining the nature of genuine religious experience. 3 Such a priori notions 
are themselves seen to be human, natural and historical.'* The autonomous religious 
consciousness is itself dissipated into the flux of the contingent movements of 
language and life.^ Religion is now imderstood as a public human activity created 
by a use of language.6 No longer conceived primarily as an autonomous principle, 
genuine religious belief and practice becomes, for Cupitt, an ecstatic incamational 
embrace of all that is transient and contingent, namely, life itself: 
The self, the world and God are each dispersed and melted down into the 
continuous flux of the contingencies of language and life."^ Language gets its 
meaning as it 'comes to life' in us and life gets its meaning as it is contextualised in 
language.^ Religious non-realism therefore does not offer a futile hope for salvation 
by engineering an escape from the flux; rather, it encourages us to see that salvation 
occurs when we fully accept contingency. Religious non-realism, Cupitt argues. 
3 Cupitt writes: "Especially around 1979-1981,1 was preoccupied with the idea of defining the essence 
of the religious, as if'the religious' as a category were an autonomous, pure and timeless essence that 
could be relied upon. My idea was that when I had discovered it I would use it as a touchstone for the 
criticism of theology. Kant had done a moral critique of theology, so I would attempt a religious one." 
But now, Cupitt continues, he realises that "morality and reli^on are not platonic essences; they are 
mere historical formations." Radicals and the Future of the Church, (London: SCM Press, 1989), pp. 
52-53. However, even at this st^e Cupitt is enticed by the lure of the a priori. Now it is not the a 
priori of the autonomous religious consciousness but the a priori reality of language. See Cupitt, The 
Long Legged Fly, (London: SCM Press, 1987), Ch. 2-3. 
'* Don Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 30. New Christian Ethics, (London: SCM Press, 
1988), pp. 85, 115 ff. 
5 Unable to "transcend the flux of phenomena," the self is "thoroughly woven into the worid." Don 
Cupitt, Solar Ethics, (London: SCM Press, 1995), p. 3. Also Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., 
p. 122.; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 70, 88-89. 
6 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 2 ff. 
" Cn^in, After All, (London: SCM Press, 1994), op. cit., pp. U3-\U:, Solar Ethics, op. cit., p. 52. 
^ Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 13. 
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produces a greater happiness about the human condition than does reahsm. He 
writes: 
We have to say yes to what is before us, in all its contingency. Such is, I 
believe, the final message of an incamational religion. The Eternal 
descends into the contingent world and is diffused through it.^ 
From this new perspective, realism becomes understood as anything that seems to 
stand in the way of our ful l acceptance of life in all its contingency and transience. 
Realism creates the deception of objectivity, immutability, imity and obligation.'" It 
is a fiction, but its adherents labour under the illusion that it is more than a fiction." 
Anyone holding to realism is thus deceived about life. They deny the valuative 
vitality that life brings to a universe that, in itself, is valueless and vitiate life with 
putative essences and foundations. The salvation that religion brings, Cupitt 
suggests, is the joyful acceptance of all that is fleeting, transient and contingent. 
This salvation is the cure for rea l i sm.Thus , by identifying religion with a ful l 
affirmation of life in all its joyfulness, transience and contingency, Cupitt can view 
religion as indubitably opposed to any form of realism. Realism creates the 
anxieties about life from which religion would liberate us.'^ Realism is therefore 
anti-religious to the core. The religious person must consequently be an active non-
realist''' who sees in religion "a cure for metaphysics and a joyful celebration of 
transience."'^ Our salvation rests in our being able to say "yes" to our own 
temporality. To do this, and "for the sake of our salvation, we need to become non-
realists."'^ In this context religion is no longer generated by an autonomous 
9 ibid., p. 8. Also see p. 75.; The Time Being, (London: SCM Press, 1992), p. 8.; The Last 
Philosophy, (London: SCM Press, 1995), pp. 74-84. 
Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit, pp. 41-43. 
"ibid., p. 144. 
'2 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 2 and chapters 7 and 8. Jesus' recorded words in Luke's Gospel 
( L K 17 V. 33), and William Blake's poem "Eternity' express the idea well. According to Blake: "He 
who bends to himself a joy / Does the winged life destroy; / But he who kisses the joy as it flies / Lives 
in eternity's sunrise'. Cupitt writes "loss becomes gain, transience becomes eternal Kfe." What is a 
Story?, op. cit., p. 154. 
'^ Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 87-94. 
iMbid.,p. 173, 
15 ibid.; p. 165. 
'6 ibid., p. 163. 
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principle but it is a story we tell and live by. It "lives only while we are making it 
up. ... [It] ... resembles art in being a human creative activity whereby a certain 
quality of life is produced."''^ 
Equally, morality is no longer conceived by Cupitt as a set of internalised 
guiding principles that we autonomically choose to impose upon ourselves. Rather, 
for Cupitt, to act morally is to live vivaciously; to "inject value into life,"'* to 
outpour ourselves continually, giving value and worth to all that is fleeting and 
contingent. Our moral task now is to create value and to 'face-down' nihilism. The 
religious and the ethical merge in Cupitt's theology of the kingdom. For Cupitt, the 
end of realism is concomitant with the coming of the kingdom promised by Jesus'^  
and the realisation of our eternal happiness.-^ 
Thus, whether we consider Cupitt's acceptance of non-realism from the second 
or the third stage of his theological pilgrimage we will be confronted by his 
assertion of the incompatibility of realism with religious belief and ethical practice. 
This perceived incompatibility is amply exemplified in Cupitt's work. I shall 
summarise some of these examples. 
3.2 The Incompatibility of Religious Belief with Realism: 
3.2a. Religious Pluralism: The growing awareness of religious pluralism over the 
last 150 years suggests that religious belief and practice is a product of human 
cultural activity.21 According to Cupitt, in order to avoid this suggestion realists 
either assert that one's own tradition is, to varying degrees, an approximation of 
ultimate religious truth to which other faith traditions only aspire, or they 
hypothesise a unity of truth at the multi-faith level so that the religiously ultimate is 
understood a^  being conceived in different cultures by different names.-- For the 
17 Cupitt, What is a Story?, (London: SCM Press, 1991), op. cit., p. 129. 
18 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 13. 
19 Cupitt, After All,, pp. 113-117.; The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 3, 122-132. 
20 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 5-9, 11, 74-78. 
21 Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, (London: SCM Press, 1990), pp. 117, 122-123. 
— Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 19. 
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non-realist, who has no truck with the notion of cross-cultural universals, this 
syncretism is just one more local hirnian truth. The syncretists, Cupitt believes, are 
correct to assert that the different religiotis traditions do not exclude each other, but 
this is not because they share in an ultimate universal truth. Religions, according to 
Cupitt, are complex historical value systems that overlap each other in many areas 
of human concern and are always appropriating from each other's traditions. For 
Cupitt, we should allow the assertion of each local religious truth claim while 
remaining committed to our own. Cupitt believes that it is no longer possible or 
useful for us to labour under the impression that there is one ultimate truth. Rather, 
we need to take seriously the existence of conflicting perspectives.^^ Cupitt states: 
There are many possible small-t truths. In adopting one to live by, we are 
choosing a life-style. We are choosing a fiction, a story to live by that 
suits us.25 
Our awareness of religious pluralism on the synchronic plain leads to a further 
awareness of diachronic religious pluralism. As an "ever-changing human 
product,"26 religion not only differs between contemporary cultures but also within 
cultures over historical periods.27 God never has had a permanent identity: "... de 
facto," Cupitt notes, "God of modem Christianity has become very different from 
the God of sixteenth century Christianity. "^ ^ This is not an idea that is amenable to 
religious realism,^^ but it is one, Cupitt believes, that many realists implicitly 
recognise, i f only in order to attempt to evade its non-realist implications, ^ o They 
know, Cupitt suggests, that the ontological status of theological language has been 
emptied of content, but hope that no-one notices. This, Cupitt argues, is an aspect 
23 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 141. 
24 Also see David A. Hart, One Faith?, (London: Mowbray, 1995), pp. 1-9, 145-146. 
25Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 64. David Hart, One Faith?, op. cit., also understands God in 
the context of pluralism in terms of the part God plays in the narrative of faith, pp. 53, 166-167. 
26 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith: Christianity in Change, (London: BBC, 1984), p. 187. 
27 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 85. 
28 Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 118. 
29 ibid., pp. 118-119. 
3° Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 36. A paradigm example of this evasive tendency for 
Cupitt is Jungian theology. Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 104. 
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of the theologian's art: making contemporary theological opinion appear as the 
outworking of the traditional essence of faith, "as if," Cupitt writes, "they were 
offering recognisable portraits in slightly different styles of an objective Being with 
known lineaments who is independently established in the language."'' Our age, for 
Cupitt, is the age of the artist-theologian.•''2 The works of Tillich and Barth, for 
example, are respectively, considered by Cupitt as "a poetic expression of Lutheran 
psychology"-^ ^ and an "expounding of the church's internal jargon."^4 They are 
productions of grand narrators. Alongside Bultmann, Rahner and Pannenberg, 
Cupitt mentions them as producing "work[s] of art [that express] a personal vision 
... [so that] ... it no longer makes sense to assess them as realists."•''^  Diachronic 
religious pluralism, non-realists believe, is evidence that it is theologians who make 
theological sense of the world through the theological stories they tell, rather than 
some time-transcending, antecedently existing entity. As story, religion becomes 
intelligible as only human." I f realism claims to be taking us outside of religious 
stories it must also be taking us outside of religion. Revelation and religious 
experience evoke a God from within the religious story and not a being who 
antecedes our religious narratives.-'^  So, for example, Cupitt writes: 
... we can still have the experience of grace, providing that we don't mind 
acknowledging that it is textually generated.^ ^ 
By inculcating an awareness of the human production of religious belief, religious 
pluralism is regarded by Cupitt as a pressure internal to religion that points toward 
religious non-realism. It shows, Cupitt notes, that: 
31 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 246. 
32 ibid., p. 246. 
33 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 86. 
3* Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 5. 
35 Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 121. 
36 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 246. 
Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 61. 
38 See Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 120.; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., 
pp. 163-164.; Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 26.; What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 95. 
39 Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
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... religion is a communal human imaginative creation, and ... that the 
only question is why people shotild ever have supposed otherwise?''" 
3.2b. The Problem of Evil: Second, Cupitt refers to the difficulty that realist 
religious belief has with the problem of evil. While, for the realist, there is 
primarily a dilemma to be faced, for the non-realist there is primarily a task to be 
achieved. The realist's dilemma is not just trying to equate a good, all-loving, all-
powerful God with the fact of human suffering, but also trying to come to terms 
with the fact that this dilemma, by allowing that there is a problem at all, aheady 
implicitly denies the traditional realist conception of God in favour of a higher 
natural, human court of appeal."' Given the evidence of human suffering throughout 
history, there is now among many realists, a desire to re-think the traditional idea of 
God. The notions of divine impassability and omnipotence may need to be 
reconceived i f the realist understanding of God, as a God of love, is to be 
maintained in the face of human suffering. God, they suggest, now needs to be 
understood as a God who suffers with us. Yet, as Cupitt points out, those 
theologians who suggest revising the traditional idea of God are accused by more 
traditional theologians of creating a picture of God so immersed in human suffering 
that God lacks the power to bring salvation and thus is not religiously adequate.''^  
In Cupitt's early account of non-realism he sides with the traditionalists. A God 
in whom we trust must be a God powerful enough to bring our salvation. But this 
traditional understanding of God is only believable as a religious ideal. I f God were 
real, God would be morally culpable in the face of human suffering and thus 
religiously inadequate. Instead, Omnipotence and Immutability are to be understood 
as mythopoeic terms symbolising the power and unconditional nature of the 
"0 ibid., p. 125 
Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 64-65 
"2 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., pp. 111-113. See Steven T. Davis' response to David R. 
Griffen's process theodicy echoed by John K. Roth. Stephen T. Davis (ed ), Encountering Evil, 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1981), pp. 191-136, e^. pp 119-122, 125-128. And R Olson's critique 
of Jurgen Moltmann's understanding of the suffering God. R Olson, 'Trinity and Eschatology: the 
Historical Being of God in Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg'm The Scottish Journal of 
Theology Vol 36, 1983, pp. 213-227, esp. pp. 221-222. 
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internalised religious demand to pursue religious values. In Cupitt's later account 
of non-realism he sides with the revisionists. The revisionists show us that it is we 
v^ho create the picture of God that we need for our ciurent purposes. Our revisions 
show that we narrate oiu- stories about God in order to make God work for us."^  
For the non-realist, the problem of evil no longer raises the questions it once 
did. Evil now presents us with a task to achieve rather than a dilemma to face. This 
task is to create value and meaning in the face of meaninglessness and is recognised 
when "we no longer expect the world to make sense antecedently and on its own 
account The moral worth, value and meaning of life is supplied by us and 
religion is our primary resource for doing this. In that we remain troubled by the old 
dilemma, as realists are, our energies for achieving the primary religious task of 
creating meaning and value wil l be unnecessarily encumbered by issues that simply 
need not bother us. For the non-realist, then, religious belief is not part of the 
problem of evil as it is for the realist, but part of the solution. Religion helps us to 
struggle against evil and meaninglessness by providing the resources we need to 
create value and purpose for our lives. 
3.2c. Prayer: Third, the incompatibility of realism with religious belief follows, 
according to Cupitt, from the Christian understanding of prayer. The value and 
effectiveness of prayer is undermined i f it is conceived as a commimication with a 
supematurally existing entity who can be manipulated to intervene on our behalf 
Conceived of in this way the religious response to life will be eroded as more people 
abandon prayer as an ineffective technology.'^'' Rather, the practice of prayer should 
Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 113. 
44 This point is made by David Hart, One Faith?, op. cit., p. 53. But also conader Cupitt's account of 
Bishop John Robinson's understanding of evil. Robinson poignantly warned to see God even in the 
cancer, despite its destructiveness and apparent purposelessness. For Cupitt, this is to impose 
religious value on life and to make meaning out of meaninglessness by creating as well as responding 
to a religious vocabulary. It is this that leads Cupitt to suggest that "perhaps Robinson was a 
theological non-realist." Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 61. 
45 ibid., p. 68. 
'^ ^ Cupitt, The World to Come, (London: SCM Press, 1982), p. xiii.; What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 15. 
47 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., pp. 154-155. 
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be carried out for its own sake, creating an attitude to life rather than seeking 
external reward. Even religious realists, Cupitt suggests, are xmhappy explaining 
the effectiveness of prayer in terms of supernatural intervention. Prayer, they argue, 
is a way of aligning our wi l l with the wil l of God."^ Such an explanation, Cupitt 
notes, indicates a movement "toward a purely expressivist view of intercession. 
...[P]raying for someone," he adds, "is not a quasi-technical operation, but a ritual 
expression of love and hope and concern. "5° However, in that the realist attitude to 
prayer remains heteronomously orientated and is conceived of in terms of an 
'animistic dialogue', it wi l l be necessary "to discourage the practice altogether"^' as 
harmful to the religious life and the psychology of the religious person. Harmful in 
the first respect because, according to Cupitt, it encourages the attitude that regards 
the religious life as a superstitious technology. Harmful in the second respect, 
because it encourages an introspective, guilt-ridden personality stifled of creativity 
and defined against the absolute selfhood of an objective, all-seeing God.52 
If, however, we avoid the idea of prayer as a dialogue with an objective 
supernatural being and i f we also avoid "any suggestion that our real life is the inner 
life,"53 we can continue the practice of prayer. In non-realist terms prayer, 
meditation, reading quietly, and thinking reflectively are fundamental religious 
activities that "help us with our real life, which is our life with others. "5" Like D.Z. 
Phillips, Cupitt believes that private prayer makes sense only in the context of the 
public prayers of the religious conmiunity."55 Prayer, for the non-realist, is a means 
by which the community of religious believers create value out of life's transience 
and contingency. As such, "the discipline of the void [is] the prayer of the future. "^ ^ 
"8 ibid., pp. 130, 132. 
"9 ibid., p. 52. 
50 ibid., p. 53. 
51 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 137. 
52 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 90 ff. 
53 ibid., p. 91. 
54 ibid., p. 91. 
55 ibid., p. 91 and D.Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 
p. 135. 
56 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 145. 
84 
That is, prayer is seen as a training in the realisation of value and an acceptance of 
the contingency and transience of life.^^ Such an understanding of prayer, non-
realists believe, is more religiously satisfying than the realist's understanding and 
hence is itself reason for being non-realist rather than realist in matters of religious 
practice. 
3.2d. Doctrines: Fourth, not only the practices but also the central beliefs of 
Christianity are shown by Cupitt to be incompatible with religious realism. In 
Cupitt's early account of non-realism, belief in a realist God is inimical to religion 
because, "religion forbids that there should be any extra-religious reality to God."'* 
I f God were real, the freedom essential to the spiritual life would be losL^' Cupitt 
writes: 
The religious requirement is not an objectively-existing individual being 
quite distinct from myself It is a judgement upon myself and a way to 
salvation that I have freely invoked upon myself and for myself 
This is not to be understood as an expression of egoism^' but an indication of the 
pure disinterested love of the religious demand.62 Unless, God is conceived as the 
57 In Cupitt's earlier non-realist account of prayer he argued that prayer is "closely tied to moral 
endeavour" {Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 130), and is "about people's relation to moral and 
spiritual values" (ibid., p. 132). He also exhibited a view of the self s relation to the religious ideal that 
now, in his later account of non realism, he repudiates. He wrote in Taking Leave of God: 
Talking to God most beautifully expresses our wish to be rid of our own wickedness, our 
desire for spiritual rebirth, our aspiration after various infinitely-precious moral and 
religious values, our sense of human solidarity, and—above all dse—our sense that life is 
short and we are dust... 
But then, contrary to his later account of religious non-realism, Cupitt adds: 
... that the religious standard is eternal and its demand upon us measurelessly great and 
awesome. 
ibid., pp. 132-133. However, the 'eternal measureless and awesome' religious standard is as likely as 
the realist picture of God to create the type of religious personality that Cupitt wishes to avoid. Now, 
for Cupitt, the religious demand is to joyfully accept the void, uncertainty, contingency, transience and 
nihility so that we are able to create value and meaning in the world. Prayer is a means by which we 
can do this. It teaches us to value and accept what is, and strengthens us to create for ourselves ever 
new meanings and values. Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 145. 
58 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 96. 
59 ibid., pp. 68-69, 107. 
60 ibid., p. 87. 
61 Cupitt writes: "Egoism is kept under conttol by constant meditation upon the illlusoriness of one's 
own self and the nothingness, or insubstantiality and impermanence, that pervades all existence." Only 
Human, op. cit., pp. 190-191.; Also see The World To Come, op. cit., pp. xiii-xiv.; Taking Leave of 
God, op. cit., p. 68. 
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symbolic personification of this love and the divine attributes further symbolic 
expressions of the religious requirement, God would hinder our religious freedom 
and the religious attitude of pure disinterested love. Thus, for Cupitt, "[tjhe only 
religiously adequate God carmot exist. "^ 3 Belief in a realist God leads to a 
heteronomous faith that carmot be genuinely religious and is further impoverished 
by dubious attempts to prove God's existence.^" 
In Cupitt's later accoimt of non-realism the religious requirement is not an 
autonomously internalised a priori principle but the demand to value life. This 
demand is symbolically expressed in the doctrine of the incarnation. Cupitt writes: 
The Word has become flesh, so that the fleshy, the corruptible, the 
transient is now the religious object. ^ 5 
In the Christian story of the incarnation, "God enters into contingency, 'God' dies, 
and now everything that lives is holy."*^ God is identified with all that is contingent 
and transient. Further, in the symbolism of the spirit, the Christian God is dispersed 
and disseminated completely into the world.*'' God and the worid are inseparably 
united. Henceforth, this world is the divine kingdom and the religious demand 
world-affirming rather than world-denying.The genuine religious impulse is to 
value our material, contingent world and all that is fleeting and transient. Such an 
impulse does not derive from some objective transcendent source but from a 
62 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., pp. 69, 117. 
63 ibid., p. 113. 
6" ibid., p. 12 and chapters 2 and 6. Cupitt points out that different proofs seem to produce different 
conceptions of God, most of which have little resemblance to the pre-philosophical God of biblical 
witness. None of the proofs provided sufficiently substantiate God's reality and merely threaten "the 
principle of the autonomy of religion." ibid., p. 84. 
65 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 145. 
66 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 75. 
6'^  Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 87-89. 
68 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 162.; The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 167.; The 
Time Being, op. cit., p. 4. This means that religion must be "folly committed to the here and now." 
Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 97. 
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creative and affirmative valuation of life. When we recognise the utter contingency 
and fleetingness of our life, everything becomes gracious.^ ? 
For Cupitt, the world is affirmed "by saving it from all invidious comparisons 
with supposedly better worlds elsewhere"70 and life is affirmed when we accept that 
this one life is all we have.7i However, the realist persists in thinking that there is 
some different, special, more truthful, eternal, antecedently existent and 
independently ordered realm, other than that which hiunan religious belief creates. 
For Cupitt, such an idea is unintelligible because it depends on language in order to 
be stated and "language is only human. "72 
Religious realism, like religious non-realism is a product of human language 
and human creativity but realism is anti-life, anti-world-affirming and thus anti-
religious.73 Religion, for Cupitt, should be a celebration of our transience, and not a 
quest that looks to salvation in another world. As long as Christianity remains 
committed to that quest, Cupitt believes, it will continue to ignore the implication of 
the incarnation and fail to be a religion of redemption that values life. Cupitt 
argues, a religion of redemption, the incarnation suggests, is "not release fi-om the 
human condition, not deliverance from the world, but the return into the human 
condition ..."74 A religion of redemption must be completely this-worldly and 
concerned with valuing and re-valuing everyday life. 
Only a non-realist view of Christianity, Cupitt argues, makes Christianity a 
religion of salvation. The salvation Christianity offers is salvation from the desire to 
escape the contingency, transience and the fleetingness of this world to some 
illusory eternal absolute world beyond. Our redemption is to accept this world, and 
69 This is one of the significant themes of Cupitt's later account of non-realism. His book The Time 
Being, op. cit., can be seen as an extended theological meditation on this theme. "God becomes 
human, heaven becomes earth ... [both]... a way of saying yes, now." ibid., p. 139. 
70 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 138. 
71 ibid., p. 143. 
72 ibid., pp. 48-49. 
73 ibid., pp. 142-143; Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 101-102. 
74 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 182. 
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to continually pour ourselves out into the activity of valuing and re-valuing life.''5 
For Cupitt, we can love God, imitate Christ, live in the spirit, realise eternal life, and 
experience salvation''6 when we drop the realist illusion of a supernatural world 
beyond our own gloriously contingent and graciously transient^^ unique life here and 
now in our natural and only home. Whereas the realist picture of God "deals 
death,"''^  by under-valuing life in favour of an illusory world beyond, the non-realist 
wi l l want to tell stories about God that affirm life. Such affirmation brings 
redemption by curing us of the time-hating, anxiety-ridden and other-worldliness of 
traditional realist religious belief "^^ Cupitt writes: 
There can be no other way to salvation except by saying yes to time, 
language, the passions and death—in short, to just about everything that 
our religions hitherto have been in flight from.8o 
The realist's religious fictions are now, Cupitt believes, clearly seen to be contrary to 
the genuine religious impulse. He writes: 
True religion now consists not in grabbing at such fictions, but in being 
cured of the need for them. Selflessly to love the transient and let it go: 
thatisbeatitude.8i 
Religious realism is now, Cupitt believes, religiously alienating. Our true religious 
happiness is created "when we stop pretending that we don't really belong here, and 
learn instead to identify ourselves completely with the flux of our own lives. "^ 2 In 
short, Cupitt notes: 
... realism is itself a disorder of which we need to be cured. ^ 3 
"^5 Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 91, 155. 
6^ -Love God'; Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 68; 'Imitate Christ'; ibid., pp. 130-131; 
'live in the spirit'; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 88; 'realise eternal life': The Long 
Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 81; 'experience salvation': ibid., pp. 85, 162. 
Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 77.; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 99. 
8^ Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 159. 
"^5 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., Ch. 7. 
80 ibid., p. 142. 
81 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 92. 
82 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 76. Elsewhere, Cupitt notes, "Religion is just for the sake 
of our this-worldly life and activity, for we have nothing else." Radicals and the Future of the Church, 
op. cit., p. 134. 
83 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 121. 
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By allowing us to say a ful l 'yes' to life, religious non-realism supplies this cure. 
Thus, for Cupitt, and those religious believers who think like him: 
... an education in non-realism is the path to religious liberation. ^ 4 
The religious liberation that non-realism brings also heralds the kingdom of 
God. "A world in which people have become active creators of religious value," 
Cupitt writes, "is what I mean by the kingdom of God. "85 A non-realist religion of 
the kingdom is the therapeutic cure for religious realism. Cupitt not only describes 
this non-realist religion, "glad to be only human,"^ as a Christ-centred theology in 
the sense that it is implied by the Christian story of the incarnation; he is also 
prepared to ascribe it to Jesus himself "Antirealism," notes Cupitt, "is ... what 
Jesus called the kingdom of God. "87 
In Cupitt's early account of non-realism Jesus' prophetic teaching about the 
kingdom is regarded as a symbolic call to live by an absolute standard of religiosity 
that is internal to the consciousness of the believer.88 This standard projects a new 
world and a new humanity. This new world, Cupitt notes, wil l replace the old worid 
"in which ordinary worldly people live ... "89 This account tells us that the kingdom 
is still to be realised. There is a world to come that is better than the present 
everyday world.9o In Cupitt's later accotmt of non-realism this 'old world—new 
world' model of the kingdom is abandoned. Now, Cupitt notes, "[rjeligion is not a 
vision of another world, but a re-vision of this world,"9i The old world, of everyday 
life, is the kingdom of God. Cupitt notes: 
84 ibid., p. 134. 
85 Cupitt, The World to Come, op. cit., p. xiii. 
86 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 
87 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 113. Despite some perceptive individuals, Cupitt believes that this is a 
message that the church succeeded m hiding fi-om Christians for over 1900 years. The Last 
Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 126-130. [N.B.: It should be remembered that although Cupitt makes at least 
two attempts to distinguish antirealism fi-om non-realism (in Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 92-
105 and The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 148-149), he tends to use them synonymously.]. 
88 Cupitt, The World to Come, op. cit., pp. 63-65. 
89 Cupitt, 'A Tale of Two Cities: The World to Come' in J. A. T. Robinson, Where Three Ways Meet, 
(London: SCM Press, 1987), p. 30. 
90 This 'new world-old world' view was still held by Cupitt in The Sea of Faith, op. cit., p. 119. 
91 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 86. 
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To say that the kingdom has come, then, is simply to say that we now 
recognize that everydayness is all there is.92 
The kingdom theology which Jesus taught''' is now seen by Cupitt as a prophetic 
pronouncement that salvation arrives when we are no longer alienated from the 'old', 
everyday world, that is our only true home. This world, he believes, is oiu- last 
worid and in it the age of the church is drawing to a close. The church's task has 
been achieved: "the divine has become fully resolved down into the human. "^ ^ The 
church can disappear. Christianity, in the kingdom of God, is transformed from the 
alienating 'between time' of its ecclesiastical structures, into post-Christianity. ^ 5^ 
This has not happened by means of an apocalyptic ending of history but, Cupitt 
suggests, has happened as part of a general "transition from modernism to post-
modernism, which in a certain sense is indeed occurring at the end of history ... 
Cupitt interprets post-modernism as telling us that history as progress, in terms of a 
linear movement from origin to teleos, is no longer possible. We no longer have the 
fixed points against which such a progressive linear movement can be defined.^^ 
Thus Cupitt believes: 
A time of fulfilment has come, and it is in many ways rather like the long 
promised 'kingdom of God' hoped for by the rabbis of antiquity. ^ 8 
St. Augustine's vision of heaven, Cupitt suggests, is now found here on eartL^' This 
is the message contained in a non-realist's re-visioning and re-valuing of the 
52 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 131. 
'3 Significant aspects of this teaching Cupitt takes to be: 'The Sabbath was made for man, not man for 
the Sabbath' [Mk. 2:27]; 'Take no thought for the morrow' pviatt. 6:34]; 'The kingdom of God is 
within, or among you' [Lk. 17:21]. 77?^  Time Being, op. cit., p. 150. 
9'* Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 23. 
95 ibid., pp. 22-23. 
96 ibid., p. 25. 
9^  Specifically Cupitt refers to the work of Jean Baudrillard in this respect. See Radicals and the 
Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 147 ff. and p. 177 n. 17. 
98 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 115. Jesus, Cupitt writes, was the "prophet of post-Christianity" (ibid., 
p. 25) whose teaching of the kingdom both precedes and succeeds the church (ibid., p. 5). And Cupitt 
notes the themes of post-modernism are also the themes of this post-Christian kingdom theology. He 
writes: 
... the end of history, the coming of the kingdom of God, the death of God, the 
outpouring of God's spirit in human hearts, and the final liberation of humanity are ideas 
all interlinked and briefly glimpsed in the first forty years or so of Christian history. 
The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 126. 
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Christian story. It is a re-visioning which attempts to make Jesus' message relevant 
for our time and a re-valuing that attempts to show that a realist mentality is now 
anti-religious. In Cupitt's words it attempts to show that: 
God takes up his throne in the human heart: ... or, to put it another way, 
Jesus' view of what God will show himself to be is non-realist.^^ 
This creative re-visioning of the Christian story is certainly not without its 
critics, but it nevertheless shows, I believe, that it is not possible to dismiss the non-
realist approach to faith as non-Christian. I have identified four facets of modem 
believing: religious pluralism, the problem of evil, the nature of prayer and doctrines 
about God, Christ and salvation, which non-realists like Cupitt believe make a non-
realist religious faith, rather than a realist religious faith, a genuine religious 
inheritor of the Christian tradition. To conclude, Cupitt writes: 
Supernatural theologies cannot cope with the problem of evil, cannot on 
their own premises explain the vast diversity of religions and their human 
history, and do not even do a very good job of explaining the contents of 
their own scriptures. So there is plenty of scope for religious naturalism 
to do a better job of explaining religion and showing why it always has 
mattered and still matters so much to us. loi 
3.3. The Incompatibility of Ethical Belief and Practice With Realism: 
As well as suggesting the incompatibility of realism with religious belief on purely 
religious grounds, Cupitt also raises a variety of moral and ethical argimients which 
further suggest the incompatibility of realism with religious belief For John Hick, 
the ultimate issue between religious realists and religious non-realists is one that 
pertains to the moral structiu-e of the universe. On the groimds of a realist theistic 
faith life is more than a struggle for survival. The majority of people who have had 
little opportunity to fu l f i l their potential are assured by a moral and spiritual hope. 
Non-realism cannot offer this hope. It offers a religion only for the minority of 
99 Cupitt, 77K Time Being, op. cit., pp. 77-82. 
1 ^ Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 126. (Cupitt's emphasis). 
Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 119. 
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human beings who are able to feel fulfilled in this life. Religious non-realism is 
therefore religion for the elite and "bad news for ordinary struggling humanity." 102 
I f religious non-realism is only a religion for the elite, it is also likely to be a religion 
for those with a stake in maintaining the social status quo and thus for those less 
willing to bring about the type of changes that might meliorate economic and 
spiritual poverty. 103 Cupitt's talk of the 'kingdom of God' on earth may then be 
understood at best as misguided, and at worst, a cynical attempt to protect the 
privileges of the forttmate few at the expense of the religious aspirations that the 
world's religions have held for the m^ority of unfulfilled humanity. Ci^)itt's 
response is that it is unfiilfillable theistic expectations that lead to nihilism and 
despair and that religious salvation occurs when we accept the contingency and 
transience of all things and yet continue to create value and meaning in the hope of 
achieving a better imagined future. 
In his book Solar Ethics, Cupitt draws a distinction between 'the moral' (codes 
and laws) and 'the ethical' (practices and lifestyles), lo* Morality is based upon a 
socially constituted code of contingent rules and norms governing human activity 
backed up by publicly approved sanctions. As long as these rules and norms work 
they wil l be upheld; when they fail to work they will be reformed or simply dropped 
in favour of another set of nUes and norms. Morality thus needs no "deep 
supernatural or philosophical justification."'05 It is not a "matter of obeying or 
conforming to antecedently existing moral realities. "106 Our religious beliefs and 
moral codes are our own responsibility, lo^ Morality is continually being re-invented 
by us. Nevertheless, our more long-lasting and generally agreed moral norms 
102 ^ ohnYlick, An Interpretation of Religion, (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 208. 
103 Rowan Williams, "Religious Realism: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt', m Modem 
Theology, Vol. 1, 1984. pp. 21-22. 
lO'' Cupitt, Solar Ethics, op. cit., Ch. 2. This distinction mirrors Cupitt's earlier distinction between 
culture and desire in The Long Legged Fly, and closely resembles the distinction drawn by Richard 
Rorty between public solidarity and private self-creation. 
105 Cupitt, Solar Ethics, op. cit., p. 11. 
106 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 158. 
10'^  Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 126. 
92 
warrant a strong degree of commitment. Our commitment to some of these norms, 
Cupitt believes, is incompatible with religious realism. Realism is detrimental to 
human dignity, human freedom, human creativity and human well-being, creating a 
slavish mentality of blind obedience to authority from which the ecclesiastical elite 
benefit 108 The church is so bound to this mentality, Cupitt argues, that it 
automatically finds non-realism unacceptable. Cupitt writes; 
The liberals reject i t because they need their vague but optimistic version 
of theological realism. The conservatives reject it, because they need 
their demanding, moralistic, threatening sort of God to keep themselves in 
order. But at this point radicals become very troubled, because along 
with all pastors and therapists they regard that particular realistic God as 
extremely damaging. The more realistic your God, the more punitive 
your morality, the more damaged your psychology and the more blinkered 
your outlook. 109 
For Cupitt, traditional realist religious belief contravenes current conventional 
standards of morality because it is a hierarchical, power-led, self-serving, alienating 
piece of sexist ideology. It damages our mental health and stifles creativity, "o 
Thankfully, Cupitt points out, we tend now not to live as i f such a God existed, 
although religious worship and theological rhetoric still evokes such a God.iii The 
108 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 159.; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 
1-5, 10, 17. Cupitt writes: 
... the task of realism is always the same: to justify the power and privileges of the elite 
who are the custodians of the currently most-prestigious knowledge-system. 
After All, op. cit., p. 110. 
109 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 167-168. 
110 Religious realism contradicts morality. It is hierarchical and patriarchal (ibid., pp. 5, 92-95.) and 
therefore sexist (ibid., pp. 45-47, 78, 86, 92-93, 153-154.), a front for power-hungry men (ibid., pp. 3, 
17, 56, 65, 74.), it is a religion of the ego rather than of the dying Christ (ibid., p. 62.). It produces 
guilt-ridden, angry, prejudiced and emotionally crippled individuals (ibid., p. 87.). It is designed not 
for our well-being but to give us a fiight (ibid., p. 164.). It inspires a mentality of dependence, 
impotence, instability and weakness in the majority so that the religious elite can provide strong 
government (ibid., pp. 63, 74.). It is authoritarian, lUDt open to question, imcritical and repressive 
(ibid., p. 64). It downfrfays fiiendship in favour of radical inequalities (ibid., pp. 90-91.) and mistakes 
psychological damage for piety (ibid., p. 92 ). It produces a religion in which subjection rather than 
liberation dominates (ibid., p. 93 ). ReaUsm encourages a pessimistic, melancholic, anxious and 
disenchanted attitude to life (The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 101-102.). It is irredeemably 
dualistic, unworkable, self-contradictory and unaware of its own human historical origin (ibid., pp. 45-
50 ). It is "psychological terrorism" (ibid., p. 59; also p. 73 .) and a form of illusory death avoidance 
(ibid., p. 117 ). It fails to allow for genuine human creativity, 'drive', 'ambition' or 'innovation' (ibid., 
pp. 4, 23.). 
111 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 74, 132-135. 
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church thereby does moral damage to itself. It instils in its members, and benefits 
fi-om, "an unconscious yearning to be ruled and told what is right and good 
But this moral mentality, Cupitt believes, is "reactive and repressive"'and should 
be exposed for the illusion it is. On the basis of our commitment to human freedom, 
equality, creativity and other conventional moral goals, religious realism, Cupitt 
believes, should be assigned to the bygone age fi-om which it emerged. H'* 
The valuelessness of religious and moral realism is most clearly stated when we 
actually have to face personal moral dilemmas. Cupitt sites the case of a woman 
who discovered, just before her wedding, that she had contracted HTV, having 
suffered rape two years earlier. Her family background and that of her fiance was 
such that disclosure of either the rape or the HTV would risk her being shurmed. 
Should she go ahead with the marriage? For Cupitt, "[t]he case shows ... the 
obnoxiousness and uselessness of moral realism ... for ... moral decision 
making."'15 A counsellor, Cupitt notes, would advise on scientific and medical 
knowledge, talk through facts, feelings and consequences and help the woman live 
with the decision she makes. "No other approach," Cupitt comments, "is humanly 
tolerable.""^ There is no right answer already laid down, no moral command to 
which anyone could appeal. The dilemma has to be lived through. In our daily lives 
we face such dilemmas, at varying levels of intensity, all the time. We thus need to 
turn fi-om the norms and laws of morality toward the practices and lifestyles of 
ethics. 
Unlike morality, Cupitt suggests, ethics is concerned with action rather than 
codes. To act ethically is to "act creatively, giving value to our life and to each 
other ... "U"' To have an ethic is to have a form of self-expression. in what Cupitt 
"2 ibid., p. 16. 
Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 167. 
Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit, p. 1. 
Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 169. 
116 ibid., p. 169. 
ii'' Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 23. 
118 Cupitt, Solar Ethics, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
94 
called the ISTew Christian Ethics', and now calls 'Solar Ethics', we express ourselves 
through our activity and are thus automatically ethical, value-producing beings. We 
should be heedless creators of those very values of love, freedom, service, friendship 
etc. which the realist framework was siqjposed to supply from some extra-human 
source. "5 Thus Cupitt vmtes: 
If we want a Christian ethics for now, we have got to invent it now. 
All the paraphernalia of religion and ethics are created by us.'^ i In that Christianity 
has not recognise this in the past, Cupitt argues, there has never been any Christian 
ethics to speak o f C u p i t t writes: 
Inheriting from Plato a dualism which located all value in the inert ideal 
world above and little or none in the sensuous life-world below, ... 
Christianity could hardly be anything else but a religion of death. The 
human being and the life-world were v^ athout intrinsic value. To find 
value one had to reject life. The ethical was opposed to life and the ideal 
was opposed to the actual. AH goodness came from above only. '23 
So long as God is understood in these terms and so long as the fear of sin and 
punishment drives human ethical practice we will remain with a life-denying, 
alienating ethic. We now need to see creative human ethical activity for what it 
is—only human. '^ ^ Christianity itself must now be seen as being created and re-
created by oxir own activity. The new Christian ethics, for Cupitt, must be a form of 
religious naturalism. It must say 'Yes' to life, be practical, expressive and directed at 
the creative realisation of value rather than driven by fear of sin.'^ s The church 
must now be seen as a resource of creative value; a "nursery of new lifestyles. "'^ 6 In 
ibid., p. 45. Cupitt refers to the new Christian ethic as solar because it "commands you to live as 
the sun does, expanding yourself in communicative self-exteriorisation." ibid., p. 26. 
Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 40. 
121 ibid., p. 125. 
122 ibid., pp. 14-15, 59. 
123 ibid., p. 101. 
124 Cupitt, 'Anti Religious Faith' in Runzo (ed.) Is God Real?, op. cit., p. 55. 
125 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 58-60. 
126 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 169. 
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such an ethic, a non-realist understanding of Christ and the self are employed and 
non-realism is shown to be a solution to nihilism. 
Christ despised and glorified and Christ as God incarnate are, for Cupitt, 
resonate symbols of the new Christian ethic. The truth Christianity relays in its 
story of Christ is that "to conquer death we must before death die to death and to the 
self "127 We do this by kenosis. To be emptied out is to give up egoistic fantasies 
about 'the soul' or 'life after death' and instead to gain a vision of redemption through 
the ou^ouring of our life energies into the world in all our valuative activity, i^s 
Cupitt writes: 
To become inwardly emptied out is the only way to a pure love of life and 
our neighbour. 125 
To pour ourselves out in this way is to live ethically in the imitation of Christ,i30 and 
is to achieve our objective immortality. Cupitt writes: 
The purpose of moral action is not to make myself into a self, but to lose 
myself 131 
I lose myself by pouring my energies into life, into the public common objective 
world of our shared language and life. All that I say and do constitutes my objective 
immortality. 
This represents a reversal of Cupitt's earlier non-realist view of the religious 
self Then the religious demand was conceived as an a priori principle which we 
had to internalise. Now the religious demand is to externalise, i^^ Cupitt writes: 
I am merely the sum of my social relations. My life-task is not to save my 
soul but to lose it. I need to forget about myself and to pour out my life 
into the human worid. i " 
127 ibid., p. 67. 
128 ibid., p. 68. 
129 ibid., p. 68. 
13° ibid., p. 88. Cupitt advises: "like Christ, die into your work. Accept self-scattering and self-loss." 
(ibid., p. 27.). 
131 ibid., p. 117. 
132 ibid., pp. 75, 166-170.; Solar Ethics, op. cit., pp. 17, 37. 
1" Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 129. 
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To pour oneself out into the world is an explicit life-afifirming act of ethical 
valuation. In self-exteriorisation we express the will to value, i^'* We do this in 
many ways and Cupitt gives foiu- examples, i^^ We can have a specialist enthusiasm 
for an aspect of life, like teaching or croquet i^^ We can offer metaphorical 
redescriptions of currently derogatory metaphorical terminology. We can show 
loving attentiveness to those people and things which we care for most and we can 
engage in the activities of Christian revolutionary re-valuation in which the image of 
Christ, despised and glorified, is applied to a poorly valued person or aspect of life, 
in order to enlist a higher valuation. In each, we put a little more value into an 
aspect of the world. However, such valuative activity does not occur in a linguistic 
or cultural vacuum. Cupitt writes: 
... in my action I have to go out into a public language that is already 
laden with values and persuasions, ... that [are] ... before me and will be 
after me. ... I want to change it, but I can do so only by ... going out into 
publicness so as to become available to others, i ^ 
Our attempts at change by re-valuation will be piecemeal and will occur by acting 
toward and speaking about people, events and aspects of life more affirmatively as 
we daily pour ourselves out into life.i^^ Cupitt admits that this seems to tum 
Christian ethics into a form of secular humanism but he points out that in the 
Christian story, God "has chosen to become human in the world. "'^ ^ In the process, 
Christ gives religious value to the poor, the outcast and the wicked. Now Christian 
ethics must be a scrutinised creative re-valuing of all that currently lacks value, •''o 
134 ibid., p. 137. 
135 ibid., pp. 135-136. Mso see Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 154. 
Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 155. 
137 ibid., p. 117. 
138 This notion leads Cupitt to reconceive the traditional nature-grace distinction. Nature becomes the 
cultural evaluation we inherit in our language and practices which we need to perfect through grace. 
For Cupitt: 
'Grace' is the Christian's constructive attempt to improve the score by loving the worthless 
and neglected and raising their value-gradings. 
ibid., p. 134. 
139 ibid., p. 136. 
I40ibid., pp. 154, 167. 
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The incarnation means that we love God by loving our neighbour and we love our 
neighbour by valuing them through our own self-outpouring love which is also the 
way of salvation. 1'*! To lead the Christian life now means to be absorbed in the 
work of valuing the ordinary and the everyday worid. The self is not defined 
subjectively, as a substantial inner space, but 'objectively' in the sense of our 
continual outpouring actively and linguistic expression. It is always something we 
define in the things we do. It is the stories we tell of our own activity and the stories 
other people tell of us. The self is a literary effect Cupitt writes: 
We exist in, and only as, the performance we are giving and the show we 
are putting on. We have no being apart fi-om our life. We become 
ourselves only in passing and in passing away. •'*2 
Life is not something ready-made and complete. We have to make life by living it, 
we have to make our soul by losing it, we have to make a worid of value by pouring 
our life into it, and we have to create God by valuing our life, our community and 
our world. i'*3 
Alongside a non-realist account of Christ's salvific work and a non-realist 
accoimt of the self, Cupitt's 'new Christian ethics' also provides a defence against 
nihihsm. Cupitt writes: 
1'*! Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 155. 
142 Cupitt, Solar Ethics, op. cit., p. 14. According to Cupitt the self must now be understood as "a 
literary product, a privatization of culture made of and by stories." {What Is a Story?, op. cit., p. 56.). 
It is only surface, we have no inside or depth. My reading of the surface is my inside; your reading of 
my surface is my outside, (ibid., p. 60 ). "Our subjectivity ... [our] inner life is a special kind of 
cultural artefact made of linguistic idioms and nothing else. Mind is a cultural fiction." (The Time 
Being, op. cit., p. 25 ). My self coincides with the 'time of my life'. Life will be worthy if a plausible 
story can be told about it. (ibid., p. 145.) We are the life we live. We are the sum of our transactions 
with our milieu.' {The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 72.) "A person is a dramatic effect produced over 
time: no more than that." (ibid., p. 72.) There is no pre-existent self for me to realise. I must expend 
mysdf; only then do I have the material for a story of my life. What the non-realist sees that the realist 
cannot accept, is that we must now consciously make ourselves. {The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., 
pp. 74-75, 98.). The self is a by-product of my language and my actions {Solar Ethics, op. cit., p. 
23.). "Your soul is your role! ... [and this role is] ... communicative action and collaborative worid-
building with other people." (ibid., p. 26.). The self is in fi-ont of you, not inside you (ibid., p. 39). 
The longer you live, the more you are objectified, that is, the more of life's energy has flowed out of 
you. (ibid., p. 55.) To exteriorise consciously is to love the worid and to live ethically. It is to affirm 
life and to accept loss, transience and death at the same time. (ibid. p. 4.) 
113 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 6, 63, 68, 107, 154. 
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We have to redeem our life from absurdity by creating value, by making 
good, by doing the work of God.^*^ 
We do this first and foremost by affirming the precious worth of life, its transience 
and its contingency. In that realists persist in believing in an absolute, life-
tianscending realm beyond the human worldly abode, existing antecedent to, and 
independent of, its creation in language by human beings, (we might want to know 
the extent to which that 'reality' was initially independent of us), they will tend to see 
the decline of belief in such an antecedently existing divine realm as evidence for 
the move toward nihilism. i45 The danger is that with the demise of the idea of pre-
existent meanings, the realist comes to see life as worthless. In this sense nihilism is 
realism's own dark side. As Cupitt notes: "realism ... when pressed to its logical 
conclusion itself topples unexpectedly into nihilism. "'^ ^ A nihilistic emptiness 
appears at the centre of the religious life when the original is thought to be lost to 
us. 147 Given the realist's premises about divine reality and its communication to us, 
we come to see our own importance in the scheme of things and gain a sense of 
purpose. 148 However, i f we begin to suspect that life does not live up to this sense of 
purpose we may begin to feel cheated. Everyday life appears as a fraudulent 
deception to what our religious heritage has led us to expect. By leading us to 
expect too much of religion, realists are themselves led to under-value what religion 
can actually do for us when conceived of as only human. i49 For those influenced by 
realism, the collapse of belief in a realist God may lead to a life-denying nihilistic 
picture of the world, in which human power is the only value in a meaningless 
universe. Cupitt writes: 
144 ibid., p. 98. 
145 ibid., p. 118. 
I ' l^ Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 169. One might say that for Cupitt 
realism is to nihilism what Mr. Hyde is to Dr. Jekyll. The Dr. Jekylls of this worid swallow realism 
whole and are gradually transformed into life-denying, world-hating monsters: unable to see that the 
values they instil are the consequence of their own creativity; also, ibid., p. 153. 
l^l' ibid., pp. 159-165. 
148 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 151. 
149 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p.84. 
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For them, there is no intermediate position; the end of dogmatism is the 
beginning of nihilism. They are terrified by the thought of a world 
without certainties. i5o 
Non-realists on the other hand are untroubled by nihilism.'5' They have no 
imaginary perfect world against which our everyday world looks bad and second 
rate. For them the function of religion is to combat nihilism and despair by helping 
us to create meanings and values by which we can live. Thus Cupitt writes: 
Religion is a here-and-now conquering of nihilism and a re-creation of 
our world out of nothing by continually generating new metaphors and 
new interpretations. ... [R]eligion is a kind of creative art by which we 
make ourselves and our world. ... Religion is only hxmian, but no culture 
survives long without it. Life's meaningfulness and worthwhileness are 
not given but have to be made, and that making is religion. i52 
Elsewhere, Cupitt notes: 
The best way to conquer nihilism would be to replace a church that sees 
its job as guarding the past with one that is confident it can create the 
fiitiirei53 
For non-realists, the new Christian ethics provides another cluster of ideas that 
indicate the preferability of non-realism over realism in matters of religious belief 
A non-realist account avoids the potential life-denying nihilistic tendency of realist 
belief It presents a view of the self that does more justice to a post-Cartesian 
philosophy of mind and calls upon a soterological interpretation of the Christian 
story of Jesus that can be applied pragmatically without being understood 
dogmatically as history or as revelation. There are, therefore, according to Cupitt, 
ample religious and ethical reasons for adopting religious non-realism. 
150 Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith' in Runzo (ed.) Is God Real?, op. cit., p. 49. 
151 Cupitt, Solar Ethics, op. cit., p. 50. 
152 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 96-97. Also see The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., 
p. 130. Cupitt suggests that Nietzsche was so influenced by realism when he presented his nihilistic 
philosophy that he was unable to see the creative role that religion could play in creating meaning and 
value. The World to Come, op. cit., p. xiv.; Solar Ethics, op. cit., pp. 50-52. 
153 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 
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3.4 Conclusion: 
My aim in this chapter has been to summarise certain pressures within religious 
belief and ethical practice that now make a non-realist, rather than a realist religious 
faith, the religious inheritor of the Christian tradition. Just as the intellectual 
heritage of western thought bequeaths to contemporary religious belief the 
possibility of a non-realist religious identity, so too do these pressures internal to 
religion and ethics. However, the decline of religious realism does not necessarily 
mean the decline of religious belief For the non-realists, religious belief will 
continue for as long as it remains of some significant use to us. For the religious 
non-realist, religion remains a usefiil, meaning-generating, comfort-providing, life-
enhancing, community-creating source of human flourishing that gives expression to 
human spiritual insight and ethical creativity. Religion is yet to be surpassed by any 
other humanly created set of practices and beliefs, but it is now inimical to realist 
presuppositions. Given these presuppositions, non-realists like Cupitt believe 
realism in religion to be intellectually, morally and religiously imdesirable. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RELIGIOUS NON-REALISM AND PRAGMATISM 
4.1. Introduction: 
In the first three chapters of this thesis I have summarised the non-realist religious 
beliefs of Don Cupitt and other writers belonging to the 'Sea of Faith' network. I 
have tried to show why they find non-realism in matters of religious belief 
appealing. Our intellectual heritage and the contemporary philosophy of language, 
suggest the possibility of reinterpreting Christian faith in a way that abandons belief 
in a divine reality independent of, and antecedent to, human creativity while 
avoiding an atheistic mentality by allowing for a continued commitment to 
Christianity's traditional vocabulary and practices. This approach to religious belief 
has been referred to as "improper" and "morally repugnant."! But, according to the 
American religious pragmatist J. Wesley Robbins, this is merely to say that an 
unusual expression of religious belief is being formulated in ways unlikely to find 
favour within the limits of a more traditional expression. There is nothing 
necessarily 'improper' about this. "The move from realism to non-realism," Robbins 
writes, "may be ill advised [but] ... bucking tradition to correct a mistake is not an 
act of dishonesty. "2 In a pragmatic context, Robbins argues, a non-realist religious 
faith can be held with integrity i f it can suggest a new and enlightening picture of 
our religious future, an alternative vision that side-steps previous problematic 
religious ideas and practices. Pragmatism, I have suggested, best articulates the 
religious and intellectual terrain that religious non-realists should ideally aim to 
inhabit. In this chapter, I shall develop this pragmatic theme through a critique of 
some aspects of Cupitt's account of religious non-realism. In doing so I shall draw 
1 Brian Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 142. 
2 J. Wesley Robbins, 'When Christians Become Naturalists' in Religious Studies Vol. 28, p. 201. 
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upon a distinction between -explanation' and 'justification' outlined in the work of 
the contemporary American pragmatist Richard Rorty. 
4.2. A Critique of Cupitt and Sea of Faith Religious Non-Realism: 
The religious non-realism outlined by Cupitt is open to a number of criticisms. I 
indicated some of these at the end of chapter two when I discussed Brian 
Hebblethwaite's response to Cupitt's work.3 An objective God is crucial to any 
adequate account of Christian belief I f Christian revelation, providential care and 
the efficacy of prayer are to be taken seriously, and morality is to have firm 
foundations, God must be a reality independent of human creativity. Scott Cowdell 
claims that Cupitt's religious non-realism "undervalues developed dogma" and 
highlights the creative element of religious experience at the expense of dependency 
and grace. It makes little attempt to assess altemative positions with any degree of 
seriousness and is itself not ideologically pure but reliant upon its own quasi-
foimdationalism.4 
Cupitt is reluctant to respond to such criticisms because, as he notes, by the 
time the criticisms arrive, he has moved on to something else. 5 Nevertheless, in 
Cupitt's defence we might point out that there is no mutually agreed definition of 
what counts as 'adequately religious'. We saw in chapter three that he believes 
religious non-realism to be a proper inheritor of the Christian ttadition. This is an 
altemative vision of such inheritance to that of Hebblethwaite's and the difference 
between them cannot be resolved by appeal to some neutral criteria. Because of 
this, all but the last of Cowdell's criticisms have little impact. Cupitt sees the 
closure of dogmatic faith and an emphasis upon human religious creativity as a 
description of what he hopes to achieve rather than a criticism of the position he 
3 For similar criticisms see David L. Edwards, Tradition and Truth (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1989), pp. 68-97. Keith Ward, Holding Fast to God (London: S.P.C.K., 1982). 
4 Scott Cowdell, Atheist Priest? Don Cupitt and Christianity (London: SCM Press, 1988), pp. 83-84. 
5 ibid., p. ix. However, in that Cupitt admits that he now recants his attempt to define religion in terms 
of the autonomous internalised religious consciousness and that he prefers Davidson to Derrida, it is 
likely that this shift of emphasis has been encouraged by the kind of concerns and criticisms offered by 
critics such as Ward and Williams. 
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holds. Equally, while it is the case that he often dismisses alternative realist 
positions by means of bold assertions and overstatement, and may be guilty of over-
simplifying what realists are claiming in order to make them look less plausible than 
they do to themselves, it is nonetheless the case, that however subtle their 
arguments, religious realists will in the end want to make some basic claim about 
God's reality with which Cupitt fimdamentally disagrees. According to Stephen 
Ross White, this disagreement follows from Cupitt's failure to appreciate the subtie 
arguments about the relation of language to reality expressed by critical realists like 
Janet Martin Soskice.^  However, I will suggest in the last chapter that the critical 
realist position that Soskice represents does not answer the type of questions that 
Cupitt raises against religious realism. Cupitt may simplify realist arguments, but it 
is not the case that he does not consider the points they make.'' Nevertheless, 
Cowdell's final criticism deserve more attention as it higWights the problematic 
nature of religious non-realism when it strays from a pragmatic context. Therefore, 
I shall concentrate on these here. By identifying Cupitt's own quasi-foundational 
assumptions it will be easier to separate the pragmatic wheat of religious non-
realism from its modernist and post-modernist chaff 
There is a sense in which religious non-realists take themselves to be 
ideologically pure. Anthony Freeman, for example, regards religious non-realism as 
"the most authentic form of Christianity which can be held today. "8 This, however. 
^ Stephen Ross White, Don Cupitt and the Future of Christian Doctrine. (London: SCM Press, 
1994), pp. 179-181, 195-197. See also JmaManinSoskict, Metaphor and Religious Language, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Ch. 7 and Ch. 8. 
' See, for example, Cupitt's discussion of Maurice Wiles in The World to Come, (London: SCM Press, 
1982), pp. 33-38, and Dennis Nineham in Z,//e Z-wes, (London: SCM Press, 1986), pp. 94-104. Life 
Lines itself summarises a number of versions of realist faith. And while he only gives brief 
consideration to the views of theologians like Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, J.A.T. Robinson and Richard 
Swinburne, it is not the case that he ignores them completely. His view of realism may be coloured by 
a particular interpretation of Plato and Descartes (see for example Don Cupitt, Radicals and the 
Future of the Church (London: SCM Press, 1989), p. 40 and Creation Out of Nothing, (London: 
SCM Press, 1990), pp. 54-60) but he argues that any subtle version of theistic realism can in the end 
not but rely upon a dualistic or hierarchical mentality that, in Hick's words, requires "a response to a 
greater reality". (Hick, An Interpretation of Religion , ibid., p. 202). Such a notion is one that Cupitt 
abjures. Don Cupitt, 'A Response to Brian Hebblethwaite', in Joseph Runzo, Is God Real?, (London: 
Macmillan 1993) , pp. 149-150.. 
8 Anthony Freeman, God in Us, (London: SCM Press, 1993), p. 10. 
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is to assume that there is some Archimedean point from which authenticity can be 
judged. If this point is not an objective God then for non-realists, Anthony Thiselton 
argues, it must be the onmipresent human self.^  As Cupitt notes in his early account 
of religious non-realism, it is "the modem concem for the autonomy of the 
individual," 10 and particularly a concem for the purity of religious autonomy, which 
makes the realist picture of God impossible. In Cupitt's work of the mid-1980's it is 
no longer the self but the void that is presented as a 'real' backdrop against which 
religious notions are projected. The void takes on the quality of a quasi-
foundational 'given' which has "run up against the limits of language."" In Radicals 
and the Future of the Church, however, the void is itself encompassed within 
language. It becomes seen as a term defining the contingency and transience of life, 
which Cupitt wants to embrace rather than overcome. 12 Yet, he still sees the void as 
doing some of the old theological work of God, making "us realize our own utter 
tiansience and imperfection," 13 but, importantly, he argues: 
I am not advocating a purely humanist religion, an idolatry of the human. 
And I am not advocating a religion directed towards a supposed 
metaphysical void that surrounds human life. ... But I am advocating a 
religion of life in the sense of a spiritual discipline that enables us to 
accept and say yes to our life as it is, baseless, brief, pointless and utterly 
contingent, and yet in its very nihility beautifiil, ethically-demanding, 
solemn and final. 14 
To avoid the charge of quasi-foundationalism, Cupitt might be advised to drop terms 
like 'the void' from his non-realist vocabulary and talk instead of the contingency of 
life and language. 
However, in Creation Out of Nothing Cupitt again lapses into quasi-
foundational discourse. Here, language, rather than the autonomous self, "stands 
^ Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 
1995), pp. 81-117. 
10 Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 85. 
11 Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 131. 
12 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
13 ibid., p. 111. 
14 ibid., pp. 142-143. 
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between us and the void."i5 Language performs the role of mediimi, as though 
reality (the void) has a quasi-foundational role as that "in which we live and move 
and have our being."i^  A biblical allusion such as this highlights the ambiguity in 
Cupitt's texts of the 1980s. Despite his best efforts, his attempt to 'take leave' of a 
realist God often gives the impression of reasserting some divine double that might 
continue the fill the space that God once filled. In Creation Out of Nothing the 
divine space is filled by the xmmasterable creative and destructive power of 
language.!'' Here Cupitt attempts to combine both pragmatic and deconstructive 
accounts of language. On the pragmatic side, Cupitt notes that language "is just a 
lot of human habits,"18 in which "[w]e narrate the world."i^ On the deconstructive 
side, the world disappears. Language is defined as a medium that hides both things-
in-themselves and God from us, making them inaccessible.20 This tension between 
these two imderstandings of language destabilises Cupitt's account of religious non-
realism. In his works of the 1980's, Cupitt increasingly gives the impression of 
having discovered in the postmodern flux of signs, images and narratives a key to 
the accurate depiction of reality. Deconstruction, Cupitt notes, reveals to us "the 
true character of language. "2' Everything is, and always has been, in flux,22 so that 
the only possible conclusion about reality is that there is no conclusion. Whereas in 
Only Human, Cupitt had noted that both realism and anti-realism were both non-
things,23 he is now prepared to abandon non-realism and to make a positive thesis 
out of anti-realism, which he then mistakenly links to the pragmatic account of 
language. As a result he believes he is able to talk of anti-realism in pragmatic 
terms as not undermining the common-sense view of the world, and in postmodern 
1^  Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op cit., p. 5. 
16 ibid., p. 4. 
I' ' ibid., pp. 33, 143, 155, 194. 
18 ibid., p. 73. 
19 ibid., p. 61. 
20 ibid., pp. 80, 148. 
21 Don Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, (London: SCM Press, 1989), p. 112. 
22 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 201. 
23 Cupitt, Only Human, O^ondon: SCM Press, 1985),op. cit., p. 51. 
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terms as the giddy destabilising movement of signs in which everything is lost in the 
nihil and remains only as it is produced from the flux of language.24 This leaves 
him free to redefine non-realism as the liberal attempt to demythologise religious 
language. He is then foimd to write that "a non-realist interpretation of mainline 
religion will not serve as an answer to today's needs. "25 Unlike the liberal, Cupitt no 
longer has a need to demythologise because he has discovered the tmth about 
language. The God of realism may have been silenced,26 but the voice of God's 
replacement is as loud as ever. It speaks now of what God really always was, 
namely "life, pouring out in language. "2'' Briefly abandoning non-realism, Cupitt 
merely ends in asserting an anti-realist inversion of realism that shares all the 
foimdational features of realism that he claims to be so damaging to religious faith. 
Cupitt's whole discussion in Creation Out of Nothing is set in the context of his 
own anxiety about metaphysics and the desire to avoid Plato. He admits to being 
unable to find ways of expressing the religious insight he wishes to express without 
drawing upon the old Platonic contrasts of appearance and reality. 28 Consequently 
truth is asserted to be an illusion and illusions becomes the tmth.29 Cupitt's own 
metaphysical anxiety, I believe, exhibits a loss of nerve in his pragmatic desire to 
abandon both realism and anti-realism. Despite Cupitt's claim to the confrary, it is 
his adoption of deconstmctive postmodernism that allows realism to reassert itself 
in his very attempt to deny it. Cupitt hoped that deconstmction would offer a theory 
of language and a theory of God—a grand theory of everything. The result was that 
God re-emerged as the "dance of signs" and the "power of language".30 Reality re-
emerges as flux, or the void. As Cupitt self-mockingly recognises, the "transient is 
24 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 105-107, 110-111, 194. 
25 ibid., p. 92. 
26 ibid., p. 70. 
27 ibid., p. 127. 
28 ibid., p. 88. 
29 ibid., p. 31. 
30 Quotes respectively fi-om Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 88, and 
Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 171. 
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the necessary. Back into Plato again. "3 • However, in pragmatic mode, he is less 
concerned with a theory of language and more concerned with the work language 
does in everyday life. Metaphysics can be left at the level of 'useful stories' which 
help us to achieve our various purposes.32 Language is not here conceived on the 
basis of an anti-realist metaphysics in which everything must first become unreal,33 
but rather as an 'actform', Cupitt's term for a "unit of skill-knowledge" which 
constitutes "a temporary-extended pattern or form of action. "3" This enables Cupitt 
to develop an integrated or holistic account of language, life and reality so that 
language no longer hides reality from us but brings us into direct contact with it. 35 
Language, Cupitt comments, "presupposes and produces a world . . . ."3^ Here, 
religious non-realism is not built around a cluster of postmodern dialectical 
paradoxes about language but around those circumstances that are ordinarily 
presupposed by what counts as successful communication. In other words, what 
Cupitt wanted to say in Creation Out of Nothing, namely that "[hjuman life 
coincides with the movement of the world of signs as a whole, and has no 
outside,"3'' is said more appropriately within a pragmatic (Davidsonian-cum-
Rortyan) account of language, where there is no longer any deep concern about 
dialectical paradoxes, rather than within a deconstructionist account. 38 Indeed, 
Cupitt recognised this himself, but not explicitiy, in Creation Out ofNothing?"^ 
I am suggesting that in turning from the autonomous internalised religious 
consciousness to a postmodern account of language, Cupitt may have been guilty of 
replacing the foundational monolithic domination of the God of religious realism 
with the monolithic domination of the self and then the monolithic domination of 
31 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 89. 
32 Don Cupitt, After All, (London: SCM Press, 1993), p. 66. 
33 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 187-188, 
34 Don Cupitt, What Is a Story?, (London: SCM Press, 1991), p. xii. 
35 Don Cupitt, The Time Being, (London: SCM Press, 1992), p. 71. 
36 ibid., p. 121. 
3'' Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 106. 
38 Don Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, (London: SCM Press, 1995), p. 25. 
39 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 72-73, 206 no. 17. 
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language. An unfortunate corollary of this replacement stiategy is that a vocabulary 
about God is sometimes uimecessarily evacuated by religious non-realists, from 
contexts in which it is most suitably applicable. For example, while Freeman has a 
personal preference for more tiaditional, detached styles of worship as opposed to a 
charismatic style, he balks at liturgical expressions that emphasise the personal 
aspect of God. 40 In so doing he risks being interpreted as a secular humanist who 
rejects the meaningfulness of a vocabulary about God because it lacks any 
resonance with his own personal preference for 'modem' modes of thought. Equally, 
when David Hart approvingly quotes Coleridge's phrase 'the willing siispension of 
disbelief as characterising the non-realist approach to worship4i he runs the risk of 
giving the impression that Christian non-realists are actually secular atheists who 
'get a kick' out of attending Church and so, for that period only, suspend their 
atheism. Hart is wrong, I believe, when he asserts that "worship is not... primarily 
'about' God. "42 We don't offer our prayers to the sum of our goals and values, or to 
the religious commimity around us. Rather, prayer, as D.Z. Phillips has consistently 
argued, is bound to a vocabulary about God. "In prayer," Phillips notes, "what is 
said can only be said directly to God. "43 However, for Phillips this makes no 
assumptions about the question of God's reality independent of the context of prayer. 
The value of Phillips' work for rehgious non-realists is its imderstanding of God in 
relation to prayer and worship that does not rely upon the metaphysical assumption 
shared by realists and anti-realists, nor by modernists who want to reconstmct a self-
40 Anthony Freeman, God in Us, op cit., pp. 52-57. 
41 David A. Hart, Faith in Doubt, (London: Mowbrays, 1993), p. 78. 
42 ibid., p. 91. 
43 D.Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 52. Indeed, 
while I have not got time to argue the point here a sttong case can be made for linking D.Z. Phillips' 
account of religious belief with that of a pragmatically orientated 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realism. 
For while Phillips is critical of some aspects of the work of pragmatists like Richard Rorty, his 
emphasis upon the significance of practice and his recognition of the pragmatic element withm 
Wittgenstein's work do make interesting comparisons possible. For Phillips' critique of Rorty see D.Z. 
Phillips, 'Reclaiming the Conversation of Mankind', m Philosophy, Vol. 69, 1994, pp. 35-53. For 
Phillips' critique of both religious realism and religious non-realism see D.Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and 
Religion (London: Macmillan, 1993), Ch. 4; and for his pragmatic account of Wittgenstein see Ch. 15 
of the same book. 
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asserting self, and by postmodernists who want to deconstruct both God and the self 
by asserting the continual flux of linguistic meaning. 
A further corollary of this replacement mentality is a confusion about the 
criteria upon which the religious non-realist's alternative to religious realism is 
asserted. This confusion is correctly rounded on by Thiselton.'^ Is religious non-
realism dependent upon the modem replacement of God by the self or the 
postmodern replacement of God by language? Thiselton points out that religious 
non-realists like Freeman and Hart hardly seem to recognise that Cupitt's shift to 
language undermines their own confident assertions about modernity's attitude to the 
depth of human spirituality and the need to continually demythologise Christian 
doctrine in order to uncover its truth. Hart, for example, wants to demythologise the 
resurrection narratives and does so by drawing upon four representatives of 
twentieth century art: Stanley Spencer, Leo Tolstoy, W.H. Auden and Gustav 
Mahler. For each, according to Hart, the resurrection is a symbol of spiritual and 
moral openness to the future: a triumphant life-giving force which wins through 
pain, death and apparent closiire; a creative htmian acceptance of times of trial, 
which, in Hart's words, produces "hope for the re-emergence of new and life-giving 
meanings within desperate human situations.'"'^ But by suggesting that these 
representatives of twentieth century art see the resurrection as a 'symbolic' 
expression of a continual hope drawn from the wellspring of spiritual life,''^ Hart 
comes close to also suggesting that such an interpretation provides what always has 
been the essential meaning of resurrection faith; a dissatisfaction with current 
conditions and creative acceptance that points a way beyond these conditions. But 
is this the case? Perhaps it would be more honest to recognise that such an account 
of the meaning of resiurection faith is held by some people in our current secular 
Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, op. cit., pp. 111-117. 
'^ ^ Hart, Faith in Doubt, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
"6 ibid., p. 47. 
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culture because they find it meaningful and usefiil as an expression of their religious 
belief. But theirs is not the definitive meaning of that resurrection faith. 
Hart also sometimes gives the impression of allowing modernity to justify 
religious non-realism. On the basis of modem imderstandings of science. Hart 
believes, we ought to affirm that the being of God is "an illusory projection of 
Ihuman ideals."'*'^  However, in Cupitt's later postmodern view, it is not clear what 
power in modernity enables us to speak of such projections as illusory other than a 
different projection. Writers like Freeman and Hart, Thiselton argues, are caught 
between this modem and postmodem critique of religious realism. 
The successful element in each stage of the development of Cupitt's thought, I 
am suggesting, is the pragmatism they share. In the pragmatic account, the self does 
not disappear into a postmodem 'puff of smoke' but neither is it the basis of a 
'modem' religious affirmation. Rather, the self is constituted in every moment of its 
practical activity. On this account, Cupitt can agree with Hebblethwaite that in 
everyday life we are not cut off from the world,''^ not because in everyday life we 
are able to bridge epistemological or ontological dualisms, but because our 
situatedness in language and in life gives us immediate contact with the world. 
Thiselton also asserts the significance of our situatedness, but for him such a 
situatedness must be ontologically relativised in the context of "God's larger 
purposes".'*^ For him, only a context of a narrative about God and God's purposes 
can ensure a hermeneutic recovery of the self, dissipated in its temporal 
situatedness. For the pragmatist, however, our situatedness is a consequence of our 
embodiment in the practical activity of everyday life. Here a further hermeneutic 
recovery, centred in 'God's larger purposes', is beside the point: the self is already 
embodied and this gives it a unified meaning within the context of the daily life and 
activity of the individual in question. According to Thiselton, this ignores biblical 
'^^  ibid., p. 88. 
48 Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth, op. cit., p. 84. 
''^  Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodem Self, op. cit., p. 151. 
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revelation and the need to place human life within a narrative of divine promise. 
Such a narrative avoids the manipulative and rhetorical strategies of religious non-
realism which only mask a bid for power. However, it is by no means obvious why 
his own position is any less a bid for power than that suggested by Cupitt. 
Thiselton's own creative misreading of Cupitt's account of evasive and deceptive 
strategies for contemporary church reform is itself a manipulative narrative in which 
he attempts to mould a critique of Cupitt in which Cupitt is falsely depicted as 
demanding church reform, not for the church's sake, but for his own.^i 
Thiselton correctly notes that Cupitt's position is consistent with the pragmatism 
of Richard Rorty, but I will argue later that the self-destmctive consequences that 
Thiselton sees in pragmatism and the social despair he believes it engenders are not 
necessary features of a pragmatic outlook. However, Thiselton is correct in pointing 
to the quasi-foundationalism that results when Cupitt attempts to link 
postmodernism with pragmatism and he wil l have done religious non-realism a 
service i f his critique succeeds in getting Cupitt to drop any remaining notion he has 
of language as a medium that simultaneously hides and creates reality. 
A further unfortunate consequence of maintaining the link between pragmatism 
and postmodernism is the ambiguity that results in relation to the religious non-
realist's attitude to those religious believers who persist with religious realism. As 
Thiselton again points out, a position consistent with Life Lines and The Time Being 
would be a live-and-let-live attitude to religious realism,^^ but Cupitt, as we have 
seen, also wants to mount a vimlent attack on religious realism. The danger of such 
an attack is that it gives the impression that there is some foundational basis upon 
which it can be sustained. On the one hand, Cupitt notes that the type of "authentic 
postmodem Christianity [sicY he hopes to promote should be "plural enough to 
allow one to choose against it,"^'' and that there are many altemative ways of being 
5° Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 111. 
5' Thisehon, Interpreting God and the Postmodem Self, op. cit., pp. 111-117. 
52 ibid., p. 114. 
5^  Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 77 (both quotes). 
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religious.5* On the other hand, he also notes that trying to maintain some version of 
a reiterated supematuralism wil l lead believers to a faith that tries to offer more 
comfort than can reasonably be expected. As a result it breeds "dishonesty and 
dissatisfaction. "55 Realism in religion, for Cupitt, is anti-religious and damaging to 
human psychic health. It might be possible to make sense of this ambiguity by 
seeing Cupitt's rejection of a reiterated religious realism not as the result of some 
depth analysis and critique of realism that reveals its 'hidden' dangers and inherent 
destructiveness, but rather the result of a comparison with his alternative vision of 
religious non-realism against which religious realism looks second best. 
One reason why Cupitt has not, until recently, begun to clarify this ambiguity 
also explains why at various stages in his religious pilgrimage he has made different 
quasi-foundational claims about the self, the void or about language. This reason is 
the desire for certainty that he often seems to exhibit. This is a desire that runs 
throughout the various stages of his work. In The Leap of Reason Cupitt wrote: 
... the religious quest is an attempt to free oneself from illusions, and to 
make true for oneself only what is true in itself 
In that book, illusion arises when subjective, rather than objective truth has priority. 
In later works, however, illusion and certainty are defined in terms of the particular 
stage Cupitt's religious pilgrimage has reached. In Taking Leave of God, where 
objective truth becomes a "betrayal of the distinctively modem spiritual 
achievement," '^^  religious truth becomes "a matter of the will.''^^ Claims involving 
religious objectivity are to be seen as illusory desires for comfort and happiness 
which are harmful to human spiritual growth.^? To be free from illusion here is to 
recognise the self-asserting religious projections of the will without extraneous 
comfort. A eudaemonistic religious faith, for Cupitt at this stage, is something that 
54 ibid., p. 98. 
55 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 61. 
56 Don Cupitt, The Leap of Reason, (London: SCM Press, 1976), p. 26. 
5' Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 136. 
58 ibid., p. 130. 
59 ibid., p. 134. 
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the religious person should attempt to abandon.^ hi Cupitt's second account of 
religious non-realism the source of religious certainty, against which everything else 
is seen to be illusory, is the creative power of language. 'Objectivity', 'immutability', 
'unity' and 'obligations' are described by Cupitt as the four illusions of realism. No 
longer blinded by them, "the tmth becomes obvious."^' This tmth is that life energy 
is given meaning only as it flows into and receives expression in language. 
Nevertheless, I have argued, Cupitt maintains a distinctively pragmatic account of 
faith. Religious belief is always practical, always known and judged by the effects it 
produces and always providing goals for us to live by. 
The point of criticism I am offering here is not that Cupitt still uses terms like 
'tme', 'right', 'wrong', 'good' and "bad' to describe various religious positions. Such 
terms can be employed pragmatically. Rather, my criticism is aimed at Cupitt's 
depiction of altemative religious positions as illusions fi^om which we should seek to 
free ourselves as though there is a source of religious certainty 'tme in itself which 
directs our attention, when correctly attuned, away fi-om these illusions. In The New 
Christian Ethics, for example, Cupitt argues that it is "clear to anyone who reflects 
on the way thought is transacted in language"^^ that ideas of transcendence and 
extra-historical tmth are illusory. In Radicals_ and the Future of the Church and 
Creation Out of Nothing Cupitt cannot tolerate illusions.^^ The postmodem account 
of language provides, as nothing else does, a certainty that exposes the illusion of 
realism.^ Rather than inhabiting a fictitious fantasy, religious faith must be 
coherent with "the here and now world of signs, the worid of conwnunication.''^^ 
For only that which is 'tme in itself can be the source of genuine and illusion-free 
religious faith. 
^ Cupitt, The World to Come, op. cit., pp. xi, 146. 
61 Don Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, (London: SCM Press, 1987), p. 43. 
62 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 168. 
63 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 168. 
64 ibid., pp. 41, 97, 101, 138; Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p.l81. 
65 Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 97. 
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However, in What is a Story?, Cupitt gives the impression of someone who 
recognises that his own quest for certainty is itself a hopeless illusion but one that 
caimot be re l inquished .He is consciously aware that he wants to assert that 
religion is only human but also aware of the narrativity of such an assertion. This 
situation remains paradoxical for him in that he still has a residual desire for 
certainty beyond narrativity. But in this work, and those from The Time Being 
onwards, a significant shift in his position has occurred. The assertion of religion as 
a hiraian creation, once based upon the certainty of the autonomous internalised 
religious consciousness or upon the postmodernist account of language, is now 
offered simply as an alternative proposal to religious realism: one that holds out a 
better prospect for our religious happiness. Here, a non-realist religious faith is 
eudaemonic rather than disinterested.^ "^ Cupitt still talks of objective reality as an 
illusion but this is not because it is being compared to something real, but because it 
is "a serious threat to our happiness. "^ ^ Consequentiy, the 'tme in itself has recently 
disappeared from Cupitt's work and a new tolerance of illusion has begun to emerge. 
He writes: 
... our tmths are those illusions without which we cannot live, the 
illusions we have fallen in love with and want to be made to believe.^' 
In this respect, the reiteration of realist religious belief also emerges as a possible 
pragmatic source for orientating one's life. Cupitt allows, for example, that religious 
realism is: 
... an ideal realism, a humanly-fictioned realism ... heuristically or 
pragmatically useful and valuable to us humans for various of our human 
and practical purposes, but utterly irrelevant to philosophy.''o 
66 Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 
67 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 9-12. Rowan Williams suggests that there has always 
been an undercurrent of eudaemonianism even in Cupitt's early account of religious non-realism. 
Rowan Williams, "Religious Realism: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt', op. cit., p. 11. See 
Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 161. 
68 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 74. 
69 Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 18. 
"^0 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 102. 
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It is this pragmatic strand in Cupitt's work that I now wish to emphasise. It is 
pragmatism, I believe, that best articulates the type of religious mentality that Cupitt 
and the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists wish to propose. Such an articulation 
would imply neither a quasi-foundationalism nor participation in the quest for 
certainty. 
4.3. Cupitt's Religious Non-Realism and Pragmatism: 
In Cupitt's early and later accounts of non-realism religion is to be understood as a 
himian activity that we engage in pragmatically rather than dogmatically, For the 
non-realist "the daily practice of religion becomes itself the only goal of religion. "^ 2 
The meaning of our religious beliefs and practices derive from us language-using 
himians and these beliefs and practices are employed for purposes that fit our human 
needs. An awareness of this pragmatic account of religious belief is for Cupitt a 
source of spiritual l ibe ra t ion .Cupi t t is convinced that metaphysical religious 
realism has collapsed. It now needs to be replaced by something like "an American-
style pragmatic humanism,"'''* which refiises to believe in any antecedent grounding 
to tmth and meaning. In this view, religious belief is tmthfiil as long as it remains 
life-enhancing and since the definition of what is 'life-enhancing' will be plural and 
ambiguous, religion wil l also be plural and ambiguous. The traditional realist 
notion of tmth does not help in this context.''^ For Cupitt, what is life-enhancing and 
liberating is the affirmation of life's transience and contingency. For others, it may 
be life-enhancing and liberating to re-state traditional realist accounts of belief But 
i f so, they are stated as fictions we can live by.^ 6 Cupitt notes, "tmth is 
fiction,"''^ a story about what works. What worked for religious belief in the past 
Cupitt, Only Human, op. cit., p. 211. 
•72 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., p. 126. 
"73 ibid., p. 66. 
74 ibid., p. 33. 
75 Cupitt, What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 135, 139-140, 153-154. 
76 Cupitt, TTie Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 144.; The Time Being, op. cit., p. 117. 
77 Cupitt, The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 144. Since realism is a fiction that denies fiction it is self-
referentially incoherent, whereas the belief that realism is a fiction is itself a fiction, and is true merely 
as a fiction, is not self-referentially incoherent because such a notion of the Active nature of truth is 
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may not now be at all useful to our needs. Now we need non-realist religious 
fictions. This does not mean that 'tmth', in the old realist sense, is now defined as 
'what works' as though 'workability' is an antecedently definable criterion of trath. 
Rather, the notion of defining trath in this realist sense is now, Cupitt believes, no 
longer useful. por Cupitt, a non-realist account of religious belief 
... doesn't tell us any new and great Truth. Al l it does is help us to 
become happy with things as they are. It is therapy ..J^ 
We should understand religion "in terms of the part it can play in our lives,"^^ not in 
terms of the pictures it conjures up for us. In that Cupitt does talk of tmth in various 
contexts, he does so without its realist connotations. For Cupitt, there are many 
small't', local, consensual, plural, rhetorical tmths; useful temporary stations in the 
process of human endeavour that deserve our respect and commitment. Such 
respect is functional rather than ontological and such commitment is regulative 
rather than dogmatical Tmths, in the non-realist sense, are not antecedently 
existing qualities determining the validity or non-validity of various human 
endeavours; they are rather qualities that we humans have to make, like skills we 
have to develop.^2 They function in the conventional human worid of everyday life. 
one which itself arises primarily not from reflection that would produce a series of fictional 
justifications of fictive accounts of truth ad infinitum, but rather arises from within the very contingent 
practices of everyday life and the language of everyday use which non-realists believe it is liberating 
for us to afiBrm. The Time Being, op. at., p. 183.; What Is a Story?, op. cit., pp. 100-103,151-154. 
Also see The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 12. 
''^  Cupitt, After All, op. cit., p. 103. However, Cupitt's rhetoric against the illusion of supematuralism 
does not always give the impression of consistency on this point. 
Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, op. cit., p. 47. 
80 Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith' in Runzo (ed.) Is God Real?, op. cit., p. 150. 
81 White, Don Cupitt and the Future of Christian Docti-ine, op. cit., pp. 55, 85.; Cupitt, The World to 
Come, op. cit., p. 64.; Life Lines, op. cit., p. 134.; Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 
15.; Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 22, 45.; The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 32, 170.; 5o/ar 
Ethics, (London: SCM Press, 1995), p. 64. 
82 Cupitt writes: 
... truth is a matter of study, arguments, literary strategies, ambiguities, disputes about 
interpretation, thinking up objections and so forth. It is a creative work of tracing, 
manipulating and constructing, all done with signs, and the conclusion's content is just, 
and no more than, the work that has gone before it and has led up to it. 
TTie Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 154. 
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This is how we are to imderstand Cupitt's reference to 'the six tmths' in The Time 
Being and his attempt in After All to sketch a "not untmthful" account of religious 
belief 83 Religion, writes Cupitt, "can have an art-tmth and it can have a pragmatic 
tmth, but it cannot have the old objective sort of Tmth-tmth."^ In what comes close 
to a paean of praise to the pragmatic account of tmth Cupitt writes: 
... the pragmatist theory of tmth, of which we have already given a hint, 
marks a real advance. I t . . . acknowledge [s] that the tme for us has to be 
what it is good for us to hold, and it suits a period of rapid change because 
it allows us to think that beliefs and tmths may have only a limited period 
of serviceability. We should regard ... [them] ... like disposable tools, 
and simply pick up the ones that will best serve our current purposes. ... 
[W]e might claim that religious beliefs are tme in the sense that they 
work out well in our lives—and no more than that can be said or need be 
said, for we have no standpoint outside our own lives from which to 
conduct any other test of our beliefs. 
... [W]ith pragmatism we have already come to the end of Tmth.^5 
Cupitt's religious non-realism, then, coincides with a pragmatic account of 
tmth. Indeed 'pragmatism' informs Cupitt's attitude generally to art, science, 
philosophy and morality. This, I suggest, also informs the non-realist's attitude 
towards the epistemological status of the pressures intemal to religious belief and 
ethical practice, discussed in the last chapter, and the intellectual heritage, discussed 
in chapter two. For while Cupitt and the other Sea of Faith writers may want to 
'explain' why they accept religious non-realism they wil l not, at their pragmatic best, 
seek to 'justify' the non-realist or naturalistic approach to religious belief as though it 
were eternally valid and exclusively accurate approach to religion. Cupitt notes: 
... it is a mistake to suppose that religion needs to be justified from 
outside by being set upon a firm foundation of metaphysics and 
epistemology. Religion no more needs that sort of justification than does 
art. 86 
83 Cupitt, The Time Being, op. cit., pp. 35-41, m.; After All, op. cit., pp. 39, 46-47, 122. 
° i Cupitt, Radicals and the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 159. 
8^  Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 44. 
86 Cupitt, The World to Come, op. cit., p. 36. 
118 
Any such justification of religious non-realism would merely engage the realist on 
the realist's own terms.8'' Rather, in pragmatic mood, Cupitt attempts to explain why 
one set of human religious beliefs (ones of a broadly realist nature) have been 
replaced, or should now be replaced by another set of human religious beliefs (ones 
of a broadly non-realist nature).88 Religious non-realists, who are also pragmatists, 
should not attempt to groimd their non-realism in some supposedly privileged 
metaphysical position over realism, but rather aim to inculcate in religious believers 
a sense of the groundlessness of the decision to be religious. That is, its 
ungroundedness in anything that is not already bound by the natural, linguistic and 
environmental conditions that make us human. 89 Chosen gratuitously, religious 
faith in its various forms is to "be assessed and compared only immanently and 
pragmatically. "90 Cupitt is prepared to suggest reasons why he believes that a non-
realist account of religious belief is today preferable to a realist or supematuralistic 
account of religious belief, but in doing so, he utilises the distinction between the 
role these reasons have as explanation, and the role they have as justification. While 
these reasons may 'explain' why a non-realist approach to religious belief is now 
preferable to a realist approach, these reasons should not be understood as providing 
grounds upon which a theologian or philosopher could 'justify' the tmth of religious 
non-realism over that of realism. To suggest that these reasons do this, is to 
predicate non-realism in religion upon a realist or foundationalist account of tmth 
which non-realists like Cupitt claim to want to set aside. As Cupitt notes: 
8'' Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 9-17.; The Long Legged Fly, op. cit., p. 86. 
88 It will mark, in Cupitt's words, the replacement of one "obsolete bunch of cultural fictions", with a 
new bunch Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 120. This also means, for Cupitt that any 
metaphysical argument will be a rhetorical and heuristic. He writes: 
... a bold metaphysical assertion is a rhetorical device used in the hope of persuading 
people to change the habitual order of their thoughts. 
Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, op. cit., p. 49. 
89 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 121-123. These conditions include space, time, body 
and society and each are understood only inside particular uses of language. See Cupitt, After AU, op. 
cit., pp. 110-117. 
90 Cupitt, Only Human, op cit., p. 9. 
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No world-view, faith or ideology whatever is objectively anchored in and 
guaranteed by the nature of things, in the sense that human beings once 
believed in, for there is no such nature of things. But it does not follow 
that none of our beliefs is more rational than any other; only, that we must 
now test our beliefs inmianently in terms of their coherence with each 
other, the way they work out in life, the sense they enable us to make of 
life, and their fecundity—the extent to which they open up new 
hypotheses and creative possibilities.'^ 
For Cupitt, the question of justification is simply a matter of going over the history 
and the argument and seeing the differences that altemative approaches to religion 
make to people's lives. We wil l then either acknowledge these alternatives or we 
wi l l not.'2 As Cupitt notes, "the pursuit of the religious ideals needs no extraneous 
justification and carmot be given one."'^ We must not seek to turn understanding 
and explanation into justification.'4 He notes, "[w]e don't seek to justify knowledge-
claims. We merely contextualize them. "95 
In his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Richard Rorty also refers to 
this distinction between explanation and justification.'6 For Rorty, 'explanation' is 
simply a "natural quest for understanding" while 'justification' is an "unnatural quest 
for certainty. "97 former is a pragmatic sfrategy which facilitates our coping with 
the world we live in. The latter is a pointless attempt to groimd our current 
understandings in something external and unchanging. Appeal to such grounds 
makes no sense because they merely reinforce sceptical worries concerning our 
knowledge of the worid rather than relieving them.'s "Nobody," writes Rorty, 
"would want 'human knowledge' ... justified unless he had been [like Locke] 
fiightened by scepticism."'^ For Rorty, i f we are to talk of 'justification' at all we 
should see it as pointing to the social context that directs our methods of knowing 
91 ibid., p. 9. 
92 Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 37. 
93 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, op. cit., p. 121. 
94 Cupitt, Life Lines, op. cit., p. 209. 
95 Cupitt, Radicals And the Future of the Church, op. cit., p. 42 
96 Richard Rorty, PMo50/7/iya«rf/AeM>roro/A/aft/re, (Oxford: Blackwell 1980) D D 139-148 178 
192. ' ' 
97 ibid., p. 228. 
98 ibid., p. 178. 
99 ibid., p. 229. 
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rather than to some "special relation between ideas (or words) and objects"'oo or 
some privileged irmer representation that enables us to divide one branch of social 
knowledge as 'purely given' (i.e. science) from another as 'purely conceptual'ioi (i.e. 
religion). To argue that we can explain "rationality and epistemic authority by 
reference to what society lets us say" 102 is merely to argue that the social function of 
the term 'justify' is the only appropriate one. As a result, Rorty writes, the 
pragmatist will : 
... abandon the notion of philosophy as a discipline which adjudicates the 
claims of science and religion, mathematics or poetry, reason and 
sentiment, allocating an appropriate place to each.'o^ 
I f we cease to understand 'explanation' as justification' and see justification' 
sociologically rather than as a term designed to segregate some privileged 
interpretation or tmth from our other human endeavours, we need not then object to 
knowledge as explanation.'04 We can offer explanations of why Christian non-
realism has developed without allowing these explanations to be taken as justifying 
Christian non-realism. Having said this, however, we may allow that i f these 
explanations are accepted within a specified society, belief in a realist God may 
become less plausible to those in that society, and a non-realist conception of God or 
atheism or agnosticism or a total disinterest in this set of religious issues may come 
to predominate. None of these positions, however, would be said to be justified by 
these explanations. As Rorty points out, the claim that the atheist, in appealing to 
enlightenment thought is "appealing to reason, whereas the religious are being 
irrational, is hokum."'05 Rather, for Rorty, the whole idea of appealing to such 
deeper justifying sources for our religious or atheistic vocabularies is an idea we 
100 ibid., p. 170. 
'01 ibid., pp. 170,210. 
102 ibid., p. 174. This is an attitude that Rorty claims to have in common with both Dewey and 
Wittgenstein. 
103 ibid., p. 212. 
104 ibid., p. 210. 
105 Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation Stopper', in Common Knowledge, Vol. 3, 1994. p. 4. 
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would do well to drop.'°6 By dropping that notion, our acceptance or rejection of 
religious belief and practice becomes a pragmatic matter. In the words of J. Wesley 
Robbins: 
A pragmatist is going to advise ... religious humanists to deflect questions 
about the authorization of their re-definition of 'God' with a response like 
"Let's try it, and see how it works."io7 
This pragmatic advice, I have been suggesting, is perhaps best taken when it 
comes to accoimting for the reasons that Cupitt and others employ to explain their 
non-realist conception of religious belief As Cupitt confirms, his non-realism is 
explored and promoted on the basis that "it is the point of view we would do well to 
adopt, because it is the one that works best."'08 From this perspective, Cupitt's more 
dogmatic statements in defence of non-realism, statements which are often made in 
a style which appears to Justify rather than explain the motivating factors behind a 
non-realist understanding of Christian faith, become statements which cogently 
affirm that a non-realist approach to religious belief might be one worth trying for. 
This, however, is not to say that a philosophy called 'pragmatism' provides the basis 
on which we can be religious today, after realism has been accepted as incompatible 
with religious belief and practice. 
4.4. Conclusion: 
In this chapter I have developed the pragmatic theme in religious non-realism. 
Pragmatism helps to articulate the context in which the explanations for the appeal 
of religious non-realism, outlined in the last two chapters, might best be understood. 
The realist critics of religious non-realism wil l have a valid point to make i f non-
realists stray from this pragmatic context. Pragmatism does not aim to replace the 
assertion of a realist dogma about the nature and content of tmth with another, non-
realist, dogma. Rather it aims to present an account of human endeavours in which 
'06 ibid., p. 5. 
'07 J. Wesley Robbins, Tragmatism, Democracy and God', in The American Journal of Theology and 
Philosophy Vol 14, 1993. p. 282. 
'08 C\xp\tx, After All, op. cit., p. 112. 
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such dogmas are replaced by the development and use of various sttategies for 
coping with the world we live in. To make this point, and to confirm the parallels 
that I have been intimating between religious non-realism and pragmatism, it wil l be 
helpful to consider the religious thought of John Dewey. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
JOHN D E W E Y . AND RELIGIOUS NON-REALISM 
5.1. Introduction: 
Although some theologians, like the American pragmatist J. Wesley Robbins, have 
pointed to a number of "similarities between Cupitt's Christian humanism and 
Deweyan religious naturalism,"' the association of ideas between John Dewey's 
comments on religious belief in his book A Common Faith with 'Sea of Faith' 
religious non-realism is rarely remarked upon. In this chapter, therefore, I shall 
summarise Dewey's account of religious belief and in the process I shall indicate its 
close affinities with the featvires of 'Sea of Faith' non-realism which I discussed in 
chapter one. 
5.2. The Development of Dewev's Understanding of God: 
The Nineteen-Nineties have seen a revival of interest in the work of John Dewey. 
This revival is evidenced by the publication of three major biographies since 1991: 
Robert B. Westbrook's, John Dewey and American Democracy, Alan Ryan's John 
Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism and Steven C. Rockefeller's, John 
Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism,- The latter, as the title 
' J. Wesley Robbins, "When Christians Become Naturalists' in Religious Studies, Vol. 28, 1992, p. 
200. Also see David Ray Griffin, God and Religion in the Postmodern World, (Albany: SUNY Press 
1989). p. 60. John Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-realism: Defining the Issue' in Joseph Runzo 
(ed) Is God Real? (London: MacmUlan 1993) p. 8. 
2 Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991). Alan Ryan's John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York, W. W. 
Norton, 1996). Steven C. Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Also see: J. Wesley Robbins, 'A Common Faith 
Revisited" in Religious Humanism Vol. 28, 1994 pp. 22-33. William L , Rowe, "Religion Within the 
Bounds of Naturalism: Dewey and Wieman' in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 
38, 1995 pp. 17-36. Douglas R. Anderson "Smith and Dewey on the Religious Dimension of 
Experience: Dealing With Dewey"s Half-God' in The American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 
Vol. 14, 1993 pp. 161-176. P. Eddy Wilson, 'Emerson and Dewey on Natural Piety' in The Journal 
of Religion, Vol. 75, 1995 pp. 329-346. William M. Shea, 'On John Dewey's Spiritual Life' in 
American Journal of Education, Vol. 101, 1992 pp. 71-81. Michael J. Rockier, "Russell vs. Dewey on 
Religion' in Free Inquiry Vol. 15, 1995 pp. 36-38. Marvin C. Shaw, 'Wieman's Misunderstanding of 
Dewey: The Christian Century Discussion' in Zygon, Vol. 22, 1987 pp. 7-19. Steven C, Rockefeller, 
'John Dewey, Spiritual Democracy and the Human Future' in Cross Currents, Vol. 39, 1989 pp. 300-
321. 
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suggests, concentrates on Dewey's philosophy in the light of his sensibility to 
religious belief It provides a comprehensive guide to Dewey's thought on 
theological matters and to Dewey's own personal religious development. 
Rockefeller distinguishes six stages in the development of Dewey's religious 
thinking. First, from an early age, until the late 1870's, Dewey belonged to his local 
Vermont Congregational Church, although without sharing a whole-hearted 
commitment to its doctrinal beliefs. Second, from 1878-1892, Dewey was 
introduced to Vermont franscendentalism, a blend of Kant's practical reason and 
Wordsworthian romanticism. At this stage Dewey gained a lifelong regard for the 
religious dimension of experience which he conceived as the sense of awe and 
wonder, dependence, peace and joy that come with a mystical appreciation of 
oneself and one's community integrated within the whole that constitutes the 
universe. Dewey claims to have had such an experience himself at this stage and 
although he attributed it to aspects of his own psychology, he found it significant 
nonetheless. Talking about the experience fifty years later, Dewey claimed that 
after it, he no longer had any doubts about the value and meaning of life and thus no 
need of beliefs either.-^  The third stage (1882-1887) coincides with Dewey's early 
teaching career during which he was heavily influenced by absolute idealism. 
Hegelian philosophy appeared to offer an understanding of the individual in relation 
to the whole which did not require belief in extemal revelation, dismption of natural 
processes or assent to ossified timeless dogma. It appealed to Dewey's desire for a 
unified method of knowledge and spoke of the 'absolute' without the trappings of 
Christian doctrine to which Dewey could not give his full assent. In this third stage, 
characterised by his book Psychology published in 1887, Dewey attempted to create 
a synthesis between Hegelian rationalism and the method of scientific inquiry that 
derived knowledge from experience. In human psychology the absolute personality 
of Hegel's system is united with the individual inquiring scientific personality. At 
3 A report of a conversation of Dewey with Max Eastman quoted in Max Eastman, 'John Dewey', in 
The Atlantic Monthly, Vol 168, 1941, p. 673. 
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this stage. Rockefeller notes, Dewey "identifies the reality of God with God's 
realization in a being like man and rejects any notion that God is an eternal static 
being existing wholly apart from the world of time, process, and becoming.'"* 
However, because for Dewey, time and history exist within the absolute, God 
remains in some unspecified way, an individual centre of consciousness distinct 
from hxmian personality. Nevertheless, the idea of the realisation of the absolute in 
the human, enabled Dewey to unite human scientific and experimental inquiry with 
rational philosophy and to assert the union of the actual inquiring self, that is the 
individual person, with the ideal rational self, that is, the perfect personality of God. 
Since, for Dewey, both the inquiring self and the perfect self had Truth, Goodness, 
Beauty and Being as their guiding objects, the self s union with the divine is to be 
seen as occurring through human endeavours in science, art, social relations and 
religion. Religion makes this union manifest and leads us, Dewey writes "[to] belief 
and trust that God is in all our life, and is all around us and about us."^ At this stage, 
the reality of God is the source of all human action and the ground of personality. 
Whereas moral action, for Dewey, tried to conform the actual to the ideal, "religious 
action is action directed at the embodiment of the ideal in the actual."^ and truth 
conceived in terms of the use that such action has. 
The fourth stage in Dewey's account of the reality of God is marked by three 
major developments in his thought, first, his increasing use of Darwinian rather than 
Hegelian terminology to explain the relation of humankind to its environment; 
second, as a result of his Darwinism, a shift from absolute to ethical idealism; and 
third, his increasing use of the pragmatic test of truth. At this stage Dewey drops the 
notion of the absolute Wil l and instead attempts to reconcile Christianity to modem 
culture by de-mythologising the transcendent God of the Bible in terms of the goods 
of human social life, democracy, open unfettered inquiry and education. In this 
Steven C. Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 96. 
5 John Dewey, 'The relation of Morality and Religion' quoted in Rockefeller John Dewey, op. cit., p. 
112. 
^ John Dewey, Psychology, quoted in Rockerfeller Jo/jn Dewey, op. cit., p. 113. 
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period, God's reality is no longer viewed as the absolute of neo-Hegelian idealism, 
but 'the organic unity of the world' interchangeable with nature and the immanent 
life of personality. At this stage. Rockefeller comments: 
[DJivine revelation [for Dewey] is the disclosure of truth in general, ... 
the Incarnation is the presence of God in all persons and society; ... 
[while]... the true church and kingdom of God are to be identified with 
the democratic community[.]^ 
However, Dewey's increasing acceptance of naturalism and pragmatism and his 
move to Chicago that cut his ties with the institutional church of his youth, also led 
to the abandonment of this liberal theology. In the fifth stage, fi-om 1894-1928, 
Dewey is mostly silent on religious matters. In essays which later constituted his 
book The Influence of Darwin on Philosoph}^ Dewey explains that he rejected 
idealism because it was pragmatically useless. Instead he affirms a naturalism 
which does not reduce to materialism but asserts the natural origins of science as 
well as art, philosophy as well as religion, human experience as well as human 
imagination. At this f i f th stage, Dewey's earlier Hegelian panentheism has slipped 
into a 'natural piety' in which God is now to be viewed as a projection of human 
values. At this stage Dewey can be seen as America's Feuerbach.' Doctrinal 
religion is no longer the most appropriate vehicle of this 'natural piety'. Rather it is 
expressed in a "creed of life implicit in democracy and science. "1° Dewey writes: 
^ Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 214-215. See here, John Dewey, 'Christianity and 
Democracy," in The Early Works of John Dewey. 1882-1898, Vol. 4. (ed. Jo Anne Boydston, 
Carbondale; Southern Illinois University Press, 1971) pp. 3-10 (henceforth, sited as Early Works). 
Such demythologising of the gospel in terms of democracy, as William M. Shea points out, suggests a 
similarity of method with that of Bultmann. Shea 'On John Dewey's spiritual Life', in American 
Journal of Education, op. cit., p. 75. 
^ John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1965 edition). Esp. pp. 1-45. 
^ Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 216. 
1^  John Dewey, 'Religion and our Schools', in Hibbert Journal, Vol. 7, 1908. p. 799. Until Dewey 
abandoned his Neo-Hegelianism in the mid 1890's he was inclined to regard the democratic spirit as 
the manifestation of absolute spirit once manifested in religion. As a result his early work on religion 
had an important influence on his understanding of the nature of democracy and scientific inquiry. 
This influence survives his abandonment of Hegelianism in favour of naturalism and is developed in his 
later religious naturalism. In a work that stands at the point of his departure fi'om Hegelianism Dewey 
writes: 
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We measure the change from the standpoint of the supernatural and we 
call it irreligious. Possibly i f we measured it from the standpoint of the 
natiu-al piety it is fostering,... it would appear as the growth of religion.'' 
For Dewey, science and democracy represent growth in the rehgious dimension of 
human experience. Supematuralism impedes this growth. It is a hindrance to "the 
recognition of that type of religion which wil l be the fine flower of the modem 
spirit's achievement."' 2 
However, Dewey had not dispensed with the idea of God. In the sixth stage, 
Dewey combines the social concern of the de-mythologised gospel of his fourth 
stage, the union of the Ideal in the actual of the third stage, and the emphasis upon 
experience which had dominated his thought since the second stage. He then views 
them in the light of the imaginative projection of his fifth stage. The result was his 
naturalistic religious humanism to which he gives expression in his book A Common 
The significance of democracy as revelation is that it enables us to get truths in a natural, 
everyday and practical sense which otherwise could be grasped only in a somewhat 
unnatural or sentimental sense. ... If God is, as Christ taught, at the root of life, incarnate 
in man, then democracy has a spiritual meaning which it behoves us not to pass by. ... 
The spiritual unification of humanity, the realization of the brotherhood of all man, all that 
Christ called the Kingdom of God is but the fiirther expression of this [democracy]. ... It 
is no accident that the growing organization of democracy coincides with the rise of 
science. ... Democracy thus appears as the means by which the revelation of truth is 
carried on. It is in democracy, the community of ideas and interest through community of 
action, that the incarnation of God in man (man, that is to say, as organ of universal truth) 
becomes a living, present thing having its ordinary and natural sense. 
Dewey, 'Christianity and Democracy', 1893 essay in Early Works, Vol. 4, pp. 8-9. In another article 
published in the same year Dewey wrote: 
The next religious prophet who will have a permanent and real influence on men's lives 
will be the man who succeeds in pointing out the religious meaning of democracy ... It is 
the question of doing what Jesus did for his time. 
John Dewey, 'The Relation of Philosophy to Theology" in Early Works Vol. 4. op. cit., p. 36. 
According to Rockefeller, Dewey's ethics of democracy, recalling its Christian origins, was an ethics of 
love. "By love," Rockefeller notes, "[Dewey] means wholehearted interest in those objects, ends, and 
ideals which the process of experimental moral evaluation recognizes as good." Rockefeller adds: 
Love so defined is the way of fi-eedom and growth for the individual and the community. 
It is the perfection of democracy as a creative way of personal life. (...) [0]ne finds here 
in Dewey a theory of what might be called a secular democratic form of spiritual practice. 
Rockefeller, 'John Dewey, Spiritual Democracy and the Human Future', op cit., p. 314. 
Dewey, 'Religion and our Schools', op. cit., p. 808. 
•2 ibid., p. 809. Dewey did not have a materialistic or reductive view of science,. Science is not final. 
It is the method of inquiry guided by intelligence. Its conclusions are always open to revision. See the 
final chapter of his The Quest for Certainty, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). Also see John Dewey, 
'Religion and the Intellectuals', in Partisan Review, Vol. 17, 1950. pp. 129-133. 
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Faith. Condemning both supernatural theism and atheism, he adumbrates, in this 
sixth stage what Rockefeller describes as "a major alternative way of being religious 
open to modem men and women."'^ 
5.3. Dewey, the Reality of God and Religion As a Human Creation: 
5.3a. Religion and the Religious: In A Common Faith, Dewey makes a distinction 
between the noun 'religion' and the adjective 'religious'. Whereas the noun denotes 
the doctrines, practices and the 'supernatural encumbrances' that have grown up 
around religious faith through the ossification of historic and culturally specific 
dogmas, the adjective denotes a certain human experience of unseen powers. For 
Dewey, these unseen powers are those ideal ends that are projected in the human 
imagination and arise within the natural conditions and processes of human living. 
The imagination provides a unified notion of the self with the universe, and has a 
moral and religious fiinction giving guidance to our contingent and transient 
practices by directing them toward the ideal ends that we currently envision. Such 
ideal ends, for Dewey, are not to be understood as "already embedded in the existent 
firame of t h i n g s " T o think that they are is to display a lack of moral faith in the 
need to strive for moral ends.^ ^ When, however, we maintain moral faith in ideal 
ends in a way that suggests their total inclusiveness, we move from a merely moral 
faith to the faith that is religious.'"' The religious attitude is defined by Dewey as 
one that seeks: 
Rockefeller, .John Dewey, op. cit., p. 22. 
John Dewey, A Common Faith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 6. 
15 ibid., p. 21. 
16 "Faith that something should be in existence as far as lies in our power," writes Dewey, is then 
"changed into the intellectual belief that it is already in existence." ibid., pp. 21-22 (my italics). But 
when experience and observation fail to bear out the existence of such ideals they are either rejected or 
made metaphysical. Moral faith becomes a hopeless illusion (as in atheism) or it becomes supernatural 
(as in traditional theism). Either way it becomes alienated from its natural origin in the human 
imagination and fi-om that endeavour which is the human responsibility to pursue. When moral faith 
turns supernatural it becomes a source of refijge for the weak and the source of fanaticism in the 
strong. Those who dissent are pitied by the first group converted through force by the second, ibid., 
p. 22. 
17 ibid., p. 23. 
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the tmification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, 
which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as 
worthy of confroUing our desires and choices. 
The ideal ends of religious faith are not to be viewed as being either antecedently 
realised or guaranteed to prevail, for then dogmatism would replace the open pursuit 
of ideal ends and possible future goods would be closed off by the fixation of 
religious ideals into credal formulae.Free from such supernatural encumbrances, 
Dewey suggests: 
Any activity pursued on behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in 
spite of threats of personal loss, because of conviction of its general and 
enduring value, is religious in quality.^o 
Thus the religious dimension of experience is potentially available within every 
human activity and not restricted to a single privileged set of doctrinal formulations 
which claim to evoke an entity in whom ideal values are already realised. Dewey 
writes: 
What I have been criticizing is the identification of the ideal with a 
particular Being, especially when that identification makes necessary the 
conclusion that this Being is outside of nature. 
S.Sb. Hitman Imagination and Experience: For Dewey, the ideals that stimulate 
religious experience are imaginative human constructs. However, Dewey does not 
mean that religious experience is illusory simply because ideal ends are 
apprehended through the imagination. For Dewey, the imagination does not 
constitute a mere garnish to human experience but provides it with future 
possibilities which shape our current realities. Even facts, argues Dewey, "are 
usually observed with reference to some practical end and purpose, and that end is 
presented only imaginatively. "22 For Dewey, the imagination supplies the 
teleological element to experience and is conceived holistically. These are two 
ibid., p. 33. 
>9 ibid., p. 22. 
20 ibid., p. 27. 
21 ibid., p. 48. 
22 ibid., p. 18. 
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crucial elements in Dewey's account of the unseen powers that clarify the sense in 
which, for Dewey, religious faith is a human creation. I wil l , therefore, consider 
these two elements in a little more detail. 
Firstly, in relation to teleology, Dewey accepts William James' use of a 
distinction between material and theistic conceptions of the world. I f the world is 
complete, according to James, then whether we choose to describe its cause in terms 
of a theistic vocabulary or a materialistic vocabulary is purely arbitrary since the 
world, as complete, would remain exactly the same. But, writes Dewey: 
It is entirely different i f we take the fixture into account. God then has the 
meaning of a power concerned with assuring the final triumph of ideal 
and spiritual values and matter becomes a power indifferent to the 
triumph or defeat of these values. And our life takes a different direction 
according[ly] as we adopt one or other of these alternatives. ^ 3 
It is more beneficial, more pragmatically useful to human flourishing, to reach out 
for ideal values projected by the imagination by adopting a theistic perspective than 
by adopting a materialistic one. As James writes: 
I f theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they wil l be 
true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much.^* 
But, he adds, whatever other truth theological ideas will have wil l depend entirely 
on how they cohere with other truths we recognise. For Dewey, pragmatism "does 
not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon 
the precedents but upon the possibilities of action. "^ 5 By putting imaginative ideas 
into action the world is changed without these ideas having necessarily been realised 
in some antecedently existing entity. 
The second element in understanding Dewey's account of the imagination and 
its projection of the unseen powers is his holism. In Dewey's pragmatism, the 
John Dewey, 'The Development of American Pragmatism' in H.S. Thayer (ed.) Pragmatism: The 
Classic Writings, (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1982 edition), p. 28. 
24 William James, 'What Pragmatism Means' in H.S. Thayer (ed.), ibid., p. 222. 
25 Dewey, 'The Development of American Pragmatism', op. cit pp 32-33 
26 ibid., p. 33. y • 
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imagination unifies human experience as a whole. Human mental activity, 
therefore, caimot be considered in isolation either from himian action or from the 
environment at large and, according to Dewey, we understand the notions of 
'selfhood' and 'universe' "only through imaginative extension."2"^ It is in this 
imaginative extension that the self and the universe are harmonised. Thus, writes 
Dewey: 
The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own 
unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes 
of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe.28 
This means that a purely voluntaristic account of our imaginative projection of the 
self wil l be incomplete. It needs to be holistically integrated with our understanding 
of the world to do ful l justice to the ideal ends envisioned by religious faith. Dewey 
writes: 
The essentially unreligious attitude is that which attributes human 
achievement and purpose to man in isolation from the world of physical 
nature and his fellows. Our successes are dependent upon the cooperation 
of nature. The sense of the dignity of human nature is as religious as is 
the sense of awe and reverence when it rests upon a sense of human 
nature as a cooperating part of a larger whole.29 
It is this holistic reluctance to "isolate man either individually or collectively 
from nature"^ *^  that characterises a Deweyan account of imaginative projection. 
Indeed, Dewey's understanding of 'experience' is predicated upon a rejection of 
dualistic metaphysics that divides subject from object and spirit from nature. Like 
every experience, the religious dimension of experience "is an interaction of 
environing conditions and an organism."-" Dewey's, then, is not a subjectivist 
account of experience. Neither, however, does he maintain an objectivist account of 
27 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
28 ibid., p. 19. 
29 ibid., p. 25. 
30 ibid., p. 46. 
3^  John Dewey, 'Experience, Knowledge and Value', in Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn 
(ed) The Philosophy of John Dewey, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, (1939 and 1951) 1989 edition), 
p. 544. 
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experience, as i f our scientific inquiry provided an immutable or absolute account of 
supposedly fixed realities.32 Rather, his is an instrumental accoimt of experience in 
which the acquisition of practical skills helps an organism to foster a better 
adjustment toward its envirormient. For Dewey, experience is the direct and 
immediate encoimter of an organism with its environment. In a collaborative work 
with Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Dewey writes: 
We reject the 'no man's land' of words imagined to lie between the 
organism and its environmental objects ... and require, instead, definite 
locations for all naming behaviors as organic-environmental 
transactions.^^ 
Scientific inquiry arises only when this encounter becomes problematic in some 
way. In this context, what Dewey asks of scientific inquiry is that it "be fiuitfiil in 
giving direction to [our] observations and reasonings." '^* The aim of such inquiry is 
always to return a problematic situation back into the direct and primary experience 
of our immediate, everyday contact with the world. By emphasising the immediacy 
of our contact with our environment, Dewey attempts to weave a path between 
idealism and realism. He writes: 
I f the things of experience are produced, as they are according to my 
theory, by interaction of organism and environing conditions, then as 
Nature's own foreground they are not a barrier mysteriously set up 
between us and nature.^^ 
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey indicates his preference for the Greek 
understanding of experience over that of 18th century empiricism. According to 
Dewey, experience for the Greeks was a matter of practical skill; the acquisition of 
32 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (London. Allen and Unwin, 1930). p. 295. 
33 John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 
121. 
34 Dewey, 'Experience, Knowledge, and Value', op. cit., p. 576. Dewey writes: 
... any aspect, phase, or element of experience as mine is not a description of its direct 
existence but a description of experience with respect to some special problem for some 
special purpose, one which needs to be specified, 
ibid., p. 532. 
For a good brief account of Dewey's metaphysics of experience, to be discussed in Chapter 6, see 
Rockefeller, John De^'ey, op. cit., pp. 362-371 
35 Dewey, 'Experience, Knowledge and Value', op. cit., p. 532. 
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habits and actions in performing instrumental tasks. The fact that they depreciated 
the natural world of experience in favour of a higher, formal, theoretical realm that 
was more certain and therefore more real, did not prevent the instrumental from 
becoming part of the general inheritance of the Western understanding of 
experience conveyed by the spread Christian theology.^^ Unfortunately, Dewey 
notes, theology also conveyed: 
... the notion, which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the 
Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, 
rather than, as is the case with our practical judgments, to gain the kind of 
understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise. (...) 
[such a notion] diverted thought from inquiring into the purposes which 
experience of actual conditions suggests and from concrete means of their 
actualization. It translated into a rational form the doctrine of escape 
from the vicissitudes of existence by means of measures which do not 
demand an active coping with conditions. (...) This deliverance was an 
intellectual, a theoretical affair, constituted by a knowledge to be attained 
apart from practical activity. ^ '^  
Such knowledge provided the ontological justification for the deprecation of 
practice which, as contingent, could never aspire to the certainty of the fixed eternal 
realms of theoretical knowledge attained through rational contemplation. 
According to Dewey, the traditional quest for certainty is the source of "all the 
characteristic problems of modem philosophy. "^ ^ It sets up the dualism between 
mind and nature foimd in both 17th century rationalism and 18th century 
empiricism, and which in Kant divided aroimd the rational and practical will as 
well as around the phenomenal and noumenal world. The dualisms between subject 
and object, mind and nature, and value and fact, thus became enshrined as the 
36 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty^ op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
37 ibid., p. 20. ' 
38 ibid., pp. 22-24. Dewey writes: 
... the valid status of all the highest values, the good, true and beautifiil, was bound up 
with their being properties of ultimate and supreme Being, namely, God. All went well as 
long as what passed for natural science gave no offence to this conception. Trouble 
began when science ceased to disclose in the objeas of knowledge the possession of any 
such properties. Then some roundabout method had to be devised for substantiating 
them, 
ibid., pp. 43-44 
39 ibid., p. 54. 
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problematic outcome of the quest for certainty upon which philosophy predicated 
itself For Dewey, a reconstruction of philosophy is required i f it is to extricate itself 
from these traditional, unfruitfiil dualisms. Such reconstruction necessitates the 
closure of the traditional quest for certainty in terms of a fixed, transcendent, eternal 
realm called the 'reality of things'. Such a quest, given the contingencies of human 
experience, may have been usefiil to human beings in need of courage and 
confidence, living in a hazardous world, but it is not one upon which we should 
reconstruct philosophy. Rather, according to Dewey, we need to drop dualistic 
thinking that separates values into a hierarchy of higher and lower, and instead 
"regard practice as the only means (other than accident) by which whatever is 
judged to be honourable, admirable, approvable can be kept in concrete 
experienceable existence,'"" so that, as Dewey adds later, the "standards and tests of 
validity are found in the consequences of overt activity, not in what is fixed prior to 
it and independently of it. "''2 The values once sought in a transcendent, antecedently 
existing realm, are now to be found in the natural conditions of experience and the 
subject matter of scientific enquiry. It is a mistake for science to become entangled 
in metaphysical notions of reality as i f its objects of reference were more than that 
with which we deal in our daily encoimters with our natural and social enviroimient 
and the endeavours of our instrumental, scientific enquiry. Dewey hopes to 
"reintegrate human knowledge and activity in the general framework of reality and 
According to Rockefeller, Dewey oflFers three arguments against such a transcendental notion. 
Firstly, it contradicts naturalism, in that it denies the interconnectedness of all events in the one worid 
open to scientific enquiry. Secondly, a genetic analysis of such transcendental notions reveals their 
origin in the natural conditions of human interests and emotional needs. Thirdly, transcendental 
notions are not helpfiil to the problem of reconstructing philosophy which aims to see human values 
shared and enjoyed by everyone. Rockefeller writes: 
The quest for assurance and certainty regarding the reality of God and the identity of the 
ideal and the real, which is the heart of the transcendentalists' agenda, is of no practical 
value in solving this problem and ofl;en serves as an obstacle. 
Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 375. For Dewey, to seek the solution to the problem elsewhere 
in natural ends is not, however, to reduce spirit to nature. 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 34. 
42 ibid., p. 72. 
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natural processes.'" 3^ Rather than relying upon the quest for certainty, the religious 
dimension of experience, should also have this relation to nature . Dewey writes: 
Religious faith which attaches itself to the possibilities of nature and 
associated living would, with its devotion to the ideal, manifest piety 
toward the actual. (...) Nature may not be worshipped as divine even in 
the sense of the intellectual love of Spinoza. But nature, including 
humanity, with all its defects and imperfections, may evoke heartfelt piety 
as the source of ideals, of possibilities, of aspiration in their behalf, and as 
the eventual abode of all attained goods and excellencies.'^ 
However, Dewey is not concemed in A Common Faith to provide a new 
argiiment for God's existence based upon his re-interpretation of religious 
experience. Such arguments prove only that the person affected by such experience 
has imbibed a certain culture associated vwith the supernatural dogmas of a 
religion.''5 For Dewey : 
The actual religious quality in the experience described is the effect 
produced, the better adjustment in life and its conditions, not the manner 
and cause of its production.'*^ 
By emphasising the reality of the effect rather than the causes of religious 
experience, Dewey believes that the faith that is religious can be emancipated from 
the beliefs and practices which constitute religion. 
Although Dewey's terminology appears to suggest an analogy of kernel and 
husk, a better analogy to express his position would be that of birth and grovsth, the 
bringing to life of something new. For Dewey there is no imchanging central core or 
essence to religious faith. Neither does Dewey allow much time for the idea that the 
term 'religion' denotes a single essence of which the various world religions are 
multiple expressions.'*^ Rather, the religious dimension of experience is as natural 
'*3 This quotation is fi-om Dominique Parody and is approvingly referred to by Dewey as the best short 
summary of his whole philosophical enterprise. Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge, and Value', op. cit., 
p. 597. 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., pp. 290-291. 
Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit.., p. 13. 
46 ibid., p. 14. 
''•^  ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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to those human beings who practice a religion as it is to those who do not.'*^  Again, 
Dewey's notion of ideal ends does not imply a fiirther distinction between means and 
ends. Ideal ends are not ends in themselves, but are part of a plurality of goods 
manifest in the natural conditions of human experience and in the imaginative 
projection of possibilities for growth.^9 They are not to be viewed as final goals to 
be aimed at as i f they were limits to be attained, but point toward directions of 
change in the ongoing process of life and growth. Thus, Dewey's understanding of 
the religious dimension of experience pays little heed to the traditional distinctions 
between kernel and husk, essence and existence or ends and means. 
However, Dewey still believes that it is useful to continue to employ the word 
'God' in his religious vocabulary, not 'God' defined in terms of some antecedently 
existing supernatural being but in terms of ideal ends. Such ideal ends are not 
simply mental, for while they have no embodied existence, they are rooted in the 
material conditions of life — in nature, action, character and personality.50 It is the 
active unity of our imaginatively projected ideal ends with the natural conditions 
that promote their actualisation that provides, for Dewey, the meaning of the term 
'God'5i. Dewey's use of the term adumbrates a 'natural piety' in which human 
endeavour is conceived in its whole relation to natural and moral ends, community 
goals and individual aspirations as these are influenced by the inheritance 
48 ibid., p. 12. 
49 For Dewey, "there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth." John Dewey, 
Democracy and Education, (New York: Macmillan, 1922), pp. 59-60. Also see, John Dewey, 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1920 and 1948 enlarged edition), p. 177. 
50 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., 48. Dewey writes; "the ideals that move us are ... not made out 
of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard stuff of the worid of physical and social 
experience." ibid., p. 49. 
51 Dewey writes, "It is the active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 
'God'." ibid., p. 51. In an attempt to clarify what he meant by using the term 'God', Dewey wrote in a 
letter to Corliss Lamont in 1935, that he regretted the use of the word "would" in this sentence for it 
gave the impression to some interpreters that he had a theistic or realist notion of God in the back of 
his mind. In that letter Dewey attempted to correct this impression. He wrote: "The meaning in my 
mind was essentially: if the word 'God' is used, this is what it should stand for; John Dewey, 
quoted in Corliss Lamont, 'Again, John Dewey is Not a Theist' in The Humanist, Vol. 50, 1990, p. 13. 
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bequeathed by history, and is employed by him because he felt that people "would 
feel a loss i f they could not speak of God"52 
The main difference between Dewey and Feuerbach however is Dewey's 
appropriation of Darwin. ^ 3 For Feuerbach the himian spirit found its fulfilment in 
the return of the projected alienated absolute spirit of humanity back into itself For 
the pragmatist, Darwin's account of human evolution means that the human spirit is 
intimately linked with nature and has no pre-determined purpose or pattern of 
achievement that has been worked out in advance. Everything becomes a product of 
time and chance. In the light of this contingency, pragmatists like Dewey, believe 
we should aim to further the processes of growth by actualising in our lives the ideal 
values that the imagination presents to us. 
In a summation of his position on religious faith Dewey asks: 
What would be lost i f it were ... admitted that they [the objects of 
religion] have authoritative claims upon conduct just because they are 
ideal? The assvmiption that these objects of religion exist already in some 
realm of Being seems to add nothing to their force, while it weakens their 
claim over us as ideals, in so far as it bases that claim upon matters that 
are intellectually dubious. 
For both Dewey and the 'Sea of Faith' non-realists, a naturalistic account of religious 
belief is thought to be more credible and more appropriate to religious sensibilities 
than a supematuralistic account of belief 
52 Dewey in a conversation with Sidney Hook noted in Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 522. 
53 Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 1-19. Also see: John P. Murphy, 
Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 63. 
5'* Dewey writes: 
A thoroughgoing evolution must by the nature of the case abolish all fixed limits, 
beginnings, origins, forces, laws, gods. If there is evolution, all these also evolve, and are 
what they are as points of origin and of distinction relative to some special portion of 
evolution. They are to be defined in terms of the process, the process that now and 
always is, not the process in terms of them. 
John Dewey, 'The Philosophic World of Herbert Spencef, quoted m Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., 
p. 384. 
55 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 41. 
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5.4. Dewey and Religious Non-Realism: 
There are many parallels between Dewey's pragmatic religious naturalism and 'Sea 
of Faith' religious non-realism. Like Cupitt, Dewey believes that supernatural or 
realist imderstanding of religious belief to be intellectually dubious because of 
advances made in the last few hundred years in many branches of hirnian inquiry. 
These advances help explain why dogmatic religion no longer has the intellectual 
authority it once did. 56 Taken together, they constitute a revolution in our way of 
thinking. After this revolution, Dewey believes, human spiritual aspirations and 
experience wil l best be served by a form of religious naturalism rather than 
dogmatic or supernatural religion. Religion is now just one among many aspects in 
human experience calling for our allegiance in what is manifestly a human abode.57 
It no longer dominates our lives as it once did. Rather than being bom into a culture 
saturated by religion we now have to choose to be religious. 5^  No matter how 
committed we may be to the doctrines of a religion, our actual day-to-day lives are 
now profoundly secular and organised upon secular presuppositions drawn from 
those advances that constitute the revolutionary shift in intellectual authority. 
For Dewey, in the current cultural situation, individuals may still carry their 
affiliation to a religion across to their other secular activity but it needs to be 
acknowledged that such activity "is a matter of personal choice and resolution on the 
part of individuals, not of the very nature of social organization. "5' Yet Dewey's 
'religious faith', attempts to break down the secular/religious distinction by 
completely filling this secular space with values and ideal ends that characterise the 
religious dimension of experience.^o The aim of A Common Faith Dewey notes: 
... was addressed to those who have abandoned supematuralism, and who 
on that account are reproached by traditionalists for having turned their 
backs on everything religious. The book was an attempt to show such 
56 ibid., p. 31. 
57 ibid., pp. 59-61. 
'8 ibid., pp. 65-66., As Cupitt colourfiJly puts it "[t]he role of'practising Christian' is now a character 
part, not a leading role any more." Don Cupitt, What is a Story?, (London: SCM Press, 1991) p.63. 
59 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 66. 
60 ibid., p. 66. 
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persons that they still have within their experience all the elements which 
give the religious attitude its value.^i 
Although Dewey regards democracy and scientific inquiry as elements of this 
religious attitude, he is not primarily concemed in A Common Faith to 
accommodate religious belief to modem ideas of democracy or science. Indeed, 
like the religious non-realists, Dewey, has little time in A Common Faith for the 
accommodationism of liberal theology.^2 issue, for Dewey, is not one of 
acconmiodating specific doctrines or beliefs into an acceptable modem form, but a 
radical re-adjustment which is itself the mark of the faith that is religious.63 xjig 
religious liberal, for Dewey, stands in no-man's-land looking on the one side, to the 
old supernatural account of religious belief and on the other side to a more 
naturalistic account of religious belief Like Thomas Mann, quoted in David Hart's 
book, Dewey allows that the fundamental issue of religious faith "is more definitely 
seen by fundamentalists [religious conservatives] than by liberals."^ This issue is 
not about accommodating items of faith to the modem world or dropping some of 
them as inessential to the tme faith, "but centers in the question of the method by 
which any and every item of intellectual belief is to be arrived at and justified"^^ 
For Dewey, as for religious non-realists, what is required is not liberal 
accommodation but a radical vision that will help to reconstmct our understanding 
of what it means to have religious belief This radical vision may have its origin in 
liberal theology and may share some of its themes, but it will demur from the intent 
and the method of that theology. 
61 John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value', op. cit., p. 597. 
62 Dewey writes: 
The modem liberal version of the intellectual content of Christianity seems to the modem 
mind to be more rational than some of the earlier doctrines that have been reacted against. 
Such is not the case in fact. The theological philosophers of the Mddle Ages had no 
greater diflBculty in giving rational form to all the doctrines of the Roman church than has 
the liberal today in formulating and justifying intellectually the doctrines he entertains. 
Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., pp. 33-34. Also p. 40. 
63 ibid., pp. 14-16. 
64 ibid., p. 32. 
65 ibid., p. 32. Dewey's criticism of liberal theology is noted by Westbrook, John Dewey and 
American Democracy, op. cit., p. 424. 
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In agreement with the religious non-realists, Dewey's reconstruction of religious 
faith does not require the support of ultimate or transcendent meaning. What it does 
require is a trust in the value of our pursuit of ideal ends.66 Concerned with growth 
rather than the attainment of absolute truth, this pursuit needs to be followed 
through with a degree of humility.6^ Dewey indicates that while we must "strive to 
direct natural and social forces to human ends ... unqualified absolutistic statements 
about the omnipotence of such endeavours reflect egoism rather than intelligent 
courage. "68 For Dewey, to suggest that philosophy can say something about 
'ultimate reality' is to have a view of philosophy which sets it apart from the natural 
conditions of inquiry with which science is concemed69 
Equally, Dewey recognises and affirms the transience and contingence of 
existence both in the sense of its impredictability and its incompleteness. His 
acceptance of change and process is best revealed in his imderstanding of science. 
Dewey writes: 
Science is not constituted by any particular body of subject-matter. ... 
There is no special subject-matter of belief that is sacrosanct. The 
identification of science with a particular set of beliefs and ideas is itself a 
hold-over of ancient and still curtent dogmatic habits of thought.™ 
Such habits of thought are as unwelcome in religion as they are in science. 
Instead, change should be regarded as an opportunity for renewal rather than a sign 
of irreversible decline. ^ 2 the new introduction to his Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, Dewey indicated that 'Being', "Nature' "Reality' Truth' and other such 
terms "had one thing in common: they were used to designate something taken to be 
66 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 26. Westbrook notes that: 
Dewey could never satisfy those who believed that there were absolute, certain, 
'hierarchised' values that could and should guide the moral life - such a stance, in his view, 
betrayed a woeful misunderstanding of human experience. 
Westbrook, ./ohn Dewey and American Democracy, op. cit., pp. 402-403. 
67 Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 
68 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
69 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., pp. 295-296. 
70 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
7' ibid., p. 26. 
72 ibid., p. 83. 
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fixed, immutable and therefore out of time; that is eternal," but he adds, "science is 
forced by its own development to abandon the assumption of fixity and to recognise 
that what for it is actually 'universal', is process . . .This process, however, has no 
ultimate or absolute purpose. It is humans working within the natural conditions of 
experience that make life have meaning and value. 
I have already indicated that it is a mistake to understand Dewey's attempt to 
emancipate rehgious faith from the enciunbrances of religion in terms of the 
kernel/husk analogy, and when Dewey insists that the union of ideal and actual "has 
in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a 
spiritual content,"''^  it important to realise that Dewey is not thereby suggesting 
the existence of an unchanging common core that constitutes the essence of 
religious faith. "Religious qualities and values," writes Dewey, "are not bound up 
with any single item of intellectual assent, not even that of the existence of the God 
of theism. "'6 As a consequence, Dewey notes, "no discovery in any branch of 
knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious."^'' Religious 
faith is thus inoculated from the sense of incredulity suffered by the religions 
following progress made in other areas of inquiry within culture, such as physics or 
biology. But, for Dewey, the fact that religious faith is less susceptible to decay than 
is supernatural religion, does not mean that religious belief is immune from change. 
Indeed, changes in the active relation of ideal and actual, mutually respond to and 
are constitutive of changes in the general cultural scene."^ * Consequently, for 
Dewey, religious faith cannot be isolated from the rest of culture. The religious 
attitude, Dewey argues, "does not shut religious values up within a particular 
compartment, nor assume that a particular form of association bears a unique 
'3 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., pp. xii and xiii. 
"74 John Dewey, 'Is Nature Good?: A Conversation', Hibberi Journal, Vol. 7, 1909. pp. 842-843. 
5^ Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 52. 
76 ibid., p. 32. 
"^7 ibid., p. 33. 
'8 ibid., p. 50. 
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relation to it."''^ Changes in the rehgious dimension of experience interact with 
changes in the general movements of cultural activities, as these activities seek new 
ideal ends and expand on ideal ends already imaginatively conceived. 
Dewey's pragmatic reconstruction of religious faith not only attempts to liberate 
religious faith from the doctrines of religion, but also the human spirit, by the 
removal of responsibility for ideal ends from antecedently existing supernatural 
entities back into the hands of human endeavour. Like Graham Shaw, Dewey 
argues that "supematuralism ... stands in the way of an effective realization of the 
sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations. For Dewey, the 
association of our values with "a supernatural and otherworldly locus has obscured 
their real nature and has weakened their force."^' Our human values become seen 
"as dangerous rivals of higher values; as offering temptations to be resisted; as 
usurpations by flesh of the authority of the spirit; as revolts of the human against the 
divine. QUT own ideal ends thus become devalued and human endeavour seems 
impotent to bring about significant social change.^ ^ 
However, this does not lead Dewey to atheism. He is as opposed to atheism as 
are the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists. Dewey writes: 
One reason why personally I think it fitting to use the word 'God' to 
denote that uniting of the ideal and actual ... lies in the fact that 
aggressive atheism seems to me to have something in common with 
traditional supematuralism.*'* 
ibid., pp. 66-67. 
80 ibid., p. 80. 
SMbid., p. 71. 
82 ibid., pp. 71-72. 
83 ibid., p. 57. Elsewhere, Dewey writes that by giving up apologetic supematuralism: 
The energy which is ... diverted into defence of positions that have in time to be 
surrendered would be released for positive activity in behalf of the security of the 
underlying possibilities of actual life. More important still would be liberation from 
attachment to dogmas framed in conditions very unUke those in which we live, and the 
substitution of a disposition to turn to constructive account the results of knowledge. 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., pp. 289-290. 
84 Dewey, .4 Common Faith, op. cit., p. 52. 
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Both atheism and supematuralism are rejected by Dewey because they appear to 
him to deny that 'natural piety' which constitutes the religious dimension of 
experience and which refuses to isolate human beings from the rest of nature.*^ 
Nevertheless, it is the issue of atheism that has focused much of the recent debate 
about Dewey's understanding of religious faith, and it this that I shall consider in the 
last section of this chapter. 
5.5. Dewey, Neither a Theist Nor an Atheist: 
For Dewey atheism lacks that 'natural piety' which prevents us from regarding the 
world as hostile and indifferent. In the religious faith Dewey conmiends 
Use of the word 'God'... to convey the union of actual with ideal [,] may 
protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or 
defiance. 86 
Further, Dewey opposes atheism because i t does not fu l f i l the purposes of 
"conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have 
received. "8'' This sense of tradition is best conveyed within the practices of religious 
faith. It reminds us of our cormection to past generations as well as of our 
responsibility to the future. It also reminds us, in Dewey's words, that: 
The things in civilization we most prize are not of oiirselves. They exist 
by grace of the doings and suflferings of the continuous himian community 
in which we are a link.88 
Despite Dewey's opposition to atheism, John K. Roth has argued that Dewey's 
critique of supernatural religion does not touch upon more subtle versions of theistic 
faith exemplified in the work of William James; and secondly, that Dewey is 
offering nothing more substantial to theology than that offered by the 'death-of-God' 
theologians.85 Both points, I believe, are mistaken. In relation to the first point, it 
85 ibid., p. 53. 
86 ibid., p. 53. 
87 ibid., p. 87. 
88 ibid., p. 87. 
89 John K. Roth, 'William James, John Dewey, and the 'Death-of-God', in Religious Studies, Vol. 7, 
1971, pp. 53-61. Roth writes: 
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has been noted by William Dean that James' understanding of God is ambiguous, 
both in respect to his accoimt of God in The Varieties of Religious Experience and 
in respect to a comparison with his later account of God in A Pluralistic Universe. 
Here James is expressly critical of the God of theism in favour of a historical and 
local God. James writes of his finite God: 
Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like 
ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness from all that is human, of the 
static timeless perfect absolute, 
However, James carried over from his previous work the hypothesis that the 
goodness of such a God could only fiinction i f human religious experience was more 
than psychology. Such experience, he argues, brings us into contact "with a wider 
spiritual environment"^'. But the idea of such an environment does not fit at all 
comfortably with the idea James has of God as a finite "Superhuman" in whom the 
plurality of ideals are already evident and waiting to be communicated to us.^ ^ 
Indeed, this idea of God may not even be of much assistance to James' other desire 
to 'naturalise' the foreign God of theism. For Dean, the value of James is not his 
theistic subtlety but that, like Dewey, he tells us that "one can be religious without 
leaving history. "^ ^ Roth's argument, in that case, can be seen as gaining its 
Dewey and the 'death-of-God' theologians tend to equate theism in general with one 
particular view of God. ... [Tjhey cast theism out in favour of an ethical perspective 
oriented around either human ideals in general or the man Jesus, 
ibid., p. 60. 
William James, A Pluralistic Universe, (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1916) p.318. 
91 ibid., pp. 299-300, 
92 ibid., pp. 124-125, 307. 
9^  William Dean, The Religious Critic in American Culture, (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 82. 
Dean suggests that the only way in which James could conceive of God's pragmatic utility together 
with God's goodness, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, was to present a view of divine 
involvement that "would violate natural processes." (ibid., p. 75). His "willingness to invest God with 
supernatural powers ... [placed] ... God beyond the workings of natural history." (ibid., p. 79). God 
becomes an exception in James' philosophical system. To rectify this, Dean notes that James 
developed, 'm.A Pluralistic Universe, a notion of God as finite. "A finite God cannot escape the limits 
of natural history or act supematurally." (ibid., p. 81). The naturalism and historicism that Roth 
condemns in Dewey is also, therefore, principally a feature of James' understanding of God. If this is 
the case, then the question is whether we follow James, Wieman, Hartshome, Whitehead and others in 
asserting that in some form or another nature and history, properly understood, provide access to 
some antecedently existing reality about which we may employ the word 'God'; or whether we follow 
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contrastive force from the fact that he confuses ambiguity in James' position with 
theistic subtlety and then offers an overly atheistic accoimt of Dewey's religious 
naturalism. 
This brings us to Roth's second point. Contra Roth, Dewey's understanding of 
the faith that is religious is not a matter of'man come of age' but a matter of the lack 
of pragmatic utility and possibilities for human growth in notions of an antecedently 
existing divine reality. The experience that is religious is now more fhiitfuUy 
understood in naturalistic terms. According to William Rowe, not only is Dewey "a 
naturalist who advances and defends a version of religious humanism,"^^ he may 
also be described, again contra Roth, as "a humanistic theist"95. While the use of the 
term 'theist' is not one I would use to describe Dewey, the suggestion that it is 
possible should make us think twice about any easy association of Dewey's ideas 
with those of the 'death-of-God' theologians. 
There are further reasons why the label 'atheist' is inappropriate when applied to 
Dewey. Firstly, there is his own mystic experience that he reports having had while 
in his early twenties and secondly, there is in Dewey a sense of personal loss that 
would accrue i f he dropped the term God from his vocabulary. In particular, as 
Rockefeller shows, a vocabulary about God is movingly manifest in Dewey's own 
poetry. 96 At this personal level, one might say at the level of prayer. Rockefeller 
Dewey in rejecting such antecedent realities in favour of the union of ideal and actual. Dewey's is a 
clear position and is held against even the most subtle forms of theistic realism. Thus, while it may be 
the case that the 'death-of-God' theologians leave untouched alternative theistic positions, to suggest 
this of Dewey is, I believe, not founded. 
94 William L. Rowe, 'Religion within the bounds of naturalism: Dewey and Wieman', op. cit., p. 19. 
95 ibid., p. 24. P. Eddy Wilson employs the term 'theistic naturalist' to describe Dewey. P. Eddy 
Wilson, 'Emerson and Dewey on Natural Piety', op. cit., p. 335. Equally, Michael J. Rockier 
reluctantly admits that: 
... while Bertrand Russell belongs on the roll of great secular humanists, John Dewey 
must be excluded from it. ... In the end the language of John Dewey is the language of 
religion, and Dewey ... must be considered a religious and not a secular humanist. 
Michael J. Rockier, 'Russell vs. Dewey on Religion', op. cit., p. 38. And William Shea goes as far as 
to say that "Dewey's little book [A Common Faith] amounts to a secularized version of Billy Graham's 
How to Be Bom Again." WiUiam Shea, 'On John Dewey's Spiritual Life', op. cit., p. 76. 
96 In a poem about the way he experienced the death of two of his sons, Gordon and Morris, Dewey 
writes: 
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argues that Dewey "never :did entirely abandon the idea of God."^'' Indeed, 
Rockefeller asserts that: 
His poetry as well as the tenor of his discussion of God in A Common 
Faith indicate that he himself got a certain personal satisfaction and 
consolation in being able to speak about God or the divine within the 
framework of his naturalism. 
This does not mean, however, that we have warrant to follow the argument put 
forward by Stanley Grean, that Dewey's religious faith presupposed a set of ultimate 
values which are not "adequately justified in the context of the naturalistic universe 
that he postulates. "^ ^ Grean wants to suggest that i f Dewey recognised the appeal to 
transcendence in his own philosophy, he would be more prepared to allow "that the 
'religious' necessarily transcends the natural, while at the same time participating in 
the natural". This argument presupposes that in some aspects of his philosophy 
Dewey does unwittingly appeal to transcendence. In presenting this argument, 
Grean accepts that on Dewey's own terms, Dewey's use of a religious vocabulary did 
not involve an explicit appeal to transcendence. Rather, referring to Henry 
To us you came fi-om out of dark 
To take the place of him who went— 
Quenched that glimmering joyous spark— 
Not ours you were, but lent. 
To us you came fi-om out of light 
Brightest of lights that ever shone 
To make dark life sweet and white; 
Not ours you were, but God's own loan. 
Wrth us a little while, our light, you dwelt— 
And did we fail to care or did we care too much? 
Again we saw a dying light to darkness melt 
While'our aching arms vainly strove to touch 
And hold our own 
God's blessed loan. 
Quoted in Rockefeller, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 231. 
97 ibid., p. 231. 
98 ibid., p. 522. 
99 Stanley Grean, 'Elements of Transcendence in Dewey's Naturalistic Humanism', in Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion, Vol. 52, 1984, p. 264. 
ibid., p. 264. 
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Wieman's review of A Common Faith and the ensuing debate in the journal The 
Christian Century, Grean suggests that such an appeal to transcendence was 
implicit. The Christian Century debate that followed on from A Common Faith 
resembled a similar debate in 1933. In that first debate, Dewey made his naturalistic 
position clear. He wrote: 
... all of the things which traditional religionists prize and which they 
connect exclusively with their own conception of God can be had equally 
well in the ordinary course of human experience in our relations to the 
natural world and to one another as human beings related in the family, 
friendship, industry, art, science, and citizenship. Either then the concept 
of God can be dropped out as far as genuinely religious experience is 
concerned, or it must be framed wholly in terms of natural and human 
relationship involved in our straightaway human experience. 
In Wieman's theistic naturalism, however, all those forces in nature directed at 
human well-being are viewed, in their various relations, as adtmibrating a matrix 
that constitutes the 'greatest good' to which the label 'God' is best attached. Dewey, 
however, responded by pointing out that nothing in Wieman's matrix of natural 
relations constituting the 'greatest good' demands that we see 'God' as the 'greatest 
g o o d ' . F o r Dewey, concrete examples of natural goodness is not furthered by its 
shift into divine goodness. Indeed, Dewey suggests that natural goodness would be 
hampered because we might be tempted to ignore the "indispensable connection 
between 'God' so defined and himian desire and devotion ...". 
In the later debate in The Christian Century, Dewey's response confirmed that 
he had no sense of transcendence in mind when talking of God, neither a natural nor 
a supernatural transcendence. He agreed with Edwin Aubrey's critique of Wieman's 
review of A Common FaithA^ Aubrey, pointed to a number of passages in Dewey's 
book that clearly made the point that Dewey did not intend by his use of a religious 
'0' John Dewey, 'A God or The God? Dr. Dewey Replies' in The Later Works of John Dewey: 1925-
1953, Vol. 9, (ed. Jo Anne Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985) p. 224. 
(Italics in original text). (Henceforth cited as Later Works). 
'02 ibid., pp. 225-226. 
'03 ibid., p. 226. 
'04 John Dewey, 'Reply to Aubrey and Wieman', m Later Works, ibid., pp. 294-295; pp. 435-437. 
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vocabulary to gratify realist intuitions. Grean, however, sides with Wieman's 
conclusion that Dewey's notion of the union of ideal ends with actual conditions, 
remains vacuous without them being groimded in the realities of the universe that 
account for their formation and development and he insists that resources within 
Dewey's work as a whole make such grounding implicit. Thus, Grean suggests that 
Dewey treats religious experience differently from other experiences. He makes this 
point in two ways. Firstly, he notes that, for Dewey, the veracity of religious 
experience is undermined, as scientific experiences are not, by human 
interpretations and the cultural conditioning that constitute it. Dewey therefore, 
according to Grean, unnecessarily evaluates the veracity of scientific and 
philosophical experiences higher than religious experiences. However, a glance 
through The Quest for Certainty and Reconstruction in Philosophy would reveal 
that Dewey is as hard on the notion of antecedently existing entities in science and 
philosophy as he is in religion. The second way Grean makes his point is to note 
that i f Dewey is, as he claims to be, really only concerned with the effect of 
experience, then whether the cause is derived from an antecedent reality or not is a 
question with which he should not be too unduly concerned. Unfortimately, 
however, Grean fails to see that, for Dewey, an understanding of the causes of an 
experience will itself have an effect upon the way we respond to such an experience. 
Dewey is concerned to show that concentration upon transcendent, supernatural or 
antecedently existing entities is more detrimental to human growth than looking for 
causes that come within the natural remit of human interaction with the environing 
surroimds. 
However, Grean does have a point i f we consider Dewey's more detailed 
attempts to work out an alternative to the subject-object account of experience and 
knowledge. Dewey's account of experience is ambiguous because it requires 
alternative distinctions to be drawn between, for example, experience as knowledge 
and experience as appreciation of the immediate quality of things; and between 
nature's foreground and nature's background. In both cases, Dewey sees these 
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distinctions in terms of a whole, integrated account of an organism's immediate 
encoimter with its enviroimient. Yet these further distinctions hinder his aim of 
articulating this encounter. 105 One consequence of these distinctions is that Dewey 
maintains yet another metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality, at 
least where knowledge is concerned. At the level of knowledge, an economy of 
representational realism continues to exist in Dewey's philosophy in order to 
differentiate science from fantasy. 106 In Grean's words, Dewey gives the impression 
of offering "an ultimate methodological commitment" 107 According to Richard 
Rorty, a more consistent pragmatism would regard the distinction between fantasy 
and science as that between different practices we have, and not a matter of an 
epistemological ability to distinguish appearances from reality. Rorty shows how 
we might rid ourselves of the subject-object account of knowledge while not 
needing to embark upon a description of experience that gives the impression of 
assuming transcendental metaphysical principles. He wants to take the residue of 
metaphysics out of Dewey's philosophy of experience: a residue which Dewey did 
not intend but which sometimes is suggested by his philosophy of experience i f not 
his treatment of religious belief Dewey's intention in developing his notion of the 
immediate qualities of experience and his non-reductive naturalism with its 
emphasis on the imagination does not, as Grean suggests, depend upon, an 
unrecognised acceptance of transcendence.'08 For Dewey the pragmatist, neither 
values nor rehgious experience require the existence of a supernatural or 
transcendent entity in order to validate their effectiveness within human life. Such 
an entity would be detrimental to our active pursuit of ideal values. 
•05 John Dewey, 'Half-Hearted Naturalism', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, 1927, pp. 57-64. 
Here, for example, he indicates that despite the distinction between nature's foreground and nature's 
background, the former does not conceal but conducts us into the latter, ibid., p. 60. On Rorty's 
reading this distinction is a necessary feature of an unnecessary metaphysics of experience. To drop 
the metaphysics would dissolve the point of making the distinction whDe not hindering one jot our 
immediate contact with our environment. 
106 Dewey, 'Experience, Knowledge and Value', op. cit., pp. 541-542. 
107 Grean, 'Elements of Transcendence in Dewey's Naturalistic Humanism', op. cit., pp. 268, 269-273. 
108 J. Wesley Robbins, 'Pragmatism, Democracy, and God: A Reply to Rockefeller', in American 
Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993, p. 282. 
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Contra Grean, Richard Bernstein suggests that the parallel between Dewey's 
accoimt of religious belief and the rest of his philosophy are so strong that he 
believes, "Dewey's treatment of the religious attitude and quality is the culmination 
of his entire philosophy. We discover here how the pieces 'add up,' and how Dewey 
viewed man in relation to the universe that he encounters. "'09 For Dewey the 
pragmatic attitude to religious belief requires an active, lived faith in which we 
attempt to develop, sustain and realise ideal values as they are imaginatively 
constructed and integrated with a positive valuation of our surrounding 
envirormient. The ground for such a pragmatic faith is the decision to act in 
accordance with a vision of possible future human flourishing with the aim "of 
bringing about a better, deeper and enduring adjustment in life ...""o while 
remaining rooted in the present conditions of living." ' The Divine, he suggests, is 
not just a term of human choice but also a guide and assistance to human 
aspirations. "2 Religious faith, he argues, should be a resource rather than a 
refuge.Interpreted pragmatically the invisible powers of religion, Dewey notes: 
take on the meaning of all the conditions of nature and himian association 
that support and deepen the sense of value which carry one through 
periods of darkness and despair. "4 
Democracy and science are human activities that now substantially help to facilitate 
the religious dimension of experience. 
Dewey's rejection of any transcendent or antecedently existing religious entity is 
seen by his critics as undermining rather than upholding the religious dimension of 
experience. Why, they ask, can't Dewey be more like James in matters or religious 
belief? They then seek either, like Grean, to show how in fact he was unwittingly 
'09 Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey, (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1966), p. 161. 
' '0 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 14. 
"'ibid., pp. 48-49. 
"2 ibid., p.54. 
"3 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 290. 
"4 Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit., p. 14. 
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more like James by appealing to other elements in his philosophy"^; or, like Roth, 
they suggest that Dewey, compared to James, had an incomplete understanding of 
what counts as religious belief "6 Indeed, even Rockefeller suggests that Dewey's 
accoimt of religious belief has implications for our understanding of ultimate reality 
that Dewey does not fully articulate. Rockefeller writes: 
Unless there be some eternal truth beyond or within the nothingness, the 
source or foundation of ultimate meaning is not made intelligible. The 
point is that Dewey's own experience of cosmic trust and meaning seems 
to point to participation in some such dimension of reality, but he avoids 
articulating such a notion.' '"^  
As a result Rockefeller attempts a reconstruction of Dewey's understanding of God 
which allows for both this realist intuition and Dewey's own critique of the old 
dualisms. "8 He tries to do this by viewing Dewey as a mystical naturalist for whom 
God is to be accepted as "the eternal One ... identified as the ground of personality 
and the wellspring of human goodness and ultimate meaning". "9 In this 
reconstruction, Dewey's talk of God gains the feel of transcendence which it 
otherwise lacks. According to Rockerfeller, this feel of transcendence would enable 
Dewey to do greater justice to people's outward, symbolic and ritualistic expression 
of religious experience than he does, while maintaining the distance he wanted 
between the rehgious dimension of experience and institutional religion. 
Rockefeller notes: 
Dewey was so intent upon integrating fiilly the energies of the religious 
life with the democratic life that he had little use for what seemed to him 
to be religious beliefs and practices associated with earlier forms of social 
life and utterly separate from the affairs of contemporary civilization. [... ] 
"5 Grean, 'Elements of Transcendence in Dewey's Naturalistic Humanism', op. cit., pp. 272-273, 285. 
Also Nancy Frankenberry, Religion and Radical Empiricism, (Albany: SUNY. Press, 1987), pp. 109-
111. 
"6 As well as Roth, this view is held by among others NClton Konvitz, Douglas Anderson, William 
Rowe, P. Eddy Wilson, Marvin Shaw and William Shea. They all argue in various ways that without 
the kind of reaUst intuition that motivated James which connects religious experience to some form of 
ultimate reality or meaning, religious sensibilities will not be dealt with in a complete or satisfactory 
manner. 
' '^ Rockefeller, .fohn Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism, op. cit., p. 533. 
"8 ibid., pp. 536-538. 
"9 ibid., p. 538. 
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However, in many human beings there is a natural impulse to express 
their religious feelings in rituals with symbols. In religious rituals, social 
and moral as well as aesthetic and mystical sensitivities are at work. 
Furthermore, religious rituals may imder the right circiraistances intensify 
a person's religious consciousness. Dewey did not wish to deny this, but 
he did not explore fully the ritual aspect of the religious life as a natural, 
mode of expression and sharing and the ways in which it may become 
part of the democratic life.i^o 
This criticism seems to me to be valid. One of the strengths of 'Sea of Faith' 
religious non-realism is that it maintains this vital cormection with human symbolic 
and ritualistic expression. However, I also agree with Rockefeller, when he notes 
the danger of offering a reconstruction of Dewey's understanding of God. J. Wesley 
Robbins is, I believe, correct in seeing Rockefeller's reconstruction as a misguided 
attempt to put new wine into old \vineskins. Robbins is critical of Rockefeller's 
attempt to turn Dewey's religious naturalism and its emphasis upon the union of 
imaginative ideal ends with actual conditions of experience, into a mystical, theistic 
naturalism that attributes to this union a sense of transcendence and ultimate 
meaning. 121 He argues that the desire for ultimacy in matters of religious belief and 
the association of Dewey with this desire is mistaken. Dewey would not be 
comfortable vAUi the dualism between the ultimate One and the penultimate Many 
which Rockefeller's reconstruction begins to open. Robbins notes that Dewey 
wanted to move away from questions of ultimacy that limited itmovation and 
change, and instead move on to questions motivated by intelligent enquiry leading to 
the melioration of harsh social conditions. The notion of ultimacy is irrelevant to 
the practical concerns of the latter type of question. 122 It also, Robbins adds, goes 
against Dewey's concern for growth and innovation, by suggesting that genuine 
human religiosity has been defined once and for all time. In taking up and using a 
120 ibid., p. 539. 
121 Robbins, "Pragmatism, Democracy, and God: A Reply to Rockefeller', op. cit., p. 282. 
122 J. Wesley Robbins, 'A Common Faith Revisited', in Religious Humanism, Vol. 28, 1994, p. 26. As 
Dewey notes: 
The question whether there is some physical or metaphysical, some existential, 
extraneous power working for the realization of moral demands and ideals, is totally 
irrelevant 
[Italics in original text]. Dewey, The Later Works, Vol. 9, p. 218. 
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religious vocabulary, Dewey did not see himself as bound by traditional faith. 
Rather, Robbins notes, Dewey "was in the middle of inventing something new: a 
new way of talking about the traditional Christian fhiits of the Spirit, love, joy, and 
peace, as well as about the Spirit that produces those fruits. "'23 Above all. 
Rockefeller's reconstruction would not appeal to Dewey because, according to 
Robbins, "it gives too much aid and comfort to religious fundamentalists".'24 The 
fundamentalist is Dewey's religious conservative. Such people, Robbins argues, like 
to think that ultimate meaning and value is in tune with their conception of it. They 
therefore see themselves as the privileged spokespersons within the life of the 
community. Whether this community is concerned v a^th religion, science, 
philosophy or politics, Dewey denies the question of ultimacy and thus the 
possibility of various privileged social priesthoods. Robbins summarises: 
Dewey's theological vocabulary involves ... a lowering of expectations 
from our being instruments of the universe, and some eternal truth 
therein, to our being, in Rorty's words, 'just one more species doing its 
best.''25 
The mention of Rorty here is timely, for according to Robbins, grounding genuine 
religious responses around the question of ultimacy of meaning, as Rockefeller and 
Dewey's other religious critics do, is to exhibit the very philosophical 
presuppositions about representationalism that Rorty, following Dewey, has done 
most to undermine. I f Robbins is correct in thinking that the realist intuition about 
genuine religious belief rests upon a representational account of knowledge, then the 
'23 Robbins, 'A Common Faith Revisited', op. cit., p. 30. 
'24 Robbins, Tragmatism, Democracy, and God: A Reply to Rockefeller', op. cit., p. 285. Robbins 
adds: 
Rockefeller certainly does not agree with the Pat Robertsons of this worid as to who the 
spokespersons for "the elusive, awe-inspiring mystery, and holiness of the God who is at 
once no God' are, or as to the sort of vocabulary that is appropriate for them to use. He 
does, however, agree that there are such spokespersons and that they occupy a privileged 
position in communal life, including that of a democratic community, because it is in and 
through their activities that the deeper meaning of democracy, and its revelatory status, 
becomes exphcit. 
ibid., p. 285. 
'25 ibid., p. 284. 
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question between Dewey and Rockefeller or between non-realists and religious 
realists, can be stated as a question of whether an idiosyncratic usage of a religious 
vocabulary should be assessed by its adequacy to some fixed religious criteria, such 
as belief in the reality of God antecedent to human imaginative constructions, or 
whether, to quote Robbins, such an idiosyncratic usage should be "compared with 
other actual and possible forms of life in human communities in order to find out, 
experimentally as it were, whether it is an improvement over past ways of being 
religious. "126 Dewey, and the religious non-realists, believe the latter. The religious 
dimension of experience is worth pursuing, without cormections to notions of an 
antecedent, franscendence or ultimacy of meaning. 
5.6. Conclusion: 
In this chapter I have summarised the religious thought of John Dewey and indicated 
its affinities with the religious thought of non-realists associated with the 'Sea of 
Faith network'. Although it is Rorty's account of pragmatism, rather than that of 
Dewey's, to which Cupitt and other 'Sea of Faith' writers tend to appeal, an 
understanding of Dewey's accoimt of religious belief is crucial i f a specifically 
religious connection is to be forged between Rorty's pragmatism and religious non-
realism. In the next three chapters I wi l l not go as far as Robbins in arguing that 
Rorty is a Deweyan religious thinker,i27 but I wil l show that, despite his rejection of 
religious belief, Rorty's work can be appropriated by religious non-realists and offers 
them a vocabulary which might help to articulate the position they aim to defend. 
'26 Robbins, 'A Common Faith Revisited', op. cit., p. 26. 
'27 Robbins, 'When Christians Become Naturalists', op. cit., p. 197. 
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C H A P T E R SIX 
M C H A R B ROIRTY, PRAGMATISM ANB T R U T H 
6.1. Introduction: 
The parallels between the account of religious belief in John Dewey's book A 
Common Faith and the religious thought of various writers belonging to the 'Sea of 
Faith Network' suggest that the latter may be appropriately understood within the 
context of ideas associated with the pragmatism of the former. Like Dewey, those 
writers, emphasise the human creation of religious belief without descending into 
the vocabulary of atheism. Like Dewey, they radicalise liberal theology, emphasise 
change, transience and contingency and deny the existence of absolute, fixed and 
antecedent religious and moral tiiiths independent of human imagination and 
growth. Dewey's account of religious faith, like that of Cupitt's, emphasises the 
imaginative projection of ideals and their extemalisation in the actual conditions of 
existence. Both reject the metaphysics of religious realism; its correspondence 
notion of truth, its dualistic account of inquiry and experience and its assertion of a 
fixed antecedentiy existing realm of 'ultimate reality'. Like Dewey, Cupitt asserts a 
biological naturalism that does not simply reduce human life to the material 
conditions of existence; and significantly, their imderstanding of the meaning and 
value of religious belief and practice to human life is couched within the shared 
context of a philosophical pragmatism. Pragmatism offers a philosophical 
articulation of the type of religious faith that non-realists would wish to promote.' 
However, pragmatism covers a wide spectrum of opinion2 and while Cupitt does 
refer to Dewey's religious naturalism as helping "to explain the sense in which a 
' This distinrtion between 'back-up' and 'articulation' is drawn by Rorty in relation to Dewey's 
understanding of liberal democracy. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical 
Papers Volume One, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 178. 
2 See Richard J. Bernstein, 'American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives', in Herman J. Saatkamp 
Jr., Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1995), pp. 54-67. 
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modem person may still have a religious attitude to life"^ his appeal is directed at its 
radical wing associated particularly with the work of Richard Rorty. 4 This is 
because Rorty, unlike Dewey, is a contemporary of the linguistic turn in philosophy. 
Cupitt was thus initially less willing to appeal to Dewey when asserting his 
unpragmatic desire to construct a postmodem, linguistic understanding of God and 
now, having given up on this desire, finds such appeal unnecessary given that 
Rorty's radical Davidsonian stance provides all the pragmatic articulation his 
theology requires. I f Cupitt unnecessarily neglects Dewey's understanding of 
religious belief, he is nevertheless correct to emphasise the work of Rorty. Rorty's 
understanding of the relation of language to the world, I shall argue, not only 
undermines a metaphysical interpretation of Dewey's philosophy of experience, it 
also helps to articulate aspects religious non-realists' self understanding. However, 
it is not obvious that linking Rorty's work with religious non-realism is entirely 
satisfactory. Roger Trigg, for example, recognises the association of ideas between 
Rorty and Cupitt but sees this more as a reflection of Cupitt's atheistic denial of 
God, and thus an anti-religious move rather than supportive of a religious point of 
view. 5 Not only is Rorty an avowed atheist, his pragmatic anti-representationalism 
has been labelled as radically subjectivist and its political consequences as fascist. 
According to Frank Farrell, in Rorty's philosophy "all determination will be a self-
determining, ... the boundaries a human discourse runs up against will be 
boundaries that it has set for itself "6 For Rorty, Farrell notes, " I ... encounter only 
3 Don Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, (London: SCM Press, 1990), p. 120, 
4 For example, Cupitt thinks that Klary Putnam's version of pragmatism does not go far enough in 
banishing old philosophical errors. Don Cupitt, The Time Being, (London: SCM Press, 1992), p. 33. 
He also makes it clear that the accounts he offers of Jacques Derrida and Donald Davidson are heavily 
influenced by Rorty's reading of these philosophers. See respectively, Don Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith', 
in Joseph Runzo (ed.), Is God Real? (London: MacMillan, 1993), p. 50. Don Cupitt, 'A Reply to 
Rowan Williams', m Modem Theology, Vol. 1, 1984, p. 26; and Don Cupitt, The Last Philosophy 
(London: SCM Press, 1995), p. 137. 
5 Roger Trigg, "Reason and Faith-II', in Martin Warner (ed ). Religion and Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33-43. 
6 Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the World in Recent 
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 139. 
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myself in everything I touch. ""^  Equally, for Richard Bernstein, "it is hard to see any 
difference that makes a difference between Rorty's irony and Mussolini's cynicism."^ 
In considering Rorty's work in more detail, in this and the next chapter, I shall show 
that it need not be interpreted in this way. Then, in chapter eight, I shall highlight 
Rorty's attitude to religious belief I shall argue that, despite his atheism, not only 
does Rorty have a use for a religious vocabulary, there is also a sense in which Rorty 
might be encouraged to adopt a religious vocabulary for himself 
Rorty vigorously pursues the type of antirepresentational non-realist philosophy 
that Cupitt admires.' Representationalism (the view that our minds can represent 
the world as a mirror represents its image), includes within its compass: essentialism 
(the view that the world, the self or humanity has an intrinsic nature), imiversalism 
(the view that a certain category or principle has overarching relevance to the 
discussion of every feature of human discourse) and foundationalism (the view that 
human discourse can be groimded in some stable entity, uncontextualised in 
language). These are all seen by Rorty as genres of a philosophical narrative that 
creates the type of philosophical problem that we would now be better advised to 
abandon. However, Rorty's critics see his alternative narrative of pragmatic anti-
representationalism as reducing questions of truth to radically subjective answers 
and questions of freedom and justice to ultra-conservative and neo-fascist answers. 
In this chapter therefore, after outlining Rorty's pragmatic antirepresentationalism, 
my aim will be to consider the development of Rorty's thought in relation to his 
concern for the question of truth (that is, the question of our epistemological relation 
to the world). In the next chapter I shall consider the development of Rorty's 
thought in relation to his social concerns (our relation and responsibility to others). 
I shall argue that neither radical subjectivism nor a dangerous political ideology 
7 ibid., p. 138. 
8 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 283. 
' Although Rorty prefers the term 'anti-representationalism', he also employs the terms 'non-
representationaUsm' and 'non-realism' to describe the position that he claims to share with Donald 
Davidson. See Richard Rorty, 'Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?' in 
Academe Vol. 80. 1994. p.61. 
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need necessarily follow from his work and that he himself explicitly denies such 
associations that have been attributed to him. In refuting these attributions I hope to 
make an association of ideas between Rorty's pragmatic anti-representationalism 
and religious non-realism more palatable than it might first appear. 
6.2. Rortv's Pragmatic Anti-Representationalism: 
Zygmunt Bauman notes that Rorty's work has had a deep and immediate impact on 
philosophy.'0 Since the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 
1980, Rorty has consistently worked to deflate the attempts of philosophers to 
secure a foundation for knowledge. In that book Rorty drew upon the work of 
W. V.O. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson, Thomas Kuhn and Hilary Putnam 
among others. They are taken by Rorty as offering means to an end which, Rorty 
believes, was shared by Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey; namely, the 
abandonment of the idea of knowledge as accurate representation." This idea, 
Rorty suggests, has its origin in such ocular metaphors as 'the mind's eye'. Such 
metaphors produced what Dewey termed 'the spectator theory of knowledge''^  and 
what Rorty calls 'the epistemology of representation'. Shared and developed by 
Descartes, Locke and Kant, the epistemology pf representation has become the 
paradigm of philosophy and is exhibited in logical and psychological empiricism 
and various twentieth century philosophies of l a n g u a g e . I n each case 
epistemological representationalism is seen to give to philosophy a privileged status 
as the means by which certain knowledge in any field of inquiry is justified as true 
and real. Rorty shows how the ocular metaphors helped to invent our idea of the 
'mind' as a faculty in its own right, first, for the Greeks, as a faculty of reception in 
which general truths were known by the intemalisation of universals in the same 
'° Zygmunt Bauman, Philosophy as the Miror of Time', in History and the Human Sciences Vol 5 
1992, pp. 57-58. ' ' ' 
'' Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 6-7. 
12 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929), p. 26. 
•5 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., chapters five and six. 
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way as the eye grasps particulars;''* and second, for Descartes, Locke and Kant as a 
faculty of judgement in which the 'iimer eye' reflects upon, and then with Kant, 
constitutes the representations contained within it. The theory of knowledge and the 
idea of the mind as the mirror of nature culminate in Kant's transcendental idealism. 
Epistemological philosophy becomes both the foundation and the constitution of 
truth and reality.Philosophy since Kant, both in the Anglo-Saxon and the 
continental traditions, has relied to some extent upon Kantian epistemological 
foundationalism. Within these traditions, Rorty notes: 
''^ ibid., p. 41. Rorty notes: 
... in Aristotle's conception intellect is not a mirror inspected by an inner eye. It is both 
mirror and eye in one. The retinal image is itself the model for the 'intellect which 
becomes all things,' whereas in the Cartesian model, the intellect inspects entities 
modelled on retinal images. The substantial forms of frogness and stamess get right into 
the AristoteUan intellect, and are there in just the same way they are in the frogs and the 
stars—not in the way in which frogs and stars are reflected in mirrors. In Descartes's 
conception— t^he one which became the basis for 'modem' epistemology—it is 
representations which are in the 'mind'. 
ibid., p. 45. (Italics in original). 
5^ Summarising his account of western philosophy, Rorty notes: 
For Plato, that point was reached by escaping from the senses and opening up the faculty 
of reason— t^he Eye of the Soul—to the World of Being. For Descartes, it was a matter 
of turning the Eye of the Mind from the confiised inner representations to the clear and 
distinct ones. With Locke, it was a matter of reversing Descartes's directions and seeing 
'singular presentations to sense' as what should 'grip' us—^ what we cannot and should not 
wish to escape from. 
ibid., p. 159. 
For Locke, "all the knowing gets done ... by the Eye which observes the imprinted tablet" (ibid., 
p. 143) and this imprinting gets done by sense experience. However, Rorty adds, Locke had no room 
in his system for an inner faculty "which judged the representations rather than merely had them" 
(ibid., p. 144). The Foundation for Knowledge had still to be established if Locke's empiricism was 
not to turn into Humean scepticism. The Foundation was provided by Kant's transcendental 
philosophy. The Mind for Kant both has, and judges, representations. Thus, Rorty notes, Locke's 
coniusion between explanation (having knowledge) and justification (judging and providing reasons 
for which representations are true and real) becomes in Kant a "confijsion between predication (saying 
something about an object) and synthesis (putting representations together in inner space)." (ibid., p. 
148). Rorty continues: "For a Kantian transcendental ego to come to believe a sentence to be true is 
for it to relate ... two radically distinct sorts of representations, concepts on the one hand and 
intuitions on the other." (ibid., p. 148). He thereby attempted to avoid the reductionism of true 
representation to either Cartesian rational concepts or Lockean empirical sensation. Rorty notes that 
in rejecting both, unless combined m synthesis, Kant "was the first to think of the foundations of 
knowledge as propositions rather than objects. Before Kant, an inquiry into 'the nature and origin of 
knowledge' had been a search for privileged inner representations. With Kant, it became a search for 
the rules which the mind had set up for itself" (ibid., p. 160). In this way accurate representation was 
assured by the transcendental claim that the mmd constituted genuine knowledge. Epistemological 
representation thus became the foundation of knowledge. 
Whereas the Anglo-Saxon tradition tended to separate epistemology from psychology, making 
accuracy of representation a matter of evidential relations and logic, the continental tradition seeing 
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[It is] agreed that philosophy is a discipline which takes as its study the 
'formal' or 'structural' aspects of our beliefs, and that by examining these 
the philosopher serves the cultural function of keeping the other 
disciplines honest, limiting their claims to what can be properly 
'grounded'.'7 
Rorty's account of intellectual history resembles Dewey's critique of the 'quest 
for certainty', but xmlike Dewey, Rorty no longer sees a substantive role for 
philosophy to play at the centre of culture. Employing Quine's critique of both 
reductionism and the necessity/contingency distinction, Sellars' critique of'the given' 
and Davidson's critique of the scheme/content distinction, Rorty shows how we 
might abandon the idea that knowledge is 'constituted' by a confrontation between a 
given world and representations of it within the mind's eye of a subject: that is, to 
abandon the idea that accurate representations provide a neutral foundation upon 
which true knowledge can be justified by those who practice the privileged 
philosophical disciplines. In place of knowledge as accurate representation, Rorty 
suggests that we understand knowledge as a historical and social product of various 
human practices orientated toward our coping with the world. Knowledge is a 
contingent feature of the 'general conversation of mankind'. Rorty writes: 
Once conversation replaces confrontation, the notion of the mind as 
Mirror of Nature can be discarded. Then the notion of philosophy as the 
discipline which looks for privileged representations among those 
constituting the Mirror becomes unintelligible. 
the philosopher as the guardian of human fi-eedom maintained Kant's emphasis on the mind's 
transcendental constitution of reality, ibid., pp. 161-162. 
ibid., p. 162. Three exceptions to this, Rorty adds, were Dewey, the early Heidegger and the latter 
Wittgenstein. 
1^  Rorty sees residual elements of representational metaphysics in both Quine and Sellars but taken 
together Sellars acts to 'purify' Quine of his residual desire to privilege the scientific over that of other 
human social practices while Quine purifies Sellars' residual desire to draw distinctions between 
language and fact of scheme and content. Davidson's own critique of the latter, and the other dogmas 
of empiricism allows Rorty to see in Davidson the final abandonment of the metaphysics of 
representation, ibid., pp. 165-212. 
1^  ibid., p. 170. Rorty later adds: 
... if assertions are justified by society rather than by the character of the inner 
representations they express, then there is no point in attempting to isolate privileged 
representations. 
Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, 
rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call 'epistemological 
behaviourism', an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein. 
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Drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Rorty suggests that hermeneutics is 
what we are left with when we have abandoned epistemology. 20 In hermeneutics, 
knowledge becomes a matter of historical and social agreement rather than a matter 
of subject-to-object relations. The hermeneutic skill is to balance the pragmatic 
benefits of established, or normal discourse against the possible greater benefits that 
new or abnormal discourse might provide.21 Hermeneutics is no successor subject 
to the epistemology of representation because unlike the latter, the former makes no 
claim about the privileged status of philosophy. Like Dewey, Rorty wants a holistic 
account of inquiry which does not reduce the criteria of truth and reality to the 
domain of a single putatively privileged discipline, nor to the notion of accurate 
mental representations. Truth is understood as "what it is better for us to believe" 
rather than as "the accurate representation of reality" 22 and knowledge is anything 
that helps us cope with the world we live in. Sometimes it will be useful to 
systematise our knowledge, other times it will not. On those latter occasions, Rorty 
argues, we will be less concerned with passing out honorific titles such as 'objective' 
or 'cognitive' upon our various systems of shared knowIedge23 and more ready to 
listen to what he terms the edifying philosopher. Edifying philosophy aims at 
keeping human inquiry going rather than finding objectivity. It is abnormal and 
reactive: "a protest against attempts to close off conversation by [the] proposals ... 
of some privileged set of descriptions. "2^ The edifying philosopher does not build 
systems of knowledge and, like Dewey, will see growth as the only moral end.25 
Such a philosopher will also want to "keep space open for the sense of wonder 
which poets sometimes cause. "26 Hermeneutics, then, attempts to balance the desire 
for edification with the need to construct stable systems of knowledge. Unlike the 
ibid., p. 174. 
20 ibid., p. 325. 
21 ibid., pp. 320, 338-339 
22 ibid., p. 10. 
23 ibid., p. 355. IDia. , p. 
24 ibid., p. 377. 
25 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 177. 
26 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., p. 370. 
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epistemological systematician, the hermeneutic systematician will not see patterns 
in normal (agreed) discourse which suggest that their truth consists in their being 
hooked onto something like Reality, Reason or Truth. 2'' The hermeneutic thinker 
knows of no way to appeal to such notions and is not sure what use they would be in 
the task of balancing the need for systems of knowledge with edifying discourse. 
Such a thinker will not try to argue against the realist who insists that genuine 
knowledge requires the 'truthfulness to reality' cormection, but will, rather, attempt 
to persuade the realist that once the work of the historian and the sociologist has 
been completed, there is very little left to discover about the justification of 
knowledge and certainly nothing that would suggest a correspondence of truth to 'the 
mind of God', Platonic forms', or 'the way the world really is'. When Dewey talked 
of truth as 'warranted assertibility', Rorty argues, he was not defining a new 
philosophical notion of truth but "making it something you could use instead of 
something you could merely respect ...".^^ However, it is in respect to the role of 
such philosophical notions that we find one area in which Rorty's appropriation of 
Dewey has been questioned; for Dewey, it is argued, still had a place for philosophy 
and the method of intelligence that it affords to cultural reconstruction and 
democratic politics.^' Whereas Dewey thought that philosophy still might have 
27 ibid., p. 385. 
28 ibid., p. 308. 
29 This point has been made, for example, by Raymond D. Boisvert, "Rorty, Dewey and Post-Modem 
Metaphysics', in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27, 1989, pp. 173-193; James D. Marshall, 
'On What We May Hope: Rorty on Dewey and Foucault', in Studies in Philosophy and Education, 
Vol. 13, 1995, pp. 307-323; and James Gouinlock, "What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism?: Rorty's 
Interpretation of Dewey', in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., Rorty and Pragmatic, op. cit., pp. 72-90. 
Boisvert argues that while Dewey was a "reluctant metaphysician", he nevertheless saw the need for a 
vision of existence that would serve as a ground map for philosophy. Rorty, on the other hand, 
according to Boisvert, exhibits his debt to positivism by his blanket rejection of metaphysics. 
Nowhere is this more evident, Boisvert argues, than in the different readings Dewey and Rorty oflFer of 
Plato. Rorty is seen as rejecting the entire Platonic tradition of philosophical reflection out of hand 
whereas Dewey, it is noted, called upon philosophy to return to Plato. However, as Boisvert notes, 
the Plato that Dewey wished to get back to was "the dramatic, restiess, co-operatively inquiring Plato 
of the dialogues ... whose highest flights of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical 
turn." (John Dewey, Trom Absolutism to Experimentalism', in G. P. Adams and W.P. Montague 
(eds.): Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 21. Plato the 
philosopher and systematician is as unpalatable to Dewey as he is to Rorty (ibid., p. 21 and John 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948) Enlarged Edition, Ch. 5). It is 
difficult to allow, as Boisvert does, that Dewey's Plato remains necessarily "linked indissolubly with 
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something significant to say about 'the nature of man', 'the meaning of life', and 'the 
progress of scientific and democratic communities', Rorty believes that such issues 
become pointless and empty once the quest for certainty is abandoned.However, 
their differences can be exaggerated, for while Dewey did indeed believe that 
philosophy was useful in furthering scientific and moral inquiry, he refused to see 
either the philosopher or the scientist along the lines of a sacred priesthood. 
Reconstruction is not necessarily the responsibility and task of philosophy but rather 
metaphysics". (Boisvert, 'Rorty, Dewey and Post-Modem Metaphysics', op. cit., p. 176). Dewey 
wished to divorce the metaphysical Plato from the dramatic and practical Plato and to see in the latter 
a source of usefiil reflection on ever-changing human goods. See Dewey, Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, op. cit., pp. v-xli. Boisvert's point is that political hope is empty without metaphysical 
grounding and Dewey, but not Rorty, still cherished the idea that a theory of democracy needs to be 
interwoven with its practice. Dewey shows, according to Boisvert, that metaphysics is possible after 
the quest for certainty has collapsed. In the hands of a reader more sympathetic to Rorty's position, 
however, Dewey's appeal to the dramatic Plato is seen as a confirmation of Rorty's reading of Dewey. 
Konstantin Kolenda writes: 
... when Rorty recommends delight, [philosophy as play], he picks up a theme in Plato 
(...). Like Dewey, Rorty looks upon playfulness not as confined to mindless fiivolity but 
as lighting up all wakefiil, heedful attentive stretches of life in which creative human 
capacities come to the surface. 
Konstantin Kolenda, Rorty's Humanistic Pragmatism, (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 
1990), p. 113. 
30 Rorty denies the necessity of metaphysics to politics. He writes: 
Dewey never, I think, saw pragmatism in the way in which Marxists saw dialectical 
materialism—as a philosophical key which unlocks the secrets of history or of society. 
Richard Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism', in Michigan Quarterly Review, Vol. 30, 1991, p. 255, n. 
23. Where Dewey does speak of metaphysics, Rorty suggests, he is trying to make his own proposals 
look 'good' to an audience, to which Dewey himself belongs, that still felt the need of a 'method' that 
would ground political action. Dewey postured toword such a putative 'method' but m fact never 
relied upon it in practice. See Rorty's contribution in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., and 
Richard Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 72-89. 
Here Rorty argues that Dewey often seems to be claiming to be able to clear away philosophical 
tradition by means of his own philosophical inventions (ibid., p. 73). If these inventions are aspects of 
Dewey's pragmatic experimentalism then Rorty sees no reason to equate the things that Dewey tried to 
do with the things that philosophers in the tradition of Plato have tried to do. If, however, this 
association between Dewey and the philosophical tradition is made, Rorty is not sure what to make of 
Dewey's claim about clearing away the philosophical tradition (ibid., pp. 73-74). The importance of 
Dewey's achievement was not that it provided a new form of philosophical representation, but: 
... the provocativeness of its suggestions about how to slough off our intellectual past, 
and about how to treat the past as material for playful experimentation ... 
ibid., p. 87. Thus when Rorty claims that "Dewey could have said everything he needed to say if he 
dropped the term 'scientific method'", he is simply doing to Dewey what Dewey himself had done to 
the philosophical tradition: philosophising without the residue of the quest for certainty. (Richard 
Rorty, "Response to James Gouinlock', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 94). Perhaps 
one of the fairest accounts of the similarities and differences between Dewey and Rorty is found in 
Richard Shusterman, 'Pragmatism and Liberalism Between Dewey and Rorty', in Political Theory, 
Vol. 22, 1994, pp. 391-413. The difference between the two on the relation of philosophy to politics 
and science, Shusterman argues, may be the result of a general confidence in philosophy that pervaded 
Dewey's intellectual worid but no longer that of Rorty's. ibid., pp. 392, 396. 
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is a common task of people "drawn firom every liseful calling. "3' Equally, Rorty still 
sees a useful role for the philosopher to fulfil, not as a "cultural overseer who knows 
everyone's common ground" but as "the informed dilettante" who charms hermetic 
thinkers out of their self-enclosed practices. ^ 2 Such a philosopher will recognise 
that the objectivity we seek will be "no more and no less than the best ideas we 
currently have about how to explain what is going on".^ ^ They will, according to 
Rorty, follow Hegel in seeing philosophy as one's own 'time grasped in thought'.^ '^  
They will be content with truth as coherence rather than as a relation of 
correspondence with antecedently existing entities. 
Thus, any discontinuity between Rorty and Dewey should not mask their 
similarities. One such similarity is between Rorty's anti-representationalism, with 
its denial that philosophical concerns are antecedent to historical human practices, 
and Dewey's critique of 'religion'. Like Dewey's 'religious' faith, Rorty's pragmatic 
culture is not concerned with attaining pre-existent truths, but rather is concerned 
with the proliferation of poetic and scientific vocabularies in the hope of producing 
new modes of inquiry and a freer society compared with what has gone before. This 
is a culture in which growth is more important than the attairmient of pre-existent 
goods. The effect of such a culture, Dewey would suggest, while adverse to historic 
religions, "is not fatal to the religious values in our common experience." 5^ 
31 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. xxxv. This view of Dewey's modest account of 
philosophy's role is confirmed by Richard Bernstein, John Dewey, (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing 
Company, 1966), p. 124. In Rorty's terms: 
Dewey offered neither the conservative's philosophical justification of democracy by 
reference to eternal values nor the radical's justification by reference to decreasing 
alienation. He did not try to justify democracy at all. He saw democracy not as founded 
upon the nature of man or reason or reality but as a promising experiment engaged in by a 
particular herd of a particular species of animal—our species and our herd. 
Richard Rorty, 'Education Without Dogma: Truth, Freedom and Our Universities' in Dissent, Vol. 36, 
1989, p. 201. 
52 Both quotes from Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit, p. 317. 
" ibid., p. 385. 
5"* Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism,OYi. cit., p. 174. 
35 Dewey, A Common Faith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 56. 
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Nevertheless, under the influence of Donald Davidson, Rorty parts with 
Dewey's understanding of truth as 'warranted assertibility'.^ ^ in articles such as 
"Davidson, Pragmatism and Truth' and in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty 
revises his account of anti-representationalism in order to clarify the point that the 
denial of representationalism does not mean becoming prey to epistemological 
relativism nor subjectivism and that the denial of truth as correspondence does not, 
as he had earlier suggested, require the assertion of truth as coherence. I shall 
consider these points here, then in the next chapter I shall address those concerns of 
Rorty's critics that relate to what they see as the socio-political implications of his 
pragmatic anti-representationalism. 
6.3. Rortv Language and Truth: 
While Raymond Boisvert notes that Dewey, imlike Rorty, continues to speak of a 
correspondence theory of truth," Dewey makes it clear that in employing the term 
'correspondence' he does not subscribe to "the epistemological miracle" by which 
there is a "pre-established harmony" between knowing and what is known that 
guarantees the truth of the particular knowledge in question. 38 Because Dewey did 
not mean what was traditionally meant by correspondence, Rorty beheves that he 
should have given up the term.39 Boisvert on the other hand believes that Dewey 
was correct to maintain the term because it highlighted Dewey's opposition to a 
purely subjectivist account of knowledge that follows from the coherence theory of 
truth and to which he sees Rorty as especially prone. In my understanding, Dewey is 
trying to assert a new conception of human knowledge that is not drawn into the 
36 At such times, Rorty notes, we need not Dewey the 'philosopher" but Dewey the 'prophet'. Richard 
Rorty, 'The Banality of Pragmatism and The Poetry of Justice", in Southern California Law Review, 
Vol. 63, 1990, p. 1815. 
3'^  Boisvert, "Rorty, Dewey and Post-Modem Metaphysics", op. cit., p. 182. 
38 John Dewey, Problems of Men, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 343. 
39 By using the term, Dewey adumbrates an interpretation based upon his 'metaphysics' of immediate 
experience. Rorty notes that Dewey appears to be saying: 
Here is something you could mean by cortespondence, even though it has nothing to do 
with the meaning used by those who worry about whether truth consists in 
correspondence. 
Rorty, 'Response to James Gouinlock, in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 99. 
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traditional subject-object dichotomy and that Rorty, in his early account of anti-
representationalism, leans too heavily upon the subjectivist side of this dichotomy. 
In this section, I will show that by developing the philosophy of language associated 
with Donald Davidson, Rorty is able to drop both coherence and correspondence 
theories of truth. Although he emphasises the centrality of the creativity of human 
uses of language, his account of truth, I shall argue, does not reduce to subjectivity 
alone."*" Rorty is thus able to fulfil Dewey's desire to abandon the subject-object 
dichotomy while also dispensing with the metaphysical overtones of Dewey's 
philosophy of experience and method of inquiry. 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty is careful to clarify that anti-
representationalism does not entail idealism. Creating systematic and edifying 
discourse does not also mean creating the objects of the physical world."*' He is also 
careful to show that it does not entail relativism or scepticism either. Only someone 
who already assumes that something like the transcendental notions of platonic 
thought already exist, will be troubled by the replacement of knowledge as accuracy 
of representation with knowledge as strategic diagrams for coping. Only someone 
troubled by the possibility that different conceptual schemes will lead to different 
constructs of 'the real' will be troubled by relativism. That is, idealism, scepticism 
and relativism are problems of representationalism. Once we take up an anti-
representational stance and drop the idea that our mental schemes accurately 
represent some content, that is once we drop the scheme-content distinction, we will 
have no cause to affirm that truth is either purely scheme-laden as in idealism, or 
content-laden as in realism.42 We will affirm the existence of nature, but accept that 
it makes no sense to talk about nature as having a preferred way of being 
'*" As David Hall points out, it is one thing to talk of the self as held together by the beliefs and desire 
that constitute an individual's creativity; it is another to say that the self is grounded on principles that 
are transcendent of our contact with nature and other people. David L. Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet 
and Poet of the New Pragmatism, (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 17. 
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., p. 345. 
''2 ibid., pp. 299-311,373-379. 
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represented.43 These ideas Rorty gleans from his interpretation of the work of 
Donald Davidson. Quoting Davidson, Rorty notes that: 
In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, 
something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the 
notion of objective truth—quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a 
dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth 
relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by 
the board. Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but 
that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and 
world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch 
with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions 
true or false.*^ 
For Davidson, our beliefs about the world and our desires for ourselves are given to 
us within a network of linguistic interactions.'^ ^ j)^^ (joes not mean that such 
interactions get in the way of our contact with the world; they are our contact with 
the world. The world causes us to have beliefs, but this causal relation does not 
itself justify our beliefs, only other beliefs do that.'*^  In 'A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs', Davidson further argues that the network of linguistic interactions is not 
'*3 Concerning this holistic relation between our beliefs and desires and our knowledge of tmth and 
reality, Rorty has recently written: 
... if you imderstand the causal relations between the acquisition of beliefs and the 
environment of the believer you do not also need to ask about representational relations. 
It seems to me that a causal, non-representational account of intentional states—an 
account along Davidsonian lines—gives you every reason in the world to say that 'real 
properties of the object are registered in language ... even after you have denied that they 
are represented in language. They are registered in the sense that if the object did not 
have those properties you would probably not say what you say, or believe what you 
believe. 
Rorty, 'Response to James Gouinlock', op. cit., p. 97. Such registering, Rorty also notes, is like 
breathing in that "we do not as far as I can see, have any choice about how to form beliefs." Rorty, 
'Response to Susan Haack', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 152. 
44 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 
198. 
45 The whole idea of objective reality, Davidson notes in a conversation with Giovaiuia Borradori, 
"depends on our being in communication with other people who are interacting with the same things." 
Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher, (E.T. Rosanna Crocitto) (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), p. 48. 
Donald Davidson, 'A Coherence Theory of Tmth and Knowledge' with 'Afterthoughts, 1987', in 
Alan Malachowski,/?cadir«g/?£>«>', (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 120-138 esp. pp. 127-128. 
Davidson writes: 
Sensory stimulations are indeed part of the causal chain that leads to belief, but cannot, 
without confusion, be considered to be evidence, or a source of justification, for the 
stimulated beliefs, 
ibid., p. 132. 
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something that exists antecedently to the particular practical interactions in 
question, as i f a system of language was already in place. I f this were the case it 
would be difficult to integrate new or errant linguistic meanings. The interpretative 
situation between speaker, listener, and the environment they share is too flexible 
for any system or theory of language, antecedent to some use. We do have an idea 
of what we might expect a speaker to mean—what Davidson calls a 'prior theory' of 
interpretation—but this need not be a shared theory. All the interpretation of a 
speaker's actual use of language is done through constructing a 'passing theory'. The 
network of human linguistic interactions is constituted by a continuous series of 
such contingent 'passing theories'. It is convergence on 'passing theories' that 
enables us to understand one another.*'^  What makes the creation of such 'passing 
theories' possible in situations where a hearer confronts a 'foreign' speaker (that is, 
anyone who does not speak in a way that fits a hearer's prior theory) is the 
application of'the principle of charity'. This principle, which we employ in the very 
act of interpretation, tells us that it is pointless to do anything else, in order to get 
interpretation under way, but to assume that most of a speaker's beliefs are held by 
the speaker to be true. Charity provides "a reason for supposing most of our beliefs 
are true that is not a form of evidence"*^ and "is forced on us; [for] ... i f we want to 
understand others, we must count them right in most matters."'*' For Davidson the 
truth of a speaker's utterances is a matter of relating a formal definition of truth, (to 
the effect (following Alfred Tarski) that 'grass is green' is true i f and only i f grass is 
green), v^ dth the behavioural dispositions of speakers and listeners.^ " Davidson 
writes: 
The ultimate source of both objectivity and communication is the triangle 
that, by relating speaker, interpreter, and the world, determines the 
Donald Davidson, 'A Nice Derangement of Epiuphs', in Ernest LePore (ed.) Truth and 
Interpretation, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 433-446. 
"** Davidson, 'A Theory of Truth and Knowledge', op. cit., p. 127. 
Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, op. cit., p. 197. 
5° Donald Davidson, 'The Structure and Content of Truth', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, 
1990, pp. 279-328. 
169 
contents of thought and speech. Given this source there is no room for a 
relativized concept of truth. [Rather truth arises] from the nature of 
interpersonal understanding ... mutually understood utterances, the 
contents of which are finally fixed by the patterns and causes of sentences 
held true ... [T]ruth thus rests in the end on belief and, even more 
ultimately on the affective attitudes. 
For Rorty, Davidson's accoimt of language and truth not only dispenses with the 
scheme-content distinction, it also dispenses with the distinction between 
appearance and reality. I f there is no non-causal mediation between our beliefs and 
the world then there is also no basis for separating appearance from reality. That 
this distinction is made amounts to the exercise of alternative ways of speaking that 
fulfil different purposes. Davidson's holism enables Rorty to replace the distinction 
"between sentences which express matter of fact and those which do not, ... by a 
distinction between sentences which serve a certain purpose and those which serve 
other purposes." Some sentences may be useful in talking about tables and others 
about disease or "praising God ... [or] ... writing witty verse etc."52 In this way 
Davidsonian holism "takes the curse of naturalism"^^ by refusing to reduce our non-
scientific practices to scientific practices. 5"* 
Rorty considers Davidson's account of language as doing the same kind of thing 
that Dewey's accoimt of experience tried to do. Both suggest that we are in 
immediate contact with our environment without giving any aid or comfort to 
representational realism. Unlike Dewey, however, Davidson does not require a 
metaphysic of experience or method of inquiry in order to assert this.^ ^ Davidson 
51 ibid., pp. 325-326. 
52 Rorty, Objectivity Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 116. (both quotations). 
53 ibid., p. 109. 
54 This is one of the main themes of the essays on Davidson in Rorty's Objectivity Relativism and 
Truth, ibid., pp. 78-156. 
55 Rorty writes: 
Our language ... is not... something 'merely human' which may hide something which 
'transcends human capacities'. ... [Rather, language] is as direct as contact with reality can 
get. 
ibid., pp. 145-146. 
56 Richard Rorty, Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., 
pp. 1-15. 
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merely asks us to consider what is involved in interpreting the linguistic and other 
behaviour of our interlocutors.Rorty notes: 
I see it as the great virtue of Davidson's linguistification of Dewey's 
antirepresentationalism that it enables us to get rid of 'experience' as the 
name of... an intermediary, 
While Davidson's account is "controlled by the nature of objects", its advantage over 
Dewey's account is that "it makes it imnecessary to worry about whether a full-
fledged object of knowledge exists prior to inquiry."^^ 
A further advantage that Rorty sees in Davidson's account of the language-
world relation is the place it finds for unusual uses of language such as 
malapropisms and metaphors. By employing a 'passing theory' we can make sense 
of such uses. Additionally, Rorty argues, such imusual uses of language can become 
common uses i f they enable us to fulfil a purpose better than we now do. Rorty thus 
sees Davidson as adumbrating a naturalistic account of language lisage that does 
justice to Darwin. Rorty writes: 
Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus of culture, as 
Darwin taught us to think of the history of a coral reef Old metaphors 
are constantly dying off into literalness, and then serving as a platform 
and foil for new metaphors.^ o 
In this way our current use of language can be regarded as having taken shape 
through many contingent linguistic mutations. The metaphorical use of 'ousid, 
'agape' and 'gravitas' by Aristotle, St. Paul and Newton respectively, are seen by 
Rorty as 'marvellous' contingent mutations in the evolution of linguistic usage.^ ' 
Developing Davidson's account of language in this way allows Rorty to propose a 
5 ' Rorty notes: 
Davidson's theory seems to me superior to Dewey's in being able to provide definite 
location for all naming behaviors as organic-environmental interaction. 
Rorty, "Response to James Gouinlock', op. cit., p. 97. 
58 ibid., p. 219. n. 10. 
59 ibid., p. 97. 
60 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p. 16. 
6'ibid., p. 17, 
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linguistic Darwinism that enables us to redescribe any narrative or constellation of 
human practices. Once we recognise that language has no goal, that it is not a 
medium, but a series of random mutations of'marks and noises'; some of which, turn 
out to be useful for fulfilling certain practical purposes: once we see that our 
language and thus also our culture "are as much a contingency, as much a result of 
thousands of small mutations finding niches (and millions of others finding no 
niches), as are the orchids and the anthropoids"62 then, Rorty asserts, we will be in a 
better position also to recognise ourselves as contingent products of a contingent 
physical world producing contingent meaning with contingent linguistic tools. In so 
doing, we will find ourselves able to dismiss a whole raft of philosophical problems 
that we once thought important. In this Darwinian view, a new set of linguistic 
descriptions does not emerge after accepting the validity of certain arguments on the 
basis of some neutral criteria that might act as a benchmark for progress,63 but 
rather, through recontextualisation: that is, through a re-weaving of the web of our 
beliefs and desires, in order to untie some problematic knots. Recontextualisation is 
marked by a continual proliferation of knowledge that always transgresses any limits 
which a previous vocabulary might once have held sacred. Recontextualisation is to 
Rorty, what 'inquiry' was to Dewey. 
Explaining the significance of Darwinism to a pragmatic account of inquiry, 
Rorty writes: 
By Darwinism' I mean a story about humans as animals with special 
organs and abilities: about how certain features of the human throat, hand 
and brain enabled humans to start developing increasingly complex social 
practices, by batting increasingly complex noises back and forth. 
According to this story, these organs and abilities and the practices they 
make possible, have a lot to do with who we are and what we want, but 
they no more put us in a representational relation to an intrinsic nature of 
things than do the anteater's snout or the bower-bird's skill at weaving. I 
see Dewey as having used this story to start freeing us from 
62 ibid., p. 16. 
63 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, op. cit., pp. Xli-XIiii. 
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representationalist notions, and I see ... Donald Davidson as continuing 
this Deweyan initiative.^ 
Dewey and Davidson, follow Darwin and understand that the immediacy of our 
relation to our environment means that there is no interesting distinction to be drawn 
between adapting to reality and knowing reality. ^ 5 However, it would be wrong to 
assume that Rorty is suggesting that a Darwinian position should be held because 
Darwin has told us how things really are. Rather, for Rorty, Darwin provides us 
with a self-image which it befits us to try, one that itself found an evolutionary niche 
created by nineteenth century culture. It is one that suggests that we drop questions 
about 'how things really are' "in the hope of having fewer philosophical problems on 
our hands. it enables us to see recontextualisation as manipulating linguistic tools 
that serve some useful purpose and not a matter of representing reality or getting at 
the truth of things. One recontextualisation of the world is followed by another as 
new problems arise and new useful vocabularies are created to deal with them. As 
we get into the habit of using them, these vocabularies, and the metaphors that 
constitute them, find a niche and become literalised as a 'useful' pragmatic truth. 
But as with all such vocabularies, '"can be made to look like' ... does not contrast 
with 'really is'".^ ^ Everything comes under some description or other. Rorty writes: 
[I]t is never very hard to re-describe anything one likes in terms that are 
irreducible to, indefinable in the terms of, a previous description of that 
thing. A pragmatist ... insists ... that there are no such thing as the way 
the thing is in itself, under no description, apart fi-om any use to which 
human beings might want to put it.68 
Sometimes redescription will be intentional, other times it will not. Either way, 
Rorty agrees when Dewey argues that, after Darwin, old philosophical questions are 
64 Richard Rorty, 'Putnam and the Relativist Menace', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, 1993, 
pp. 447-448. 
65 Rorty, Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin', op. cit., pp. 1-15. 
66 Rorty, THitnam and the Relativist Menace', op. cit., p. 448. Also see Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, 
Rationality, and Sentimentality', in The Yale Review, Vol. 81, 1993. pp. 8-9. 
6'7 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume Two, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 4. 
68 ibid., p .4, (my italics). 
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not so much solved but abandoned in favour of new questions.^ ^ When, however, 
redescriptions are intentional, there may, as Jennifer Herdt argues, be a problem in 
Rorty's account. If the use of a particular redescription is realised only after it has 
been created, because at the point of its creation it is a non-cognitive unfamiliar use 
of language, how are we to decide what redescriptions should replace our current 
ones?''° To this Rorty would have two replies. The first would be to emphasise, 
with Dewey, that the type of intentional change Herdt is concerned with will always 
begin in the imagination. Our current social norms are, Rorty notes, "fossilized 
products of some past act of imagination." '^ Redescription will always be couched 
within the confines of some real or imagined alternative. Second, Rorty would note 
that to get our imaginary products implemented we just ought to give them a try. 
Things change, Rorty notes, "by somebody proposing a new idiom, its being tried 
out, and its being found to work better than its predecessor. "''^  
To summarise the account of reality that follows from Rorty's adoption of a 
Davidsonian philosophy (which, I believe, religious non-realists ought to adopt) we 
might consider the example of'phlogiston'. For Rorty, the word 'phlogiston' can best 
be understood as a tool in the chemist's historic vocabulary for which she no longer 
finds a use. It is no longer helpfiil to her purposes of prediction and control. Talk of 
oxidation or the transfer of energy is more helpfiil for this purpose. That is to say, 
beliefs concerning oxidation fit the chemist's other beliefs in a way that beliefs 
about phlogiston do not. For Rorty, "[t]o say that one's previous language was 
inappropriate for dealing with some segment of the world ... is just to say that one is 
now, having learned a new language, able to handle that segment more easily. "''^  
9^ John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1910 and 1965), p. 19. 
Jeniufer A. Herdt, 'Cruelty, Liberalism and the Quarantine of Irony: Rorty and the Disjunction 
Between Public and Private', in Soundings, Vol. 75, 1992, pp. 79-95. 
^' Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 186. 
^- Richard Rorty, 'Response to Men Hance', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 125. 
'^ ^ Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity op. cit., p. 14. Also see Rorty, Objectivity Relativism 
and Truth, op. cit., pp. 54-60. 
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The rationale behind the shift from 'phlogiston' to 'oxidation' is bound up with 
the relation of certain ordinary beliefs to other ordinary beliefs and not a matter of 
the relation of ordinary beliefs to non-beliefs. Equally, it serves no useful purpose 
to understand this rationale as providing us with a separate criterion for why we 
should say that oxidation is true and phlogiston false, for there is no substantial 
justificationary work for the notion of'truth' to do. This is not because talk of truth 
has no role, but because the truth of our ordinary beliefs is already presupposed. It 
is not that oxidation corresponds to something in the world which phlogiston does 
not. The world does not stand to these words in a relation of 'making true'. Rather 
beliefs about 'oxidation' are holistically, but not too tightly, linked with other beliefs 
about what counts as an observation of oxidation, in a way which beliefs about 
phlogiston are not. Rorty notes that "'true' and 'belief are interlocking concepts"'^ '* 
As Davidson points out that, "the agent has only to reflect on what belief is to 
appreciate that most of his basic beliefs are true."''^  
This is not to be confused with the idealist notion that the physical world is 
mind dependent. Rorty's pragmatist will still be required to recontextualise while 
responding to the causal effect that her environment has upon her, to "objects she 
does not control. "'^ ^ The mistake of idealism, Rorty notes, was not the idea that the 
world has to be contextualised in some linguistic network of beliefs and desires but 
the idea "that space and time are unreal, that human beings cause the spatio-
temporal world to exist".'''' If we accept the first idea, the second idea about the 
reality or non-reality of the world simply makes no sense. The world we inhabit, the 
'''* Richard Rorty, "Putnam on Truth' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, 1992. 
pp. 417. 
Donald Davidson, 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' with 'Afterthoughts 1987' op. 
cit., p. 133. 
Rorty Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 101. The pragmatist, Rorty notes: 
is no more free from pressures from outside, no more tempted to be 'arbitrary' than 
anyone else. She is free from the questions 'are you representing accurately?' and 'are you 
getting at the way the object really, intrinsically is?' but not from questions like 'can you fit 
the belief that the litmus paper turned red (or that ... your lover has deceived you) with 
the rest of your beliefs?' 
ibid., p. 101. 
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, And Solidarity, op. cit., p. 4. 
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real world that has a causal effect upon us, is the world our beliefs say it is. In this 
view the ideas of 'correspondence' or 'representation' play no role in supplying our 
ordinary beliefs with their truth. Rather, truth and belief come together in the same 
linguistic package. Language does not mediate between truth, belief or reality. 
Since correspondence and representation provide realism with its distinctive 
hue, dropping the notion of language as a third thing between mind and world also 
means dropping the main supports of realism. Rather, for the pragmatist and the 
non-realist, the truth or falsity of the realities with which we deal are holistically 
related to the practices that we employ. Language, in this view, is not an adequate 
or an inadequate medium, but a tool with which we can achieve certain purposes. 
Some of these purposes are assisted by dividing up the world and labelling the bits, 
other purposes are not. It is a mistake, in this view, to regard truth and reality as 
distinctively defined by the distinction between label and labelled. Talk of 
'phlogiston' may not have labelled anything, but it once held a place within the 
chemist's network of true beliefs as a sign of an anomalous property of the world's 
causal relation to us that required what Dewey termed 'inquiry' and what Rorty terms 
recontextualisation. 
We are in direct contact with things like tables but, Rorty argues, it makes no 
sense to talk of this contact in terms which regard that table as either dependent or 
independent of the mind. Affirming or denying that correspondence and 
representation connects minds with tables, makes no actual difference for our direct 
dealings with the table. Witty verse and God are no exception when it comes to a 
pragmatic account of truth and reality. It is our practical dealings with such things 
that leads us to talk about their reality. Therefore, imder the influence of his 
interpretation of Davidson, Rorty does not reject notions like 'truth', 'reality', or 
'reason'. What he does reject is the idea that it makes sense to talk about these 
notions as if they refer to, or are dependent upon, an antecedently existent entity or 
property which our mind or our language might represent or fail to represent. Such 
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notions are meaningful in terms of what we do, rather than what we might represent. 
They are pragmatic terms rather than metaphysical terms. Rorty writes: 
... nobody ever said there was no such thing as objective truth and 
validity. What we say is that you gain nothing for the pursuit of such 
truth by talking about the mind-dependence or mind-independence of 
reality. All there is to talk about are the procedures we use for bringing 
about agreement between inquirers.''* 
It is in these pragmatic terms that religious non-realists will find a suitable account 
of non-realism. It is one that abandons the realist's economy of representation rather 
than sharing in it through an idealist or anti-realist negation.''^  
However, Rorty did not do enough in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature to 
prevent himself from being interpreted as a subjectivist. This is an interpretation 
that he made plausible by linking, rather than swapping, Dewey's account of truth 
with Davidson's. It is an interpretation given ftirther plausibility by the insufficient 
attention Rorty gave to distinguishing coherence theories of truth from the holism he 
shares with Davidson. *° Rorty regrets having made this interpretation plausible in 
Rorty, "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?' op. cit., p. 56. 
''^  According to Rorty, the anti-realism expressed by philosophers like Michael Dummett is predicated 
upon a representational criteria according to which a proposition might be characterised as either 
realist if it is established indepentently of our knowing it or anti-realist if its truth or falsity is in some 
way dependent upon "the sort of thing which we count as evidence for a statement..." Michael. 
Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, (London: Duckworth, 1978), p. 146. For Dummett, Rorty 
argues: 
Our inarticulable knowledge of what it is for such a statement ['It is red'] to be true, 
presumably, is enough to make us realist about redness. For these types of statements we 
can have a strong sense of'correspondence to reality' - strong in that we are confident 
that what makes the statement true is 'reality' rather than merely ourselves. Here we have 
the empiricist picture, ... according to which language stands as a veil between us and 
reality, with reality punching its way through (or being known to punch its way through) 
only at the tips of a few sensory receptors. The farther into the upper storeys we get... 
[to statements not limited to these sensory receptors] ... the more doubt there is that we 
are in touch with the world, and the more temptation to be an 'anti-realist' in regard to 
certain entities - that is, to adopt a theory of meaning which explains the truth of such 
statements [quoting Dummett] 'm terms of our capacity to recognise statements as true, 
and not in terms of a condition which transcend human capacities.' 
Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 145. Also p. 2. 
In the introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty speaks of "Davidson's holism and 
coherentism" in the same sentence. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, op. cit., p. xviii. However, 
Davidson also regrets having used the term 'coherence theory'. He writes: 
My emphasis on coherence was probably just a way of making a negative point, that 'all 
that counts as evidence or justification for a belief must come fi-om the same totality of 
belief to which it belongs.' 
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these ways. In relation to the first regret, Rorty initially saw Dewey's account of 
truth (as what inquiry takes to be warranted) to be as innocuous as Davidson's—a 
tool to help us get things done. But on later reflection Rorty sees Dewey's view as 
driving a wedge between truth on the one hand and the test of warranted assertibility 
on the other, as if the latter was an independent criterion for judging the reality of 
the former. For Rorty, as we have seen: 
... 'true' is not the sort of term which is going to get explained, defined, 
analyzed, or usefiilly contrasted with some mighty opposite such as 
'assertible'. ... I obscured this Davidsonian point in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature by trying to associate it with the Deweyan claim that 
truth is warranted assertibility.*' 
Truth needs no definition. To suggest that it does is to engage once more with the 
scheme-content distinction in which truth is either subjectively imposed or pre-
given. Rorty allows that his critics were correct in objecting to his earlier suggestion 
that we are forced to choose between either a "radical subjectivism in which the self 
projects schemes out upon a featureless reality ... [or] ... an unknowable 
noumenon."*2 associate Dewey with Davidson in this respect; to identify 
warranted assertibility with a scheme by which we define the criteria of truth, is to 
undermine the holistic account of knowledge that Davidson and Rorty both wish to 
affirm. This brings us to Rorty's second regret, his failure to distinguish a coherence 
view of truth from holism. This failure stems from the residual interest Rorty has in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature for the appearance-reality distinction, manifest 
in the form of a distinction between correspondence as "transparency to the real"*^  
and coherence as coping with the real. Although he never explicitly affirms a 
Davidson, 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge: Afterthoughts, 1987', op. cit., p. 135. Also 
see Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 174 where Rorty describes the view he wants to 
assert as holism without idealism. 
81 Richard Rorty, 'AReply to Six Critics', in Analyse undKritik, Vol. 6, 1984, pp. 96-97. 
82 Richard Rorty, 'A Response to Frank B. Fartell', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 
19. 
8^ Rorty, Philosophy artd the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., pp. 368, 310 no. 41. 
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coherence theory, he does acquiesce in its instantiation when, for example, he writes 
of justification: 
that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to 
find some test other than coherence.** 
Here, truth as coherence will not escape self-referential problems because it will 
always need to assume a total context which gives to it the truth it claims. Holism 
on the other hand makes no such claim about truth. It is one thing to say with 
holism that "you have to understand words and sentences in the context of an entire 
linguistic practice";*^ it is another thing to say that 'coherence is the only test*. In the 
holist view there is a closure of the subject-object dichotomy in favour of an 
'intersubjective' account of knowledge in which our linguistic and other practices 
make sense in a context that takes for granted a speaker, a listener and a shared 
world, enabling us to drop the distinctions between the world itself and our view of 
it and thus also making "it hard to be either a realist or an anti-realist."*^ In the 
coherentist view, the subject-object dichotomy is opened up once more by the idea 
that coherence acts as a test. In this view, the truth of some feature of a particular 
area of human endeavour is judged not only on how that feature coheres with other 
features in that endeavour, but also by how it relates to the entire endeavour. The 
endeavour itself becomes the limit and criterion of the truth for the features that 
constitute it. When we consider the entirety of human endeavour, a coherence 
theory of truth necessarily imposes an abstract reality upon inquiry that must 
somehow encompass in a system all those endeavours that are true. For Spinoza 
such a system is the mind of God; for Hegel it is the Absolute Will; and for Rorty 
and Cupitt, their critics argue, it is the self-asserting subject. 
This is the main thrust of the critique offered against Rorty by D. Vaden House 
and Frank B. Farrell. Vaden House argues that rather than transcending the 
^ ibid., p. 178. 
*5 Richard Rorty, 'A Post-Philosophical Politics?: An Interview by Danny Postel', in Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, Vol. 15, 1989, p. 199. 
^ Rorty, 'Response to Frank B. Farrell', op. cit., p. 191. 
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problems of realism, Rorty simply inverts them in the form of a neo-Nietzschean 
affirmation of the self Despite the care that Vaden House recognises Rorty takes to 
avoid scepticism and idealism, his position cannot avoid making truth and reality a 
matter of the self-assertion of the knowing human subject. While Vaden House 
admires much of Rorty's critique of representationalism, in the end he sees Rorty as 
dispensing v^ dth the indispensable, namely the idea that the truth or falsity of our 
vocabularies do depend upon the world's own nature.*'' To avoid this error, Vaden 
House argues, Rorty needs to recover "a sense of the world as creation and human 
life as response."** I have tried to argue here that Rorty has made this recovery but 
without the implications that Vaden House thinks are required for an adequate 
account of truth and falsity. Vaden House understands Rorty incorrectly as saying 
that "it makes no sense to think of the world causing a vocabulary to be right or 
wrong. "*^  But once Rorty follows Davidson in abandoning the distinction between 
scheme and content and between appearance and reality, what in fact makes no 
sense is to argue that we are out of contact with the world. Coping with the world is 
the process by which we engage directly with it. As Rorty comments: 
An antirepresentationalist ... does not view knowledge as a matter of 
getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for 
coping with reality. 
To abandon the scheme-content distinction is to abandon the need for 
epistemological bridges between subject and object and thus to collapse that very 
distinction. To abandon these bridges, however, does not mean, as Vaden House 
assumes it does, that we abandon any idea of our contact with the world or its 
independence of us. The issue for Rorty is not about whether the worid causes us to 
hold beliefs—like Davidson he believes it certainly does— t^he issue is whether it 
makes sense, as Vaden House believes it must, to take the fiirther step and call these 
*^  D. Vaden House, Without God or His Doubles: Realism, Relativism and Rorty, (Leiden- E J Brill 
1994), pp. 116-145 esp. p. 127. 
** ibid., pp. 125-126 no. 17. 
*9ibid., p. 123;alsopp. 62, 81. 
'° Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 1. 
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beliefs right or wrong as if the world has a 'say' in what makes our vocabularies true. 
Summarising his account of truth and reality Rorty writes: 
To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with 
common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of 
causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not 
out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no 
truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and the human 
languages are human creations. 
Truth carmot be out there - carmot exist independently of the human 
mind - because sentences caimot so exist, or be out there. The world is 
out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the 
world can be true or false. The world on its own - unaided by the 
describing activity of human beings - caimot. 
(...) The world does not speak. Only we do.^ ' 
However, sentences like these lead Frank Farrell to view Rorty as an inverted 
qtiasi-religious thinker. Farrell argues that Rorty wants to think of the world as if 
something like 'God' still existed. Unlike Vaden House, Farrell suggests that to view 
the world as a divine creation actually encourages us to view nature as lacking in its 
own self-determinacy. Rorty transposes the world's lack of self-determinacy viewed 
in the light of its supposed creation by God, into a lack of self-determinacy that 
follows from a subjective determination of the world by the self According to 
Farrell, Rorty then maintains what Farrell believes to be the religious idea that 
humanity's place in the world is one of coping with a pre-given divine creation. This 
religious structure to Rorty's thought, Farrell argues, "means that the subject 
ambitiously takes on a divinized role or that it modestly projects its schemes upon a 
world it cannot hope to understand itself "'^  in the former view the world 
disappears into idealism, in the latter view it disappears into scepticism. Once 
transposed to the subject the religious structure of Rorty's thought about reality 
results in an anti-realist account of truth. 
^' Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Ami Solidarity, op. cit., p. 5-6. 
52 Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism, op. cit., p. 139. 
93 ibid., pp. 148-159. 
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Again, such a criticism only holds if Rorty maintains the distinction between 
scheme and content that appears to make a choice between anti-realism and realism 
necessary; but because Rorty's anti-representationalism abandons that distinction, it 
sees this choice as a non-issue. Farrell allows that Rorty follows Davidson in 
rejecting these distinctions but still believes that there is a 'gulf between the two 
thinkers on the significance of the question of truth and its relation to the world. ^ '^  
Rorty's response to Farrell is first to point out how much he agrees with Farrell's 
account of Davidson's understanding of the necessary triangulation between, in 
Farrell's terms, "the world, the intentional life of subjects ... and the cultural realm 
in which our semantic production is repeated and interpreted and shaped. "^5 
Secondly, however, whereas Farrell interprets this triangulation as supporting a 
'modest realism', Rorty interprets it as Davidson asking us to give up both realist and 
anti-realist intuitions.^ ^ The gulf that Farrell sees between Davidson and Rorty is, 
on Rorty's reading, more of a gulf between his own and Farrell's interpretation of 
Davidson. 97 Farrell argues that while the world cannot make our beliefs true, it 
nevertheless remains a criterion with its own articulation by "being that to which our 
beliefs attempt holistically to accommodate themselves..."9* In this way the world 
affects our practices in such a way that we cannot view our beliefs as merely himian 
creations. For Farrell, there are either true holistic beliefs about the world which the 
world causes us to have, or there are errant beliefs, such as those of religious faith. 
For Rorty, however, the idea of the mind projecting its structures onto the world is 
94 ibid., pp. 118-147. 
95 ibid., pp. 113-114. Rorty describes himself and Fartell as'fans'of Davidson's position. Rorty, 
•Response to Frank B. Farrell', op. cit., p. 191 
9^ Rorty, 'Response to Frank B. Fartell', op. cit., p. 191. 
9'' ibid., pp. 190, 228 no. 2. Fartell's interpretation has to deny the pragmatic element in Davidson's 
position in order to establish his interpretation, (Fartell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism, op. 
cit., pp. 75-79) while also highlighting Rorty's position prior to his complete adoption of Davidsonian 
triangulation. One difficulty with Fartell's position is that he is forced to accept that there are more 
ertant beliefs than Davidson would be prepared to allow. For Davidson even the Neanderthals had 
mostly true beliefs, because we must assume that another person has mostly true beliefs if we are to 
make sense of their actions, beliefs and desires, but also because, as Rorty points out, truth is largely a 
matter of the shared practices and the purposes we are curtently engaged in pursuing. 
9* Fartell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism, op. cit., p. 120. 
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as ludicrous as the idea of the world projecting its structures into language as though 
such language is only secondarily our own. He wants to drop such secondary-
primary distinctions, as well as the optical metaphors on which they are based, and 
in the process to abandon the subject-object, scheme-content and realism-
antirealism distinctions as well.^ ^ Rorty notes: 
If one is content to think of the relations between human organisms, their 
beliefs, and the rest of the universe in merely causal terms, rather than 
dragging in representational relations in addition to causal ones, questions 
about realism and antirealism will not arise. 
One side of Davidson's triangle is held in place by the other two sides. It is thus 
impossible to isolate the world from beliefs and linguistic interactions. For Rorty, 
nothing deep now hangs on the distinction between 'the world out there' and 'truth 
out there' because the world will always come in the description and redescription of 
our language-shaped packe t s .He writes: 
The antirepresentationalist is quite willing to grant that our language, like 
our bodies, has been shaped by the environment we live in. Indeed, he or 
she insists on the point... .[In their view,] [i]t is one thing to say that... 
an ability to use the word 'atom' as physicists do, is usefiil for coping with 
the environment. It is another thing to explain this utility by reference to 
representationalist notions, such as the notion that the reality referred to 
by 'quark' was determinate before the word 'quark' came along. '^ ^ 
Farrell correctly notes that Rorty's interpretation of Davidson's work does leave 
room for some disagreement with Davidson,but the dialogue between Rorty and 
99 Rorty, 'A Response to Frank B. Farrell', op. cit., p. 192. 
100 ibid., p: 193. 
101 As Davidson writes: 
... my own view is that, until we have an idea of what's going on in the minds of other 
people, it doesn't make sense to say that we have the concept of objectivity, of something 
existing in the world quite independent of us. ... First we find out what is in somebody 
else's mind, and by then we have got all the rest. Of course, I really think that it all comes 
at the same time. 
Borradori, The American Philosophers, op. cit., p. 50. 
102 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 5. 
103 Two outstanding differences between Rorty and Davidson are firstly, that Davidson does not see 
anything particularly pragmatic about 'intersubjectivity" while Rorty does. Compare here Davidson's 
comments in Borradori, The American Philosopher, op. cit., pp. 43-44 with Rorty's comment in his 
T)oes Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?'in ^ cofifeme, Vol. 80, 1994, p. 61. 
Secondly, Davidson sees his account of language, beliefs and behavioural dispositions as providing 
something more to truth than what it is good for us to believe. Rorty does not. See Davidson, 'The 
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Davidson has led Rorty to abandon a coherence account of truth and to avoid the 
danger of subjectivism. It has also led Davidson to abandon the idea that his holism 
might reinstate a revised correspondence theory. Davidson comments on Rorty's 
essay Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth' that he sees Rorty as saying that: 
... my view of truth amounts to a rejection of both coherence and 
correspondence theories and should properly be classed as belonging to 
the pragmatist tradition. ... I pretty much concur with him ..J^ 
He also concurs with Rorty's claim that he is not "answering the sceptic" who 
questions the possibility of contact with the world, but "telling him to get lost."'"^  
For Davidson, correspondence theories cannot intelligibly answer the sceptic 
because in taking the sceptic's questions seriously they allow the sceptic logical 
space. But to say that there is no way for our knowledge of the world to 
comprehend its objects without implying some use of that knowledge, does not 
mean accepting epistemic (schematic) or coherence theories of knowledge and truth. 
Such theory-laden approaches "reduce reality to so much less than we believe there 
is "106 Rorty agrees, but he emphasises those conclusions of Davidson's 
triangulation that lead Davidson to write that "it is fiitile either to reject or to accept 
the slogan that the real and the true are 'independent of our beliefs'. "i°'' The 
independence necessary for 'correspondence realism' is beside the point when it 
Structure and Content of Truth', op. cit., pp. 279-328 and Richard Rorty, 'Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? 
Davidson vs. Wright', in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, 1995. pp. 281-300. On Rorty's 
account, after truth has been related to a triangular analysis of our dispositional behaviour, telling us 
what a speaker finds it good to believe, all we are left with are three irmocuous uses of the term: (i) a 
cautionary use, e.g. 'ray belief that my car's engine will start tomorrow is perfectly justified but may not 
be true'; (ii) a commending use, e.g. 'it is true that the film was a good movie'; and (iii) a disquotational 
use, e.g. 'if what the teacher says is true then the candidate will pass their exam'. Unlike Davidson, 
Rorty notes: 
I see no significance in the fact that we use the same word to designate what is preserved 
by valid inference as we use to caution people that beliefs justified to us may not be 
justified to other, better, audiences, 
ibid., p. 286. Also see Rorty, 'Response to Susan Haack', op. cit., p. 150. For an account of some 
differences between Davidson and Rorty similar to that offered by Fartell see Maria Baghramian, 
•Rorty, Davidson and Truth', in Ration (New Series), Vol. 3, 1990, pp. 101-116. 
1°'* Davidson, 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' with 'Afterthoughts 1987', op. cit., p. 
134. 
ibid., p. 134. 
1°^ Davidson, 'The Structure and Content of Truth', op. cit., pp. 298-299, 
ibid., p. 305. 
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comes to questions of truth and reality. "Realism," Davidson notes, "with its 
insistence on radically nonepistemic correspondence, asks more of truth than we can 
understand. "108 
Timothy Jackson, like Farrell and Vaden House, accepts the loss of 
metaphysical consolation that Rorty's work portends, but also, like Farrell and 
Vaden House, feels that Rorty emphasises too strongly a philosophy of subjective 
'bestowal' at the expense of a philosophy of'appraisal', lo^  If this once was a feature 
of Rorty's work it is, I have argued, no longer one he holds to. In an essay from 
1984 Rorty notes that a consideration of works like Dewey's A Common Faith leads 
us to see that accepting the contingency of our words makes a sense of gratitude 
possible. Rorty notes: 
The gratitude in question is not the sort which the Christian has when he 
or she thanks Omnipotence for the stars and the trees. It is rather a matter 
of being gratefiil to the stars and trees themselves— t^o the beings that 
were disclosed by our linguistic practices, no 
To appraise oneself as a gift rather than as a source for the bestowal of power, Rorty 
continues, enables you to "combine the humility of the scientific realist with the 
spiritual freedom of the romantic."!" This, Rorty adds, is a combination Dewey 
hoped to achieve. This is also, I believe, a vision of a combination that Rorty 
shares: a vision that attempts to combine the philosopher's concern for 'truth' with 
the fiirther attempt to combine concerns about freedom with concerns about justice. 
It is Rorty's attempt at the second type of combination which I shall discuss in the 
next chapter. 
108 ibid., p. 309. Also see Rorty, 'Response to Frank B. Farrell', op. cit., p. 190. 
•09 Timothy P. Jackson, 'The Disconsolation of Theology: Irony, Cruelty, and Putting Charity First', in 
The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 20, 1992, pp. 1 -35. 
110 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 48. 
111 ibid., p. 48. 
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6.4. Conclusion: 
In this chapter I have summarised that aspect of Rorty's work which, according to 
David Hall, constitutes the work of Rorty the philosopher rather than Rorty the 
poet. " 2 As a philosopher, Rorty is as much concerned about questions of truth as 
any of the most esteemed philosophers of history. I have argued that while he may 
have given them cause to hold the view that his pragmatic anti-representationalism 
reduces to radical subjectivism he regrets having done so. His use of a Davidsonian 
account of language, I have argued, makes the charge of radical subjectivism one 
that now no longer applies to his work. Neither, I wish to suggest, would it apply to 
religious non-realists if they were to be more consistent in adopting the type of 
pragmatic account of reality and truth ouflined in this chapter. 
' 12 Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 235. 
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C H A P T E R SEVEN. 
RICHARD R O R T Y . PRAGMATISM AND T H E SOCIO-POLITICAL GOOD. 
7.1. Introduction: 
In an autobiographical sketch Rorty recalls that he recognised from an early age that 
the point of life was to fight injustice while being free to pursue ones own little 
idiosyncrasies. He tells us that he hoped to hold reality and justice, freedom and 
solidarity in a single vision. Such a vision, he believed, needed firm foundations 
and these could be philosophical or religious. But, Rorty notes: 
... a pridefiil inability to believe what I was saying when I recited the 
General Confession gradually led me to give up on my awkward attempt 
to get religion. So I fell back on my absolutist philosophy, i 
Unfortunately, absolute or foimdational philosophy also left Rorty disillusioned. 
The philosophers he read all seemed to build their systems on incommensurable first 
principles. This led him to accept that the foundations he sought belonged only to 
religion, "those lucky Christians for whom the love of God and the love of other 
human beings are inseparable. "2 He thus abandoned the attempt to provide 
foundations for his vision. However, I shall claim that the vision has never left him. 
In his philosophical works Rorty continues to balance concerns about truth with the 
further concern to balance justice with freedom in order to promote what he takes to 
be the interests of the pragmatic socio-political good. Having dispensed with the 
idea that Rorty's pragmatic anti-representationalism necessarily leads to radical 
subjectivism in the last chapter, in this chapter I shall argue that Rorty's pragmatism 
does not necessarily lead to dangerous political ideologies. Then, in chapter eight, I 
shall discuss his attitude to religion. His atheism, I shall argue, does not prevent a 
religious appropriation of his work. 
1 Richard Rorty, 'Trotsky and the Wild Orchids', in Common Knowledge Vol. 1, 1992. p. 144. 
2 ibid., p. 147 
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1.1. Rortv's Anti-Representationalism and the Social Concerns of Philosophv: 
As we have seen, Rorty allows that from the perspective of the epistemological 
thinker, the anti-representationalist looks both subjectivist and relativistic. 
However, such a perspective relies upon the very distinctions and realist intuitions 
which the anti-representationalist seeks to deny. Once these distinctions and 
intuitions are dropped, the charge of epistemological subjectivism and relativism no 
longer carries any weight. However, it might still be argued that Rorty is 
nevertheless a cultural relativist, if not an epistemological relativist and therefore 
unable to defend a conception of the social good. As Rorty notes, if being a 
relativist means accepting "that our only usefiil notions of 'true' and 'real' and 'good' 
are extrapolations from ... [our] ... practices and beliefs,"^ then he is prepared to 
accept the term. However, this does not mean also accepting that any belief is as 
good as any other or that no socially defined criteria of truth can be used to judge 
one set of beliefs favourably against another set of beliefs.'^  Pragmatists, like Rorty, 
are accused of being relativists in this later sense because they no longer see any 
point in the attempt by philosophers to ground our theories of justice, science or 
religion etc. in something external to the practices of these disciplines. The version 
of cultural relativism that Rorty is concerned to refiite is the one that says that it 
does not matter which practices in these disciplines 'win through'. Rorty does see a 
point in debating alternative political and scientific theories but denies that it makes 
sense to offer support for any of these alternatives by appealing to the worth of their 
philosophical grounding. What counts is the various practical advantages or 
disadvantages that these theories might have.5 What 'philosophical' culture fails to 
3 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980),p. 377. 
'* Richard Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 166. 
5 A culture which still values philosophical grounding, however, will tend to see the pragmatist as 
denying something essential to these disciplines that enables us to get them right. But Rorty deiues 
that "loyalty to our fellow-humans presupposes that there is something permanent and imhistorical 
which explains why we should continue to converse ...". ibid., p. 171. Such a presupposition is held 
in vain for the conversation of mankind is merely our conversation (ibid., p. 172) and thus the charge 
of relativism against the pragmatist is the charge of someone who wants to express disgust at the 
thought that we might lose philosophical culture and still manage our various practices. 
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see is that we can still have all the debates we want about politics, morality or 
religion without first giving them philosophical grounding. Such grounding makes 
no sense in a historicised culture that has given up the distinction between 
contingent cultural bias and necessary rational judgments.^  When we see our 
current values as historical rather than as a property of 'nature' or 'reason', we will 
recognise that foimdational philosophies which suggest that our practices can be 
grounded in something extra-historical say more about the idiosyncratic fantasies 
and private self-creations of the philosophers who propose such foundations than 
about the relevance of such foundations to our practices. We will also recognise, 
Rorty suggests, that the only difference between the Nazi and the liberal is that the 
liberal cares that they look good in the eyes of others.'' Rorty writes: 
Whether such a narcissistic self-justification can avoid terrorism depends 
on whether the notion of persuasion rather than force still makes sense 
^ Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume One, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 207-208. Rorty writes: 
... we postmodernist bourgeois liberals no longer tag our central beliefs and desires as 
'necessary' or 'natural' and our peripheral ones as 'contingent' or 'cultural'. This is partly 
because the anthropologists, novelists and historians have done such a good job of 
exhibiting the contingency of various putative necessities. In part it is because 
philosophers like Quine, Wittgenstein and Derrida have made us wary of the very idea of 
a necessary-contingent distinction. 
ibid., p. 208. 
^ Rorty argues that we cannot appeal to some imiversal principle of human justice as a defence against 
contextualised expressions of human wickedness such as Nazism - justice too is de-divinised. The 
only defence we have is the skill of the liberal to persuade the worid to adopt some of the habits of a 
liberal vocabulary. For Rorty, "the absence o f . . . a neutral tribunal, to render judgement on us and 
the Nazis does not imply that there is no moral truth of the matter." Richard Rorty, "Putnam and the 
Relativist Menace', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, 1993, pp. 453. n. 18. His ethnocentric 
liberalism provides this moral 'truth', he writes: 
Part of the force of the Darwinian picture I am suggesting is that the spirit of Sartre's 
famous remark about a Nazi victory was right, though the letter is a bit off. Sartre said: 
... after my death ... Fascism [may wui out]... if so Fascism will then be the 
truth of man, and so much the worse for us. 
Sartre should not have said that Fascism will be "the truth of man." There is no such 
thing. What he should have said is that the truth (about certain very important matters) 
might be forgotten, become invisible, get lost - and so much the worse for us. "Us" here 
does not mean "us humans" (for Nazis are humans too). It means something like "us 
tolerant wet liberals". 
ibid., p.453. The quotation fi-om Sartre is found in J-P. Sartre, 'Existentialism is a Humanism', in W. 
Kaufinan (ed ), Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre, (New York: New American Library, 1975), 
p.358. My marks of omission. 
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after we renounce the idea of human nature and the search for 
transcultural and ahistorical criteria of justification.* 
Rorty believes that it can, but that this will mean allowing that what we do in 
philosophical culture will be irrelevant to the type of things we do in politics, for 
persuasion means showing others the practical benefits or otherwise of living in a 
'postmodernist bourgeois liberal democracy' and not outlining philosophical 
foundations in its defence or as its critique.^ The 'rights' we possess are not achieved 
by mastering antecedently existing philosophical principles but are earned as a 
matter of social effort and historical luck. Politics comes first and philosophy is the 
attempt to justify to ourselves the type of society we have developed. "The question 
of whether justifiability to the community with which we identify entails truth," 
Rorty notes, "is simply irrelevant.""' We can congratulate ourselves in the 
democratic first world for having developed the type of liberal practices we have, 
but we would be mistaken i f we thought that our achievement was the result of 
having discovered and exploited certain truths about the human condition or 
reasoned political discourse. Thus in essays such as 'The Priority of Democracy to 
Philosophy' and 'Post-Modernist Bourgeois Liberalism', written in the early 1980s, 
Rorty hoped to show how postmodernist bourgeois liberalism "might convince our 
society that loyalty to itself is morality enough."" This unflinching ethnocentric 
pragmatism has aroused a good deal of criticism. As Michael Roth notes: 
* Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 214. 
9 Rorty quotes John Rawls with approval. Rawls writes: 
... what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and 
given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding and aspirations, and our 
realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the 
most reasonable doctrine for us. 
John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism', quoted in Rorty, ibid., p. 185 (Rortys italics). 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 177. 
" Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 199. 
'2 In explaining what he means by the term 'ethnocentric' Rorty confessed to having been somewhat 
ambiguous. He does not mean the term to refer to some existential notion of himian finitude but 
rather simply to a particular ethnos—a socio-political culture. Rorty wants to identify with the ethnos 
of western liberalism; his critics may not. So Rorty notes: 
So when I say ethnocentric things like 'our culture' or 'we liberals,' their reaction is 'who, 
we?' I, however, find it hard to see them as outsiders to this culture: they look to me like 
people playing a role—an important role—within it. I do not see them as having 
develof>ed an alternative culture, nor even as having envisaged one. I see the culture of 
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... on the one hand Rorty offended traditionalists by emphasizing the 
historical specificity of what some had thought to be eternal problems or 
questions, while on the other hand he enraged radicals by defending 
contemporary western values and institutions after having redescribed 
them as foundationless.^^ 
However, Rorty has shown himself willing to change his position in response to 
criticism. In the next two sections I shall consider two shifts in Rorty's postion as he 
attempts to develop a pragmatic account of the socio-political good. 
7.3. Rortv's Pragmatism and the Severed Vocabularies of Public Solidaritv and 
Private Self-Creation: 
As we have seen, Rorty hives of f questions about truth in terms of representational 
epistemology from questions about the pragmatic or social justification of our 
beliefs. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, this pragmatic context redescribed 
the subject-object distinction as a distinction between normal or systematic 
discourse and abnormal edifying discourse and the balance between them was 
weighed out on the scales of hermeneutics. By the time of writing the introduction 
to Consequences of Pragmatism two years later, Rorty had largely dropped this 
particvilar term.^ '* Instead, the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics 
was now made between upper case P' "Philosophy' and lower case 'p' 'philosophy'. 
While proponents of Thilosophy' presuppose that we can "believe more truths, or do 
more good or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or 
the liberal democracies as still providing a lot of opportunities for self-criticism and 
reform, and my critics on the left as fellow citizens taking advantage of these 
opportunities, 
ibid., p. 15. 
13 Michael S. Roth, Review of'Contingency, Irony and Solidarity", in History and Theory, Vol. 29, 
1990, p. 341. 
One reason why Rorty drops this term is that it can become a surrogate of epistemology when, after 
foundationalism, it is interpreted as a ncarative theory of universality. This is the position taken by 
Gary B. Madison, 'Coping with Nietzsche's Legacy: Rorty, Derrida, Gadamer', m. Philosophy Today, 
Vol. 36, 1992, pp. 3-19. Indeed, other critics of Rorty see his espousal of hermeneutics as making this 
claim to universality. See for example Kate Soper, 'Smooth But Fuzzy', in Radical Philosophy, Vol. 
60, 1992, pp. 36-39. Also see, Georgia Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 151-166.; and Donald Rothberg, 'Gadamer, Rorty, Hermeneutics 
and Truth: A Response to Wamke', \n Inquiry, Vol. 29, 1986, pp. 355-361. For Rorty, hermeneutics 
may now be too connected with representational presupposition to be a usefid label to describe his 
project. 
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Rationality proponents of philosophy want to drop this presupposition 
common to Platonism and positivism and instead, in Davidsonian fashion, see 'truth' 
as "the name of a property which all true statements share. "'^ The question of 
whether this claim about the philosophical enterprise is itself true, is a question for 
philosophy rather than Philosophy'. That is, it is a question about "whether a post-
Philosophical culture is a good thing to try for[:]"i7 about the type of benefits it 
might bring, the Philosophical' puzzles it helps us to discard and the type of 
community it helps us to promote. The philosopher puts Philosophy' aside, as the 
hermeneutic thinker puts epistemology aside, in order to free us from the view that 
something antecedent to the contingencies of human life, like God, Science, 
Rationality or Truth, might step in and save us.^' Once Philosophy' is discarded, 
Rorty can define philosophy as "an attempt to see how things, in the broadest 
possible sense of the term, hang together ... ."^o Like the hermeneutic thinker, 
Rorty's philosopher wants to achieve balance and coherence between the things 
philosophers do. He wants to keep a pragmatic tolerance going between those 
philosophers like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, who fall upon the literary side 
of CP. Snow's division of culture, and those philosophers like Kripke, Russell and 
Kuhn who fall on the scientific side.^' He wants to balance John Rawls' quest for 
human solidarity through democratic institutions with Foucault's critique of the 
power relations that distort that quest. This is the type of balance that Dewey 
wanted to achieved.22 For Rorty, Dewey is the paradigm philosopher who, by 
Rorty, Consequences 0/Pragmatism, op. cit., p. xv. 
1^  ibid., p. xiii. 
I ' ' ibid., p. xliii. 
1* This is how Rorty avoids the type of criticism that suggests that his own account of truth must 
either itself be true in the sense required by the correspondence theory or useless. For an example of 
this type of criticism see John 0. Nelson, "Pragmatism According to Rorty: A Disaster Area", in 
Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 20, 1995. 
1^  Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 208. 
2° ibid., p. xiv. 
21 ibid., p. 229. 
22 Rorty writes: 
If, with Dewey, one sees vocabularies as instruments for coping with things rather than 
representations of their intrinsic natures, then one will not think that there is an intrinsic 
192 
replacing questions of copying like 'have we got this right?' with questions of coping 
like 'what wil l happen i f we try this?', was able to continue to use words like truth', 
'rationalit>'', 'progress', 'freedom', 'democracy', and 'God' without presupposing a 
vocabulary about correspondence to antecedent reality.^^ When the representational 
dualisms between subject and object, value and fact lose their force, there is no 
longer any reason, Rorty writes, "to keep either the 'aesthetic' or the 'religious' apart 
from the 'scientific' or the 'empirical'".2* The philosopher follows Dewey in wanting 
a hohstic account of inquiry in which the distinction between disciplines is dropped 
in favour of a general conversation that employs human intelligence in solving 
various problems.25 
In this way the philosopher, the Deweyan pragmatist, can be seen as holding 
together in a single vision the contingency of all our starting points with a concern to 
create human solidarity. To lose the hope of grounding human solidarity in 
something extra-historical is to recognise that human solidarity only comes from oiu-
conversation with our fellow-humans. This recognition, Rorty argues, hightens "our 
identification with our conunimity" because it reminds us that our community is 
"ours rather than nature's".^^ It allows us to regard bourgeois liberalism as "the best 
example of ... solidarity we have yet achieved and Deweyan pragmatism the best 
articulation of it,"27 
However, i f the decline of "Philosophy' means that we can no longer draw a 
distinction between making and criticising our community independently of the 
connection, nor an intrinsic lack of connect between ... being able to predict and control 
people ... and being able to sympathize and associate with them, 
ibid., p. 198. 
23 ibid., pp. 86, 163, 206. 
24 ibid., p. 46. 
25 ibid., p. 51. 
26 last three quotes, ibid., p. 166. 
2'' ibid., p. 207. Elsewhere Rorty writes: 
Followers of Dewey like myself would like to praise parliamentary democracy and the 
welfare state as very good things, but only on the basis of invidious comparisons with 
suggested concrete alternatives, not on the basis of claims that these institutions are truer 
to human nature, or more rational, or in better accord with the universal moral law, than 
feudalism or totalitarianism. 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 211. 
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critical practices that our community has developed through its liberal democratic 
institutions, and i f our contingent practices which shape the contours of these 
institutions are practice in which we all must share i f we are not to be considered as 
crazy, are we not simply taking Deweyan pragmatism into an apology for the status 
quo and laissez-faire conservative politics? This was the thrust of Richard 
Bernstein's 1986 critique of Rorty's position.28 It is a critique which Rorty took with 
some seriousness,29 and which led him again to rethink his attempt to hold in a 
single vision the quest for human solidarity and private edifying discourse. The 
latter seeks private perfection and is useful for dreaming up Utopian visions of a 
human future but is not much use to the quest for human solidarity, The former, 
seeks principles of social agreement but is not very good at creative social 
irmovation. 
The purveyors of private perfection have no respect for the type of universal 
criteria that purveyors of human solidarity require and that Bernstein castigated 
Rorty for not offering. Rorty responds to Bernstein's castigation by asserting that the 
purveyors of private perfection are largely correct in pointing to the non-existence of 
such imiversal criteria but that their private self-creations should have no public 
consequences anyway. For Rorty, one's self-creation is of no public concern. Some 
philosophers and novelists (Mil l , Dewey, Rawls, Habermas, Zola, Dickens, Orwell) 
are useful to political practice; others are more useful in providing intellectuals with 
a better self-image and are irrelevant to political liberation (Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Derrida, Wittgenstein, Woolf, Proust, Nabokov).^! 
28 Richard Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: Rorty on Liberal Democracy and 
Philosophy', in his The New Constellation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 230-257. How can 
we decide between benign and pernicious poUtical experiments if there are no criteria by which to 
judge them independent of our own ethnocentric practices? With such criteria, Bernstein argues, 
Rorty's tolerance "can lead to the worst forms of intolerance", ibid., p. 243. This criticism is also 
made against Rorty by Jonathan Culler who sees in Rorty's position a pragmatic complacency 
'appropriate to the Age of Reagan". Jonathan Culler, Framing the Sign, quoted in Richard Rorty, 
'Feminism and Pragmatism', in Michigan Quarterly Review, Vol. 30, 1991, p. 254 no. 23. 
29 Richard Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein', in Political Theory, Vol. 15, 1987, pp. 
564-580. 
30 ibid., p. 571. 
31 ibid., p. 572. 
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Thus, partly as a result of Bernstein's critique, in Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity, Rorty no longer thought it possible to combine the liberal imagination of 
historicists like Habermas with the private self-creation of historicists like 
Foucault.32 Whereas historicists with a public concern seek stable structures upon 
which to base human solidarity, historicists of private perfection effectively 
undermine all such structures. While historicists with a public concern often 
possess their social hope for human solidarity by appealing to some universal 
feature common to 'humanity', historicists of private perfection are particularists, 
emphasising the historical contingency and particularly of language and our inability 
to step outside of it. Whereas historicists with a public concern wish to place human 
activity in a trans-contextual vocabulary which belongs to everyone in general and 
no one in particular, historicists who promote private perfection wish to 
recontextualise such activity in a vocabulary which they explicitly recognise as their 
ovm. Whereas the historicists with a public concern regard the historicists of private 
perfection as "infected with irrationalism and aestheticism,"^^ the latter are 
suspicious of the socialising tendencies of the former. Rorty writes, "the vocabulary 
of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, imsuited to argument. The 
vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative 
exchange. "3"* We can have both historicist vocabularies, Rorty argues, i f we hold 
them separate from each other. Then, Rorty suggests: 
[we wil l see]... the aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be 
as privatistic, 'irrationalist', and aestheticist as they please so long as they 
do it on their own time - causing no harm to others and using no resources 
needed by those less advantaged. 
32 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
pp. xiii-xiv. In a 1980 essay Rorty admitted to having no arguments that would allow him to combine 
self-creation with solidarity but suggested that a discussion of combining private fiilfilment with public 
morality might possibly fiimish such arguments. In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty rejects 
this possibility. 
33 ibid., p.xiv. 
ibid., p.xiv. 
35 ibid., p.xiv. 
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A space should exist in the liberal imagination for ironic and poetic self-creation, 
but the fi-eedom to be idiosyncratic should not disrupt confidence in the solidarity 
and justice that liberal democracies create. Human solidarity, however, should not 
rest simply in the practices of the democratic institutions themselves for this, Rorty 
admits, risks maintaining the status quo. Nor should it rely upon some return to 
Philosophy'. Instead we should appeal to sentimentality. By appealing to 
sentiment, Rorty hopes to create an ethnocentric solidarity arotmd the liberal 
susceptibility to extend its sense of 'we' to include a lot more of 'them' when them' 
are seen as our fellow sufferers rather than as sharing some common trans-historical 
universal antecedent nature.36 Taking up Judith Shklar's description of liberals "as 
people for whom ... cruelty is the worst thing they do,"3'' Rorty is able to demarcate 
private from public vocabularies. He writes: 
... our responsibilities to others constitute only the public side of our 
lives, a side which competes with our private affections and our private 
attempts at self-creation ... .38 
The liberal fear of being cruel and causing humiliation is, according to Rorty, the 
criterion by which we may assert a liberal, rather than some other form of human 
solidarity. 39 The intellectual's contribution to moral progress, according to Rorty, is 
to provide "detailed descriptions of particular varieties of pain and humiliation (in 
e.g. novels or ethnographies), rather than philosophical or religious treatises."*" 
Conscious of Whitehead's definition of religion Rorty notes that such treatises help 
"us decide what to do with our aloneness."*' Suitably privatised, they help us create 
an identity for ourselves, but they are not much use in public debate. 
36 Richard Rorty, 'Trotsky and the Wild Orchids', op. cit., p. 148. 
3"^  Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices, quoted in Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. xv. 
38 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 194. 
39 ibid., Ch. 4. Rather than seeing the vocabulary of human solidarity as having its source in some 
universal idea of human nature, Rorty turns to social dreamers: the visionaries and the novelists. 
These people inspire piecemeal reform in areas where their local society currently appears cruel 
without appealing to some objective standard. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists', op. cit., p. 578, no. 24. 
Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 192. 
Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists'; op. cit., pp. 572, 578 no. 24. Also see Richard Rorty, 'Religion As a 
Conversation Stopper', in Common Knowledge, Vol. 3, 1994, pp. 1-6. 
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However, Jennifer Herdt has noted that the essays which constitute 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity reveal some degree of tension between this new 
position on social philosophy and Rorty's earlier position, a tension that may result 
from the fact that these essays were written around, or just after, Bernstein's 1986 
challenge. Nevertheless, the last chapter 'Solidarity', written especially for the book, 
clearly reveals the contours of Rorty's new position. ^ 2^ He concludes Contingency, 
Irony and Solidarity as follows: 
... [T]o distinguish public from private questions, questions about pain 
from questions about the point of human life, the domain of the liberal 
from the domain of the ironist... makes it possible for a single person to 
be both.« 
Rorty again achieves an integration of sorts and rescues some degree of balance. 
This time it is a balance more finely weighed out in the figure of the liberal ironist. 
The liberal ironist has the type of social project Rorty admires in the work of 
Habermas while supplementing it with the idiosyncratic need for private self-
creation Rorty admires in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida. The 
latter undermines the former's attempts at universal solidarity and transcendence by 
doing justice to the historical contingency of language. The former's quest helps 
make the world more just."** Thus, Rorty disagrees with both "Foucault's attempt to 
be an ironist without being a liberal [and] ... Habermas' attempt to be a liberal 
without being an ironist.'"*^ In this way Rorty hopes to split the difference between 
liberals and ironists. For Rorty, a liberal culture needs its ironists in order for it to 
continue to proliferate, but they are of little relevance for public action. Rorty 
writes: 
For my private purposes, I may redescribe you and everybody else in 
terms which have nothing to do with my attitude toward your actual or 
possible suffering. My private purpose, and the part of my final 
^^ 2 Jennifer Herdt, 'Cruelty, Liberalism and the Quarantine of Irony: Rorty and the Disjunction Between 
Public and Private', in Soundings, Vol. 75, 1992, pp. 79-95. 
Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 198. 
^ ibid., p. 67. 
ibid., p. 65. 
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vocabulary which is not relevant to my public action, are none of your 
business. But as I am a liberal, the part of my final vocabulary which is 
relevant to such actions requires me to become aware of all the various 
ways in which other human beings whom I might act upon can be 
humiliated."^ 
The use here of terms like 'redescribe' and 'final vocabulary' draws attention to 
Rorty's account of the contingency of language discussed in the last chapter When 
we abandon representationalism and assert in its place that "human beings make 
truths by making languages in which to frame sentences,"'*'^  we are not asserting a 
version of linguistic idealism, but rather the view that our beliefs about the world 
and our desires for ourselves are given to us within a network of human linguistic 
interactions.'•^ Then, Rorty asserts: 
We should restrict ourselves to questions like 'does our use of these words 
get in the way of our use of those other words?"*' 
When we have this view of language, terms like 're-description' and 
'recontextualisation' are used to account for our skills at weaving and reweaving the 
network of linguistic interactions which constitute our beliefs and desires. This skill 
enables us to get certain words 'out of the way' of other words and thereby to create 
a new 'final vocabulary' that helps achieve more effectively the things we hope to 
do. This is the reason why a liberal society needs its private ironists like Foucault 
and Derrida. Rorty writes: 
For us ironists, nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save 
another such vocabulary; there is no answer to a re-description save a re-
re-redescription. ... Ironists are afraid that they wil l get stuck in the 
vocabulary in which they were brought up ... so they (...) read literary 
critics, and take them as moral advisers, simply because such critics have 
an exceptionally large range of acquaintance. ... They have read more 
books and are thus in a better position not to get trapped in the vocabulary 
of any single book. 5° 
ibid., pp. 91-92. 
ibid., p. 9. 
''8 ibid., pp. 10-11. 
ibid., p. 12. 
50 ibid., pp.80-81. 
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Wanting to extend her own vocabulary, the liberal ironist tries to emulate the 
literary critic by extending her acquaintance "to theology, philosophy, social theory, 
reformist political programs, and revolutionary manifestos. In short, ... extending it 
to every book likely to provide candidates for a person's final vocabulary."5i Rorty's 
ethnocentricism may be open to criticism but he recognises and welcomes this as 
part of a dynamic opermess to other vocabularies. Such openness prevents our 
current practices fi-om dominating the ongoing process of conversation. It thereby 
helps to prevent that sort of cruelty which results from failing to be aware of other 
people's final vocabulary. 
7.4. Rortv's Pragmatism and the Reconsideration of the Fracture of Public and 
Private Vocabularies: 
An opeimess to criticism is manifest in Rorty's more recent work. In particular, he 
has responded to those who doubt both the probity and the practical possibility of 
keeping one's private self-creation separate from one's public concerns, and to those 
who doubt the effectiveness of the cruelty criterion, given the requirement of irony, 
to defend liberalism. For example, Nancy Fraser argues that Rorty's distinction 
effectively denies to radical thought any political implications. Being placed in the 
private realm of self-creation, the ideas of Heidegger and Foucault are kept safely 
away from any challenge that they might offer to liberal democratic institutions.52 
Fraser writes: 
There is no place in Rorty's framework for political motivations for the 
invention of new idioms, no place for idioms invented to overcome the 
enforced silencing or muting of disadvantaged social groups. (...) Finally, 
there is no place for nonliberal interpretations of social needs and 
collective concerns, hence, no place for, say, socialist-feminist politics. 53 
In making the public-private distinction, Bernstein argues, Rorty seems more 
concerned with the cruelties that might be inflicted by intellectual ironists than the 
51 ibid., p.81. 
52 Nancy Fraser, 'Solidarity or Singularity?: Richard Rorty Between Romanticism and Technocracy', m 
Alan Malachowski, Reading Rorty, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 311-312. 
53 ibid., p. 316. 
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cruelties inflicted by liberal society on, say, the unemployed or the homeless. By 
assuming that the public-private split is enough to guarantee both justice and 
freedom, Rorty leaves no room either for social facticity or tragedy. 5'' In this sense, 
according to Guignon and Hiley, Rorty appears as an aloof observer of culture and 
thus apparently willing, as an ironist, to detach himself from cultural commitments. 
The type of ironic cultiffe Rorty hopes for, they argue, would be a cynical culture in 
which moral commitments mean nothing and in which disorders of the self are 
exacerbated for the sake of creating a social enclave from which the leisured elite 
can contemplate their ironic doubts. It would be a culture without justice because it 
would be a culture without reasons not to be c r u e l . T i m o t h y Cleveland and 
Michael Roth share Bernstein's concern that by denying argumentative force to the 
historicised decision to be liberal there is nothing to stop Rorty's irony from turning 
into Mussolini's cynicism. Equally, Bernstein and Roth question whether the novel 
is able to perform the role in social criticism that Rorty attributes to it. Why should 
a society be receptive to one novel rather than another?^^ For Cleveland, the issue 
does not just revolve around the question of how much contingency an ironist can 
embrace in order to maintain solidarity, but also what kind of solidarity would 
result. He notes that Rorty's emphasis upon historical contingency means that the 
realisation of a liberal society becomes "a matter of weapons or luck, not a matter of 
having truth on your side, or having detected 'the movement of history'."" But, 
Cleveland asks, does this not concede too much to the fascist? He writes: 
Bernstein, The New Constellation, op. cit., pp. 258-291 esp. p. 287. 
55 Charles B. Guignon and David R. Hiley, "Biting the Bullet: Rorty on Private and Public Morality", in 
Alan Malachowski, Reading Rorty, op. cit., pp. 339-364. Similar points are made by Roy Bhaskar, 
"Rorty, Realism and the Idea of Freedom" in the same volume, pp. 198-232. However, Guignon and 
Hiley do find Rorty's intentions admirable if not the consequences that follow. They write: 
What is most admirable about Rorty, we feel, is the courage, integrity and clear-
sightedness with which he bites the bullet and draws out the mevitable consequences of 
anti-foundationalism for moral and social thought. He is willing to stand unflinchingly for 
the ideals of liberal society while both undercutting their traditional supports and 
acknowledging that there is a price to be paid, 
ibid., pp. 343-344. 
5^ Roth, "Ksview of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., pp. 354-357. 
5 ' Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 91. 
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The liberal ironist cannot help but play into the hands of the non-liberal 
because the ironist philosophy leaves no room for liberal distinctions that 
would separate the methods of the liberal ironist fi-om those of the fascist 
and other non-liberals. 58 
In the end, Rorty lacks any argumentative resources in favour of liberalism because 
his ironism does not allow for any.59 
This view is shared by Norman Geras. For Geras, to talk of our shared ability to 
experience pain and humiliation is to define human nature so narrowly that it gives 
some credibility to Rorty's suggestion that without our socialisation by language and 
history we would be unrecognisable to ourselves, but it does nothing to support the 
quest for human solidarity. What Rorty sees as defining a quality that motivated 
those who rescued the Jews from the Nazis, Geras sees as preparing the type of 
cynical approach to himian nature that was shared by those who persecuted the 
Jews. However, Geras also argues that Rorty has a rhetorical need to affirm a 
universal human nature. That is, Rorty affirms some universal traits—those that 
centre on human socialisation—even i f only to employ them against metaphysical 
notions of a fixed a-historical imiversal human nature. In so doing Rorty employs 
the very traits that make talk of a universal human nature interesting while 
simultaneously denying such talk.60 
Rorty's response to these criticisms is to agree that the position his critics attack 
is indefensible, but to claim that they are not positions he ever held. Accepting 
historicism does not mean refraining from political commitments nor does it mean 
refusing to defend liberal against fascist political alternatives.^! What it does mean 
is that such defence can no longer be made by appeal to the sort of antecedent, 
extra-historical conditions or principles that those with realist intuitions desire. In 
his recent article 'Feminism and Pragmatism', Rorty has suggested that granting that 
58 Timothy Cleveland, 'The Irony of Contingency and Solidarity', in Philosophy, Vol. 70, 1995, p. 240. 
55 Jay Rosenberg, "Raiders of the Lost Distinction; Richard Rorty and the Search for the Last 
Dichotomy', xn Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, Vol. 53, 1993, pp. 195-214. 
^ Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of 
Richard Rorty, (London. Verso, 1995), pp. 47-70. 
^' Rorty, 'Trotsky and the Wild Orchids', op. cit., pp. 149-150. 
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our contingent historical situation means that there are no extra-practical or extra-
ethnocentric way of justifying to ourselves the feminist case rather than the Nazi 
case, does not mean that we are unable to hope that the dreams of the former group 
rather than those of the latter can become established social facts.^2 
Nevertheless, partly as a result of these criticisms and partly to make his own 
position clear, Rorty has moved beyond his attempted demarcation of public and 
private concerns. In a niunber of recent essays Rorty has suggested ways in which 
public and private concerns interpenetrate. One such is the supplementation of his 
novelistic hope (for democracy, equality and freedom), which Rorty articulates in 
essays like "Heidegger, Kimdera and Dickens',^3 yvith prophecy and political 
campaigns. In Teminism and Pragmatism', Rorty argues that the feminist social 
hope wil l not succeed because it appeals to something called 'reality' which 
transcends our social practices telling women that 'God' or 'nature' or 'reason' has 
always recognised them as the unjustly oppressed half of humanity and thus on their 
side in their struggle for liberation. Rather, it wi l l succeed i f it can do "the same sort 
of things as the early Christians, the early socialists ... and the Nazis did: trying to 
articulate hitherto undreamt-of possibilities by putting new linguistic and other 
practices into play and enacting new social constructs."^ These groups succeeded 
because, by force or persuasion, they managed to suggest to a larger group of people 
that they would be crazy not to share their dream. 
For Rorty, the difference between the Nazi and the liberal is also the difference 
between the radical and the reformist and between the realist and the pragmatist.^^ 
^2 Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism", op. cit., and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., pp. 90-
95, 111 no. 11. 
^3 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume Two, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 66-82. 
^ Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism", op. cit., p. 236. 
*5 Rorty"s contrast between the liberal and the radical at this point may at first appear to undermine the 
argument made earlier in the thesis that pointed to the need for radical rather than liberal perspectives 
in theology. However, there is an important Deweyan distmction to be made here in terms of the 
relation of ideal to actual. This distinction allows one, as a Utopian prophet, to be as radical as one can 
be in dreammg up new and better ways of doing the things that humans want to do as long as a 
practical reformer who wants to implement the prophet"s vision takes into account the actual 
202 
Whereas the liberal and the pragmatist rely upon persuasion alone, the Nazi, the 
radical and the realist want something more powerful on their side that would help 
enable people to consider themselves crazy not to follow the vision they offer. As 
Glyn Daly makes clear in his critique of Rorty, Rorty comes off second-best 
compared with the ideas of the anti-foundationalist neo-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe because while the latter pair, like Rorty, disclaim realist intuitions, 
their radicalism makes them prepared to argue that democratic citizenship requires 
for its defence an ontology of power and violence. In contrast to Rorty's liberalism, 
Dalymotes: 
... the post-Marxist's emphasis on the constitutive and ineradicable nature 
of power and antagonisms is one which affirms the centrality of authorial 
and discursive violence as the very condition for meeting this [the 
democratic] challenge.^^ 
Daly sees Rorty as offering merely the freedom to dream not the ability to act. He 
believes that the type of unmasking of power relations that neo-Marxists see 
themselves as good at, can provide some theoretical weapons in the fight for 
democracy. Rorty, on the other hand, is concerned that with such a position we 
would find it difficult not to "avoid having these weapons turn in our hands and bash 
all the genial tolerance out of our own heads. "^ ^ 
Concerned with breaking the chain of patriarchal power and violence, Rorty 
believes the feminist is better o f f with reformist pragmatism than with the radical 
and the realist. Rorty notes: 
Radicals think that there is a basic mistake being made, a mistake deep 
down at the roots. They think that deep thinking is required to get down 
to this deep level, and that only there, when all the superstructural 
appearances have been undercut, can things be seen as they really are. 
Utopians, however, do not think in terms of mistakes or of depth. They 
abandon the contiast between superficial appearance and deep reality in 
conditions in which such reform has to take place, including the need to avoid the potential humiliation 
that might be caused to those who do not share a particular prophet's vision. 
6^ Glyn Daly, 'Post-Metaphysical Culture and Politics: Richard Rorty and Laclau and Mouffe', in 
Economy and Society, Vol. 23, 1994, p. 193. 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 43. 
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favor of the contrast between a painful present and a possibly less painful, 
dimly-seen, future. Pragmatists cannot be radicals, in this sense, but they 
can be Utopians. They do not see philosophy as providing instruments for 
radical surgery, or microscopes which make precise diagnosis possible. 
Philosophy's function is rather to clear the road for prophets and poets, to 
make intellectual life a bit simpler and safer for those who have visions of 
new communities.68 
The realist wants a confrontation between our moral ideas and the real seams of the 
universe; the pragmatist aims at "reweaving and enlarging a fabric which is not 
intended to be congruent with an antecedent reality. "^ 9 The pragmatist does not 
need something like a 'critique of ideology' before engaging in reformist practices. 
Rather, such practices wil l aim at the melioration of current social conditions 
through imagined sketches of better alternative conditions.'^ o jhe pragmatist sees no 
antecedent reality or depth to human nature, the discovery of which empowers the 
critique of existing practices. Such practices should not be viewed as distortions 
from an original purity as i f we might then attempt, as some post-modernists do, to 
unmask the rhetoric of oppression." '^ In the case of a society viewed as suffering 
from patriarchal ills the pragmatist will not require some prior general theory of 
male oppression nor some accurate a-historical representation of women's 
experience. Rather, the pragmatist will see the melioration of patriarchal ills as a 
matter of women "creating such an experience by creating a language, a tradition 
and an identity. "'''2 Pragmatism helps feminism not by providing unshakeable 
foundations but by clearing the road of representational and realist ideology. 
Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism", op. cit., pp. 239-240. 
69 ibid., p. 252. 
•'O Richard Rorty, 'The Intellectuals at the End of Socialism", in The Yale Review, Vol. 80, 1992, pp. 1-
16 esp. pp. 5-6. 
1^ Richard Rorty, Teminism, Ideology and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist View", mHypatia, Vol. 8, 
1993, pp. 96-103; and Teminism and Pragmatism', op. cit., p. 234. Rorty notes: 
Pragmatism ... offers all the dialectical advantages of postmodernism while avoiding the 
self-contradictory postmodernist rhetoric of unmasking, 
ibid., p. 237. 
2^ Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism", op. cit., p. 250. Also see Essays On Heidegger And Others, op. 
cit, pp. 119-128. Here Rorty notes: 
... the realm of possibility expands whenever somebody thinks up a new vocabulary, and 
thereby discloses (or invents .. .) a new set of possible worlds, 
ibid., p. 127. 
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enabling feminists to create the moral space they require for the deliberation of the 
type of questions about human identity which patriarchal culture finds bizarre.'3 
Within such a space, "what looked like nature begin[s] to look like culture."'''* The 
language of the oppressor, which the oppressed imbibe so that they look crazy even 
to themselves to view themselves as oppressed, is broken by the suggestion of an 
alternative language in which the oppressed can express their own aspirations. ^ 5 
Until and unless such real or imaginative alternatives emerge, Rorty argues, women 
wil l not see themselves as oppressed. 
The pragmatist thus advises the feminist to "[d]rop the appeal to neutral criteria 
... [and instead] ... make invidious comparisons between the actual present and a 
possible, i f inchoate, fiiture." In this way, Rorty continues: 
... pragmatism allows for the possibility of expanding logical space, and 
thereby for an appeal to courage and imagination rather than to putatively 
neutral criteria.^' 
From the logical space pragmatism makes available private Utopian dreams can 
become relevant to public social concerns i f small communities can be formed 
around such Utopian hopes. By seeing themselves as campaigners rather than 
founders of a new movement, the members of these commimities may succeed, like 
"the early Christians meeting in the catacombs, "''s getting their private self-
creation accepted as part of normal social discourse. Achieving such acceptance is a 
matter of imagination and of courage, of the sympathy it can engender and the 
prophetic vision it offers to the community at large.''^ The only test of such 
''3 Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism', op. cit., pp. 234-235, 240. 
, ibid., p. 232. 
'5 ibid., p. 239. Emphasising the ideal in Dewey's active relation of ideal with actual, Rorty notes: 
"Anti-foundationalists ... want to substitute our social constructs for theirs." They do so by pretending 
that the sort of community they want to see is already in existence and, with luck, such community will 
be created ex nihilo. Richard Rorty, "What Can You Expect From Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?: 
A Reply to Lynn Baker', in Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, 1992, p. 726. 
Rorty, "Feminism and Pragmatism', op. cit., p. 244. 
Both quotes fi-om Rorty, Teminism and Pragmatism', op. cit., p. 242. 
78 ibid., p. 242. 
ibid., p. 247. Rorty notes that: 
Good prophets say that if we all got together and did such and such, we would probably 
like the results. They paint pictures of what this brighter fi:ture would look like, and 
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alternative vocabularies will be how they work when they are put into practice. ^ ° If 
the feminist vision of a new human community in which gender difference is no 
longer an issue eventually materialises, it will not be because feminists have 
revealed something about human nature which previously we failed to recognise but 
because they will have succeeded in making their new language a part of the 
language we all share.^ ' That is, they will have succeeded in crossing the public-
private divide. As new discourses, bom from private Utopian hopes, can become 
common public possessions, so what were once common public possessions can 
return back into the private sphere and eventually die out. Rorty notes: 
... What people cannot say in public becomes, eventually, what they 
cannot say even in private, and then, still later, what they cannot even 
believe in their hearts. ^ 2 
Rather than undermining the public-private distinction, as Glyn Daly suggests, 
Rorty's new position can be seen as a further, more subtle, articulation of it. As 
William Buscemi argues, Rorty's distinction can be seen as part of a pragmatic 
strategy by which he engages in conversation those most likely to reject his position 
in order to debate his own prophetic vision of a 'poetised polities'. i f this view is 
accepted then, rather than regarding Rorty's distinction as Daly does, as an attempt 
to present a covert philosophical essentialism centred upon the irreducibility of 
liberal freedom, we might see the distinction in Buscemi's terms as the attempt by 
Rorty to employ the same prophetic strategy that he recommends to feminists. His 
write scenarios about how it might be brought about. When they've finished doing that, 
they have nothing more to offer, except to say "Let's try it!" ... This kind of prophet does 
not think that her views have 'legitimacy' or 'authority'. 
The bad prophet claims to speak in the name of such authority. Rorty, "What Can You Expect From 
Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?', op. cit., p. 719. 
8 ° Richard Rorty, 'Why Can't a Man Be More Like a Woman, And Other Problems In Moral 
Philosophy", in London Review of Books, 24th February 1994, pp. 5-6; "Human Rights, Rationality and 
Sentimentality", in The Yale Review, Vol. 81, 1993, p. 15; "What Can You Expect From Anti-
Foundationalist Philosophers?', op. cit., p. 719. 
81 Rorty, "Feminism and Pragmatism", op. cit., p. 249. 
82 Rorty, "What Can You Expect From Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?", op. cit., p. 726. 
8^ Glyn Daly, Tost-Metaphysical Culture and Politics: Richard Rorty and Laclau and Mouflfe", op. cit., 
p. 198, no. 17. William Buscemi, 'The Ironic Politics of Richard Rorty', in Review of Politics, Vol. 55, 
1993, p. 153. 
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work might then be seen as offering proposals for Deweyan reconstruction rather 
than for political stasis. Buscemi concludes: 
[I]t can be argued that Rorty is to the left of those who charge him with 
conservatism. ... His seemingly conservative embrace of contemporary 
institutions is seen, upon analysis, to be not an embrace but a strategy for 
total transformation of those institutions.** 
While Rorty's liberalism allows for piecemeal reform, such reform is inspired by 
prophetic vision and Utopian desire for a better human society which can be as 
radical as any political philosophy ever was. 
In Rorty's articles, published in the Nineteen-Nineties, the public and private 
infiltrate each other to such an extent that the distinction becomes heuristic rather 
than a strict demarcation of responsibilities. To some degree this view is now 
accepted by both Bernstein and Fraser. According to Fraser, Rorty correctly sees in 
feminism "far-reaching redescriptions of social life ... yet... simultaneously tied to 
the collective political enterprise of overcoming oppression ..." and thus, she 
continues, "the effort to think about feminism has had a major impact on the 
structure of Rorty's thought," exploding his earlier distinctions.^ 5 However, Fraser 
still maintains some reservations about Rorty's new position because the move she 
sees him making from irony to prophesy does not necessarily imply a finther move 
to politics, or rather, the type of collective political agreement and political theory 
that Fraser hopes might defend feminist aspirations. For her, feminism needs to be 
seen as a mass democratic movement rather than a club for prophets. Fraser's 
reservations have been criticised by J.M. Fritzman. Fritzman agrees that in 
"Feminism and Pragmatism', Rorty has shown how the public and private interact 
and how existing practices can be changed by employing the distinction as a 
^ William Buscemi, 'The Ironic Politics of Richard Rorty", ibid., p. 157. This view is also found in 
David L. Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet cmd Poet of the New Pragmatism, (New York: SUNY Press, 
1994), pp. 190-196. According to Hall, Rorty would do well to be less bashful about his own 
prophetic strategies. 
85 Nancy Fraser, "From Irony To Prophecy To Politics: A Response To Richard Korty", in Michigan 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 30, 1991, p. 262 (both quotes). 
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heuristic tool. Further, Fritzman argues that the courage and imagination of the 
feminist prophetic voice does not require in addition to the formation, and support 
of, a small group that shares the prophet's vision, the type of 'social theory* that 
Fraser still hankers for. Such a theory, Fritzman suggests, can be seen as a grab for 
power over the new communities that have formed to promote the prophet's vision. 
Such communities are not merely 'individualistic, aesthetic and depoliticised' 
without such a theory, as Fraser suggests, but articulate a new voice in the political 
sphere.86 What Rorty offers feminism, according to Fritzman, "is an understanding 
of prophecy that is ironical, and a concept of politics that remains prophetic." 
Prophecy does not replace irony as Fraser suggests, but instead is part of a strategy 
of "dialectical succession". Again, politics is not one step removed firom prophecy, 
as Fraser suggests, but "consists in the systematic attempt to instantiate prophecy, 
and to make it possible for others to do so as well."^' According to Fritzman, the 
difference between Rorty and Fraser is that whereas Rorty emphasises a continual 
proliferation of new vocabularies and practices, Fraser emphasises the need to 
implement the ones we have. Both are allies in the process of reconstructing current 
unjust social and political discourse. 
o 
Indeed, Rorty regards himself as a 'progressive' v^ h^o wants a liberal political 
consensus to mesh with something like European social democracy and opposes the 
orthodox conservatism of the American new Right .However, within the 
'progressive' camp, Rorty suggests, there is a relatively unimportant battle between 
intellectual, left-wing post-modernists who argue that liberal institutions are 
inherently wicked and intellectual, left-wing liberals who argue that such institutions 
^ J.M. Fritzman, 'Thinking With Fraser About Rorty, Feminism, and Pragmatism', in Praxis 
Iraemational, Vol. 13, 1993, pp. 113-125. 
"^^  ibid., p. 121 (all three quotations). Fritzman writes: 
The prophetic moment does not represent the abandonment of irony, but rather its 
expansion into the pubUc sector, as well as an acknowledgement of its collective nature. 
But otherwise, prophecy is the sublation of irony. Irony simultaneously is negated ... 
affirmed... and transcended... by prophecy, 
ibid., p. 121. 
88 Rorty, 'Trotsky and the Wild Orchids', op. cit., p. 150. 
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have made a significant contribution to a more just and less painful way of life than 
humans have ever before enjoyed. Explaining his own position as it is seen by his 
critics, Rorty writes: 
I am distrusted by both the 'orthodox' side of the important war and the 
'postmodern' side in the unimportant one, because I think that the 
'postmodems' are philosophically right though politically silly, and that 
the 'orthodox' are philosophically wrong as well as politically dangerous.*^  
As a citizen who is also a philosopher, Rorty engages in the former war against the 
'orthodox' conservative. As an intellectual Rorty engages in the second war. In 
articles like 'The Intellectuals at the End of Socialism' and Intellectuals in Politics' 
he castigates those post-modernists who think that they have made a blow for justice 
when they have detected a social ill in a soap opera or who think that concentrating 
upon difference in 'race, gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation' does more for 
human solidarity than redressing the balance between the rich and the poor. Such 
post-modernists are more concerned with cultural politics and 'political correctness' 
than with "mobilizing moral outrage in defense of the weak."^ As a consequence 
the American academy is more fragmented and less able to offer the type of social 
vision that characterised Dewey's academic life. So while Rorty believes that any 
leftist politics is better than no left,'' he would like to see less cultural politics and 
more moral indignation from his 'progressive' colleagues. Such indignation has as 
little to do with the unmasking of cultural power relations as feminist social hope 
has to do with a recovery of authentic human relations but, Rorty notes, it meshes 
well with "what is still alive in Christianity. "'^  Like the Christian, Rorty claims, the 
progressive liberal should be indignant at the way the rich treat the poor, at the way 
people in the west are not willing to be taxed to help people in the third worid. He 
writes: 
89 ibid., p. 151. 
^ Richard Rorty, "InteUectuals in PoUtics", in Dissent, Vol. 38, 1991, p. 489. Also see pp. 488-491. 
9' RoTty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 137. 
92 Rorty, 'The Intellectuals at the End of Socialism", op. cit., p. 14. 
209 
We are indignant, in short, over the tendency of human beings to divide 
up into groups who want to hold on to what they have, rather than sharing 
the surplus ... [This] is the tendency ... Jesus observed in the Jerusalem 
of his time. ^ 5 
Referring to Rorty's recent essays, and to a paragraph similar to the one just quoted, 
Bernstein acknowledges that "[w]hen Rorty writes in this vein he is carrying on the 
tradition of John Dewey. "^ '^  
One of Rorty's realist critics, Norman Geras, has conceded that the academic 
reception of Rorty's most recent work "is that it marks a significant shift by him, 
away from the anti-universalistic views he had previously put forward. "'5 Qeras 
disagrees with such an interpretation but allows that i f it is correct, "so much the 
better for Rorty ... so much the worse however for a solidarity and a liberalism 
without foundations.''^ ^ Geras suspects that Rorty's position will not have changed 
until he abandons his critique of foundationalism: something which Rorty 
emphatically refuses to do even in his latest essays. What, then, gives credence to 
the recent academic reception of Rorty that suggests a recovery of an 'element of 
universalism' in his work? Partly it is Rorty's creation of the prophetic liberal ironist 
which we have already discussed, but perhaps more significantly it is the greater 
emphasis Rorty now places upon sentimentality. Sentimentality encourages us to 
appreciate a shared sense of human dignity without the prior presumption of some 
fixed universal human nature. This emphasis is made by Rorty in his 1993 Amnesty 
International lecture 'Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality'. After Darwin, 
Rorty argues, we no longer need to ask questions which aim to establish human 
ibid., p. 14. The point is not whether Rorty has correctly identified Jesus as a moral teacher but that 
he sees a congruence between Christian social concern and his own. It might be relevant to note at 
this point that Walter Rauschenbusch, the leader of the social gospel movement, was one of Rorty's 
grandparents. 
Richard Bernstein, 'American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives', in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., 
Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University 
Press, 1995)., p. 65. Bernstein refers here directly to a quotation fi-om Rorty's 'Trotsky and the Wild 
Orchids', op. cit., p. 150, and also to Rorty's article 'Intellectuals in Polities'. See the Saatkamp Rorty 
and Pragmatism op. cit ., p. 214 no. 20. 
^5 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, op. cit., pp. 98, 104 no. 43. 
96 ibid., p. 103. 
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rights upon something intrinsic to human nature. ^ '^  It is not clear to Rorty, as it is to 
Geras, why asserting human dignity also must involve asserting something special 
and universal about human nature. Following the suggestion of Annette Baier, 
Rorty argues that we should see the growth of 'the human rights culture' not as a 
matter of an increasing sense of moral obligation as a fixed human essence or moral 
law but to 'a progress of sentiments'. Rorty writes: 
This progress consists in an increasing ability to see the similarities 
between ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the 
differences. It is the result of ... 'sentimental education'. The relevant 
similarities are not a matter of sharing a deep, true self which instantiates 
true humanity, but are such little, superficial similarities as cherishing our 
parents and our children—similarities which do not interestingly 
distinguish us from many nonhuman animals. ^ 8 
Rorty wants to drop the assertion common to Plato and Nietzsche of an intrinsic 
universal human nature and instead see the notion of human dignity as something 
we make, and should continue to make, rather than find. Human rights is a 
historical rather than a philosophical foundation which "owe[s] nothing to increased 
moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories. "'^  Rorty 
doubts that such knowledge would lead us to change our behaviour. Thus the 
difference between Rorty and Geras is not between implicit and explicit 
affirmations of human nature as Geras suggests, but between whether we should put 
our trust in sentimentality or rationality. Whereas the effectiveness of the latter 
relies upon increasing our knowledge, the former relies upon manipulating feeling; 
whereas the latter requires something antecedent to be known, the former requires 
us to expand our imagination. Substituting sentimentality for moral knowledge is 
equated by Rorty with the desire to "disentangle Christ's suggestion that love matters 
more than knowledge from the neo-platonic [Johannine] suggestion that knowledge 
'"^  Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", op. cit., p. 4. "Keeping faith with Darwin," 
Rorty asserts, means accepting "the realization that our species, its faculties and its current scientific 
and moral languages are as much the products of chance as are ... mutated viruses." Richard Rorty, 
"Untruth and Consequeaces', in New Republic, Vol. 213, 1995, p. 36. 
'8 Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", op. cit., p. 15. 
99 ibid., p. 7. 
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of the truth v^U make izs free."i°° What the barbarous are in need of is not more 
moral knowledge but greater security and a lot more sympathy.What Geras sees 
as Rorty's rhetorical need for universal human nature, Rorty sees as a historically 
constituted sense of the liberal imagination's susceptibility to be moved by 
someone's story of suffering, someone's story of affection, someone's story about 
their struggle against all the odds. Although philosophers may have such stories to 
relay, there is no reason to think of them as indispensable to this task. Rather, such 
stories are better relayed by historians, novelists and journalists.'"^ 
However, Rorty's emphasis upon sentimentality does not presage a total denial 
of rationality. I f pragmatists talk of rationality, Rorty argues, they will first 
distinguish between three uses of the term. The first use views rationality as a skill 
or an ability, something not imique to humans but something humans have more of 
than squids. Rationality in this use is a survival skill. The second use sees 
rationality as an ingredient unique to humans, an evaluative capacity that enables us 
to distinguish ourselves from other animals and to distinguish principles for action 
fi-om the actions themselves, evaluating the former with greater value than the latter. 
The third use of rationality is synonymous with freedom and tolerance: the ability to 
imagine better ways of living and a predilection for persuasion rather than force. 
Whereas the first and third uses of rationality are instrumentally connected to a 
flexible ability to adapt to a changing envirorunent, the second is reified and a-
historical; it is disconnected from natural conditions. Pragmatists like Dewey, Rorty 
100 ibid., p. 10. 
'01 ibid., pp. 13-15. Rorty comments: 
By security I mean conditions of life sufiBciently risk-free as to make one's diflFerence from 
others inessential to one's self-respect, one's sense of worth ... By sympathy I mean ± e 
sort of reaction ... that white Americans had more of after reading Uncle Tom's Cabin 
than before, the sort that we have more of after watching t.v. programs about the 
genocide in Bosnia. Security and sympathy go together for ... the more you have to be 
afraid of, the more dangerous your situation, the less you can afford the time or effort to 
think about what things might be like for people with whom you do not immediately 
identify. 'Sentimental education' only works on people who can relax long enough to 
listen. 
ibid., pp. 14-15. 
•02 ibid., p. 12. Also see Richard Rorty, 'An Exchange on Truth, Freedom and PoUtics' Truth and 
Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy', in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 16, 1990, p. 643. 
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asserts, want to debate the relationship between the first and third use of rationality 
and drop the second as un-Darwinian.io3 That is, to: 
... drop the whole idea of rationality2 and come to think of ourselves as 
continuous with the amoebas and the squids, although also continuous 
with those far more flexible, free, and imaginative humanoids who may 
be our descendants.'o^ * 
To combine the first and third type of rationality is to balance the skills of survival 
and the minimisation of suffering with Utopian hope. According to John Rothfork, it 
is to see one's deepest social hopes and commitments as tacitly embedded in the way 
we live. Drawing upon Michael Polanyi's notion of tacit or personal knowledge, 
Rothfork sees in Rorty's philosophy an articulation of those social commitments to 
tolerance and freedom tacitly displayed within self-indulgent Anglo-American 
culture which, to those struggling against injustice and oppression, might appear 
light-minded and frivolous in regard to moral principles. Such a response, however, 
misses the tacit commitments of such a cul ture .These commitments are 
embedded in a way of life and defended by an appeal to rationality one and three 
rather than by an appeal to rationality two. The way of life in question, Rorty notes, 
helps to "make the world's inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, 
more receptive to the appeal of instrumental rationality, " i ^ ^ Such a way of life, 
despite the views of its critics, is one that tacitly knew what was right in 1939 and 
now is prepared to sacrifice its youth in order to establish greater tolerance in 
Bosnia. Combining Rorty with Polanyi, Rothfork argues, enables us to see the 
'rationality' in Rorty's moral philosophy. It enables us to see Rorty as asserting "that 
the deepest values of liberal society are tacit. Because we live them, we do not need 
to profess them ritually,"'°'' 
Richard Rorty, 'A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural DiflFerence", in Philosophy East and 
West, Vol. 42, 1992, pp. 581-582. 
104 ibid., p. 587. 
John Rothfork, 'Postmodern Ethics: Richard Rorty and Michael Polanyi", in Southern Humanities 
Review, Vol. 29, 1995, pp. 15-48. 
1°^ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 193. 
1°'' RotMbrk, 'Postmodern Ethics: Richard Rorty and Michael Polanyi', op. cit., p. 45. 
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Losing faith in the second type of rationality does not mean entering a moral 
abyss but rather being prepared to live in a plurality of communities and sharing a 
range of overlapping commitments. These include, among others, scientific, 
educational, legal, religious, and aesthetic communities.'°8 Involvement in such 
communities tacitly requires the acceptance of tolerance and democracy but when 
we ask why, Rothfork notes, "the answer cannot be rendered as a principle ... it can 
only be novelistically illusfrated by descriptions of personal knowledge. "i09 This, 
for Rorty, is moral commitment enough and i f it is open to possible imagined future 
goods it will be rationality enough. Rorty's emphasis upon sentiment does not, as 
Geras ironically suggests, "edge one toward a possible terrain of morally relevant 
transcultural facts, but rather highlights the tacit set of commitments involved in 
the kind of ethnocentric liberal culture that Rorty regards as "the best little culture 
anyone ever thought o f" ' " The concrete benefits of such a culture can be fought 
for and preserved without regarding its particular manifestations as antecedently 
realised or transcendentally deduced. As long as such a culture has its prophets, its 
dreamers and indeed its philosophers to ensure that it does not get stuck within 
particular practices, it v^ll be better able to deal with the inequalities and the 
unnecessary suffering that many of its members still experience. 
As well as reinte^ation of public and private discourse, Rorty's latest work has 
also attempted to reintegrate the type of thing philosophers have to say about truth 
with the kind of things he has been saying about the social good. In his article Does 
Academic Freedom Have Presuppositions?' he draws a distinction between 'practical 
presuppositions' which tell us that, for example, surgery is more likely than 
1°8 ibid., pp. 35-42. 
l ° 9 ibid., p. 39. As Rorty notes: 
... one can be human without being universalist, without believing either that it is 'rational' 
to be concerned with the sufferings of others or that there is a 'common humanity which 
binds you to those others. One can want to relieve suffering without having an interesting 
answer when Socrates asks you why you desire this ... 
Rorty, Essc^s on Heidegger arui Others, op. cit., p. 198. 
1 '0 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, op. cit., p. 102. 
^ 1 ^  Richard Rorty, 'Toward a Liberal Utopia' (Interview by Martyn Oliver), in The Times Literary 
Supplement, June 24, 1994, p. 14. 
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acupuncture to be successful at treating cancer, and philosophical presuppositions 
which tell us, for example, that truth is more likely to be successful if it is viewed on 
the model of correspondence to reality than anything else. Alterations in the first 
type of presupposition would have definite social effects—greater investment in 
acupimcture, for example. Alterations in the second type of presupposition will 
have little impact beyond a small band of philosophy professors. This is because the 
latter presupposition is "not tied very closely either to observation and experiment or 
to practice."! 12 Our social practice, including that of academic fi-eedom, will be 
shaped by practical presuppositions, and any philosophical presuppositions they are 
thought to require will be ornamental rather than foundational. Philosophy will not 
have much impact upon practice. However, this raises the problem of the 
relationship between Rorty's own anti-representational pragmatism and his social 
views. Is not pragmatism a philosophy that is supposed to make a difference? Does 
not Rorty make presuppositional use of Dewey and Davidson to develop the social 
implications of his linguistic Darwinism in which the creative misuse of language 
can cause changes in beliefs and effect our social practices?"^ Does Rorty draw on 
these philosophers, as Alasdair Maclntyre suggests, merely to employ their 
conclusion without heeding their rational presuppositions?!i'* 
Rorty's response to these questions is to insist upon a further distinction 
between short-term and long-term effects of philosophical presuppositions. For 
example, while under oath Christians may tell the truth because they fear damnation 
and atheists may do the same in the short term because they could not with integrity 
break the social construct against committing perjury, "in the long run", Rorty notes, 
"it may make a lot of difference whether a society is regulated by its members' fear 
112 Rorty, "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', in Academe, Vol. 80, 
1994, p. 53. 
11^ See, for example, Rorty's use of anti-representational philosophy against the type of foundationalist 
Marxism that still appeals to Terry Eagleton. Richard Rorty, "We Anti-Representationalists', in 
Radical Philosophy Vol. 60, 1992. pp. 40-42. 
11'' Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Review of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity', in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 87, 1990, pp. 708-711. 
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of non-human sanction or by secular sentiments of pride, loyalty, and solidarity." '^^  
If Rorty had to choose between the social practice of academic freedom or anti-
representationalism he would choose the former because philosophy should be 
placed in the service of political progress, not placed at its foundation. 
Nevertheless, he regards anti-representationalism and its accoimt of truth as more in 
the long-term service of academic freedom than representationahsm. To quote him 
at length he concludes: 
We shall not change our practices ... merely because we have ceased to 
concern ourselves with epistemology, or because we have adopted non-
representationalist philosophies of language and mind. But we may 
change our attitude to these practices, our sense of why it is important to 
carry them out. Our new sense of what we are doing will be itself as 
indemonstrable and as intuitive as was the Western Rationalistic 
Tradition. But pragmatists think it will be better, not just because it will 
free philosophers from perpetual oscillation between skepticism and 
dogmatism, but because it will take away a few more excuses for 
fanaticism and intolerance."^ 
When seen in the service of social progress, philosophy can become useful not as a 
foundation for our practices but as an element in the long-term expansion, 
clarification and improvement of our practices.''"' Philosophy is not socially 
useless:"8 "anything that philosophy can do to free up our imagination a little is all 
to the political good." Rorty continues: 
the freer the imagination of the present the likelier it is that future social 
practices will be different from past practices. Nietzsche's, Dewey's, 
Derrida's and Davidson's treatment of objectivity, truth and language have 
freed us up a bit. ... But philosophy is not ... a source of tools for path-
Rorty, 'Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', op. cit., p. 58. 
" 6 ibid., p. 61. 
Rorty, 'A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural Difference', op. cit., p. 594 no. 7. 
" 8 Rorty notes: 
Had there been no Plato, the Christians would have had a harder time selling the idea that 
all God really wanted fi-om us was firatemal love. Had there been no Kant, the nineteenth 
century would have had a harder time reconciling Christian ethics with Darwin's story 
about the descent of man . . . . 
Rorty, 'Trotsky and the Wild Orchids', op. cit., p. 152. Rorty wants to maintain a gratitude for the 
prophetic Utopian Kant if not his claim to have discovered truth. Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality 
and Sentimentality', op. cit., p. 7. 
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breaking political work. Nothing politically useful happens until people 
begin saying things never said before. 
Philosophy can help us solve particular problems: it can help give us a better self-
image, it can suggest means of reconciling ideologies, it can suggest distinctions 
which make existing practices easier to understand. It can suggest ways of 
reconciling old ideas with new imaginative ones, it can be a vehicle for 'holding 
one's thought in time'; what it cannot do is offer a foundation which assures us that 
our thoughts and practice accurately represent something a-historical and relevant 
for all time. It carmot, in this sense, offer 'truth' but it can offer truthfulness. 
"Truthfulness," Rorty writes, "like freedom, is temporal, contingent, and fragile. But 
we can recognize both when we have them." 120 It requires us to relate how things 
work in particular situations; it involves us in clearing up difficulties and removing 
obstacles. Possessing it makes us less dogmatic and more experimental. 121 
A Utopian hope, irony, prophecy, trust, pragmatic rationality, sentimentality, 
indignation, courage, imagination, campaigning reformism, fellowship groupings 
and truthfulness are all employed by Rorty within a Deweyan means-ends 
continuum to maintain and reform the type of tacitly tolerant imgrounded 
democratic society that balances freedom with justice— t^he type of open and 
challenging democratic society that Dewey saw as now exhibiting significant 
features of the religious dimension of experience. In this, and the previous chapter, 
I have suggested that Rorty attempts to further balance these concerns with an 
additional concern for questions about truth. Having these three concerns is part of 
the traditional job-description of the philosopher and the attempt to integrate them a 
common philosophical task. This is a task Rorty shares with Dewey. Like Dewey, 
however, Rorty wants such an integration without the quest for certainty and without 
any possible assistance from some putative antecedently existing entity that might 
119 Rorty, Teminism, Ideology and Deconstrurtion: A Pragmatist's View', op. cit., p. 100. 
120 Richard Rorty, 'Philosophy and the Future', in Saatkamp, Rorty and Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 205. 
121 Rorty, 'Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', op. cit., p. 59. Also see p 
56. 
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have traditionally been thought to ground and support such a task. Rather than 
calling upon such an entity, both Dewey and Rorty content themselves with carrying 
this task through by participating in the practical activity of problem-solving and by 
engendering cormnunity self-reliance. I f "democracy and reciprocal tolerance" can 
be kept alive, then "everything else can be settled by muddling through to some 
reasonable sort of compromise." 122 This thesis, Rorty claims, is the same as saying 
in philosophical terms that Davidsonian intersubjectivity is just as good at making 
our practices intelligible as talk of objectivity, but without the latter's forlom need 
for foundation. Translated into the terms of rehgious belief, he notes: 
... this is the Feuerbachian thesis that God was just a projection of the 
best, and sometimes of the worst of humanity. 123 
7.5. Conclusion: 
In this chapter I have traced the development of Rorty's social philosophy as this has 
been shaped by his dialogue with other social philosophers. I have suggested that 
Rorty is not adequately treated when he is interpreted as a cultural relativist. His 
appeal to liberal values without the further need for philosophical foimdations is not 
a cynical and empty exercise. Such an appeal arises from his tacit commitment to 
the moral goods involved in perpetuating and improving the tolerant, just, open and 
free society that western liberal culture sees itself as having become By first 
dividing public from private vocabularies, and then imiting them again as a result of 
criticism, Rorty has developed a philosophical discourse that encourages prophetic 
and Utopian visions of radical transformation of social ills and practical piecemeal 
reform, while asserting that our most prised liberal freedoms are nothing more than 
a matter of luck and historical contingency. 
Forged in the crucible of criticism and conversation, Rorty's pragmatic anti-
representationalism, I have been arguing, does not necessarily lead to radical 
122 ibid., p. 61. 
123 ibid., p. 61. 
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subjectivism nor to dangerous political ideologies. My next task is to show that 
despite his avowed atheism his thought is not necessarily antithetical to the type of 
religious belief that has been outlined in the first three chapters and chapter five of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RICHARD RORTY'S PRAGMATISM AND RELIGIOUS NON-REALISM 
8.1. Introduction: 
In the last two chapters I argued that it is not a necessary feature of Rorty's work that 
it leads to subjectivism or to dangerous political ideologies. Rorty's pragmatic anti-
representationalism may undermine overblown expectations that have traditionally 
constituted philosophy's approach to concerns for truth, justice and freedom but this 
does not mean that Rorty no longer shares these concerns. He may at times, as 
David Hall points out, be coy, diffident and bashful about admitting to the assertive 
nature of his own strategies of intellectual road clearing, irony and prophecy' by 
which he hopes to persuade rather than force his commimity toward the type of open 
liberal democracy that John Dewey worked for, but this is not, as Hall posits, an 
attempt to stand above the philosophical fray, as though Rorty aims to out-do 
Nietzsche and Heidegger and thereby gain a place among the immortal names of 
philosophy.2 Rather, such coyness, diffidence and bashfulness stems from a desire 
not to humiliate other people by redescribing them and their practices in such a way 
that they take such redescriptions to be an exertion of force over them, rather than a 
persuasive invitation to new practices and a new self image. To suggest, as Hall and 
others do, that all Rorty has to offer is 'table talk', because in the end he carmot 
escape from the privatising irony of his own philosophy,- is an account of his work 
that Rorty finds hurtful rather than persuasive.* It is a redescription of his work 
' David L. Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, (New York: SUNY Press, 
1994) pp. 169-200. 
2 ibid., p. 231. 
5 ibid., p. 236. 
* Richard Rorty, Trotsky and the Wild Orchids, In Common Knowledge, Vol. 1, 1992. p. 141. 
Defending Rorty on this point J. Wesley Robbins writes: 
It is no part of this thesis that knowledge is self-referential, that all the sentences we 
manipulate are about our own linguistic behaviour. Those sentences are about all sorts of 
things inside us as well as outside of us and, therefore, so is our knowledge. It simply 
220 
which, in this respect, and despite Hall's claim to critique Rorty in the spirit of his 
own work, goes against that spirit by being forceful rather than persuasive. This 
does not mean that such a critique has no place, for as we have seen, Rorty has often 
changed his position in response to criticism, but this is only to say that he was 
sufficiently persuaded to do so. Whether a criticism, or an attempted redescription, 
turns out to be positively persuasive or negatively humiliating will often only 
emerge after lengthy discussion and dialogue which requires us to keep open the 
charmels of conversation and tolerant democratic interaction to which Rorty is 
supremely committed. In what follows in this chapter I shall consider Rorty's 
attitude to religious belief I shall not go as far as J. Wesley Robbins and argue that 
Rorty is a Deweyan religious thinker, for this may also be a forceful rather than a 
persuasive redescription of his work. Rather, my aim will be to suggest that despite 
his atheism, his work might still be appropriated by religious non-realists. 
Rorty is a self-confessed atheist and thus may at first appear, an unlikely figure 
for theological appropriation. ^  For Rorty, a Christianity that centres on the reality of 
God, or on human wickedness, a Christianity that tells us that only by grace through 
faith do we gain salvation, a salvation that is not of ourselves, will have to be 
recontextualised as a moral enterprise, concerned with love rather than knowledge 
and as a prophetic vision that abjures cruelty by engendering a sense of indignation 
at social ills, i f it is to function outside of a privatised idiosyncratic desire. Yet, on 
his own admission, i f defined broadly enough "even the atheist will be said to have a 
religious faith. Here, I intend to argue that Rorty's pragmatic anti-
does not follow that, since human knowledge is linguistic all the way down, therefore 
regardless of what we seem to talk about all we ever really talk about, and know, is our 
own'conversation', 
J. Wesley Robbins, 'Neo-pragmatism and the Radical Empiricist Metaphysics of Pure Experience' in 
American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993. p.30. 
5 Richard Rorty, 'Response To Charles Hartshome' in Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Rorty and 
Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1995), p. 36. 
6 Richard Rorty, Objectivity Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume One, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 182. 
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representationalism need not be anti-religious. After summarising Rorty's rejection 
of religious belief, I shall argue that his entire philosophy is predicated upon his use 
of the divine trope and that therefore 'God' has a negative 'use' in his work. The 
divine trope is used by Rorty as a symbol for all that is wrong with realism and 
representationalism. It is also employed as a warning against the move from a 
metaphysics of representational presence to a deconstructive post-modem 
metaphysics of representational absence. I wil l then draw upon passages in Rorty's 
work where he offers a more positive account of religious belief These positive 
allusions to religious belief, I wi l l suggest in the concluding chapter, make Rorty 
just as open to theological appropriation as any other atheistic philosopher, hi that 
final chapter I shall suggest that Rorty's figure of the prophetic liberal ironist and his 
pragmatic anti-representational helps to articulate important features of religious 
non-realism and provides it with an argumentative resource that it can employ 
against alternative critical realist accounts of religious belief 
8.2. Rortv's Rejection of Religious Belief and His Use of the Divine as a Trope: 
Rorty believes that it is unnecessary to provide arguments against God. I f you no 
longer believe in God you do not have to argue the case. You simply pick up the 
habit of using a vocabulary in which 'God' need not appear. The word 'God' like 
'phlogiston' is being "unstitched and thus erase[d]"'7 as we continue to 
recontextualise the linguistic web of our belief and desires. The age of belief in an 
objective God has passed. To argue about God gives this practically useless notion 
too much credence. It would be like trying to argue against the existence of 
unicorns or the possibility of finding a 3000 B.C. pharaoh alive in his pyramid 
drinking a cup of tea. No one bothers with such arguments. There is no use in 
employing them, either for or against. Nobody, Rorty claims, is interested in 
ibid., p. 93. The residual eflFect of religious belief, Rorty predicts, may have about another 500 years 
survival, ibid., p. 115. 
222 
hearing the orthodox theist criticised.^ A theological vocabulary no longer serves 
any useful purpose^ He notes: 
... we may find ourselves no longer bothering to use religious 
terminology. In such cases x-talk just fades away, not because someone 
has made a philosophical or scientific discovery that there are no x's, but 
because nobody any longer has a use for this sort of talk.i° 
Galileo's de-centring of the world, Darwin's account of our biological 
contingency (which Rorty regards as "lying behind both Nietzsche and Dewey,""), 
Freud's account of the contingency of the self and Davidson's account of the 
language-world-self relation, all make it "harder to believe in God,"'^ by 
recontextualising our understanding of our world and our use of language. The 
recontextualisation these figures have wrought has made us conscious as never 
before of the de-divinising process of recontextualisation itself'^ Language should 
now be understood as a contingent tool that helps us to fiilfil our purposes; not a 
medium of representation. As such, the contingency of language makes it 
impossible to argue that there is a special divine language in which God has always 
wanted to be spoken and in which God always speaks. Language is human. Our 
view of language is itself contextualised, always itself under certain linguistic 
descriptions which are useful for certain purposes. Rorty's own anti-representational 
account of language is itself a recontextualisation. It does not itself represent 
something real. Rather, he notes, his own linguistic Darwinism is not true in the 
sense that it has correctly represented reality as i f it has laid bare the mind of God, 
but because it "provides a useful vocabulary in which to formulate the pragmatist 
^ Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 64. 
^ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op cit., pp. 186-187. n. 31. 
lOibid., p. 115. 
' ^ Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume Two, (Cambridge . 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 3. 
12 ibid., p. 144. 
' ^  Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 39-40. 
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position."i4 Like our direct contact with the world the ability to recontextualise is so 
characteristically human as the desire to know 'essences' or 'God' is not. The former 
ability is not a privileged mode of thought but something over which, as humans, we 
have "little choice but to employ."'^ 
The word 'God' therefore, as Rorty understands it, is found vkithin the list of 
"dead metaphors which pragmatists can no longer find a use for."'^ The issue 
though, does not rest upon the phrase 'dead metaphors' because, for Rorty, all 
literalised language is made up of dead metaphors, and a lot of literalised language 
is usefixl. Rather, the issue rests on the fact that for Rorty's pragmatist, the notion of 
'God' has no use. In a world conscious of recontextualisation, recontextualisation is 
also a process of de-divinisation. Rorty summarises his rejection of belief in God in 
the following passage: 
... the secularist ... says not 'There is no God' but rather 'All this talk 
about our relation to God is getting in our way'... It isn't that we believe 
in God, or don't believe in God, or have suspended judgement about God, 
or consider that the God of theism is an inadequate symbol of our 
ultimate concern; it is just that we wish we didn't have to have a view 
about God. It isn't that we know that "God" is a cognitively meaningless 
expression, or that it has its role in a language-game other than the fact-
stating, or whatever. We just regret the fact that the word is used so 
much.1' 
However, for someone who professes to have this regret, Rorty seems reluctant 
to drop the term 'God'. This is because the term has a significant function in his 
texts as a personification of all that is wrong with representationalism. Rorty 
employs 'God' as a negative trope against which he attempts a recontextualisation of 
many other realist notions. For him, to say there is 'truth' about human nature or that 
there is 'reason' for the type of solidarity that we now experience; to say that there is 
Richard Rorty, Putnam and the Relativist Menace', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90 1993 p 
447. 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 110. 
Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 20. 
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
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a substantial self and a convergence of meaning; and to say that there are rationally 
deducible principles for imderstanding nature or the moral good all amount to talk 
about topics which are as unprofitable as talk about the nature and reality of God.'^ 
Rorty notes that a realist view of truth treats truth as "identical with God", while the 
realist view of the everyday world treats facts as identical "with the world as God's 
project."^^ He writes: 
The very idea that the world or the self has an intrinsic nature - one which 
the physicist or the poet may have glimpsed - is a remnant of the idea that 
the world is a divine creation, the work of someone who had something in 
mind, who Himself spoke some language in which He described His own 
project. ... To drop the idea of languages as representations ... would be 
to de-divinize the world, 
Equally, a realist account of science is viewed by Rorty as the attempt "to make 
nature do the duty of God." That is, to see science as representing "a power not 
ourselves, rather than simply facilitating our commerce with the things around us. "2' 
This is not an apology for relativism because just as there is "no such thing as 
blasphemy" for someone who does not believe in God so there is no such thing as 
relativism for someone who no longer believes that her language represents 
something to which it is meant to correspond.22 Whether he is discussing his 
attitude to nature or science, the self or humanity, justice or ethics, language or 
human solidarity, or encouraging us to drop the notions of essence, universality, 
representation, correspondence and reality, we find his views are always set against 
the need to de-divinise these vocabularies. In each case 'God' is used as a trope with 
negative force against which Rorty's anti-representational recontextualisation is 
defined. 
1^ Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p.8. Also pp. 5, 20, 35, 41, 68-69. 
' 9 ibid., p. 5. 
20 Rorty, Contingency, Irorry, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 21. 
2' Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 87. (Both quotes). 
22 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 50. 
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A second, less negative, use that the trope 'God' plays in Rorty's texts is found in 
his warning not to take deconstruction too seriously. Deconstruction highlights 
difference as the site of the fissure of linguistic meaning through which an openness 
to 'the other' is glimpsed but never captured. This evasion destabilises all attempts 
to fix linguistic representations and thereby dissolves the metaphysics of presence. 
It finds no room for self-present, self-sufficient explanation and thus no room for 
divinity that purports to be such an explanation, whether this comes in the form of 
religion or the surrogate theologies of humanism. For Rorty, however, we should 
not try to turn Derrida's valuable, but private ironic fantasies, into yet another realist 
philosophy as some of his interpreters tend to do. Rorty's comments upon Paul de 
Man are relevant here. 
According to Rorty, de Man sees literature's 'take-over' of philosophy as 
pointing to a void at the heart of reality. By revealing the total contingency of 
language, deconstruction exposes the vain attempts by philosophy to cover this void: 
the attempt to show "that sign and meaning can coincide. "2^  This logocentric desire 
is impossible to fu l f i l and knowledge of this engenders a sense 'of the presence of a 
nothingness' - a void which can be named but not known.. The 'essence' of literature 
is that it has no essence. Thus the 'essence' of things, which literature 
recontextualises, is that which all these things lack. Literature thus reaches the 
'essence of man' - the void - which other disciplines, like philosophy, fails to reach. 
But, for Rorty, just because the logocentric desire may be shown by deconstruction 
to be unsatisfiable this does not mean that this imsatisfied desire is the essence of 
language or man. It merely shows us that we have more choices than we once 
thought. Returning to the divine trope, Rorty writes: 
... pragmatists see no reason to set up an altar to Literature - to the Dark 
God whose voice is in the literariness of language - on the spot where we 
once worshipped the radiant, effulgent logos. Pragmatists would prefer to 
have no high altars, and instead just have lots of picture galleries, book 
2^  Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op cit., pp. 130-132. 
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displays, movies, concerts, ethnographic museums . . . and so on - lots of 
cultural options but no privileged central discipline or practice.^* 
Rorty equates de Man's accoxmt of language directly with negative theology. To 
reintroduce essence, even in a negative sense, is to reintroduce God; something that 
is immune from recontextualisation. Pragmatists, Rorty asserts, reject the notions of 
"the negative theologians, the worshippers of the Dark God whose voice is in the 
Literariness of Language. "25 Unlike de Man, Rorty argues, Derrida does not 
essentialise the absence of presence, he is simply trying to make the meaning of 
words enigmatic.26 Whereas de Man "needs a clear vision of the dead, but 
luminous, God of Presence in order to display (by contrast of darkness to light) his 
living but invisible Dark God of Absence,"27 Derrida, according to Rorty, simply 
exhibits "the comic writer's urge to make something once held sacred look funny, "^ s 
A theology of deconstruction, such as Mark C. Taylor's a/theology which tries 
to think of God in the absence of God after the death of God, as an absence in 
presence and a presence in absence falls into the same representational 
conceptuality as de Man's philosophy of literature. The flow of difference which 
heralds the slippage of fixed meaning from words, makes impossible any direct 
speech about God through the use of putatively privileged words. Rather, the 
endless play of signs itself becomes the nomadic terrain of divinity: "divine insofar 
as it is the creative/destructive medium of everything that is and all that is not."^^ In 
deconstructive theology, therefore, God has become totally immanent within the 
flow of language nowhere graspable but nevertheless omnipresent. As J. Wesley 
Robbins notes: 
24 ibid., p 
25 ibid., p 
26 ibid., p 
27 ibid., p 
28 ibid., p 
132. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
117. 
29 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
p. 116. 
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The divine, in short, is, according to the theological deconstructionists, 
the vital force resident in language rather than the permanent transcendent 
referential framework of language, 
Offering the type of critique of Rorty encountered in the last chapter, Taylor 
suggests that Rorty, and pragmatists who think like him, replace epistemological 
forms of intellectual domination with hermeneutical forms of domination so that 
while Rorty's open-ended 'general conversation of mankind' purports to provide a 
dialogue between our various cultural domains, it in fact "ends as a monologue ... 
written to colonize the other. "^ ^ Pragmatism, for Taylor, is just one more failed 
attempt by the human subject to take for itself the mantle of divinity and become the 
upholder of extra-linguistic meaning. As such, it is a form of theological humanism 
that remains captive to the 'philosophy of presence'. According to Robbins, 
however, it is not pragmatism but deconstruction that remains caught within the 
economy of representation. ^ 2 
Robbins argues that a deconstructive a/theology employs a vocabulary which, in 
effect, claims "that language as disciplined, fixedly defining objects, is less real than 
language as flow interminably putting o f f fixed definitions."^^ Compared to this 
privileged vocabulary, other vocabularies are secondary, illusory projections that 
have failed to unmask the real workings of language. Such secondary vocabularies 
will eventually submit to that ultimate vocabulary which contains the divine names 
of 'differonce', 'trace', 'otherness' and 'fissure' among its pantheon.^ * Deconstruction 
can thus be read as an attempt to instantiate a theology of religion that is 
truer—closer to reality—^than any other. Robbins notes: 
To them has been revealed, through their immersion in language, the 
bountifiil, but restless, sacred void that is the worldly reality underlying 
30 J. Wesley Robbins, "Pragmatism and the Deconstruction of Theology* in Religious Studies, Vol. 24, 
1989, p. 377. 
31 Mark C. Taylor, Tears, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), p. 129. 
32 J, Wesley Robbins, '"You Will Be Like God": Richard Rorty and Mark C. Taylor on the Theological 
Significance of Human Language Use' in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 72, 1992, pp. 389-402. 
33 Robbins, 'Pragmatism and the Deconstruction of Theology', op. cit., p. 378. 
34 ibid., pp. 378-379. 
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human language and culture. It is these literati who, in and through 
writing, are closest to, and thereby in a position to keep the rest of culture 
close to, the divine reality. ^ 5 
Whereas pragmatists disregard the notion that language conceived as 'fixed' or as 
'flow' is 'closest to reality', deconstruction continues to perpetuate it "under the guise 
of a literary culture. "^ ^ Robbins continues: 
Their literary culture ... supposedly has overcome the errors of 
referentiality that plagued its predecessors, plays exactly the social-
cultural role that those predecessors played. It, like the theology, 
metaphysics, epistemology, and hermeneutics which it would depose, 
purports to show us how we must think, speak, act, worship, i f we are to 
be true to reality.^'' 
Christian non-realists. I suggest, would be better advised to follow the pragmatist 
line and avoid the seductive lure of the new linguistic foundationalism of 
deconstruction. 
In this section I have attempted to summarise Rorty's critique of religious belief 
In doing so I have suggested that Rorty presents his entire philosophical project 
against the backdrop of the de-divinisation effect of recontextualisation. Rorty 
rejects belief in God not because there are sound argxmients against such a belief but 
because, in a contextualised world conscious of recontextualisation, such a belief 
now serves no or little purpose. A world recontextualised into atheism, rather than 
argued into atheism, is a world which the religious non-realists like Don Cupitt and 
Graham Shaw try to inhabit. They agree that i f what we mean by 'God' is something 
which resists human recontextualisation; something which is regarded as 
antecedently real and independent of the world, then Rorty is correct. Such a God 
'is' next to useless and can take a place alongside the unicorn and our tea-total 
pharaoh. However, for them, the loss of this view of God no more heralds the end 
of religious belief and practice than the loss of enlightenment rationality heralds the 
35 ibid., p. 379. 
36 ibid., p. 381. 
•^^ ibid., p. 381. 
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end of the beliefs and practices of liberal democracy. Rorty recontextualises belief 
in God in negative tropological terms. He employs the spectre of the divine trope in 
order to both undermine philosophical realism and to warn interpreters of 
deconstruction not to try to build methodological practice in philosophy or literature 
on the new foundations of a negative theology. Despite his claims to the contrary, 
Rorty does have a use for religious language. Religious non-realists have a more 
positive use for it. 
8.3. Rortv's Philosophy and Religious Non-Realism: 
Despite Rorty's critique of religious belief and his negative tropological use of the 
term 'God', there are pointers in his work that suggest the possibility of a more 
positive attitude to a religious form of life. I shall consider these in this section and 
relate them to the type of things Dewey and the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists 
want to say about 'God.' In his more positive considerations of religious belief Rorty 
tends to regard it as a vocabulary of private perfection. He accepts Whitehead's 
definition of religion as that activity which I do with my solitariness, my "obligation 
to ... become who I am,"^^ as a definition of a private vocabulary. However, he is 
also prepared to allow that the private fantasy of St. Paul and other Christians have 
been successful in literalising their metaphors into 'common sense',^ ^ and these have 
made a significant historical contribution to human solidarity.^o According to Rorty, 
one consequence of the Christian's private fantasy was to make the world less 
crueFi by giving charge of European history to "people who pitied the humiliated 
and dreamed of human equality".''2 As Rorty notes: 
38 For Rorty, this is rendered as 'what an individual does with their aloneness'. Rorty, Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth op. cit., p. 13. A.N. Whitehead, Religion In The Making, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1930), p.6. David Hall notes that Rorty exchanges Whitehead's use of'soUtude' for 
his own use of'aloneness' in order to dissuade any thoughts that 'soUtude' might mask some hidden 
internal metaphysical comfort. Hall, Richard Rorty, op. cit., pp. 171-174. 
3^ Rorty, Contingency, Irony, And Solidarity, op. cit., p. 17. 
'^ ^ Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., pp. 121-122; Contingency, Irony, And Solidarity, 
op. cit.., pp., 184. 
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, And Solidarity, op. cit., p.55. In a discussion of George Orwell's 
Nineteen Eighty Four, Rorty relates that among the historically contingent "ideas associated with 
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... it is part of the tradition of our commimity that the human stranger 
fi-om whom all dignity has been stripped is to be taken in, to be re-clothed 
with dignity. This Jewish and Christian element in our tradition is 
gratefully invoked by freeloading atheists like myself'•3 
Nevertheless, Rorty maintains that Christians should not actively seek to implement 
their private beliefs into public action. Religion should remain 'privatised'. 
However, he assimies that a religious frame-of-mind, will always tend to opt-out of 
worldly struggle and to direct its goals and desires toward the perfect 'City of God', a 
wholly other realm than our own.^^ In other words the religious frame of mind v^ll 
always imderstand God in terms of the representational ideology that constitutes his 
own tropological use of the word 'God'. This is a frame-of-mind which Rorty 
equates with what Nietzsche termed 'ascetic priests'—people, according to Rorty, 
who are "not much fim to be around" although useful as "vehicles of linguistic 
novelty ... by which a culture is able to have a future interestingly different from its 
past. 
In his explicit comments on religion in his article "Religion as a Conversation 
Stopper' he clearly feels the effect of his 'tropical' God and thus continues to want to 
privatise religion, as he puts it, "to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious 
liberty.46 Nevertheless this is not to trivialise religion. He writes: 
The poems we atheists write, like the prayers our religious friends raise 
are private, nonpolitical, and nontrivial.... The search for private 
perfection, pursued by theists and atheists alike, is neither trivial nor, in a 
pluralistic democracy, relevant to public policy.4? 
Christianity" which he admires, we find, "the idea that reciprocal pity is a sufBcient basis for political 
association, the idea that there is something importantly wrong wdth (to use OrweU's list) 
"imprisonment without trial, the use of war prisoners as slaves, public executions, torture to extract 
confessions, the use of hostages, and the deportation of whole populations," the idea that distinctions 
of wealth, talent, strength, sex and race are not relevant to public policy - these ideas were once 
fantasies as implausible as those associated with O'Brien's oligarchical collectivism." ibid., p. 184. 
42 ibid., p. 184. 
43 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p.202. 
44 Rorty Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 
45 ibid., pp. 72-73. 
46 Richard Rorty, 'Religion as a Conversation-Stopper', in Common Knowledge, Vol. 3, 1994, p.3. 
4'7 ibid., p. 2. 
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Despite this, it is Rorty's attitude to religion that confirms for him the need to keep 
the public separate from the private. Calling upon one's religious beliefs in the 
context of public debate stops conversation. The pause is followed by the response 
from a secular colleague 'that's your own private affair, this is public policy'.'*^ He 
does not deny that there can be a religious influence on public policy but he does 
deny this to religious arguments, by which he means appeal to something like 'the 
revealed wil l of God' or 'the immortal soul"*' However, this is only to sanction 
against a religious vocabulary that appeals to antecedently existing reality. Any 
such appeal should be viewed as a private idiosyncratic need rather than a source of 
moral knowledge. Democratic debate is silenced rather than furthered by appeal to 
private, idiosyncratic sources of such moral knowledge.5o Again, this is not so much 
a sanction against religious knowledge, as against defining public policy in terms of 
some pre-given 'source' as opposed to 'public consensus'. Talking of the religious 
citizen, Rorty notes, "the fact that one of us gets his premises in church and the other 
in the library is, and should be, of no interest to our audience in the public square."5i 
In the public square there are no religious or non-religious arguments although there 
are both religious and non-religious influences. Privatising belief in antecedent 
sources is demanded by the lack of utility such belief has for our civil practices. 
Whether the privatisation of realist religious belief is thought generally to be 
appropriate will be a matter of whether privatisation is thought to be a fair price to 
pay for religious liberty, and whether this is a good social policy to have will be a 
matter of whether more is to be gained than lost. Either way, Rorty argues, such 
privatisation does not triviahse religious belief 52 Nevertheless, while belief in 
Rorty's tropical God may need to be privatised, a Deweyan religious faith and 'Sea 
'*8 Richard Rorty, 'Towards a Liberal Utopia', an interview with Martyn OUver in The Times Literary 
Supplement, June 24th 1994. p. 14. 
Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation-Stopper' op. cit., pp. 4, 6. 
50 ibid., pp. 4-5. 
51 ibid., p. 4. 
52 ibid., p. 6. 
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of Faith' religious non-realism which do not groimd religious belief upon such a 
tropical God should perhaps be allowed, on Rorty's ovra premises, to take a full part 
in public argument and debate. 
In his article "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', 
there is some evidence that Rorty might allow the possibility of a public Christianity 
i f it drops the 'tropical' God. Such a possibility emerges from his use of Christian 
belief, again as a foi l against which he presents his own ideas, this time, his desire to 
defend the notion of intersubjectivity against subjectivism and academic freedom 
against unwarranted politicisation. Confirming both his concern for truth and the 
possibility of a non-realist Christianity, Rorty writes: 
... philosophers who deny that there is any such thing as the 
correspondence of a belief to reality ... are no more dangerous to the 
pursuit of truth than theologians who deny the existence of hellfire. Such 
theologians put neither morality nor Christianity in danger, and such 
philosophers endanger neither the imiversity nor society. ... [T]heologians 
did, however, change our sense of what Christianity was—of what it takes 
to be a good Christian. We now have a conception of Christianity which 
would have seemed perverse and outrageous to many of our eighteenth-
century ancestors. 53 
This change, Rorty argues, can be seen in pragmatic terms, not as a move from 
darkness to light, but as a matter of growth, as "escape from the satisfaction of old 
needs into the satisfaction of new needs ... [which] ... will indeed be an escape 
from error to truth"54 but not an escape from appearance to reality. The defence of 
academic freedom, Rorty argues, no more requires respect for correspondence 
theories of truth than a defence of modem Christianity requires respect for hellfire. 
He notes: 
The distinction I am drawing is analogous to that between saying 'we have 
no further use for Christianity' and saying 'we cannot explain the 
53 Rorty, 'Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', in Academe, Vol. 80,1994, 
pp. 53-54. 
54 ibid., p. 60. 
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Eucharist by reference to Aristotelian notions of substance and 
accident'. 55 
For Protestant Christianity, the view that such an understanding of the Eucharist 
might mean the end of Christianity is ridiculous. For Rorty, disputes between 
Catholicism and Protestantism are as pointless to Eucharistic practice as disputes 
between proponents of coherence theories of truth and proponents of 
correspondence theories of truth are to academic freedom. I f anti-
representationalism wins out in the end, Rorty suggests, neither historians nor 
physicists would behave differently, although they may have a different long-term 
self-image (perhaps a greater sense of self-reliance and a greater sense of 
responsibility for what they do). 
What ensures the continuation of academic freedom is the traditional practices 
of the academy like civility and tolerance which historians and scientists respect, not 
the ability to connect with some mind-independent reality. Equally, Rorty writes: 
... the only difference between unconsecrated and consecrated bread is in 
the social practices appropriate to each ... The point, we say, is not 
whether Christ is Really Present in the bread, but whether we should treat 
a consecrated Host as we would a snack. 56 
Continuing the analogy between university and church, the healthy university, Rorty 
argues, wi l l ingest new radical perspectives in politics and religion and the new 
insights of each generation by 'muddling through' as best it can.57 The healthy 
church, Cupitt would say, would now function in a similar way. Just as Rorty's 
academy wi l l 'muddle through' by appeal to its traditions of drawing the line 
between unacceptably new politicisation and unreplaceable old utility, so would 
Cupitt's church. Like Cupitt's church, Rorty's academy is "unlikely to remain 
healthy and free once people outside ... take a hand in re-drawing this line."58 For 
55 ibid., p. 55. 
56 ibid., p. 55. 
5' ibid., p. 55. 
58 ibid., p. 56. 
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Rorty, i f we keep civility and tolerance ahve and maintain the academy's 
independence, disinterested objectivity, rationality and truth will look after 
themselves. For Cupitt, i f we keep alive religious tolerance and prayerfulness and 
maintain a "Kingdom Church' of faith, hope and outpouring love, then our 
blessedness will look after itself 5^  Just as disinterested objectivity, rationality and 
truth for Rorty wdll be a matter of describing "how the people we most admire 
conduct their inquiries,"^^ so for Cupitt, blessedness will be a description of how 
religious belief shows itself in the work done by those religious people we most 
admire. 
Nearly every book vmtten by Don Cupitt since 1982 can be seen as an attempt 
to recontextualise Christian belief for a world conscious of the de-divinising 
consequences of recontextualisation. Thus Cupitt writes: 
... Our religious beliefs and practices are an integral part of the evolving 
totality of culture, and must change with it. (...) In the old scheme of 
things God did all the creating. God stood on the far side of the world, 
everything was ready-made for us, and nothing much could be altered. ... 
Today, by contrast, human creativity confronts the flux. God has moved 
round to our side, and looks through our eyes. Christian action is now at 
last liberated. The material we have to work on is our world and our own 
lives.61 
For Rorty, recontextualisation de-divinises the world. Assimiing his antecedently 
existent tropical God, religious talk is private; useless to community affairs. For 
Cupitt, however, recontextualisation is a religious activity. The language of creation 
attributed to the deity is now transferred back to us.62 Religious myths about the 
creator God provide; a useful vocabulary for understanding our own 
recontextualisation of our world, but not, as Farrell suggests, by stripping the world 
59 Here I refer to the type of religious faith, hope, love and blessedness presented by Cupitt in his 
books The Last Philosophy, (London: SCM Press, 1995), esp. pp. 5-9, 124; and Solar Ethics. 
(London: SCM Press, 1995), esp. p. 59. 
60 Rorty, "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?', op. cit., p. 56. 
61 Don Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith', in Joseph Runzo (ed.), Is God Real?, (London: MacmiDan, 1993), 
pp. 54-55. 
62 Don Cupitt, Only Human, (London: SCM Press, 1985), p. 181. 
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of a causal determinacy for Cupitt values science as much as he values religion. 
Like Rorty, he does not ask: 'Does God exist?' Instead he asks: 'What job does 
religious vocabulary do?' For Cupitt it does "something distinctive in shaping our 
practices,"63 and since Rorty allows that a vocabulary is for a purpose, and that the 
more vocabularies the better, he can hardly complain about those who find a 
purpose for a religious vocabulary. 
To some extent, Rorty recognises this in his discussion of Paul Tillich and John 
Dewey in Pragmatism Without Method'. There, Rorty argues that 
... certain forms of religion (when not construed as an encounter with a 
pre-existent power that wil l rescue us) do help us envisage [our 
coimection with the world in ways] which naturalism ... does not help us 
envisage.64 
Tillich and Dewey remind us of the futility of reducing knowledge to scientific 
criteria. I f such a reduction is made, Rorty asserts, proponents of religious belief 
wil l "find some new terminology for forms of discourse that are not subject to such 
criteria but which are nevertheless necessary for our lives. "65 For Rorty, both Tillich 
and Dewey offer such new terminology. He sees no difference between the former's 
attempt "to distinguish genuine from idolatrous faith"66 and the latter's "attempt to 
distinguish the religious from the supernatural."6'7 Both men were saying the same 
thing to different audiences. Rorty argues that both Dewey and Tillich wanted to 
continue to speak of'God' even after they had accepted naturalism. He continues: 
... both experimented with various reweavings that might enable them to 
do so. Tillich also thought that he could hang on to some beliefs best 
expressed using the world 'Christ', though Dewey did not. Both were ... 
keeping as much of the old as they could in the face of the new. 68 
63 ibid., p. 179. 
^ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 74. 
65 ibid., p. 74. 
66 ibid., p. 69. 
67 ibid., p. 69. 
68 ibid., p. 70. 
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The fact that Rorty feels that reference to the word 'God' "is a rhetorical blemish, a 
misleading way of getting one's point across,"69 does not diminish the main point 
that he accepts that other people can still reweave their beliefs and desires so as to 
include the word 'God'. 
Rorty recalls, that when he was asked why Dewey and Tillich still talked about 
'God', he found himself replying by quoting Dewey's desire to avoid the isolation, 
despair, and defiance that comes with atheism.''^ Importantly, Rorty is prepared to 
allow that 
Dewey's seemed, and still seems, a good way to keep the term 'God' in 
one's vocabulary, thus enabling one to keep some of the strands in one's 
web of belief which, at the time one became a naturalist, one had feared 
one might have to tease out.'^ ' 
In various articles J. Wesley Robbins makes an association between Dewey's 
Darwinian inspired immediacy of experience with Rorty's equally Darwinian, but 
Davidsonian inspired, account of the immediacy of our linguistic contact with our 
environment."72 j ^ i s leads him to assert that 
Dewey and Rorty are both naturalists who believe that the creative power 
of human language use, in causal interaction with the surrounding 
environment, happens to be all that is left of God.''3 
Because Rorty extends Dewey's critique of antecedent reality Robbins believes that 
Rorty can be seen as "a latter day Deweyan religious humanist." He continues: 
Rorty's ironist, simply put, is a person who takes to heart Dewey's 
distinction between the religious as devotion to imaginatively projected 
69 ibid., p. 71. 
70 ibid., pp. 69-70. 
"^1 Rorty, ibid., p. 70. (my italics). 
•72 J. Wesley Robbins, '"You Will Be Like God": Richard Rorty and Mark C. Taylor on the Theological 
Significance ofHuman Language Use'in 772eJOT/777a/o/i?e/;g?on Vol. 72, 1992, pp. 381-392, 397-
399. Also J. Wesley Robbins, 'A Neopragmatist Perspective on Religion and Science' in Zygon, Vol. 
28, 1993, pp. 337-349. 
'73 J. Wesley Robbins, "Neo-pragmatism and the Radical Empiricist Metaphysics of Pure Experience' in 
American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993. p.34. 
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ideal values and a religion as beliefs about 'unseen higher powers' in 
which such ideals are antecedently realised.'''^  
Indeed, he argues that Rorty's entire philosophy is "predicated on Dewey's 
distinction between a religion and a religious faith. "^ ^ A devotion to ideal ends, 
which Dewey saw as determining religious faith, translates in Rorty's terminology as 
those commitments, hopes, doubts, alliances and projects that constitute our various 
final vocabularies.''^ As a consequence, Robbins believes that it is possible to assert 
that Rorty's account of philosophy amounts to a "projection of a religiously 
humanistic culture, the inspiration of which is, among others of his works, Dewey's 
A Common Faith."'''' 
However interesting this interpretation of Rorty's work is, it may not do 
complete justice to Rorty's own declared position. Rather than following this 
'strong' account of Rorty and religion I have offered a 'weaker' version. I have 
suggested that Rorty is driven by a vision that hopes to balance the traditional 
philosophical concerns about truth with the further concern to balance freedom with 
justice. This vision points to the type of democratic community that Dewey saw as 
continuing aspects of the religious dimension of experience and is expressed within 
Rorty's own use of the prophetic strategy that he describes in others. This strategy is 
the Deweyan strategy by which actual conditions of existence are actively united 
with the ideal ends that the prophet calls into being. Rortyan prophecy, we might 
say, is centred on the image of Dewey's definition of God and requires a 'leap of 
faith' in the possibility of a Deweyan divine immanence, a commitment to the type 
of human inquiry (recontextualisation) that Dewey saw as unblocking the "highways 
Robbins, 'A Neopragmatist Perspective on Religion and Science', op. cit., p.339. 
Robbins, "When Christians Become Naturalists' in Religious Studies Vol. 28, 1992, p. 197. 
Robbins, 'A Neopragmatist Perspective on Religion and Science', op. cit., p.339. 
J. Wesley Robbins, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Experience' in American Journal of 
Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993, p. 177. Also see, J. Wesley Robbins, 'A Common Faith 
Revisited'in Religious Humanism, Vol. 28, 1994, p. 24. 
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of thought ... that lead to the future."''8 Such faith commitment, Rorty allows, is 
'absolute' in the sense of an "unconditional obligation" rather than "objective 
factuality." Rorty writes: 
To say that one has an absolute obhgation, in the first sense, is to say, 
'here I stand, I can do no other.' In the second sense, however, 'absolute' 
means something like 'objectively wrong,' where 'objectively' has the 
force of 'wrong whether or not you, or anyone else, can see its 
wrongness-yet you would only fail to see its wrongness i f your mind were 
clouded by sin, prejudice, emotion, impure motives, or unfortunate 
cultural conditioning.'''5 
He denies that rejecting realism about God, or the good, or the self etc. makes it 
impossible to hold absolute commitments in the first sense. Such commitments are 
not related to something 'out there' that might underwrite them, but to the contingent 
practices that make our life meaningfial. For Rorty, the practices that matter are 
those which emphasise our shared dignity and Christ as much as Socrates, should be 
congratulated for giving Europe these practices.^ o Unlike Charles Taylor, who 
suggests that we can neither maintain moral realism nor abandon it without spiritual 
loss and therefore need, in some way, to hold on to our realist intuitions while 
recognising that in doing so we cannot escape from a 'personal resonance,'*' Rorty 
believes that hxmian spiritual health is best promoted by following Dewey and 
giving up all our anxieties about realism and anti-realism*^ Realism and anti-
realism should better be seen as a non-issue. Referring to A Common Faith Rorty 
notes: 
John Dewey, Trom Absolutism To Experimentalism' in G.P. Adams and W.P. Montague, (ed.) 
Contemporary American Philosophy Vol. 2. (New York: Macmillan, 1930) p. 26. 
Richard Rorty, 'The Seer of Prague' in The New Republic, July 1st 1991. p.39. 
*0 ibid., pp. 39-40. 
*' Rorty refers here to Charles Taylor, Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modem Identity, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.513. 
*2 Rorty writes: 
.. .if we could get rid of both ... [the] sense that we are meaningless unless we are getting 
something not ourselves right, and the Nietzschean sense that we are meaningless unless 
we create a world in our image ... then our spiritual state would be better than it is now, 
Richard Rorty, 'Response to Farrell' in Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Rorty and Pragmatism, op.cit., p. 
195. 
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Dewey thought that once the subject-object way of thinking faded out, so 
would the sense of awful and magnificent solitude which ensued upon the 
death of God, and so would any temptation to arrogant self celebration.^^ 
We would then not worry about whether our absolute commitments have some 
transcendent factual objectivity 'out there', but see such transcendence as something 
like, 'what our commitments might mean to our descendants'; that is, something like 
Dewey's Utopian hope that, Rorty notes, highlights Dewey's "highly secularised 
definition of f&iih."^-a. faithfulness to ideal ends. As Rorty further notes: 
Dewey thought that, just as many Christians have outgrown the need to 
ask whether the sentences of the Creed correspond to objective reality, so 
civilisation as a whole might outgrow the supposed necessity to believe in 
absolute truths. 
The type of absolute commitment that Rorty can affirm, which is congruent with 
'Christianity without correspondence' and with a Deweyan religious faith, need not 
be restricted to the private realm. Rorty now sees the difference between 
subjectivity and scholarship as the difference between needs that are satisfied 
privately and "needs which are widely shared, well publicized and freely debated"^^ 
Thus, like all other human enterprises, religion is neither no more nor no less a 
private matter than it is a public matter.^'' 
8.4. Rortv's Use of a Religious Vocabulary: 
Having considered Rorty's more positive treatment of religious belief I now wish to 
go one stage further and suggest that Rorty might find a definite use of a religious 
8^  Richard Rorty, 'Taylor on Self-Celebration and Gratitude' in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 54, 1994. p. 200. 
^ Richard Rorty, 'A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural Difference', in Philosophy East and 
West, Vol. 42, 1992, pp. 589-590. 
5^ Richard Rorty, "Does Academic Freedom Have Presuppositions?' op. cit., p. 59. 
86ibid.,p.61. 
In a review of Alan Ryan's John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, Rorty 
questions Ryan's claim that Dewey wanted religious belief without its epistemological price tag on the 
grounds that "pragmatists do not think that beliefs come with epistemological price tags attached. 
Nevertheless, under the influence of his 'tropological' God, Rorty still maintains that neither should 
religious belief come with social price tags. "All religious pragmatists need to do," he comments, "is 
to be reasonable, to keep their reli^on out of their scientific and political activities...." Richard 
Rorty, 'Something To Steer By', in London Review of Books, 20th. June 1996. p. 8. 
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vocabulary in his own network of beliefs and desires and that an anomaly in his own 
work calls for a 'religious' resolution. This suggestion wil l not be simply a matter of 
accusing Rorty of making the same mistake that he sees in the later Heidegger of 
leaning "over so far backward to avoid being one more ... metaphysician, one more 
theologian, that he ceases to reweave."** It is rather a matter of making a practical 
suggestion that at one point in his thinking, Rorty might find it useful to reweave a 
religious strand into his web of beliefs, especially i f this religious strand, to use 
Rorty's words, is "not construed as an encounter with a pre-existent power that wil l 
rescue us."*^ 
This 'knot' in Rorty's thought occurs when he comes close to allowing that one 
feature of our finitude—our experience of anguish, pain and suffering—cannot be 
recontextualised. He finds it hard, i f not impossible, "to imagine a human life which 
felt itself complete."^ He comments: 
The world can blindly and inarticulately crush us; mute despair, intense 
mental pain, can cause us to blot ourselves out. But that sort of power is 
not the sort we can appropriate by adopting and then transforming its 
language, ...91 
It was to avoid such despair that led Dewey to keep the word 'God' as a strand in his 
web of beliefs, but Rorty has no such strand and thus no resource for 
recontextualising human suffering. He writes: 
... our relation to the world, to brute power and to naked pain, is not the 
sort of relation we have to persons. Faced with the nonhuman, the 
nonlinguistic, we no longer have an ability to overcome contingency and 
pain by appropriation and transformation, but only the ability to recognize 
contingency and pain.'^ 
This is not the Davidsonian point of the world's causal effect upon us, it is more an 
existential point that for a crucial aspect of our finitude, redescription becomes 
** Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 73. 
89 ibid., p.74. 
9^  Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p.40. 
91 ibid., p.40. 
92 ibid., p.40. 
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impossible. Since resistance to redescription is a mark of Rorty's understanding of 
the divine trope, he may here by guilty of keeping something—pain and 
suffering—holy. Here, the metaphorical playfulness of redescription is just too 
difficult to imagine. For Cupitt and Dewey, this is not the case. Cupitt is able to 
partake of 'playful' recontextualisation because he still has a use for religion. For 
example, he notes that the 'sermon on the mount' is useful in "teaching that eternal 
hfe is to be completely and selflessly absorbed in the present fleeting moment. "9^  
By taking every moment as it comes we might make it easier to see our life as 
'complete' at every moment. Religion helps us to imagine a recontextualisation of 
finitude and this might result in slightly less despair. Equally Cupitt notes: 
... we might reinterpret Jesus' death for us. Dying he passed into the void 
for our sakes. He saw the Nihil as he died (Mark 15.34), and his having 
gone into it then helps me to go into it now. We are all going to have to 
put our heads into the black sock, you, me, everybody. He had to; but his 
despair may give us hope, i f we can but bring ourselves to share it. Dying 
with Christ in the practice of religion, we go into the Nihil with him. We 
experience it while we are still alive. We die before death, and are 
thereby liberated for eternal, non-egoistic life now. I f I have already died 
to Death in this way, I can accept my own insubstantiality and that of 
everything else, and live free from anxiety. That is religion. 94 
This issue is illuminated in a discussion of Helmut Peukert's political theology 
by the philosopher Thomas McCarthy. Political theology, McCarthy suggests, takes 
the view that: 
... without religious faith we caimot avoid moral-political despair [and 
that] solidarity with the victims of history makes sense only on the 
assumption of a just God who reconciles virtue and happiness.95 
In this way, it resembles Kant's second critique. Kant, as we saw in chapter two, 
believes that to avoid moral despair, moral action required the postulate of God's 
9^  Cupitt, Creation Chit of Nothing, op. cit., p. 16. 
9'* ibid., pp. 16-17. Note that Cupitt's use of the term 'void'; occurs 'within' religious vocabulary. It is 
not therefore used in de Man's sense. For Cupitt there is no 'mystic potency' to words, p. 18. 
95 Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary 
Critical Theory, (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press, 1991), p. 206. 
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existence. While such a postulate was subjectively held, it was produced within 
pure practical reason, that is, by rational faith. Peukert, notes McCarthy, employs 
Jurgen Habermas' theory of commimicative action, rather than the Kantian second 
critique, to ground such rational faith. He thereby hopes to make possible a 
solidarity with the victims of history. In developing this point, Peukert draws upon a 
debate between Max Horkheimer and Walter Benjamin in which Horkheimer takes 
a view that resembles Rorty's refusal to recontextualise the human experience of 
pain and suffering. For Horkheimer, McCarthy notes, historical "injustice has 
happened and is over and done with. ... What happened to those human beings who 
have perished cannot be made good in the future."'^ Any thought of redescription is 
theological fancy. However, for Benjamin, who hopes for a historical solidarity 
with past generations by means of an empathetic memory, we cannot be totally non-
theological in our attempts to transform the past. Peukert argues that Benjamin's 
desire for an anamnistic solidarity with history's victims is made possible i f we draw 
upon Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action. Such a theory enables 
Peukert to restate Kant's postulate argument for God and thus to hope that the past 
wi l l be transformed in God's all-consuming love. However, McCarthy finds 
Peukert's use of Habermas problematic. Mutual understanding, intersubjectivity and 
free non-coercive discussion are concomitant with imdistorted communication 
rather than the teleological manifestation of the imion of virtue and happiness. 
Happiness is part of the content of justice rather than its reward. However, Peukert 
thinks that the future happiness of a fulfilled, ideal, historical human community 
wi l l be rendered an inhuman and a guilt-ridden nightmare i f it is to be built upon the 
unredeemed and tortured bodies of past humanity. McCarthy corrunents that for 
Peukert: 
96 Max Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie Vol. 1, p. 198. Quoted in McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions, 
ibid., p. 207. 
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[w]ithout a rational faith in God and immortality to supply a background 
of hope to practical reason, moral-political practice in solidarity with the 
victims of history makes no sense; it can only lead to despair. 97 
While this despair cannot be used as an argument that says it cannot obtain, 
neither do we have to treat it as Rorty appears to, as a stubborn imrecontextualisible 
brute fact. Religious non-realists like Cupitt agree that the past is past, but will not 
remain content with Peukert's or Rorty's despair. They respond by allowing with 
Peukert that the ideas of religious faith provide resources that enable us to develop a 
sense of solidarity with the sufferings of past generations while denying Peukert's 
belief that such solidarity is only obtainable on the assumption of a 'Lord of History' 
outside of human practice. Religious non-realists would agree with McCarthy when 
he points out that the postulate argument Peukert professes furnishes us with 
subjective rather than objective knowledge of God. Rather than seeing this 
subjective knowledge in terms of the requirements of moral and practical reason, 
religious non-realists wil l follow Dewey and see it in terms of imagined ideal ends 
and their union with actual conditions. By projecting ideal ends, a religious faith 
may assist the type of empathetic and compassionate solidarity with the past that 
Benjamin envisages without the despair that follows from accepting the finitude of 
the past. Nothing can redeem the suffering of those victims of the terrible events 
that constitute such historical horrors as the Holocaust, but a religious faith with the 
memory of the suffering of himian beings at its centre and guided by projected ideal 
ends for a better, more just, fiiture, wil l attempt to incorporate as part of its own 
self-understanding an identification with the victims of history. 
Religious belief provides a vocabulary in which 'naked pain' and 'brute power* 
can be recontextualised and transformed. Cupitt agrees with Rorty that everything is 
contingent, that the world is de-divinised "and everything is negotiable. "9* But he 
writes: 
97ibid.,p.211. 
9* Cupitt, Creation out of Nothing, op. cit., pp. 16, 17. 
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I differ from Rorty only in that I find that to . survive in our post-modem 
universe made only of contingencies, relativities and interpretation, I need 
more resources than Rorty's ... accoimt supplies.'^ 
For Cupitt, religion is the acceptance of contingency through ritual.'^o For Dewey a 
religious faith coimects us with nature in such a way as to assuage us from despair. 
Both find a use for religion in its ability to provide a vocabulary for 
recontextualising our experience of human pain and suffering. This vocabulary, I 
suggest, is one that Rorty could choose to use, for he allows that once we see a use 
for a certain vocabulary for fulfilling a purpose, including a Christian vocabulary 
we should use it. It was used in the past, he suggests, to alleviate cruelty, perhaps 
today, it can be recontextualised and used in the way Cupitt and Dewey suggest. 
Since Rorty admits that the manipulation of metaphors can cause us to "gain or 
lose religious f a i t h , " a n d since his liberal ironism requires "as much imaginative 
acquaintance with alternative final vocabularies as possible""'^ we might hope that 
Rorty may become more imaginative about religion, for only a "lack of ingenuity" 
can hinder our ability to recontextualise.We can argue that he should separate 
his tropological God from his conception of religion, but adopting Rorty's own style, 
it might be more effective to persuade him toward more ingenious 
recontextualisations of religious belief 
8. 5. Conclusion: 
In this penultimate chapter I have discussed Rorty's attitude to religious belief He is 
an atheist who claims that a reUgious vocabulary is no longer of much social use. 
Nevertheless he has been shown to have both a negative tropological use for 'God' 
99 ibid., p. 16. 
100 ibid., p. 17. 
101 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p.55. 
102 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 163. 
103 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 92, 
104 ibid., p. 134. 
105 As David Hall points out the most effective critique of Rorty will be to employ a sympathetic 
misreading of his work. Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, op. cit,, pp. 
9-10, 169. 
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and a more positive attitude to a religious vocabulary that has been suitably de-
divinised. Such a vocabulary is offered in 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realism and by 
John Dewey in his book A Common Faith. I have suggested that although Rorty 
does not affirm such a religious vocabulary himself, he caimot criticise those who 
do. Further, I have suggested, that a recontextuahsation of Rorty's own 'final 
vocabulary' so that it includes a more explicit affirmation of a 'religious' stand would 
help reweave a certain knot in his own complex of beliefs and desires. In the 
concluding chapter I shall argue that, despite his atheism, a theological 
appropriation of Rorty's work is possible. Not only does it mesh well with, and help 
articulate, the self understanding of 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realism, it also 
provides it with an argumentative resource by which it might defend itself against 
alternative religious critical realist positions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1. Infroduction: 
In this thesis I have summarised the main ideas associated with some of the 
prominent writers belonging to the religious non-realist 'Sea of Faith' network. By 
far the most significant of these writers and the inspiration behind the network is 
Don Cupitt. Cupitt argues that the intellectual history of the last four hundred years, 
and pressures internal to religious belief and ethical practice suggest that religious 
non-realism, rather than religious realism, is now a genuine inheritor of the 
Christian tradition. I have emphasised the pragmatic strand both in the 'Sea of Faith' 
writers and in Cupitt's early and later accounts of religious non-realism. I have 
argued that this pragmatic element in their work is paralleled in the religious 
thought of John Dewey. However, Cupitt prefers to appeal to the neo-pragmatism 
of Richard Rorty. In the latter part of this thesis I have attempted to defend this 
appeal by addressing three major issues related to the interpretation of Rorty's work: 
that in matters of truth he is an epistemological subjectivist, that his pragmatism 
leads to a dangerously cynical political ideology and that his atheism offers little or 
no support to a religious mentality. I have challenged these claims. While Rorty 
was to some degree responsible for making these interpretations of his work 
credible, his position has not been static. Changes in his position in relation to the 
first two concerns make appeal to Rorty's ideas by religious non-realists more 
palatable than might first appear. His work neither necessarily implies subjectivism 
in matters of truth nor cynicism about the social good. Thus, the association of 
religious non-realism with Rorty's pragmatism need not lead the religious non-realist 
to fear that they are being yoked to an apology for relativism, for fascism or for 
idealism and its anti-realist cognates. Equally, despite his avowal of atheism, I have 
argued that Rorty has a positive as well as a negative use of religious belief 
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Further, while not necessarily going as far as J Wesley Robbins in viewing Rorty as 
a Deweyan religious thinker, an incorporation of a religious vocabulary into Rorty's 
pragmatism may assist him in resolving certain remaining problematic features in 
his work. In this concluding chapter I want to consider some of the practical gains 
for religious non-realists from a theological appropriation of Rorty's work. 
One such, directs our attention to the possible future development of religious 
non-realism in terms of its relation to, and interaction with, other theological 
perspectives influenced by pragmatism. Future study might investigate the 
similarities and differences between 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realism and the 
pragmatic strand in the work of theologians influenced by Wittgenstein, such as 
D.Z. Phillips and Gareth Moore. According to this theological interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, it makes no sense to talk of divine reality as lying hidden behind the 
veil of language. The way you use the word 'God', noted Wittgenstein,"... does not 
show whom you mean but rather what you mean."i As D.Z. Phillips argues: 
... language is not a screen which hides God from us. On the contrary, 
the idea of God in the language ... is the idea of a hidden God.^ 
Gareth Moore also points out that to look for God behind language, as i f language 
were a medium between us and God, is to hold a view of language that leads us to 
search for God in the wrong place. "The impossibility of describing God," he writes, 
"comes from there being nothing there to describe." And yet, he adds: 
... on the other hand, it is very easy to describe God: God is merciful, 
compassionate, omnipotent, just, watchful, faithful; and God is everything 
that Jesus Christ shows him to be. But such a description of God is not a 
description of a something we know not what:... ^ 
' Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 50e. 
2 D.Z. Pimps, Faith After Foundationalism, (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 289. 
5 Gareth Moore, Believing in God (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), p. 56. Moore indicates that 
"the language in which we talk about God is like the rest of our language our language." (p. 55). For 
Moore to fear and to trust God (p. 123), to love God (p. 126), to pray to God (pp. 60-62), and even 
the creative activity of God (pp. 278-279) can all be understood in the context of the last sentence of 
his book. "We may say:" he writes, "people do not discover religious truths, they make them." (p. 
287). 
5 
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A second group of theologians, also influenced by pragmatism and with whom 
religious non-realists might find fhii tful dialogue, are those broadly termed 'radical 
American religious empiricists' such as Gordon D. Kaufinan, Sallie McFague, 
Jerome A. Stone and Everett J. Tarbox'*. A prime example of this group of 
theologians is William Dean. Like Cupitt, Dean values both science and religion 
and calls for spiritual renewal based upon the establishment of sacred conventions. 
Such conventions, he argues, are human creations but v^ l l also take on a life of their 
own. 
Important though these interactions with other theological traditions influenced 
by pragmatism are, I shall concentrate upon two other practical gains that follow for 
religious non-realists from a theological appropriation of pragmatism. These relate 
to Rorty's figure of the prophetic liberal ironist, discussed in chapter seven, which 
articulates significant elements of the non-realist's self-imderstanding and his 
pragmatic antirepresentationalism, discussed in chapter six, which provides them 
with an argumentative resource they might choose to employ in order to defend their 
position against alternative critical realist accounts of religious belief 
Gordon D. Kaufinan, In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Sallie McFague, Mocfe/s q/"God- Theology for an Ecological Age, (London: 
SCM Press, 1987); Jerome A. Stone, 'The Viability of Religious Naturalism', in The American Journal 
of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993, pp. 35-42; Everett J. Tarbox Jr., "Linguistic Pragmatism, 
William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein', in American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 15, 
1994, pp. 43-58. While theologians like Kaufinan and McFague still claim to be realists, Joseph 
Runzo in the case of Kaufinan (Joseph Runzo, 'Realism, Non-Realism and Atheism', m Runzo (ed.). Is 
God Real?, op. cit., pp. 154-156, 174) and David Bromell in the case of McFague (David J. Bromell, 
'Sallie McFague's Metaphorical Theology', in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 16, 
1993, pp. 485-503; see pp. 499-501), have pointed out how close their position is to that of the 
pragmatic non-realist. For McFague, our metaphors for God (and the metaphor 'God') do 'refer" to "a 
power ... which is on the side of life and its fiilfihnent."" (Sallie McFague, Models of God, op. cit., p. 
195) But this, as she points out, is itself a linguistic construction made up of metaphors which 
produce rather than imitate reality, (ibid., p. 192) She admits, therefore: 
... the main criterion for a "true" theology is pragmatic, preferring those models of God 
that are most helpfiil ia the praxis of bringii^ about fulfilment for living beings, 
ibid., p. 196. For a further discussion of the theological implications of this tradition see Terence 
Reynolds, 'Two McFagues: Meaning, Truth, and Justification in "Models of God", in Modem 
Theology, Vol. 11, 1995, pp. 289-313; see also John Avery, 'Three Types of American Neo-
Pragmatism', inJoumal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 18, 1993, pp. 1-13. 
5 William Dean, The Religious Critic in American Culture, (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 
especially chapters 7 and 8. See also his 'Sheltering Skies: A Response' in The American Journal of 
Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 1995, pp. 87-98. 
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9.2. Prophetic Liberal Ironism and Christian Ironism: 
Anthony Thiselton, contrasts what he terms 'Rorty's socio-pragmatic hermeneutics' 
unfavourably with the 'socio-critical hermeneutics' of Jiirgen Habermas.^ However, 
I want to suggest that a Rortyan pragmatism is not as disagreeable to theology as 
Thiselton argues. That Rorty does not affirm a personal religious faith should not be 
taken as negating the possibility of a theological appropriation of his work. For 
Thiselton, Habermas and Rorty represent different ends of a spectrum which finds 
its centre in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer.'^  Whereas Habermas' hermeneutic 
"reaches beyond the horizon of particular persons or communities''^ toward the 
possibility of a trans-contextual critique of human practice, Rorty insists that this is 
not possible. Criteria for a trans-contextual critique of human practice, "remain 
relative to what is perceived to count as criteria within a given social community. "9 
Thus, according to Thiselton, Rorty's account of hermeneutics denies to Christians 
the possibility of seeing in the cross of Jesus a critical perspective on the world. In 
Rorty's pragmatism, notes Thiselton "the cross is controlled, domesticated and 
transposed into a construct of the linguistic world of some given community. The 
cross performs no trans-contextual function. 
For Thiselton, a theology of the cross must perform such a function and 
therefore Christian theology must share some cotmnon concerns with the socio-
critical hermeneutics associated with Habermas, who alongside Karl-Otto Apel, the 
later Wittgenstein and the atheistic deconstructive critique of post-modernism 
associated with Christopher Norris are all marshalled by Thiselton into a critique of 
Rorty's socio-pragmatism.'' In Thiselton's eyes these writers provide philosophical 
support for the idea that it is possible for us to bridge our own contextual boundaries 
and assert the validity of notions like 'the common behaviour of mankind'. As we 
^ Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, (London: Harper Collins, 1992), Chapter 11. 
ibid., p. 6. 
8 ibid., p. 7. 
9 ibid., p. 7. 
10 ibid., p. 7. 
11 ibid., chapter 11 and pp. 540-550. 
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have seen, Rorty would reply that there are contexts in which talk of trans-
contextual bridges might make sense, but that these bridges are built by a 
commtmity as it expands what it takes to be "us" to include more of "them." For 
Thiselton, to follow Rorty would be to make theology hostage to the imperial claims 
of American cosmopolitanism.However, an antipathy to meta-critical theory does 
not necessarily lead to one specific cultural or political direction. It need not mean 
accepting as one's own, the contextual setting which is Rorty's. Rather it can mean 
acknowledging our own responsibility for our continued commitment to a Christian 
context in which the meaning and purpose of our lives and the lives of other people 
is understood and given expression. 
In a rare discussion of theology, Habermas notes, contra Thiselton, that a trans-
historical hiaman solidarity does not need "an experience accessible only in the 
language of the Christian tradition."^^ While it is the case that human solidarity 
cannot be separated from a dependence upon a certain degree of historical 
favourableness "this favourableness," Habermas notes, "is still no licence for the 
assumption of a divine promise of salvation."''* Habermas asserts the plausibility of 
speaking of a 'transcendence from within', but adds that an awareness of the limits of 
such transcendence "does not enable us to ascertain the coimtermovement of a 
compensating transcendence from beyond. "15 Commenting upon the assertion of 
Charles Davis, that "a secular hope without religion cannot affirm with certainty ... 
a future fulfilment,"!^ Habermas argues that he does "not see why [such] a 
superadditum is indispensable in order that we would endeavour to act according to 
moral commands." 
12 ibid., pp. 27-28, 398-401. 
1^  Jiirgen Habermas, 'Transcendence From Within. Transcendence in this World' [E.T. Eric Crump and 
Peter P. Kenny]. In Don S. Browning and Francis Schussler Fiorenza (ed.), Habermas, Modernity and 
Public Theology, (New York: Crossroads, 1992), p. 238. Also see William J. Meyer, Trivate Faith or 
Public Religion?: An Assessment of Habermas's Changing View of Religion', in The Journal of 
Religion, Vol. 75, 1995. pp. 371 -391. 
1'* Habermas, 'Transcendence From Within. Transcendence in this World' op. cit., p. 238. 
15 ibid., p. 238. 
16 ibid., p. 238. 
1' ibid., pp. 238-239. 
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I f Habermas is persuaded to talk in theological terms he prefers what he terms 
'methodical atheism' which he associates with the Danish theologian Jens Glebe-
MoUer. Habermas emphasises Glebe-Moller's atheistic vision of the ideal 
communicative fellowship: a vision in which God remains unthinkable, but in 
which, we strive ourselves to bring about a solidarity which makes a positive use of 
the loss, guilt and pain of the human condition; and a practical use of Jesus' 
example, without employing any notion of divine deliverance, i^ Habermas even 
goes a stage further in his antipathy to religion. He asserts that i f religious language 
is to have any meaning today it must risk the loss of its identity and be translated 
into the language of scientific culture.'9 Rorty's pragmatism, on the other hand, wil l 
allow that i f religious belief can be shown to serve a useful purpose no such 
translation need be demanded. Like Habermas, Rorty insists that religion will need 
to reconstruct its arguments into secular terms i f its proponents are to have a place 
in public debate. But unlike Habermas, Rorty notes: 
'Reconstructing the arguments in purely secular terms' just means 
'dropping reference to the source of the premises of the arguments' and 
that this omission seems a reasonable price to pay for religious liberty.^o 
In that neither Dewey's religious naturalism nor Cupitt's religious non-realism share 
realist premises there can be no objection that Rorty could raise against allowing 
them both a place in public debate. 
Thiselton recognises that his own appeal to Habermas, while providing ^00/5 for 
developing a socio-critical trans-contextual understanding of the cross, also 
"constitutes a theological transposition of Habermas' social theory into a new or 
different key"2i. I wish to argue that Rorty's pragmatic antirepresentationalism can 
also undergo 'theological transposition into a new and different key': one in which 
Rorty's hostility to religion is cancelled out by his freeing of religious discourse 
1^  ibid., pp. 235-236. Also see Jens Glebe-Moller, A Political Dogmatic, (E.T. Thor Hall. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 112. 
19 J. Habermas, 'Transcendence From Within. Transcendence in this Worid' op. cit., p. 234. 
20 Richard Rorty, 'Religion as a Conversation-Stopper', in Common Knowledge, Vol. 3, 1994, p. 5. 
21 Tiaselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, op. cit., p. 393. 
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within the open, 'general conversation of mankind' which liberal institutions try to 
keep going. In some respects, Rorty's anti-trans-contextuaiism is confirmed by 
Thiselton's desire to see Habermas' socio-critical hermeneutics within the context of 
a specifically Christian construal of his work. I now wish to suggest that a 
specifically Christian construal of Rortyan pragmatism, contra Thiselton, can affirm 
the transformative power of the crucified Christ as a means of encouraging human 
solidarity. In order to do this, i t wi l l be useful to remind ourselves of the 
characteristics of Rorty's prophetic liberal ironist. 
Rorty's figure exhibits at least four characteristics. First, she recognises that her 
own commitment to justice and human solidarity is itself contingent. Claims to 
ground solidarity on anything more stable are seen by her as "platitudes used to 
inculcate the local final vocabulary. "22 Yet, writes Rorty, such commitment "can 
still be thought worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that... [it] ... is 
caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance. "2^  Second, the 
liberal ironist is committed to the notion that cruelty is the worst thing we can inflict 
on other people.24 She does not look for 'reasons' to care, but tries to ensure she 
"notices suffering when it occurs"25 in order to help prevent or alleviate it. Her 
conmiitment to the "hope that suffering wi l l be diminished, that the humiliation of 
human beings by other human beings may cease"26 remains an ironic, ungrounded, 
historically contingent hope. Third, she is someone who refuses to answer the 
question, "How do you decide when to struggle against injustice and when to devote 
yourself to private projects of self-creation?"2'' because there is no general answer to 
such a question. Only by the contingencies of local events can one judge the 
answer, and these answers wil l differ. What she does know is that she needs both 
• 22 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1989), pp . 76-77. 
23 ibid., p . 189. 
2^* ibid., p p . 73-74; 92-93. 
25 ibid., p . 93. 
26 ibid., p . XV. 
2^  ibid., p . XV. 
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the vocabulary of justice and the vocabulaiy of self-creation. She also knows that 
she initially needs to keep these vocabularies separate from each other. This is 
because "most people do not want to be redescribed." Rorty continues: 
They want to be taken on their own terms ... The ironist tells them that 
the language they speak is up for grabs by her and her kind. There is 
something potentially very cruel about that claim ... redescription often 
humiliates.28 
For this reason Rorty's ironist is always a liberal—someone who is prepared to 
redescribe every final vocabulary while continuing to be sensitive to the humiliation 
such redescription might cause. The prophetic liberal ironist wants more solidarity 
than we have now, but she believes it is a mistake to think that 'reasons' for such 
solidarity are independent of our creating it. If we think there are independent 
reasons, the sceptic can use his rejection of these reasons as an excuse not to seek 
solidarity.29 The prophetic liberal ironist wants to eliminate this excuse as much as 
she wants to abandon universalism and essentialism. Rorty notes: 
She thinks of final vocabularies as poetic achievements rather than as 
fiiiits of diligent inquiry according to antecedently formulated criteria. ^ ° 
Fourth, because redescription is a continuous process "of diversification and novelty 
rather than convergence to the antecedently present,"^ ! the prophetic liberal ironist 
will take care to be skilfiil enough to redescribe by persuasion rather than force.^ 2 
Part of this skill will be the ability "to separate the question 'Do you believe and 
desire what we believe and desire?' fi-om the question 'Are you suffering?'"" A 
fiirther part of this skill will be the ability to allow one's sensibilities to such 
suffering to support a move from irony to politics by instantiating persuasive 
prophetic visions of a more just community or a community more at ease because it 
has less problems to trouble it. These abilities will be part of the further skill to 
28 ibid., pp. 89-90. 
29 ibid., p. 196. 
30 ibid., p. 77. 
31 ibid., p. 77. 
32 ibid., pp. 60-61. 
33 ibid., p. 198. 
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"work with the final vocabulary we have, while keeping our ears open for hints 
about how it might be expanded or revised. "•'"^  Such an ability, Rorty believes, is 
one more readily practised by the prophetic liberal ironist than the metaphysician 
who believes he has a fixed universal criteria for ethical action. The difference 
between the prophetic liberal ironist and the metaphysical ethicist is not, according 
to Rorty, that the former is engaged in constant redescription of the world which 
may hmniliate people, while the latter is not, for "redescription and possible 
humiliation are no more closely connected with ironism than with metaphysics. "•'^  
Rather, it is that "[t]he metaphysician ... thinks that there is a connection between 
redescription and power, and that the right redescription can make us fi-ee,"^^ The 
prophetic liberal ironist will see a greater danger of humiliation from the vocabulary 
of the metaphysical ethicist who substitutes persuasive skill for a claim to be 
speaking of a power greater than ourselves. 
The prophetic liberal ironist hopes to combine public and private 
vocabularies—to combine a concern for truth with fiuther concerns for social justice 
and the protection of liberal freedom. In doing so, Rorty believes, she resembles 
"Christians (and others) for whom the search for private perfection coincides with 
the project of living for others ... "'"^  Perhaps, i f Rorty were not so dominated by his 
negative tropological conception of God he might be more explicit in 
acknowledging that much of what he attributed to liberalism, in terms of its 
relevance to public concern for human solidarity, is also part of the public 
vocabulary of contemporary Christianity. He might then allow the possibility of a 
'Christian ironist' who like the prophetic liberal ironist desires both a vocabulary of 
private self-creation and a vocabulary of public concern. Any such 'Christian ironist' 
would be committed to the Christian concern for one's neighbour in the terms of a 
'Christian', rather than a 'liberal' vocabulary, while recognising that there is no extra-
ibid., p. 197. 
35 ibid., p. 90. 
56 ibid., pp. 90-91. 
3^  ibid., p. 143. 
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human guarantee for such a vocabulary nor any philosophical or historical necessity 
about them. She would accept, in Cupitt's words, that 
In this shifting relativistic world of ours, we can still choose oiir values 
and fight for them, but our beliefs won't have the old kind of permanent 
anchorage in an unchanging ideal order. 38 
Having reminded ourselves of these characteristics of Rorty's prophetic liberal 
ironist, we can now compare her vocabulary and the vocabulary of the religious non-
realist. To develop this comparison I shall relate some Rortyan remarks to the 
theological views expressed by Graham Shaw. 
Like the prophetic liberal ironist, the Christian ironist would acknowledge that 
today the sermon has largely been replaced by the novel, the movie and T.V. 
programmes, as a source of moral guidance.39 She would also acknowledge, with 
the liberal ironist, that these media are able to bring about social reform not by 
appealing to divine imperatives or some Habermasian universal criteria, but 
piecemeal, by characterising local situations.'^ o ^ novel like Bleak House, writes 
Rorty 
... aroused participative emotions which helped change the laws of 
England, and ... [was] ... written so as to keep right on producing tingles 
between the shoulder blades long after the particular horrors of Dickens's 
century had been replaced by new ones.^ ' 
The Christian ironist would agree, but would see the Bible in a similar fashion. She 
will suggest that scripture can have a similar effect as Dickens' novels. The gospel 
story of the life and death of Jesus, re-enacted in the Eucharist, brings similar kinds 
of tingles with equal social consequences.'*2 Such sentimentality is not simply a 
private matter but rather also a matter of our public responsibility. 
38 Cupitt, 'Anti-Realist Faith', in Joseph Runzo (ed.) Is God Real?, (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 48. 
39 ibid., p.46. Also see Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. xvi. 
Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 79. 
'^^  Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 147. (Also see p. 148.) 
'*2 David Hart, Faith in Doubt: Non Realism and Christian Belief, (London: Mowbray, 1993) pp 92-
93. 
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Graham Shaw accepts that religious belief is a private, self-creative quest for 
perfection. He writes: 
When I invoke God, I am being truly creative. No image is being 
imposed upon me. ... in prayer, in relation to the God of my imagining, I 
develop a self I can respect. In praising my God I learn the value of my 
imagination. 
He is ironic about the attempts of humans to seek supernatural power to reverse the 
contingencies of life.'*'* Such attempts are fiitile and succeed only to buttress the 
position of the powerful authority figures, within the social structures of the religion 
they claim to serve.'*^  This fiitile attempt occurred in Christianity with the 
development of the resurrection myth. This myth attempts to reinstate the 'God of 
Power' over the 'God of Peace' conveyed by Jesus in his suffering death on the 
cross.'*^  For Shaw, the creator God, the judging God, the redeeming God who will 
intervene in the world to put everything right, is the 'God of Power' repudiated in the 
cross of Jesus. The effect of the 'God of Power' was that it "cloaked the violence of 
men [so that] the glory of God hid the self-regard of his agents.'"''^  Yet Jesus, writes 
Shaw 
... was content to be deprived of all human power and stripped of all 
human prestige, because only in that way could the integrity of the man of 
God be demonsfrated. ... only the man on the cross without power or 
prestige can speak to us of a God which our suspicion cannot sully. 
Out of Shaw's private irony emerges a sense of Christian identity—its association 
with the weak, the powerless and the victim. This is similar to Rorty's liberal whose 
identity rests in her concern for the himiiliated and her desire to avoid cruelty. For 
Shaw, the cross reveals the Christian God to be "a God who can sustain the self-
respect of the victim".'*^ Such a God is proclaimed against the realist God of power 
Graham Shaw, God in Our Hands, (London: SCM Press, 1987), p. 220. 
ibid., p. 186. Compare this with Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 75. 
45 Shaw, Godin Our Hands, op. cit., pp. 153. ff. 
'^ ^ ibid., pp. 114, 121-122, 136. 
47 ibid., p. 135. 
48 ibid., pp. 135-136. 
49 ibid., p. 239. 
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which, according to Shaw, encouraged "human beings to seek privilege and shun 
solidarity. "50 Summarising his understanding of what Jesus reveals to us, Shaw 
writes: 
The disconcerting feature of his goodness is precisely that it has discarded 
all claim to power, human or divine; it does not need them. The man of 
God needs neither the violent defence of men nor the privileged 
intervention of an Almighty God ... The utter vulnerability of goodness 
is displayed without equivocation, in a way which makes it possible to 
realise that our wretchedness comes not from the pain we suffer but from 
the damage we inflict. Instead of feeling threatened and looking for 
protection, the victim directs our attention toward our own 
destructiveness. 51 
Shaw sees in the suffering death of Jesus the source of human solidarity which does 
not require the God of power. Rorty claims that "victims of cruelty ... do not have 
much language"52 and therefore, someone else will have to speak for them. For 
Rorty, the novelist and the journalist are good at this. For Shaw the gospel writers, 
who attest to the God of Jesus do this (however tempted they might have been by the 
God of power). They tell us that the man of the cross should not remind us of our 
victories but of our victims.53 
Like Rorty, Shaw is very keen to emphasise human self-creation. For Shaw, 
religion is the means by which I can be true to myself. 54 But, also like Rorty, Shaw 
sees the source of human solidarity in our avoiding the danger of inflicting pain and 
humiliation on other people, that is, in a 'common danger' rather than a "common 
possession or a shared power. "55 Picking up on the notion that himian solidarity 
comes from a similar danger, Shaw writes: 
... in the mirror which the crucifixion holds up to us we lack not power 
but pity and peace. For us the cross remains a haunting symbol not least 
because it reflects our ruthless and destructive possibilities. Mankind 
with nuclear power in its possession no longer kneels to an Almighty 
50 ibid., p. 110. 
5Mbid., p. 124 (my italics). 
52 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 94. 
53 Shaw, Godin Our Hands, op. cit. p. 129. 
54 ibid., pp. 192, 220-223. 
55 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 91. 
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God. As we come to recognise our real needs the religions of power must 
give way to a religion of peace. 
A religion of peace, rather than a religion of power is best suited to the cause of 
human solidarity. For both Rorty and Shaw, human solidarity is created by seeing 
the dignity of the human stranger as a potential fellow sufferer. In this way they 
combine private and public vocabularies within a prophetic vision of a new 
humanity. 
Given this it seems difficuh to agree with Anthony Thiselton that "[sjocial 
pragmatism accepts only social winners as criteria for truth. "^ '^  Whatever 'truth' 
might mean here Rorty is clear that human solidarity 
... is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the 
pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased 
sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalise people different from 
ourselves by thinking, "They do not feel it as we would,... 
Neither does Rorty 'domesticate' the cross. Recognising that "Nietzsche was 
absolutely ... wrong to treat Christianity and ... [democracy] as signs of human 
degeneration," '^ he acknowledges that after dispensing with 'God and his doubles' 
the Cross takes on a far more important role in Christianity. He writes: 
Pragmatism seems to me ... a philosophy of solidarity rather than of 
despair. From this point of view, Christianity's turn from an Omnipotent 
Creator to the man who suffered on the cross, ... can be seen as ... [a].... 
preparation for the act of social faith which is suggested by a Nietzschean 
view of truth^o 
Contra Thiselton: a socio-pragmatic. Christian ironism can centre on a theology of 
the cross. Contra Habermas: a cross centred theology for human solidarity is 
possible. 
5^ Shaw, God in Our Hands, op. cit., p. 21. 
5"^  Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, op. cit., p. 550. 
8^ Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. xvi. 
59 Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality', in The Yale Review, Vol. 81, 1993, 
p. 17. 
^ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, op. cit., p. 33. 
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Having suggested that Rorty's pragmatism is capable of sustaining a counter-
cultural theology of the cross, I now intend to discuss a fiirther practical gain for 
non-realists who adopt pragmatism by showing how a Rortyan account of the 
Davidsonian triangulation of truth articulates an argumentative resource that non-
realists might employ in defence of their position against altemative critical 
religious realist positions. 
9.3. Rorty's Pragmatism and the Debate Between Religious Non-realists and 
Religious Critical Realists: 
For religious critical realists, versions of realist faith which emphasise divine 
revelation or human reason as the basis of our epistemological access to divine 
reality do not always fully appreciate the extent to which our epistemological 
capacities shape and condition the reality that they convey. Like non-realists, 
critical realists point out that what we take to be divine revelation always comes in 
'ready-made' cultural packages relevant to the specific psychological and social 
background of the individuals or communities who receive and interpret the 
revelation.. They argue that reality is to a large degree constructed by the rational 
procedures available to humans as knowers. For religious critical realists, the reality 
of God, as well as the realities of the physical world, are independent of us but are 
necessarily imderstood and shaped in language and conveyed through media that 
reflect the psychological, sociological and cultural conditions which any particular 
observer will always manifest, and which thereby limit the claims of any observer to 
'describe' the realities being referred to as they are in themselves. Janet Martin 
Soskice summarises 'religious critical realism' when she writes: 
... we are saying that the theist can reasonably take his talk of God, bound 
as it is within a wheel of images, as being reality depicting, while at the 
same time acknowledging its inadequacy as description. '^ 
And Arthur Peacocke notes: 
61 Janet Martin Sos]sice, Metaphor and Religious Language, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p.l41. 
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Critical realism in theology would maintain that theological concepts and 
models should be regarded as partial and inadequate, but necessary and, 
indeed the only ways of referring to the reality that is named as 'God'... ^2 
Critical realists therefore, view language as an inadequate but necessary medium for 
representing divine reality. Inadequacy, for them, indicates the inability of 
language, or other representational media, to convey directly to us the entities 
necessarily referred to or depicted by these media. 
For John Hick, critical realism holds: 
... that the world as we experience it is a distinctively human construction 
arising from the impacts of a real environment upon our sense organs, but 
conceptualised in consciousness and language in culturally developed 
forms.63 
For Hick, the philosophical background to critical realism was provided by Kant's 
analysis of the categories of human understanding and our conceptual intuition of 
space and time, producing thereby a distinction between the noumenal and 
phenomenal world: that is, between the world unknowable by us and that world 
understood through the conditions which make knowledge possible for human 
beings. Hick suggests, in effect, that Kant is applying to our knowledge of the 
physical world a distinction which has long been part of our traditional 
understanding of God, that is, between God as God's self, completely unknowable by 
us, which Hick calls 'the Real', and God as we perceive God to be.^ '' Hick notes that 
since Kant's time we recognise even more the contribution made by language, 
culture, history, social backgroimd and psychological make-up in shaping our 
awareness of the envirormient around us and also "that ultimate environment ... of 
which the religions speak. "^ ^ This ultimate envirormient, 'the Real', like Kant's 
noumena, cannot be directly encountered but is available within, and approached by. 
^2 Arthur Peacocke, Theology For A Scientific Age, (London: S.C.M. Press, 1993 Enlarged Edition) 
p. 14. 
3^ John Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-realism', in Joseph Runzo (ed.) Is God Real?, op. cit., p. 5. 
^ John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 241. 
5^ John Hick, 'Religious Realism and Non-realism', op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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culturally specific religious discourse and experience.^ ^ Thus our experience of'the 
Real' and the language in which this is expressed will always be inadequate as an 
actual description of'the Real' in itself 
A rather different account of critical realism is provided by Soskice. For her, 
metaphor provides the necessary but inadequate medium for representing reality. 
Towards the end of her book Metaphor and Religious Language she writes: 
All the metaphors which we use to speak of God arise from experiences 
of that which carmot adequately be described, of that which Jews and 
Christians believe to be 'He who is'.^' 
Soskice correctly rebuts the view that metaphors are merely rhetorical tropes. They 
are, she writes, "figures of speech whereby we speak of one thing in forms which are 
seen to be suggestive of another''^ ^ They can, therefore, be understood as referring 
terms within a causal theory of reference. That is, Soskice's causal theory of 
reference asserts that when we say in faith, 'whatever caused this experience is God' 
and then go on to depict this God as 'love', 'father', 'spirit', etc., we engage in a 
dubbing event in which metaphors make referential claims. Metaphors not only say 
something which cannot be said in any other way, they also refer to entities which 
caimot be referred to in any other way. Such entities include the theoretical entities 
of science and the supernatural entities of religious belief However, while 
metaphors may refer, they do not offer literal descriptions of that to which they 
refer. God is not literally 'a father' nor, in science, do genes literally 'pass on 
information that is written into them'. As stiaightforward descriptions of things, 
metaphors are to be regarded as inadequate. As a result, we might be led to abandon 
certain metaphorical references and the network of associations, or models, that they 
inhabit, as failing to refer. Phlogiston is mentioned by Soskice in this respect. We 
do not, therefore, need proof of the existence of such entities in order to make a 
^ John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, op. cit., p. 14. 
67 Sos]dcQ, Metaphor and Religious Language, op. cit., p. 160. 
68 ibid., p. 15. 
69 ibid., p. 131. 
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reference but we do need a designation that fits our experience. In relation to 
references to God we need a designation of God which, writes Soskice, "if it existed. 
Christians would be obliged to say was God."^ o Anselm's designation of 'that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived' seems to fit the bill, but i f it was shown that 
such a designation could not reasonably be imderstood in personalistic terms or i f it 
were to go the way of phlogiston, then theists must be prepared to admit to have 
held errant beliefs. For Soskice, realism always means being prepared to be 
wrong. '^ She believes that metaphors, while revisable and inadequate, are sufficient 
for depicting the experience that religious people have when they talk of God and 
that such depiction is enough to guarantee the veracity of the critical realist's 
position. For her, the fact that we caimot describe God is an advantage because it 
shows that the transcendence of God passes beyond all our attempts to capture 
divine reality in language. It also means, in relation to the natural world, that our 
science need not "mirror the world in unrevisable fashion"'2 in order to be 
considered as reality depicting. 
However, many realists, including Brian Hebblethwaite and Michael Durtant, 
have suggested that critical realism is not realist enough.'^ 3 por Durrant, Soskice's 
accoimt of reference does not guarantee that God is in fact a real entity. Indeed, 
non-realists accept the view, affirmed by both Hick and Soskice, that "theological 
models must be understood contextually"'^ '^  and they can also accepts Soskice's 
causal theory of reference. In a purely causal theory of reference, that which words 
name, for example 'the blood hoimd of Baker Street' or 'the Iron Lady', need not refer 
to a 'real thing' and thus notions like 'correspondence' or 'representation' are not 
'0 ibid., p. 139. 
ibid., pp. 139-140, 152. 
72 ibid., p. 136.. 
"^3 Hebblethwaite disagrees with the type of epistemological realism associated with John Hick. Such a 
realism risks giving the impression that we are cut off from the world by our concepts. Instead, 
Hebblethwaite's is an ontological religious realism. The world is as observation says it is and God is as 
revelation says God is. Brian Hebblethwaite, The Ocean of Truth: A Defence of Objective Theism, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 71-85, 102-113, 139-149. 
7'* SQs]sice, Metaphor and Religious Language, op. cit., p. 153. 
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involved. The causal theory on its own makes no distinction that would enable it to 
divide what is a real thing from what is not. For non-realists, who are also 
pragmatists, what coimts as successfiil reference is the contribution it makes in 
assisting our coping with the world by the naming of various portions within it. In 
this view of reference, language works to serve our purposes rather than mediating 
to us some antecedently existing 'real thing'. Thus, like the reference to the "blood 
hound of Baker Street', the metaphorical dubbing that refers to God as 'that which 
caused this religious experience' need not make a reference to anything outside of 
our human creativity. This is the point that Durrant makes. For him, reference 
without some prior knowledge or description of what is being referred to is an 
impossible realist position. He writes: 
In order to determine that ... an experience is of God we must first be 
able to truly claim that God is of such a nature that such experiences are 
of him; ... [this would] demand that some prior description of God is 
possible,... which Soskice denies.'5 
In order to make her view more plausible, Soskice places the emphasis of her 
account of reference on culturally oriented religious experiences. Metaphorical 
references in religion are, she writes, "... stumbling approximations used to 
articulate experiences judged to be of God."76 Because reference need not imply 
correspondence, Soskice, like Hick, supports her claim that metaphorical references 
are reality depicting by pointing to cultural and psychological experiences of God 
which can equally well be interpreted in non-realist terms. As Hebblethwaite 
acknowledges: 
... an argument from religious experience for the reality of God ... is 
exfremely vulnerable to altemative psychological and sociological 
explanation as Cupitt [is] quick to point out.77 
75 Michael Durrant, 'Reference and Critical Realism' mModem Theology, Vol. 5, 1989. p. 142. 
76 ibid., p. 153. 
77 Brian Hebblethwaite, "Reflections on Realism vs. Non-realism' in Joseph Runzo (ed.), Is God Real?, 
op. cit., p. 210. 
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Given the premise of the critical realist's epistemological distinction between 
cultiu-al or metaphorical oriented reference and literal description, Durrant's point 
seems cogent. Critical realism does seem unable to give an account of reality that is 
independent of our cultural or metaphorical access. This point applies as much to 
Hick as it does to Soskice, for i f descriptions of 'the Real' are limited to, and 
exhausted by, phenomenal formulations how are we able to regard these 
formulations as expressions of something more real? And yet, the critical realist's 
critique of the possibility of a neutral or literal description of supernatural entities 
also seems convincing. We therefore reach an impasse. 
For non-realists influenced by Rorty, this impasse does not present a problem that 
needs to be solved but rather an issue that needs to be dissolved. For them the 
notion of inadequacy will not pertain to the descriptions of entities referred to, but to 
the relevance of these descriptions to our purposes. In a context which drops the 
distinctions between appearance and reality, and between scheme and content, the 
language we use at any particular time will not be understood as inadequate unless it 
fails to reach the purely conventional standards required by any particular 
contemporary discipline or activity. Pragmatic non-realists would not apply the 
notion of inadequacy to representational media. They would not talk of our 
language, or anything else, as media with a representational role. They would 
accept, with Soskice, a causal link between our beliefs and the world, but they 
would not see this as something in need of support from a fiirther notion like 
'reference'. The relation between our knowledge of our environment, they will 
argue, has nothing to do with correspondence or representation and everything to do 
with our direct contact, dealing and coping with the world we live in. What the 
critical realist sees as representational media, the non-realist will see as fodder for 
our creative purposes. They will reject the critical-realist and anti-realist issue as a 
non-issue because they will dispense with the idea that knowledge or language 
mediates or fails to mediate reality. However, they will not dispense with reality. 
Instead they will follow Dewey, Rorty and Davidson and emphasise our immediate 
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contact with our environment without recourse to the epistemological dualisms 
which make questions of realism and anti-realism plausible. 
J Wesley Robbins agrees. He argues that critical realism requires something 
like 'reference' to be independent of the linguistic structures that shape our particular 
views of the world while simultaneously being accurately represented in such 
structures. But i f we follow Davidson and Rorty and give up on the distinctions 
between reference and description, we will assert the causal coimection between our 
beliefs and the world and see the truth of our beliefs as a matter of their expediency 
to our purposes.78 The vocabulary of religious faith will still be effective even after 
its truth is no longer regarded as depending upon the attempt to see it as representing 
accurately some extia-linguistic power. For pragmatic non-realists, what makes 
religious belief valuable and effective has nothing to do with representing reality 
and everything to do with what purposes it will enable us to fiilfil. Thus Robbins 
argues that Christianity "is not the private property of people who happen to believe 
that ideal values are nothing i f they are not realised in some antecedent thing. "79 
Such people draw upon a representational philosophy which, Robbins notes, "should 
have no more standing as a constraint on contemporary Christian self-understanding 
than Aristotie's theory that some people are slaves by nature"8o should have on 
contemporary social theory. Such people, including creationists and critical realists 
share with reductive scientific naturalists, a common reliance upon the notion of 
ultimacy.8i 
78 J. Wesley Robbins, 'When Christians Become Naturalists' in Religious Studies, Vol. 28, pp. 205-
206. 
79 ibid., p. 203. 
80 ibid., p. 203. 
8' See J. Wesley Robbins, "ReUgion in Culture: Religionism or Pragmatism?' in Religious Studies, Vol. 
22, 1986, pp. 439-446. Also see three other articles: J. Wesley Robbins, 'Science and ReUgion: 
Critical Reahsm or Pragmatism' in International Journal For Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 21, 1987, 
pp. 83-94; 'Seriously but not Literally: Pragmatism in Science and Rehgion' in Zygon, Vol. 23, 1988, 
pp. 229-245.; 'A Neopragmatist Perspective on Religion and Science' in Zygon, Vol. 28, 1993, pp. 
337-349. 
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Robbins' critique of Peacocke's referential realism is particularly revealing. 82 
For Peacocke, the quest after religious truth carmot begin before a theory of 
reference is in place. This theory guarantees that "we may fairly hope to speak 
realistically of God through revisable metaphor[s] and model[s]"83 Reference, for 
Peacocke works in two ways. First, it "is grounded in the seminal initiating 
experience of individuals and communities,"84 that is, the dubbing of a name which 
individuals and communities continue to use over time to 'refer' to the same thing 
through its various states and changes during that time. This Robbins calls a causal-
social theory of reference. Second, successfiil reference will occur when something 
pre-existently real is being referred to.85 The first is causal and conventional and is 
unobjectionable. The second, however, posits a representational vocabulary which 
claims for itself a privileged position at the centre of culture.*^ Peacocke requires 
this stronger, correspondence theory of reference in order to affirm that our 
references are to "real prompters. "^ ^ Peacocke sees the second account as much as 
the first as being relevant to the realities of both science and religion.88 But, 
Robbins argues, while science and religion are parallel cases in the first account of 
reference, when it comes to the cortespondence theory the parallel breaks down. He 
writes: 
Peacocke does not identify any cases of religious success that are parallel 
to these scientific ones. ... God, after all, is not supposed to be an entity 
within the physical order whose causal properties can be taken advantage 
of by our mechanical devices.*' 
*2 J. Wesley Robbins, 'Science and Religion: Critical Reahsm or Pragmatism' op. cit., pp. 83-94. 
83 Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 46. 
84 ibid., p. 47. 
85 ibid., p. 25. 
86 Robbins, 'Science and Religion', op. cit., pp. 83, 91-93. 
87 ibid., p. 88. 
88 Arthur Peacocke, Theology For a Scientific Age, op. cit., pp. 15, 21. 
89 Robbins, 'Science and Religion', op. cit., p. 89. 
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This disparity emerges in Peacocke's account of the use of models and theories 
in science and religion, an accoimt that is shared by Ian Barbour.90. Peacocke 
writes: 
Science can often be confident of the realities to which its theories refer, 
but ... its language and models concerning these realities are always 
revisable and subject to change.9i 
Unlike theories, models have no propositional structure of their own. They do not 
have a representational relation to the world but, according to Barbour "are used to 
generate plausible hypotheses to investigate. They are a source of promising 
theories to test. "92 Once tested, however, these theories help us decide if the model 
is to be "amended or discarded." The theories therefore determine which models are 
to be taken seriously and which are merely usefiil. But while science has its theories 
to keep its models firmly under control, religion only has its models. While in 
science, models are in touch with reality when confirmed by theories, in religion 
theories (doctrines) derive from models that are only putative representations of 
reality. For Peacocke, there are two solutions to this problem. First, he asserts a 
hierarchy of order to reality in which God stands at the summit as a comprehensive 
explanation of a theistically structured universe in which scientists produce their 
models and theories,93 and second he allows "that, having referred to God, whatever 
we say will be fallible and ... inadequate. "94 
The problem with Peacocke's first solution is that it tries to justify the use of 
models in theology by reference to a theological model. The problem with 
Peacocke's second solution, is its predication on the paradoxical, dualistic, 
assumptions about the inadequacy of language. Language is somehow supposed to 
cross the veil of what is sayable and convey in language (refer to) that which human 
language cannot convey (describe). But, Robbins notes: 
90 Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms. (San Francisco; Harper and Row, 1974) 
9' Peacocke, Theology For a Scientific Age, op. cit., p. 14. (my itaUcs). 
92 Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, op. cit., p. 34. 
93 Peacocke, Intimations of Reality, op. cit., pp. 43, 51-52. 
94 Peacocke, Theology For a Scientific Age, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Neither Barbour nor Peacocke describe what it is for models to be more 
or less like the world's own structure by themselves, apart from being 
associated with, and under the control of, a definite set of propositions 
[theories].95 
Without such an accoimt, Robbins continues: 
[W]e have only the hopelessly vague assertion that models of Christianity 
stand in some sort of indefinite connection to the worid's own structure 
such that they deserve to be taken seriously but not literally.^^ 
All critical realism leaves us with, Robbins argues, is the negative point that 
theological models should not be dismissed out of hand as merely subjective 
because they are without the propositional support that theories give to scientific 
models. But without any means of supplementing this negative point, the 
impression is given, in Robbins' words, that religion "is semantically deficient in its 
truth cormection to the world when compared with micro physics. "'^ g^t crucially 
Robbins adds: 
There is no reason to come to this conclusion if, as pragmatists claim, the 
truthfiilness of our ideas is a fimction of the role(s) that they play in our 
coping with the world. ^ 8 
On the pragmatist's view, models in science and the models in religion are parallel 
cases. Pragmatism has no place for a distinction between theories that cormect 
reference to the real world and models that do not. Equally it sees no distinction to 
be drawn between references we should take literally in the light of these theories, 
and references we should take seriously but not literally in the light of these models. 
For pragmatists, the literal-metaphorical distinction should be reconceived as a 
"historical distinction between those sentences that do and those that do not have a 
fixed usage and acceptability in an ongoing practice. "99 
95 J. Wesley Robbins, 'Seriously but not Literally: Pragmatism in Science and Religion' in Zygon, Vol. 
23, 1988, p. 236. 
96 ibid., p. 236. 
97 ibid., p. 237. 
98 ibid., p. 237. 
99 ibid., p. 237. 
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Peacock's referential realism is unsatisfactory, according to Robbins, because it 
is too sceptical. As long as entities are conceived of as remaining "beyond the range 
of any completely literal description" we have reason to doubt the extent to which 
any of our references are true to reality itself For pragmatists Robbins comments: 
[It is] our practical familiarity ... [of| ... coping with the world that 
provides us with the 'sense' that our representations are in touch with 
reality regardless of how 'unobservable' the aspect of the world that we 
are dealing with .,. may be. 
Equally, Peacocke is falsely led to believe that there is more support for his version 
of referential realism among the community of philosophers of science than in fact 
there is.'^^ Considering the move to a holistic accoimt of scientific inquiry found in 
the work of philosophers like Davidson, Robbins argues that 
... holistic accounts of empirical inquiry offer, i f anything, less support 
for taking Christian assertions about God to be assertions of fact than did 
their logical empiricist predecessors. 
This is because a holistic framework of inquiry, by denying the possibility of any 
neutral standard for knowledge, undercuts both "the logical empiricist standard of 
factuality ... [and]... arguments for divinity as the ultimate ground and guarantor of 
cognitive endeavour. "^ ^^  Religious realists are happy to accept the former but 
extremely reluctant to accept the latter. 
Pragmatic religious non-realists, like Robbins and Cupitt, do not differ from 
religious critical realists like Hick, Soskice and Peacocke in viewing the world as 
having a causal relation to what is said about it. They differ on whether language is 
a representational medium or a tool for facilitating our purposes. Robbins writes: 
100 Peacocke, Theology For a Scientific Age, op. cit., p. 15. 
Robbins, 'Seriously but not Literally', op. cit., p. 241. 
102 ibid., pp. 239-240. 
103 J. Wesley Robbins, 'In defence of Attitudinal Christianity' in Religious Studies. Vol. 18, 1982, p. 
14. 
104 ibid., p. 13. 
Robbins illustrates this point in his discussion of the views of R.B. Braithwaite and R.M. Hare, (in 
'In defence of Attitudinal Christianity' ibid., pp. 11-27.) and those of Wentzel van Huyssteen and Philip 
Clayton, in his "Review of Theology and the Justification of Faith by Wentzel van Huyssteen and 
Explanation from Physics to Theology by Philip Clayton' in Zygon, Vol. 27, 1992, pp. 225-231. 
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I submit that questions about whether theology is more Hke physics or 
Hterature are, broadly speaking, moral questions about what kind of 
people we want to be and what kind of culture we want to have. It is a 
matter of where to pin our hopes for salvation. 
This is not a denial of the meaningflxlness of religious belief. All that is denied is 
that anything is explained by asserting that the 'finality', 'ultimacy' and 'cultural 
centrality' of a religious vocabulary is to be derived fi-om a correspondence to reality 
that has been underwritten by a distinction between reference and description.'O'' 
Robbins notes: 
[Starting] "with the words of Jesus, who taught us to say 'our Father* and 
the words of his followers, ... I say the same things about those words 
that Rorty says about the words of Galileo, that there is no secret behind 
them. There just is the terminology and how it has worked out thus far. 
That leaves questions about whether to continue using those words ... as 
matters of practical judgement and the right to believe. 
One advantage of this pragmatic approach is that it allows that a religious belief 
wi l l be true to the extent that it facilitates our coping with the world. To this extent 
those who profess a realist view of God are nonetheless "allies in our efforts on 
behalf of ideal values. "'^^ JQ qaote Robbins again: 
When it comes to coping with the problem of modem life, Dewey's 
naturalistic solution is not the only one. Others may elect to make 
different adjustments in their belief systems, for instance, ones that leave 
their initial belief in a supemattiral God untouched. Such a solution to the 
problem is a reiteration of Christian supematuralism. Pragmatism takes 
these different solutions, reiterated supematuralism and religious 
naturalism to be ... expedients to be evaluated in terms of their relative 
merits as such.'i° 
For Robbins, Christianity's future is now best served within the context of pragmatic 
non-realism. I have argued that this is the direction in which Cupitt has recently 
106 J Wesley Robbins, "Review of Theology and the Justification of Faith by Wentzel van Huyssteen 
and Explanation fi-om Physics to Theology by Philip Clayton' in Zygon, Vol. 27, 1992, p. 231. 
Robbins, 'Religion in culture', op. cit., pp. 444-446. 
J. Wesley Robbins, 'Neo-pragmatism and the Radical Empiricist Metaphysics of Pure Experience' 
in American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, Vol. 14, 1993. p.31. 
J. Wesley Robbins, 'When Christians Become Naturalists' in Religious Studies, Vol. 28, p. 206. 
1'° ibid., pp. 199-200. Cupitt allows that if realist "religious practice makes sense within the world of 
signs, then we are bound to concede the legitimacy of their position." 
Don Cupitt, Lifelines, (London; S.C.M. Press, 1986), p.212. 
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been moving. It is a direction that enables him to affirm both our scientific and our 
religious practices without reducing one to the other. 
I have traced Cupitt's theological pilgrimage from his own understanding of 
God in the critical realist terms of inadequacy to the Rortyan view that religious 
meaning, like all other meaningful areas of life, " . . .wi l l be an explanation of what 
people do, rather than of a non-causal, representing, relation in which they stand to 
non-human entities."'" For Cupitt, theology is constituted in, and by, particular 
uses of language. Davidson, Cupitt notes, points "philosophy toward a new version 
of pragmatism [which is] ... [b]est popularized by Rorty."i'2 For these pragmatists, 
language as such cannot be imderstood as an inadequate medium. To think we can 
get outside of language to see what our language refers to independent of its 
descriptive activity adds to our linguistic practices but not to our knowledge of 
putatively extra-linguistic, extra-natural entities. H-' This does not mean that 
everything we say will always be adequate. Our purposes move on and so does what 
we take to be a usefiil description. As Cupitt notes, "... we stick to our current 
theories because they are the ones that work best at present, but when the time 
comes we wil l unhesitatingly frade them in for new ones.""'^  This also goes for our 
religious beliefs. Cupitt writes: 
... God is the role God plays in developing our self understanding, 
focusing our aspirations, and shaping the course of our lives; ... the right 
God for us at any one time is the God that is most religiously powerfiil for 
us at that time. ... You need a God that is right for you just now, and still 
more do you need the God that will be right for you next, i '^  
Contra critical realism, to say that certain uses of language become inadequate is to 
say that we no longer employ them to fu l f i l our purposes. It is not to say that 
language is essentially inadequate as a description of that to which it refers. 
111 Rorty, Objectivity Relativism and Truth, op. cit., p. 154. 
" 2 Cupitt, The Last Philosophy, (London: SCM Press, 1995), p. 137. 
113 Don Cupitt, The Time Being, (London: S.C.M. Press, 1992), p.33. 
' 14 Cupitt, Life Lines, ibid., p. 103. 
1'5 ibid., p. 103. 
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When our discourse in science, religion or anything else is primarily a function 
of the relation between our purposes and more and different language, rather than a 
connection to some extra linguistic stuff, we can say that those people working on 
the intemal stmcture of the atom or the human genome, are no more nor less in 
contact with reality than are those working on the trinity or the relation between 
cultural formations of belief and 'the real'. Non-realists, therefore, can agree with 
Soskice when she allows that the models and metaphors by which religious people 
orientate their lives "... have been gradually selected out by the faithful as being 
especially adequate to their experience.""* But, this should in no way imply that 
language works as an epistemological bridge to an antecedently existent divine 
reality. 
For the non-realist, who accepts a Rortyan pragmatic antirepresentationalism, 
religious critical realism is one among many possible adequate approaches to the 
question of God because, contra critical realism, language is not a representational 
medium, but a tool for achieving certain purposes. Our purposes might be 
misconceived but the language which articulates these purposes caimot itself be 
inadequate. When the adequacy of language becomes more widely recognised the 
strength of the non-realist challenge to traditional religious belief might become 
more fully understood. 
9.4. Conclusion: 
In this concluding chapter, I have suggested that Rorty's pragmatism helps to outline 
the non-realists' radical religious ahemative to existing religious ideas, an alternative 
that is both counter-cultural and critical. Remaining ironic about its own 
commitments, this altemative nevertheless chooses to see religious practice and 
symbols as the source of its radical identity and counter-cultural perspective. I have 
suggested that Rorty's pragmatism offers religious non-realists a vehicle for 
reminding Christians of the centrality of the cross as the source of human solidarity 
Soskice, Metaphor andReligiotis Language, op. cit., p. 153. 
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with the victims of history. It also supplies an argumentative resource that enables 
non-realists to defend their position against alternative critical realist positions. 
Taken together, these aspects of Rprty's work help to establish the credentials of 
religious non-realism as a contemporary revision of religious thought that deserves 
serious theological attention. 
The substantial proportion of this thesis has been directed at drawing lines of 
connection between the views of the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists, the 
religious naturalism of John Dewey and the pragmatic antirepresentationalism of 
Richard Rorty. Rorty and Dewey, like Cupitt, suggest that salvation is a matter of 
gaining a greater deal of intersubjective self-reliance, instead of looking for some 
connection to an extra-historical or exfra-human power that might save us. For 
them, the salvation that is 'religious' is not a rescue but an adventure, a process of 
growth in which we are continually forming more plausible and more integrative 
self-images. On the pragmatist reading, our different vocabularies, be they 
religious, scientific or literary, are of value not in terms of their closeness to a 
representation reality but in terms of our practical muddling through— t^he problems 
they help us to solve and the things they enable us to do. Here 'non-realism' is 
defined as rejecting the representational conceptuality that realists require. Unlike 
anti-realism, idealism and atheism, non-realism drops the question of reality as a 
non-issue when it comes to deciding what, for all practical purposes, counts as our 
encounter with divine or worldly reality. When the centre is gone, things don't fall 
apart. We just come to recognise the different ways in which human beings achieve 
different purposes. I f the pragmatists' own vocabulary is thought of as true it is not 
because it holds to a representation of reality, giving it privileged status at the cenfre 
of culture, but because it has hit upon a temporarily usefial way of conveying our 
cultural situation, one that does away with many of the outworn philosophical 
disputes by simply dropping the correspondence view of truth. Pragmatism offers a 
vision of the kind of people they would like us to become, whether they are 
successful only time wil l tell. The 'truth of the matter' has nothing to do with what 
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time will bring. The fhiitfulness of our current strategies for coping are far more 
important in this respect. For them, religion, alongside science and the arts, remains 
one of the most potent of such strategies. To be sure, it will be non-realist religion 
without the traditional cormection with the vocabulary of antecedent, divine 
ultimacy, but the point that religious non-realists and pragmatists are trying to make 
is that such a vocabulary is not required to sustain the practices in which we engage. 
Their fiiiitfulness is enough to sustain them. There is, therefore, no reason, on 
pragmatic grounds, why we should cease being Christian, Buddhist, Islamic etc. and 
every reason why we should continue. 
r 
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